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MODERN EUROPE.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

The second volume will contain chapters upon the following subjects: the rise of the Second Empire and the policy of Napoleon III.; the diplomatic situation in 1853; the causes of the Crimean War and its consequences; the constitutional development of Piedmont, and the final attainment of Italian unity and independence; the growth of Prussia, the wars of 1866 and 1870, and the accomplishment of the unity of Germany; the reorganization of the Austrian state and the formation of the dual monarchy; and the progress of the Eastern Question from 1856 to the present time. The later chapters will be devoted to the history of the various European countries since 1870, not for the purpose of drawing final conclusions but to discover the problems in political and social life that have been or are being solved.





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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPE

FROM THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TO
THE PRESENT TIME

BY

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1815-1850

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PREFACE.

IN this work, as its title indicates, I have attempted to trace the historical development of Europe from the congress of Vienna to the present time. As the condition of Europe in 1815 and the later movements in the various countries cannot be properly understood without some knowledge of the political, social, and economic changes that have transformed Europe of the eighteenth into Europe of the nineteenth century, I have devoted considerable introductory space to the chief characteristics of the old *régime*, to an outline of the French Revolution, and to the career and influence of Napoleon Bonaparte. The present volume carries the subject to 1848 in France, to 1849 in Italy, and to 1850 in Germany; the next will bring it down to the present time.

There are two methods of writing the history of Europe since 1815, one or the other of which will be employed according to the purpose of the writer. The first of these is to treat events more or less chronologically, by passing from country to country, from national to international affairs, not so much with regard to continuity of treatment and unity of subject as from a desire to keep the history of all the European states at a constant level. This method, which has been in the main employed by the two ablest historians of Modern Europe, Fyffe and Stern, is better adapted for advanced students than for those less familiar with the subject; because by never completing the study of any one movement in any one place, it tends to leave a confused picture in the mind of the reader. Therefore, in this

work, which is not in the first instance written for students, I have employed a different method, that of treating separate movements and subjects—such as the European political system, the Restoration in France, the July Monarchy, the liberal movement in Germany—as logical wholes, carrying each forward to its issue before turning to the others. Although this method involves some repetition, and an occasional reference to events not related in full in this volume, I believe that it will prove the most satisfactory for the purpose in hand.

In another particular does the plan of the work call for an explanation. I have tried to present the subject with a distinct regard for the continuous development of the life and thought of Europe, to study those movements that have made for progress rather than to describe events in detail, or to present all subjects with historical completeness. Therefore I have given but little space to the detail of the Austrian administration and policy, and one entire chapter to the growth of political experience and education in Italy. This movement in Italy deserves prominence, not only because of its importance in the struggle for Italian independence and unity, but also because it stands as a type of the educational development of all the people of central Europe. I have treated the revolutions in Greece and Belgium chiefly in connection with the diplomatic history of Europe, and have said little, except incidentally, of internal events in Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Sweden, for, however interesting and important these events are in themselves, they had little part in bringing about the great changes in political thought and organisation that have characterised the last sixty years.

It has seemed best in a work of this kind to omit all foot-notes and elaborate bibliographical references. I have used the best authorities, and have incorporated in a number of instances material from special monographs and recently printed documents, but I cannot pretend to have noted all the literature on

the subject, nor was it necessary for my purpose to do so. I am not aware of having been dependent upon any single work or set of works to such an extent as to make necessary special reference to them here. Students familiar with Sorel's *L'Europe et la Révolution française* and with Fournier's *Napoleon der Erste* will note my indebtedness in my first and second chapters to these writers. In the later chapters on France I have been greatly stimulated by that excellent little work, Dickinson's *Revolution and Reaction in Modern France*, and in all that treats of Germany I have depended, as all must depend, very largely upon Sybel's *Die Begründung des deutschen Reiches*, which I have used in the English translation. Finally, I may express my regret that Stern's admirable *Geschichte Europas*, which has been very serviceable, has not gone beyond the year 1820. The maps accompanying this volume are intended to satisfy no more than the immediate needs of the reader for the period after 1815. The best work in which to trace in detail all geographical changes is Hertslet's *Map of Europe by Treaty*, 1814-1891, in four volumes. There is an excellent map, *Europe après les Traités des 1815*, in Schrader's *Atlas de Géographie historique* (Part 5, sold separately); and in Larned's *History for Ready Reference*, pp. 244, 1540, 1864, are useful maps, of which the second on the Germanic Confederation, the Zollverein, and the Netherlands is admirable. Satisfactory maps can be found in the less accessible atlases of Spruner-Menke, Droysen, and Putzger.

In conclusion, I wish to express my thanks to the many friends who have encouraged me, and to those students in my classes who have given me assistance. But to no one am I under greater obligation than to my wife, whose criticism has guided and strengthened me in every part of the work.

CHARLES M. ANDREWS.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE,

July 8, 1896.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I.—THE FRENCH REVOLUTION	I
II.—NAPOLEON BONAPARTE	37
III.—RECONSTRUCTION AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM.	86
IV.—FRANCE DURING THE RESTORATION	134
V.—THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ABSOLUTISM IN ITALY	180
VI.—THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT IN GERMANY	229
VII.—THE JULY MONARCHY TO 1840	276
VIII.—THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN FRANCE	320
IX.—REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.—I.	363
X.—REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.—II.	409

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

IN tracing the forces that in their development and expansion have had a direct part in creating the civilisation of our present age, we find ourselves led step by step back to the religious revolution of the sixteenth century. In the outset mainly a religious attack upon the unity and universality of the mediæval church, the revolution soon plunged its followers into a series of religio-political wars in France, Germany, and the Netherlands that, for the time, retarded the normal progress of civilisation. In the midst of this struggle the national states of Europe, freed from the incubus of a mediæval empire, and already outgrowing the limitations of their mediæval life, entered upon their careers as independent political units, and gave to the last period of the great religious struggle an essentially political character. Furthermore, the 'Thirty Years' War, beginning as a local German movement and, at the start, concerning itself altogether with religious and economic questions, began to assume a cosmopolitan character; and before it was over the questions that were to occupy the attention of Europe for another century and a half had presented themselves

for solution. Differences of opinion as to the relation of states, and not religious dissensions, caused the wars and shaped the diplomacy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Although this struggle in its entirety lasted for more than a century, it was no less a revolution than was that of France a century and a half later. Its principles were general and abstract, its influence was cosmopolitan—for it appealed with equal force to people of all Europe,—and it provoked war of the bitterest kind. It broke up the existing order of religious and political society, and established a new system based on the traditions and the tendencies of individual European states. The treaty of Westphalia, which closed the 'Thirty Years' War, shows that at the time it was made the mediæval system had broken down, that universality in church and state had passed away and the state system been established in religion and politics, and that the public law of the Middle Ages had been destroyed as well in practice as in theory. This treaty gave legal sanction to that system which it was the part of the French Revolution to overthrow. The work of one revolution was as complete as that of the other, but the tasks to be performed and the means employed were essentially unlike.

The new system was based on one fundamental idea, the supremacy of the state, an idea that dominated the public law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But the embodiment of the state was not the nation, it was the prince, the product of Roman, feudal, and Christian forces; the prince, autocrat, suzerain, and chosen of God. To this conception of the state the tendencies of fourteen centuries had been contributing: the Roman law and institutions, the feudal law and customs, the Christian doctrine regarding the divinity of kings had tended to advance the interests of the prince rather than those of the people, to encourage not the liberty of man but the authority of the state. Furthermore, the state confounded itself with the person of the sovereign, and the authority of the

state centred in the person of the prince. He gathered into his own hands all the lines of power; he made alliances and accepted treaties, was chief of the armies and arbiter in peace and war; he fixed the taxes, regulated imposts, extended or curtailed the expenses, had the right of confiscation and escheat, and owned unoccupied lands; he created the nobility, made the laws, dispensed justice, and stood as sovereign head in religious matters;—he was the master of his people, their guardian, judge, legislator, and pontiff. Such were Louis XIV., Frederic II. of Prussia, and Joseph II. of Austria. Under such circumstances it naturally followed that no other human authority was recognised. Legislative bodies as such did not exist, for assemblies of notables, estates, or peoples were but councils of state, committees for consultation not for action. God alone was the judge of the actions of princes, and to him alone was the prince responsible.

Just as at home the state recognised no other will than its own, so abroad it recognised no public law to which it was even morally responsible. Other rights than those of state were not taken into consideration by the kings and diplomats of the old *régime*, who, acting upon the principle that those who gain nothing lose, made it their policy to extend the boundaries of the state and increase its grandeur. Centralisation of authority and enlargement of territory became the two main objects of the states of the old *régime*, and in trying to secure these the diplomats of the eighteenth century developed an international system based on the principle that one nation's gain is another nation's loss, and the interests of one are necessarily opposed to the interests of all. For reasons of state engagements could be broken, contracts of marriage recognised or denied, wills and pragmatic sanctions set aside, wars waged, territory divided, rights of succession disputed, and monarchs dethroned. Of this policy founded on the necessities of state, war was the chief agency; and inasmuch as what was necessary was

just, war was also the arbiter of justice. Thus there existed no general law governing the relation of state with people, or of state with state ; the code of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was silent upon the subject of established right, good faith, the durability of engagements, and the obligation of contracts.

The public law defined by the treaty of Westphalia was, therefore, neither a guarantee of right nor a support for public order and public peace. It was dominated by a spirit of selfishness due to the rivalry of states, and by a narrowness of principle that was inevitable when each state was determined to retain for its own use all available resources. While the system of equilibrium was pretending by its principle of the balance of power to ensure its own stability, it was by the abuse of that principle making itself unstable and insecure. Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was well prepared for conquest, because by a logical development of ideas it had come gradually to believe that the dismemberment of states and the dethronement of kings, in satisfying ambition, prevented war. Europe was broken into fragments, and with the exceptions of France and England, no homogeneous national units could be found.

Instead of a solidarity of monarchies supported by a national sentiment there existed a group of states whose territories were constantly liable to curtailment, and whose princes were in constant danger of dethronement or exclusion from succession. This state of affairs resulted from the mis-application of the theory of the balance of power ; and, paradoxical as it may seem, the theory when most loudly proclaimed was, in the very act of its maintenance, being most vigorously perverted. Expropriation for the common good of Europe became in time the principle of the state system. Force and the convenience of the sovereigns had become the supreme law to the states of the eighteenth century, and at the time of the French Revolu-

tion, when in theory, at least, sovereignty resided not in the prince but in the people, it became the supreme law to the revolutionists, who had but to turn against the state system its own methods to destroy it.

Although the form of government differed among the states of the European system, from the despotism in Spain, Prussia, and the states of the Habsburgs in Austria to the republicanism of Switzerland, Holland, and Poland ; nevertheless, the causes for the general decay were everywhere the same. Unequal distribution of wealth ; excessive expenditures in court life ; the erection of magnificent buildings, and the maintenance of extravagant mistresses and court-favorites ; armaments costly, and constantly increasing in number ; and the heavy demands of war ;—these were the burdens that weighed upon the states of Europe. States were in debt, and, crushed by an ever recurring deficit, were forced to borrow at ruinous rates, and to draw on their revenue for many years ahead to pay the interest. In these respects the smaller states were more exhausted than the larger, because with inferior and more uncertain resources they were equally prodigal. The nobility and the church freed themselves from financial obligations to the state on the ground of privilege ; the *bourgeoisie*, hampered by annoying gild and trade restrictions, paid to the state more than their due ; while the peasantry, crushed by a double burden, made payment not only to the government, but also to the feudal seigneurs, who, though they no longer fulfilled their part of the feudal contract by giving their dependents protection, yet retained their feudal rights and held the peasantry in subjection. In France these burdens were least onerous and least vexatious, though here as in Denmark the nobility, partly resident, partly non-resident, gave control of their estates to intendants and agents. Serfage had been re-established in Russia and Prussia in the sixteenth century ; in Poland it was still harshly maintained ; in Germany was rigidly and painfully enforced ; though in some parts of

Italy, in Hungary, and parts of Prussia the kings endeavoured to restrain the heartless nobility, yet in most of the minor states of the Holy Roman Empire the treatment of the peasantry was atrocious, the agricultural labourer being little better than a slave.

But the tendency toward decay was accompanied with a movement toward reform. The prevailing suffering, due to internal disorder and the survival of manorial rights and obligations, did not escape the attention of the governments, nor was it permitted to pass unnoticed by the more humane thinkers and philosophers of the period. In the writings of Voltaire and Diderot and in the practical work of Turgot the desire for reform first found expression, but in France as in other countries men turned their attention not to a reorganisation of the state but to the redress of abuses. But this desire for reform was not confined to France; it existed in the other countries of Europe, where it was brought about not by the influence of French ideas but by conditions antedating the French Revolution, analogous, however, to those whence the French Revolution sprang. Natural law founded on reason, and drawn from the Christian religion and the precepts of the Roman law, after its second revival in the sixteenth century, prevailed over positive and public law founded on fact. That which was as old as Plato, which Locke and Hobbes voiced in England, Wolf in Germany, and Filangieri in Italy, Rousseau made popular in France. The religion of humanity, the sentiment that all laboured for the good of the human race, began to find expression throughout Europe. Sympathy with the revolution in America, and admiration for the incomplete reforms of Louis XVI. and Turgot and for the mistaken efforts of Joseph II., roused the interests of philosophers and politicians who believed that reforms should be undertaken by the state and in the interest of the state. Kings and reformers worked in common, but for different reasons; reformers appealed to princes

instead of to nobles, inasmuch as everywhere, in Sweden, Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia the estates were showing themselves, as were the *parlements* of France, enemies of change and jealous guardians of their privileges; while princes, in the interest of their own struggle with the assemblies for absolute power, encouraged the speculation of philosophers. Throughout Europe the progressive revolution went steadily on. An enlightened despotism began to recognise the importance of a better intellectual, social, and judicial system; education was encouraged, schools were opened, universities were increased in number, and in Sweden and Prussia religious toleration began to be appreciated. Serfage began to disappear: it was ameliorated in Prussia under Frederic II., in Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia, and Hungary under Joseph II., and already overthrown in England two centuries before, it was abolished in Baden in 1783, and in Denmark in 1788. In other countries the *corvées* were diminished, and the pitiable lot of the peasant was made more endurable. The penal laws were amended, torture was either done away with or reduced in severity, and reforms of the civil law were begun. It is a striking fact that the reforms of Joseph II., though undertaken with an unfortunate disregard of tradition and national prejudice, were more drastic in their nature than those proposed by the Constituent Assembly of the French Revolution itself.

Along with this attack on feudalism, which materially benefited the people at large, went an attack on the church for the purpose of reducing it to subjection to the state. The Society of Jesus, which during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries had advocated the autocracy of princes, and, in its zeal for the extension of the faith, had aided in gaining the victory for absolutism, now fell before the very power it had helped to create. The struggle thus begun against the Jesuits was carried on against the Roman Church itself, and while the philosophers attacked the doctrine, the princes at-

tacked the discipline of the church. In each case the authority of the Pope was threatened, and the ecclesiastical estates, already diminished by secularisation, became a ready source of supply for a safe enlargement of princely territory. Catholic princes resisted the temporal claims of the papacy, and in Austria, Parma, Tuscany, and Portugal there was open conflict between church and state. France, the chief defender of the papacy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, followed the practice of the other states of the old *régime* when under the Constituent Assembly and later under Bonaparte it subjected the ecclesiastical orders to the authority of a temporal sovereign.

There was thus throughout Europe toward the end of the eighteenth century a preparation for a social and civil reformation by the state, for the state, but in no way limiting the state. Reforms were undertaken in the interest of power : enlightened despotism was willing to recognise religious toleration and civil liberty, though there was no thought of a reorganisation of the state itself in the interest of popular sovereignty or of political liberty.

But the state, in neutralising the influence of assemblies, in promoting social and civil reform, in destroying feudalism, and in overthrowing the power of the church, stirred the passions of the people, rousing hopes rather than satisfying desires. These very reforms made by the state led the people to believe that the old world needed rejuvenating, created disquietude at a time when the instability of the social order gave promise of success to popular movements, and familiarised the people with the idea of change. There was unrest in Prussia, and in Sweden discontent with monarchy ; the Belgians were in armed resistance to the house of Austria ; revolution broke out in Bohemia, Hungary, and Galicia, and civil war in Holland, where the patriot party tried to regain its national privileges usurped by a despotic stadtholder ; while in Geneva, a municipal revolt

that had been stimulated by the writings of Rousseau foreshadowed, in its hatred of classes and in the cosmopolitan character of the principles that actuated it, the greater revolution to come. The state system that in its pursuit of absolute power had ruined the institutions of the past, was in its turn threatened with ruin when the sudden outbreak in France transformed a progressive revolution into a cataclysm which overwhelmed, in a marvellously brief space of time, the whole European order. Beginning as a national movement, the French Revolution took the form of a great convulsion, and, scattering its ideas and principles throughout Europe by means of military proselytism, drew down upon itself the wrath of the states of Europe. By its declared principles it seemed to threaten the very foundations of European monarchy. Its doctrine of the sovereignty of the people presented as an evident and universal truth, and its appeal to all nations to revolt and free themselves, were so foreign to the principles upheld by the old *régime* that they were interpreted as a menace to all established governments, to whom revolution, considered as a normal overturning of society, was unknown and incomprehensible.

The revolution broke out in France not because the misery was more intolerable or the feudal practices more iniquitous there than elsewhere, nor because the government was less intelligent and more despotic. The reasons were exactly the reverse. The movement began in those parts of France where the old institutions were already disappearing, where the agriculturist, already ceasing to be a serf and becoming a proprietor, was the more alive to the burdens he bore, and resented more deeply the imposition of the feudal dues. The feudal obligations became more hateful as the condition of the peasantry improved; the yoke seemed less easy to bear as it became less weighty. As prosperity increased, the people of France sought to escape from the restrictions that feudalism and mer-

cantilism imposed upon them ; they felt the demands of a progressive civilisation, and revolted against a system that, on the eve of the nineteenth century, retained the narrow and burdensome condition of three centuries before. France was a country where ideas of reform had been most widely spread, where intelligence was most highly esteemed, and where education even among the peasantry was well advanced ; where was greater homogeneity of national feeling, where government was more centralised, the nobility less politically important, and the power of the king more absolute than was the case elsewhere. The fact that France was a nation free from disintegrating forces, either political or racial, gave to her popular movement a strength that was wanting to similar uprisings in other European states ; and she acted before the other states because she had already solved the problem of national unity and national independence.

At this crisis France was in need of a great minister and a great king. Louis XVI., as has been well said, was a good man and a Christian, but not a king. He knew how to love, to pardon, to suffer, and to die, but he did not know how to reign. He would not delegate authority to another, yet he was unable to take energetic and consistent action himself. The work of his minister, Turgot, inaugurated a promising reform that was nothing less than a revolution ; but Turgot was too hopeful, too little cognisant of the difficulties of the situation, too anxious for a consummation of his plans, and, thwarted by the opposition of those who were interested in the financial privileges, he fell. A reaction to the advantage of the nobility followed, and the events of the next few years completed the embarrassment of monarchy. The existing condition of things could not last ; a crisis was inevitable. France more than any other country was fruitful, the taxation *per capita* was less than it is to-day ; yet the state was suffering from an enormous deficit and the people were complaining.

The *parlement* was in full revolt ; the army, disorganised and on the verge of insurrection, was ready for defection ; while the people, aware of the necessity of reform and of the inability of the government to consummate it, were denouncing existing institutions as a negation of their inalienable rights. With liberty, they thought, all things would become possible ; they had become the superstitious supporters of an idea. The government, also recognising a crisis, though ignorant of its true meaning, was powerless to act, and looked in vain for support among the ruins of the old institutions. But from top to bottom of the hierarchy, from centre to extremities, every power was paralysed. The old *régime*, having exhausted its own resources by excessive centralisation, had now no resort save an appeal to the nation. In convoking the States-General France solemnly confessed the impotence of the old institutions.

With this gathering of the representatives of the estates all those ideas and principles that had been agitating France for half a century were called into action. The men of the Third Estate, who constituted a majority of the Constituent Assembly, were dominated by the democratic idea, and sought the destruction of the feudal *régime* and the establishment of equality. Under the spell of the ideal, they sought to destroy the old and build up the new. They paid their tribute to the theories of the Revolution by spending many precious hours in discussing the fundamental rights of man. On the night of the 4th of August, 1789, in an indiscriminate sacrifice of all rights and privileges, they showed their devotion to their principles, and in the proclamation of the 11th of February, 1790, testified to the work already done. Innumerable privileges had been abolished ; feudalism as a system had disappeared ; bribery had been suppressed ; tithes had been done away with ; the reorganisation of the finances and the reform of the criminal code had been begun, and the codification of old, complicated, obscure, and contradictory civil law been planned ; a

new educational system had been proposed, and in order to substitute for the love of the province the love of the fatherland, the administrative system had been changed ; the nation had resumed control of legislation and imposts, and the rights of man had been restored. In the year following this proclamation of February, ecclesiastical corporations, monasteries, and religious houses were suppressed, and trade and gild restrictions abolished.

This was a work fundamental and far reaching, and one that bore witness to the high aim of those who in these two years accomplished the really important part of the Revolution.

But when the work had been finished, what had the destroyers to substitute for the old *régime*? For the moment they offered principles : political as well as civil liberty ; sovereignty of the people ; responsibility of ministers ; freedom of conscience, of the press, and of the person ; proportionate representation and taxation ; equality in the dispensation of justice ; the supremacy of the law—noble principles, such as underlie the modern state. These they embodied in the Declaration of Rights, that part of the constitution of 1791 that shows American influence. But could the Revolution put these doctrines into practice? It could destroy, but could it build up? Government must be based not upon theories, but in large measure upon experience and tradition. The people of France turned instinctively to the traditions and methods of the old *régime*, and could not in one night rid themselves of their mental habits and convictions, even if that night were the 4th of August. They had won liberty, but what was liberty? It was synonymous with sovereignty, said Siéyès. The monarch of the old *régime* had been sovereign and free, and in the transfer of the sovereignty from the king to the people, liberty also had been transferred. But how did the people exercise the liberty thus gained? Democracy recognised no other right than its own, no other authority superior to itself. Monarchy was to be dis-

carded, but the state was to remain as before, only its despot was to be not one but many, a despot abstract and impersonal. Even when liberty had been won, the people of France could not free themselves from the spirit of the old government. The Constituent Assembly declared itself to be a sovereign body, endowed with supreme authority which it intended to use. It recognised none of the checks of the modern parliamentary system ; it would divide its power with no one. As the prince of the old *régime* had possessed both executive and legislative powers, so the Assembly combined both executive and legislative functions, and in its exercise of sovereignty showed a complete system of centralisation and absolutism at the very time that it was advocating decentralisation and division of power.

When, therefore, the representatives of the people were confronted with the task of giving concrete expression to these new ideas, they were brought face to face with the most difficult problem of the Revolution. And no wonder they hesitated ! A statesman was needed to control the situation ; a Cæsar should have been on the throne in place of Louis XVI. Mirabeau, the man best able to apply the new principles, was not understood by the king, nor was he trusted by the Assembly ; the king was too narrow-minded and the people were too visionary to appreciate the plans of this great man. He was, as he himself said, the supporter of monarchical power governed by law, the upholder of liberty guaranteed by monarchical power. But the members of the Assembly looked with doubt and suspicion upon any such form of government. They turned away from the large ideas of Mirabeau, and endeavoured to apply as best they could the principles of 1789. And how well did they succeed ? In the first place they preserved monarchy, but it was not the monarchy of Mirabeau ; it was a monarchy in the last stages of its downfall, shorn of its power, and useless as an executive. Its existence contradicted the absolute sovereignty of the people. Furthermore, the responsi-

bility of ministers was proclaimed, but it was a responsibility without authority, and as no self-respecting person would hold office under such a system, ministerial efficiency was impossible. The right of every citizen to take part in making laws was interpreted to mean the right of every active citizen paying taxes equal to the amount of three days' wages in the locality where he lived. Thus the working man, having lost by disenfranchisement his share of the liberty and equality that had been proclaimed for all, found himself opposed by law to the *bourgeoisie*. And just as the Assembly failed to recognise the full sovereignty of the people, so it failed to recognise full liberty of conscience. By the civil constitution of the clergy it subordinated the church while pretending to protect it, and suppressed liberty of conscience by interdicting any other form of worship than that officially authorised. The Assembly was consistent, however, in denouncing all plans of conquest; but in declaring that the French nation refused to undertake any war with the idea of conquest, and would never employ its forces against the liberty of any people, it was making promises that it could not fulfil. In spite of itself, by the force of events, and at the time when it was most fondly cherishing the hope of a universal peace, it was on the eve of a long and bitter war, and that, too, not for defence but for conquest. Lastly, in the organisation of local government and in the method of constitutional amendment, a system was established so complicated as to be for the most part impracticable.

This is why the fact of the Revolution did not correspond to the theory. The Assembly showed its ignorance and its inexperience in practical matters, and betrayed its doubt and fear of its own constituency, that new and untried power, the people. The deputies may have longed for a new France that would be better than the old, but in fact they compromised the situation by establishing a government that could not be permanent. The Assembly possessed sovereignty but did not

exercise it directly ; while the king, who according to the constitution should have exercised it, was not allowed to possess it. Having rejected the strong system of Mirabeau based upon monarchy, the Assembly substituted its own system made up partly of the old and partly of the new. This half-way measure, by which monarchy was allowed to exist while the legislative was supreme, failed because of its own inherent weakness, and the fact that it contradicted the very principles according to which the Constituent Assembly was supposed to act. Such government was destined to give way to a system from which monarchy had been wholly eliminated, and in which sovereignty was both possessed and exercised by the legislative body,—a radical system associated with the names of Danton and the Convention of 1792.

The principles embodied in the declaration of February were, as we have seen, ineffectually applied in France, yet they had at first roused great joy and enthusiasm among those in Europe at large who were already desirous of reform. The universal ideas of the French people were soon scattered abroad by means already prepared for them, and were modified by the political and social environment into which they came. Each country of Europe interpreted the principles of the Revolution in its own peculiar way, and adapted them to the traditions of its own past. We hear of a democratic uprising in the territory of Liége, of a Roman Catholic movement in Ireland, of a monarchical agitation in Poland, and, what is even more remarkable, we find Belgium and Hungary revolting against the denationalising reforms of Joseph II. But while the grandeur of the ideas quickened the pulses of the European agitators and philosophers, strangely enough they roused neither fear nor apprehension among the princes of Europe ; the Revolution was at first looked upon as but a periodic malady to which all states were liable. Having been reassured by the uncertain and timid acts of the Constituent Assembly.

that no serious trouble was to be expected from France, and seeing in the new movement only the effacement and the ruin of a dangerous rival state, the cabinets of Europe remained passive and indifferent while the progressive revolution in their midst went steadily on.

Thus far France had succeeded in preserving peace with the nations. Affairs in eastern Europe had been temporarily harmonised by the treaty of Reichenbach ; the submission of Spain in the Nootka Sound dispute with England had released France from the obligations of the "family compact"; the Belgian revolutionists had received no recognition from the king and the Assembly ; and Austria and Prussia were looking to the east in the possible event of another partition of Poland. Indeed, so earnestly were they seeking their own aggrandisement that they turned toward the west with regret and reluctance when the course of events demanded their co-operation in defence of the monarchical principle.

But it was impossible for France to remain isolated from the affairs of Europe. In the first place, the logical interpretation of the principles of the Revolution demanded the extension of those principles ; and though the Assembly may have desired a peaceful propaganda, yet the revolutionists were obliged to adopt the traditional policy of the old *régime*, the policy of the supremacy and aggrandisement of the state. The logical deduction from the principle of liberty was liberty for all humanity, and it was this desire to free the human race that made legitimate the policy of conquest. But European cabinets recognised no such motives, and, failing to understand the spirit of the Revolution, saw only in the aggressiveness of the French people, the extension of the French power. In the second place, by her attitude toward monarchy France drew down upon herself the vengeance of the advocates of the old institutions. They had not been alarmed by the compromise of 1791, for monarchy was still retained as part of the French

system : but in the constitution of that year the principles of the Revolution had not been consistently expressed, and the more radical revolutionists were determined that that which had been marred should be mended, that liberty and equality should be given their proper place in the building up of the new state, and, furthermore, that the sovereignty of the people should be made a reality. The doctrine of Danton, who saw the necessity of a strong government to suppress anarchy and restore order, and the doctrine of Robespierre, who held that the people were sovereign and could do no wrong, were in harmony upon one point, the rejection of monarchy. Even before the Constituent Assembly broke up, the supporters of monarchy saw their danger, for Robespierre and the Jacobins were becoming the heroes of Paris. This inevitable tendency toward the supremacy of the principles of the Revolution was accelerated by the struggle of monarchy to maintain its position. From October 5, 1789, when the women and mob of Paris forced the king to come to the city, to June 20, 1791, when the king, finding himself practically a prisoner in Paris, sought to escape to Montmédy but was stopped at Varennes, the power of monarchy decreased, and the victory of the revolutionists became more and more complete. After June 25th all attempts on the part of the king to regain his authority were useless.

This dangerous situation of monarchy was destined to make real what had seemed impossible in the spring of 1791, that is, a coalition against France. Since the summer of 1790, the thought of appeal to Europe, a plan familiar to the old monarchies, had been in the mind of the queen, but the king had held back. The decree regarding the civil constitution of the clergy, the greatest error of the Assembly, finally fixed his determination, for in signing it he had been compelled to agree to an act that he thought had no justification. Having at last realised that in the minds of the revolutionists the person of the king and the sovereignty of the state were separate, and that a

fundamental principle of the old *régime* had been discarded, he yielded, and authorised negotiations with foreign courts. In this way Louis XVI. was able to attract the interest and attention of the Eastern Powers, and this was something that the *émigrés* had been ineffectually trying to do for two years. These men, fleeing from France at the first indication of danger, never understood the spirit of the Revolution, and knowing nothing of historical development, and ignorant of the real character of absolute monarchy, they thought the institutions of the old *régime* unchangeable and imprescriptible. In bearing to the frontiers the old *régime* with all its errors, follies, and weaknesses they stood as the last defenders of the feudal system in France, a second Fronde, divided and undisciplined, noisy and insolent, with the Count of Artois as their viceroy and the Prince of Condé as their military leader. There it was that they tried to unite Europe for the restoration of the old *régime*. Although the minor German principalities sympathised, and Sardinia and Spain made promises, the leading Powers, especially Austria, refused politely, and for the time being checked all combination. But the flight to Varennes and the danger of the queen changed the attitude of Germany. Said Leopold in a letter to his brother Maximilian: "It is high time to save our sister and to smother this French epidemic." Austria began to draw nearer to Prussia, the preliminary treaty of July 25, 1791, guaranteed each her own territory, and the allies promised to follow a common policy regarding the affairs of France. On August 5th the treaty between the two courts was signed, but Austria, now determined to carry out her project of intervention, found that a concert of European Powers could not be obtained. Therefore the result of the conference held at Pillnitz was, notwithstanding the importunities of the Count of Artois, merely an expedient that failed wholly of its object. Leopold, knowing from the attitude of England that the European Powers could not be

brought to a common agreement, was unable to commit himself to any definite policy, and could only hope that a threat of intervention would bring about a reconciliation between the French king and his subjects.

For a moment Leopold had reason to think that his hopes were to be fulfilled. On September 13th Louis XVI. accepted the constitution of 1791, and on the 18th notified the foreign Powers of his act. At the same time he made known to his brothers his disapproval of their attempt to form a European coalition, complaining especially of their presence at Pillnitz. But the position taken by the king was deceptive in its indication of strength, and instead of having gained support, he had in fact completed his own isolation. His acceptance of the constitution seemed to the Powers of Europe to indicate that he had become reconciled with his people and no longer needed their aid. By reproving his brothers he antagonised the *émigrés*, who, already enraged because the coalition had not frightened France into restoring the old *régime*, disavowed the action of the king, and continued to negotiate and intrigue under their cry of "No concession to the Revolution." The revolutionists, on the other hand, seeing in the treaty of Pillnitz proof of the treason of the court and a plot woven by the king with the foreign Powers, refused to support the king any longer, and gradually committing themselves more and more to republican principles, finally determined to reject monarchy altogether. The declaration of Pillnitz, and the insolent letter by which the Count of Provence and the Count of Artois conveyed the news to France, roused the patriotism of the French people and a hatred of the old *régime* that eventually strengthened the hand of the radical party, ruined the cause of the *émigrés*, and widened the breach between the king and his subjects.

The growing radicalism of France that made impossible any permanent reconciliation between the king and the people,

found expression in the acts of the new Assembly that sat under the constitution. It was soon seen that of the seven hundred and forty-five young, untrained men who composed the Legislative Assembly—in which body the Constituent Assembly had forbidden its members to hold office—the majority were either pronounced revolutionists, or a floating centre that hated the clergy, the aristocracy, and the court, suspected the existence of plots and coalitions, and generally acted with the revolutionary party. The leaders of this Assembly, the Girondins, characterised by youth, eloquence, and generosity, agreed with the Jacobins in desiring to weaken monarchy, but differed from them in being visionary and lacking practical statesmanship. Influenced by republican ideas, and so representing the progress of events, they provoked by their war policy a situation that demanded a strong government, if France were to be saved from invasion. To them war meant power, and their own advancement meant the triumph of the Revolution; and foreseeing only success, they took no thought for the necessities of the future. At the very time that the Assembly, under their leadership, was arousing the antagonism of Europe, it was preparing, by the establishment of the committee government as a permanent part of its system, the means whereby the people of France were to rule more despotically than had even the princes of the absolute state. It was these committees of the Legislative Assembly that gave birth to the Committee of Public Safety.

The policy of the Girondins, which eventually gave rise to a situation that they were unable to control, first took form in the Assembly, in November, 1791, when two laws were passed, one requiring that all *émigrés* who had not returned by January, 1792, should lose their estates; the other, that such of the clergy as did not take oath to the constitution within a week should be deprived of their benefices and expelled from their departments. For the first act the Jacobin hatred of

feudalism, and the threats, plots, and the warlike preparations of the *émigrés* were a sufficient excuse ; but the second act was inexcusable, iniquitous, and impolitic. Each showed that the spirit of despotism was beginning to rule the Assembly, and that reasons of state were as powerful in 1791 as they had been in the days of Louis XIV. These measures were far-reaching, both in their immediate and in their ultimate consequences. The immediate effect was to force the issue of a war with the foreign Powers, the ultimate consequence was to be the separation between the two great factions of the revolutionary party. To the Girondins war seemed necessary, because it would insure the success of the Revolution ; to the Jacobins it seemed unnecessary, in that it would compromise the Revolution : Danton said internal strength first ; Marat complained that war oppressed the poor. But the king himself hastened the catastrophe by daring, on account of conscientious scruples, to veto the law against the clergy, and by commanding the *émigrés* to disperse. By one act he antagonised Paris and the Jacobins, to whom the existence of the king was oppressive and his exercise of the veto power treasonable ; by the other, he so threatened the peace of the minor princes of Germany, the protectors of the *émigrés*, that they appealed for help to the larger Powers of Europe.

Thus did forces from all sides combine to bring about an intervention in French affairs by the foreign Powers. Austria and Prussia agreed to act together, and Russia gave her approval, because, as Kaunitz said, "The Empress wished to see Austria and Prussia engaged with France, in order to overthrow the independence of Poland." Had France been willing to meet the demand of the Powers by returning Avignon to the Pope, compensating the minor German princes for losses in Alsace, and restoring monarchy, peace would still have been possible ; but the Girondin policy and the war fever made an amicable arrangement impossible. The answer of France was

contained in the declaration of January, which called on the Emperor Leopold to renounce his intentions of opposing the sovereignty and the independence of the French nation. The death of Leopold in March removed the last obstacle to the policy of the Girondins, who had come to the ministry in April after the fall of the Feuillants. As soon, therefore, as they had assured themselves of the neutrality of England and Sweden, they made every effort to compel the king to resign his policy of peace, and to declare war for the nation. In a spirit of exultation the Assembly declared that it was not undertaking the war for the purpose of conquest, or with the intention of employing its forces against the liberty of any people, but only to defend its own liberty and independence against the aggression of kings. Thus the war against Austria, which was ostensibly for the purpose of resisting the Emperor's demand regarding the *émigrés* and the rights of the princes of the Empire, was in reality a war upon Europe and the old *régime*.

The effect of the war upon the progress of the Revolution cannot be overestimated. It sealed the fate of monarchy, led to the fall of the Girondins, and was the immediate cause of the government of the Terror. Each succeeding event intensified the situation. The failure of the first campaign in Belgium increased the excitement in Paris and weakened the position of the king, who had hoped that a victory would strengthen the hand of the Crown. The people, finding in the king's dismissal of the Girondins and in Lafayette's haughty letter to the Assembly evidence of a royal plot, determined at the first opportunity to forestall it by a counter-plot. This the king's veto of the decrees regarding the priests and the camp of the federates furnished, and on June 20th a mass of eight thousand people broke into the Tuileries and insulted the king. This insult, in turn, not only endangered the safety of the royal family and entirely alienated the king from his people, but also strengthened the determination of Prussia and Austria to main-

tain the integrity of the French kingdom against the revolutionists. The first result of this alliance, the impertinent manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, which threatened the city of Paris with destruction if the least violence were committed against the royal family, maddened the people of France, and by precipitating the insurrection of August 10th and the murder of the Swiss guards, completed the downfall of monarchy, and threw the government of Paris into the hands of the insurrectionary Commune. But the revolutionists, at last victorious, began to dispute among themselves for the supremacy, and what had up to this time been a struggle between the Revolution and Royalty came to be a struggle of one revolutionary party against another, and of the Revolution as a whole against Europe.

DANTON In reality this victory of the Revolution was a victory for the Jacobins, who, after the 10th of August, had become the masters of the Assembly as well as the masters of France. They were the only organised body, and their instrument and the only effective force was the army of the insurrection made up partly of idlers, vagabonds, soldiers, refugees, and adventurers, and partly of those who wished to destroy France in order to regenerate her. The leaders who used the army for their own ends and remained in Paris quarrelling with one another, felt that the principles of the Revolution had not yet been thoroughly worked out, and that all previous attempts to establish the sovereignty of the people had been but half-way measures. Each attempt had failed and had given way to one more radical, until at length a party had risen to power whose hatred of the moderates and the constitutionalists was immeasurably greater than had been that of the Third Estate for the aristocrats at the beginning of the Revolution. Danton, who in his genius for statesmanship was head and shoulders above his colleagues and rivals, desired a strong government that would bring order and peace, and therefore happiness for

France; while Robespierre, who desired the same strengthening of the executive, wished to use it for the purpose of terrorising his enemies that the doctrines of Rousseau might be established in their entirety. It was his purpose that France should be remodelled, as well as saved from anarchy.

But as long as the Girondins retained any power, the victory for the Jacobins was not complete. The memorable struggle of these two parties for supremacy merely marks one stage in the development of radical principles. From the beginning of the Revolution the tendency had been to decrease the power of royalty. The theory of monarchy based on divine right had given way before Mirabeau's conception of a strong, royal executive, which in its turn had been rejected by the constitutionalists who supported the weakened executive of 1791. But the Girondins, who, having displaced the constitutionalists, had rejected monarchy altogether though wishing to save the person of the king, were now called upon to defend themselves against Danton and the insurrectionary Commune of Paris.

This struggle lends a pathetic interest to the history of the National Convention which met September 21, 1792, to proclaim the first republic and to draw up a new constitution. Scarcely had the Convention assembled when the conflict began. The first victory for the Jacobins was the passing of the decree authorising the king's death, and of the act creating a new tribunal that was to punish with death all who endangered the safety of the republic. The Girondins were caught in toils of their own making, for having brought about the war, they had made evident the need of a stronger government than that they were capable of giving. The defeat of the French army at Neerwinden, in March, 1793, led to the creation of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and combined with the defection of Dumouriez, caused the establishment of the Committee of Public Safety. Furthermore, the Girondins lost their hold upon the people by their ill-timed and unsuccessful attack upon Marat. Jacobin

Paris expressed its hostility toward them in the uprising of June, 1793, and the popular demand for their arrest brought about their downfall ; the Commune of Paris had won its first great victory over the representatives from the provinces. Judged by history, the Girondins stand as the heroes of a tragedy. Noble and generous in their ideas, they were in their acts inconsistent, weak, and ineffectual. They raised hopes that they could not satisfy, and the people of Paris, thinking themselves deceived, rose and overthrew them. From the Jacobin standpoint, the Girondins were dreamers rather than men of action,—men of words rather than deeds,—and such men could not be suffered to rule in such a crisis. Executed or exiled they passed from the scene of revolutionary politics, and the Mountain entered into absolute possession. The inadequate rule of the Girondins gave way before the powerful government of the Terror.

Having thus traced the progress of the Revolution, one may well ask where lay its strength. Did it lie in the Jacobins' doctrine, in their leaders—men of mediocre ability to be sure, but determined and audacious—or in their wonderful organisation of Jacobin clubs throughout France? He who seeks for the secret of the Revolution will find it, says M. Sorel, "not in the character of the doctrines nor in the violence of the movements, but rather in the souls who received the doctrines, and in the environment in which the revolutionary ideas were nurtured, in France—in a word, in her people, her social structure, her past." Thus it was the genius of the French people, and not the boldness of the radical party, that supported the Convention and gave efficiency to its action. This was the force that gave life to the decree of November which declared that France wished to help other nations to gain their liberty and to found republican institutions elsewhere. Twenty-five millions of men submitted to the will of a few and sacrificed their possessions and their lives, not for the support of the

Jacobins or their doctrines, but for the aggrandisement of France herself, for the conquest of the old world by the French ideas. The revolutionary leaders were able to guide the destinies of France by appealing to the pride and military spirit of the French people, and by utilising for their own ends the inspirations that the Revolution gave to the French to extend those ideas, those natural principles of social order and government that were intelligible to all, and were, as Tocqueville says, "susceptible of simultaneous application in a hundred different places."

The Jacobins now entered upon their active work, and offered, as the first results of their labour, the republican constitution of 1793, which was based upon equality, liberty, security, and property, on manhood suffrage, and the right of veto by the people, a constitution that never went into practice, but which stands as a statement of the principles of the first republic. If Danton desired peace and Robespierre a government based on the ideas of Rousseau, each was forced to recognise the impossibility of having his wishes granted. A strong government was indeed to be established, but it was to be one that would bring neither peace nor the Utopia of Rousseau. War and national danger were the arbiters of events. The execution of the king had changed the position of the foreign invaders from one of resisting propagandism and revolutionary conquest to one of positive aggression for the purpose of dismembering and exterminating France. Furthermore, the sight of so great a misfortune borne with such unflinching courage had roused the pity of the French people, and had turned the better elements of the country against the Terrorists. The royalists were conspiring in the south-east; the moderates at Lyons were organising to resist the government at Paris; the large cities of Normandy were declaring in favour of the Girondins; and La Vendée was in full revolt. From without, the independence of the nation, the liberty of its citizens, and the

integrity of its territory were threatened ; from within, the federalists of the provinces, and the surviving Girondins, who though dispersed were threatening to advance, were exciting fear in Paris.

The war was now for life or death, and no republican constitution was adequate to meet the emergency. Even while the Girondins had been in power steps had been taken that were to lead to the despotism of the Terror, and material had been prepared for the strong government that the situation demanded. The Committee of Public Safety, the Committee of General Defence, and the Revolutionary Tribunal were already in existence, and in April, 1793, were made much more efficient by the increased power of the representatives on mission, and by the creation of the army of the *sans-culottes* and the law of the maximum, that is, the maximum price of necessities. The executive power was now transferred to the centre of the republic, and on September 17th was formed the Great Committee of Public Safety, made up of men who, though neither specially gifted nor noted as trained administrators, were thrust to the front by circumstances. By the powers vested in them by the Convention these men became despots entrusted with the task of ruling France by terrifying it into silent obedience to their will. Under this system Paris was terrorised from September, 1793, to July, 1794, and never was a government so centred and absolute. Power did not lie in the hands of the anarchists or in the hands of the market-women ; indeed, at no time during the Revolution had the populace had so little influence in the city. The government was definite and inflexible, and its work was the systematic execution of all suspects, and the removal of all persons who might endanger the republic. Paris at this time was not in an uproar, nor did it flow with blood except at the guillotine. Social and business life went on as usual ; people were able to fulfil their obligations or to amuse themselves, as the case might be ; and for the majority of the

citizens life was quiet and undisturbed by the occurrences of the *Place de la Revolution*.

There was more disturbance, however, in the ranks of the revolutionists themselves. So despotic was the new government that it could brook no opposition. Just as the old state had removed its political opponents by crushing them, so the Committee of Public Safety, seeing a rival in the Commune of Paris, which had been the real agent in the insurrection of the 10th of August, in the massacres of September, and in the fall of the Girondins, determined on its overthrow. Attacked by both Danton and Robespierre in March, 1794, Chaumette, Hébert, and their followers, the advocates of atheism, socialism, and the worship of reason, were sent to the guillotine. But Danton's own fall had already been foreshadowed by his failure to obtain a place on the Great Committee. This man, the greatest of the revolutionists, sought more sincerely than did any one else to bring to fulfilment the hopes of 1789. He believed in the unity of the French nation, and wished to appeal to the true sentiments of France and not to resort to measures of terror. He planned to inaugurate a reign of law and justice, to revise the constitution, to improve industry and commerce, to encourage sciences and arts. But he needed time to mature his plans, and lacking this in the too rapid movement of the Revolution, he seemed to the people uncertain, heedless, and vacillating, and they lost confidence in him. It was no time after the events of 1793 to propose peace, and a policy of non-intervention, and of renunciation of conquest; it was no time to think of saving Marie Antoinette or the Girondins, or to suggest making an alliance with the moderates after he had committed himself to acts which contradicted each of these proposals. The principles of 1789 could not now be held, for the Revolution was progressing toward a despotism, not toward a republic. Danton, who had been responsible for much of the work of the Convention and so largely responsible

for the genesis of the Great Committee, finally fell before his own creation, because he did not believe in its methods, and not seeing the necessity of wholesale bloodshed, dared to advocate a policy of mercy.

Robespierre, on the other hand, was quick to recognise the tendencies of the Revolution, and convinced of the impracticability of Rousseau's ideas, began a struggle for personal power. The events of the Revolution were working in his favour, for they were leading directly to a dictatorship, but in the sequel it was seen that Robespierre was not dictator. He was not a man of sufficient ability to avail himself of the opportunity that the Convention gave him when it established the Committee of Public Safety, and decreed Terror to be the order of the day. It was not Robespierre who ruled France during the period of the Terror, but this Committee of Public Safety itself, in which was centred all the absolutism of the old state, and which violated by its acts the public law and the principles of the republic based on the rights of man. In the constitution of 1793 the republic had pretended to change the old system and to do away with the excesses of the absolute monarchies by proclaiming the sovereignty of the people ; but now, instead of submitting itself to the law of that constitution and making it the inflexible rule of justice, it used the catch-words of 1793 as a mask to conceal a system of Cæsarian despotism.

The Committee having thus established its political supremacy by the destruction of its enemies, also gained for itself a theocratic supremacy by Robespierre's decree of the 18th Floréal, which accepted in behalf of the French people the belief in the existence of a Supreme Being and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Dogma and inquisition took their place beside political absolutism. This new concentration of power, the greatest since the days of barbarian kings, was justifiable in that it made possible a vigorous war policy, and

enabled France to stand as the strongest state in Europe. Other countries, terrified by the results of the French Revolution, checked the progressive movements in their midst, stopped all projects of reform, and tried to create a reaction by falling back upon the methods of the eighteenth century. Their policy, opposed as it was to the system of public law under which France was acting, roused the anger of every true Frenchman, and made him confound the cause of the Revolution with the cause of his fatherland. The Great Committee could therefore bring to the war a strong national force, whereas continental Europe because of its confusion and discord was powerless. The result of the conflict could not long remain in doubt. Success everywhere attended the republican arms. During 1793 and 1794 eight pitched battles were won by the revolutionists, one hundred and sixteen towns and two hundred and thirty forts were taken, and thirty-eight hundred cannon captured. The danger to the republic was removed.

But the continuance of the system of the Terror demanded the continuance of the conditions that had brought it into existence ; whereas, in fact, the success of the French arms, though freeing France from imminent danger, broke up the unity of the Great Committee, and roused against Robespierre, who to his contemporaries appeared as dictator of the Terror, a feeling of opposition in Convention and nation. The Revolution, turning against its own excesses, first struck down the man who seemed to be the personification of the movement, and, attacked by the members of his own party, who were jealous of him, and by the Thermidoreans or moderates, who represented public opinion, Robespierre fell. Humanity had at last entered into the Revolution, and the innovation having once been made, the Terror vanished. The Convention, too, before bringing to a close its long and eventful career, expressed clearly its feeling against the unreasonable acts of the Terror, and did much toward establishing a more rational system of

government. It stopped the work of the guillotine and opened the prisons ; it abolished the law of the maximum ; it modified the civil constitution of the clergy by suppressing the clerical pensions and restoring liberty of conscience, by authorising freedom of worship, and by giving the clergy control over the churches ; it banished the Mountain, recalled the remnant of the Girondins, and abandoned the revolutionary propaganda against Europe. At the same time, however, it frustrated every attempt of the royalists to gain governmental power, defeating the *émigrés* at Quiberon in June, 1795, and on 13th Vendémiaire, with cannon planted in front of the Tuileries under the command of Bonaparte, shooting down the national guard that had risen in aid of the royalists. The success of the Thermidoreans made possible the establishment of the third revolutionary constitution, that of the year III, (1795), upon which was based the government of the Directory, and by means of which a new effort was made to build up an order of things that would take the place of that overthrown in 1793. The first attempt of this sort had ended in the catastrophe of the Terror and the despotism of the Committee of Public Safety ; and this, the second attempt, was to end in the *coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire and the despotism of a military dictator. The establishment of the government of the Directory was but a futile attempt on the part of the Revolution to carry out the principles of 1789, to do justice to itself by establishing a stable republican government.

As war had made possible the first despotism, so war was to make possible the second ; yet in 1795 Europe was ready for peace. The foreign armies were discouraged by the victories of the republicans in Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Spain ; the new project for a partition of Poland was increasing the jealousy between Austria and Prussia and turning once more the attention of these Powers to the east : while a general weariness of all the Powers, save England, was furthering the desire

for a cessation of war. For France there was even greater need of peace. Misery and economic anarchy prevailed ; confusion in administration and corruption in finance were accompanied with a depreciation of the currency and a fall in the values of houses and lands ; money was hoarded, or sunk in the purchase of confiscated property, and proprietors could neither sell nor borrow ; famine, cold, and extreme poverty increased beggary and brigandage ; the ordinary needs of the provinces had been neglected ; education had almost ceased to be considered, houses were in decay, and roads were impassable ; trade was at a standstill and commerce destroyed. Were France to be saved from the requisitions being made upon her resources, and her security to be restored, she must have peace. Thus it seemed to the Thermidoreans, who by bringing about the peace of Basle did more for France than by giving her a new constitution, for by the former they removed Prussia from the list of her foreign enemies, and secured for her the momentary rest she so much needed.

But the long duration of the war of the First Coalition had roused in the French people an excessive patriotism that was rapidly becoming militant in character, and had made impossible a permanent peace. They were willing and ready to do battle for their country, for all that which seemed part of the national life and law ; they were even eager to defend the acts of the Convention that by means of its greatest committee had grievously oppressed them. And why ? Because they saw in the work of the less prominent committees of the Convention a new life and law for France, a reform far-reaching and grand ; for not only had the Convention risen against the evils of the Terror, but it had also advanced the cause of civil and religious liberty, furthered national unity and independence, paved the way for the revision of the law, and outlined a great plan for national education. In a word, it had accomplished a work of the utmost importance not only for France but

for humanity. In the minds of the French people these very necessary and beneficial reforms came to be associated with the idea of country, and therefore, when the Convention in October, 1795, declared that the Rhine and the Alps were the natural boundaries of France—and in so doing committed future governments to the annexation to France of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine—the French nation considered itself bound as an act of patriotism to defend this declaration.

This doctrine of the natural limits became a part of the public law of France at a time when the nation was already confusing its own sovereignty with the grandeur of the state, and when—a matter of prime importance in the history of the Directory—the national spirit of France was assuming an unmistakably military character. To the Directory was entrusted the task of carrying out the principles of the Revolution in the interests of a France animated not, as in the outset of the struggle, by spirit of reform, but by a sense of pride and dignity, and by a desire for conquest as great as ever roused a Bourbon monarch to an extension of his power. The influence of events was gradually creating an *esprit militaire* that refused to recognise the old boundaries; that saw in war the life of the state, the glory, the future of France, and in peace,—deception, mediocrity, and humiliation. The Convention, it is true, had set aside revolutionary propagandism; but it had substituted a more dangerous doctrine, the invasion of an enemy's country, as an act of duty and justice, for the affranchisement of lands which, according to its own declaration, were national. The application of such a doctrine as this of natural limits could not but bring on war. If Prussia and the minor states of Germany were willing to accept it, Austria and England were not. Francis II. believed France to be exhausted, and, already committed to the war, made every preparation to continue it. England was an even greater obstacle in the way of the enlargement of the French state; for, already outraged by

the act of the Convention, November 28, 1792, which declared the Scheldt a free river, she was now ready under the second Pitt to continue the struggle begun forty years before for supremacy at sea. Pitt was convinced that a durable peace could not be obtained save by a restoration of the monarchy within the old boundaries of France ; and to carry out any such plan meant the territorial and political weakening of the French state. France in her turn recognised the bitterness of the antagonism, and saw eventual success only in England's defeat ; and inasmuch as this could be accomplished only by isolation, to separate England from the Continent became a cardinal principle of the republic. The great antagonists could not be reconciled, so opposed were their interests, and France was forced to continue the war in defence of a public law established by herself.

Thus the tendencies from within and the pressure from without were forcing issues other than those to which the republic seemed committed. The Revolution took the form, not, as had been expected, of a peaceful republic, with its accompanying advantages of security, intelligent legislation, and administration, but of a warlike republic dependent for eventual peace upon victories won from a Power with whom peace was impossible if the principles of the Convention were to be upheld. The army was dominating the republic ; it was becoming the instrument of its policy, its protector, its only organised support ; it was, in fact, the nation, and in it lay the patriotism, the enthusiasm, the genius of France. The army, not the Directory, represented the real feeling of France from 1795 to 1799. The logic of events was pushing to the front a system based on military discipline, unity, and obedience, controlled by a single mind, and organised for a single purpose, the glory of France. In the master of such a system lay the real power in France, and such a master was Napoleon Bonaparte.

In contrast with the unity of the army was the disunity and weakness of the government of the Directory. Although for

two years it was powerful enough under the guidance of able men to maintain order in France and preserve its own dignity, yet it was destined to fall into discord and divisions, and in consequence to lose the confidence and respect of the French people, because of the party rivalries and jealousies handed on to it along with the principles of the Revolution, and because of the terms of the constitution itself. The Directors, an executive body of five, who were retired at the rate of one-fifth each year, represented the government of the old Convention, and therefore tended to retain the spirit of the Revolution longer than did the members of the legislative Councils, who, retired at the rate of one-third yearly, began after the election of 1796 and 1797 to be more and more representative of the new spirit of the nation. A conflict in the government was inevitable, a conflict between the old and the new France. On one side was the old France represented by the Jacobins, who by the constitution were legally at the head of the state; on the other, the new France represented by the majority of the nation, which, neither Jacobin nor royalist, but democratic and patriotic, was still loyal to the principles of the Revolution, though wholly opposed to the form that the Revolution was taking. The military successes in Italy and the gains of France in the Preliminaries of Leoben were turning toward Bonaparte the attention of this majority, who were daily becoming more discontented with the government of the Directory, and daily growing more influential in the state. During the conflict between the Directors and the Councils on the 18th Fructidor (September 4, 1797), which resulted in a victory for the Jacobins—their last victory—the weakness of the constitution became very evident, and once more was France reminded of the hopelessness of a government dominated by Jacobin narrowness, and exposed to party conflicts and personal prejudices. The better elements of the nation, who saw in the victory of the Jacobins only national disorder and bankruptcy,

could not but compare the aimless, chaotic, and seemingly selfish government at Paris with the disciplined and orderly organisation in Italy which had fought with brilliant success for the glory of France. It was only necessary that to this evidence of constitutional weakness there be added indications of military inefficiency and of an unsound judgment concerning external affairs, to bring about a *coup d'état* of great moment ; and this evidence the acts of the Directory plentifully supplied. It had already antagonised Switzerland and the German states along the Rhine by injudicious interpretations of the doctrine of natural limits ; it had roused against France the Second Coalition, in which Russia was the leading spirit ; and it was rapidly losing Italy, which Bonaparte had won with great glory. Bonaparte had only to withdraw to Egypt to show the inability of the Directory to cope with the situation that he had created ; and a few forced loans, a law regarding hostages, and an uprising of the *chouans* were sufficient to make evident the inability of the Directory to control affairs at home. France, once more threatened with invasion, wearied with disputes of parties, and aware of the steady increase of insurrection and brigandage, feared a relapse into Jacobinism, and to escape anarchy willingly yielded itself to the only person that seemed able to cope with the situation. The *coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire was possible because the people wished it. Bonaparte represented successful conquest, and stood for unity and order, for the integrity and the prosperity of France ; and knowing that France was worn out with the Revolution, he was able to overthrow the Directory, the last government founded on the ideas and principles of 1793. In his proclamation of December, 1799, he said to the people of France, "The Revolution has ended." And so it had. He was not the child of the Revolution ; he was its Nemesis.

CHAPTER II.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

AS the strength of the Jacobins in the days of the Reign of Terror had lain in the support which the people of France gave to the government of the Committee of Public Safety, so the supremacy of Bonaparte became a reality because France without question approved the *coup d'état*. The nation having lost all taste for revolution and having grown weary of the abuse that the demagogues of the Directory were making of their power, welcomed the downfall of the revolutionary government. The majority of those interested in their own private concerns, without clearly defined political opinions, attached themselves to Bonaparte because he promised order and the return of peace. The royalists of all classes were devoted to him because they hoped for a restoration of the old order, and the re-establishment of the social and political system overthrown by the Revolution ; while even the moderate republicans, who had already seen the constitution of 1795 violated and their system practically destroyed, preferred that this should be done by a single man of genius rather than by a body of obscure intriguers who had seized upon an exclusive control of public affairs. In this common consent, in the adherence of the army, the *bourgeoisie*, the royalists, and the more enlightened republicans lay Bonaparte's strength ; and his supremacy was legalised and defined by the constitution of the year VIII. (1799), which accommodated itself to the actual situation by creating a strong and powerful executive,

one that was destined to be the only really efficient part of the new government. Such a constitution gave to Bonaparte his opportunity.

Bonaparte's attitude toward France and the Revolution was clear and well defined. He appealed to the vanity of the French people and to their love of glory rather than to their desire for liberty. France, he declared, did not need theories of government, phrases and speeches by idealists ; she needed a chief famous for his exploits. For the principles of the Revolution he expressed only contempt ; for democratic ideas he had no sympathy. He never understood the "man" of Rousseau or the "citizen" of St. Just. Instead of abstract man possessing equal and fundamental rights, he saw only the real man, whose favour and support he wished to gain, filled with prejudice, dominated by religious and national antipathies due to heredity and historical conditions. He declared Rousseau to have been a madman, he looked on all popular uprisings with mistrust, and considered all speculations and theories wholly idle and absurd. He had watched the Revolution and he had seen its failure ; he had seen idealism end either in the brutal realism of the 'Terror or in the incompetency of the Directory, and he considered it time to return to facts. Feudal and class privilege had been destroyed, the Bourbons had been driven out, equality, liberty, and popular sovereignty had been proclaimed. Upon this foundation Bonaparte prepared to erect a new governmental structure, which, while utilising the results of the Revolution, was destined to check the progress of its ideas and to postpone for fifteen years all farther advance. The Revolution had prepared a nation ready for his hand. He used this material for his own purposes, and neutralised, by his interpretation, the very principles that the Revolution had endeavoured to make real. The principle of equality he made the basis of a political and social structure, because by it a career was opened to every individual in France ; and he

needed the services of the French people. He utilised all talents without regard to birth or political antecedents. His generals were frequently of low rank, his councillors might be aristocrats of the old *régime*, ultramontane reactionists, or protestant Jansenists. Incompetence and opposition to his will were the only bars to a share in his government and to leadership in his armies. *Émigrés*, non-juring priests, peasants, and *bourgeoisie* were equally welcome, and for every talent and every shade of opinion he found a use. But he interpreted equality in terms less broad than had the Revolution, because he made it utilitarian and not theoretical. Of social equality he knew nothing, and in consequence he built up a hierarchy which competed with that of the old *régime*, but which differed from it in that promotion was determined by no other test than talent and obedience. Liberty he understood less than equality; it was lost in the system to which he owed his rise. As his soldiers obeyed, so he expected obedience from the people of France. Sovereignty of the people he recognised by appealing to what appeared to be the dominant passion, by convincing the people that he was ruling them as they wished to be ruled. He said that France did not want popular government, was not ready for it, could not have it. Sovereignty was concentrated in himself; he had saved the people from the anarchy of the Revolution, by him alone must the new structure be reared. Parties, he believed, were factions to be crushed, ministerial independence was a conspiracy to be blotted out, official doubt was treason. In consequence freedom of speech did not exist, and freedom of the press was impossible.

Such was the relation of Bonaparte to the Revolution, and such his attitude toward the ideas that were springing up as a part of the progressive revolution in the other countries of Europe. But although he set himself squarely in the path of progress, established a tyrannical and despotic government, and checked the progress of the Revolution, yet he could not destroy

the principles that underlay the Revolution. Up to this time France had by means of her own example instructed the people of Europe in revolutionary ideas, and by founding the republic in 1792, had shown them that to be independent and free they must have sovereignty based upon unity ; but now, abandoning her peaceful propagandism, she was to thrust her ideas upon them by means of conquest. Bonaparte himself, like a second Alexander, was destined to carry the seeds of a new Hellenism and to scatter them by force over Europe. But neither conqueror nor conquered understood the importance of the work. The people of other countries who had received with joy and enthusiasm the appeal of the Constituent Assembly, now confounded France with the man who ruled her, and failing to recognise the Revolution under the new form of conquest, resisted it with horror. Though to the monarchs of Europe Bonaparte seemed the Revolution incarnate, to the people he seemed only the destroyer of their fondest hopes and liberties.

With marvellous skill Bonaparte as first consul entered upon the task of raising France out of the chaos and the humiliating military condition into which she had fallen under the Directory. After spending a year in healing the discords of parties, he began to redeem the pledge that he had made to restore order and correct abuses. He reorganised local government, re-established the credit of the state, alleviated the distress of the poor, and, drawing his authority from the constitution of the year VIII., he reduced the functions of the local governments, and began to concentrate all power in himself. By 1801 he had put an end to the religious schism by a policy of religious toleration, and had signed a concordat with the Pope ; and about the same time restored the *émigrés* in order to destroy them, and began the creation of his new aristocracy. He continued the work of the Convention by undertaking the revision of the law code, and by erecting a vast system of education whereby he might attach the youth of France to himself and

to his government. He founded schools in the provinces as well for military and technical training as for academic, and outlined the scheme for university instruction which he perfected a few years later. Finally, he entered upon the task of internal improvements, constructed roads, canals, harbours, and breakwaters, and began the rebuilding of the great cities of France. In these ways he won the support of the peasantry, the *bourgeoisie*, the aristocracy, and the church.

But before this work of re-establishing France was even approximately completed, Bonaparte had restored the military prestige which the Directory had placed in peril. Hardly was he seated in his place when he found it necessary to turn his attention to the war of the Second Coalition. Having sent Moreau into upper Germany, he himself with great military skill carried an army over the Alps into Italy, and in the battle of Marengo won back all that the Directory had lost. Austria, not only having lost Italy, but threatened with a greater danger when Moreau after winning the battle of Hohenlinden advanced within twenty leagues of Vienna, was compelled to sue for peace, and to submit herself at Lunéville to the harsh terms of her conqueror. In nine months Bonaparte, by removing Austria from the path of French conquest, and by persuading Russia to withdraw from the alliance with the other Powers, had destroyed the coalition, and more than restored to France the position she had held in 1797. The channel of the Rhine became the new boundary line on the east, the territories on the left bank fell into the hands of the republic, and the republican governments of Italy were reorganised and re-established. The shock of war was already beginning to reshape the map of Europe, to simplify its political arrangements, and to prepare the way for national unity in those countries where particularism and disunity had so long prevailed. The Italian states were reduced from twelve to six. At the Diet of Ratisbon the whole imperial structure of Germany was recast; the ec-

clesiastical estates were secularised and added to the existing kingdoms ; a kind of Germanic Empire took the place of the Holy Roman Empire ; and a congeries of larger states supplanted the multitude of petty principalities. This work of reorganisation, which occupied the attention of the German princes for two years, was not completed, however, in 1803. A second conquest was needed three years later to show the weakness of the old imperial structure, and to destroy entirely the old *régime*.

The retirement of Pitt in 1801 made possible at last a general European peace, for England, the last member of the coalition at open war with France, agreed to the treaty of Amiens in the following year. But the peace could only be temporary, for the real question at issue had not been settled. The struggle for the supremacy at sea, and for the mastery of the new worlds in the east and the west had been a long one. Begun in India with Clive, continued in the Seven Years' war, the first part of the struggle had been fought out at Plassey in 1757, at Minden in 1759, and at Quebec in the same year. The second part of the struggle had seen the victory of Yorktown and the revenge of France in 1781 ; while the third part, begun by England as paymaster of the First Coalition, had merged into an open war when Pitt, uniting Russia and Austria in the Second Coalition, had fought with the Directory in Holland and on the sea, and failing on land, had maintained the English naval supremacy in the battles of Cape St. Vincent and Camperdown in 1797. Bonaparte took up the gage of battle fully aware of the mightiness of the conflict, for from the time of the campaign in Italy in 1797 he had seen in England the great and abiding enemy whose overthrow was essential to his own supremacy in Europe. But her national unity, commercial prosperity, industrial strength, and geographical isolation were such that instead of conquering England as a preliminary step to continental supremacy, he was led on to the subjugation of

the Continent in order to form a counter-coalition by means of which to destroy his greatest enemy.

The idea of the conquest of England through the destruction of her commerce had originated with the Jacobins, and Bonaparte in accepting it not only made use of the commercial fear and jealousy that underlay the hostility of France toward England, but also showed himself in sympathy with the prevalent but mistaken notion that English wealth depended on commerce alone. Already in 1796 and 1797 the Directory had begun to exclude British goods from France, but the serious results of this policy did not appear until the turn of the century, when the application of steam to machinery increased enormously the English manufacturing output, and led to a consequent enlargement of the export trade. The danger of the closure of the world market to English goods became evident immediately, and it was Bonaparte's determination to effect this closure that led to the renewal of the war. He had formulated a scheme for the invasion of England as early as 1797, but had changed his plan of attack and entered upon the "mad expedition" to Egypt to drive England from her possessions in the east, to destroy her depots in the Red Sea, and to seize the Mediterranean route to India. To accomplish this he had retained the Ionian islands in the treaty of Campo Formio, an act that antagonised Russia and made possible the formation of the Second Coalition. England, in her turn, determined to preserve the Mediterranean route to India, maintained her control in Malta, and in so doing technically violated the treaty of Amiens. In this retention of Malta Bonaparte saw not only a breach of the treaty, but also a bar to his control over the routes to the east, one of which he already possessed through the Dutch in the Cape. Unwilling to make the slightest concession favouring the importation of English goods, and continuing during the negotiations over the treaty to increase the number of French, Italian, and Dutch ports from

which English merchants were excluded, he made the renewal of the war an industrial necessity to England.

Preliminary skirmishing followed the declaration of war in 1803. English privateers chased French merchant-vessels from the seas, and Bonaparte advancing into Hanover defeated the electoral troops, and closed northern Germany to English commerce. At the same time he assembled on the borders of the Channel at Boulogne a formidable array for the ostensible purpose of driving English vessels from the strait, and possibly of invading England herself. Whether this movement were anything more than a grandiose display for the purpose of terrifying John Bull is doubtful, but at any rate in Bonaparte's eyes Boulogne formed an admirable training ground in case the war should take on a more threatening character. That it would do so he had no doubt, but he took advantage of the delay of 1803 and 1804 to establish himself more firmly in France. Having suppressed (by the execution of Cadoudal and the banishment of Moreau) a dangerous conspiracy that had for its object the restoration of the Bourbons, he began the exercise of autocratic power by the murder of the innocent Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, a pitiable blunder, which sent a thrill of horror through Europe, and undoubtedly deprived him of much of the confidence, enthusiasm, and devotion upon which his power rested. But Bonaparte knew the value of a successful *coup d'état* in the eyes of the French people, and he did not allow the crime of Vincennes to hinder his march toward absolutism. The constitution of the year XII. (1804), by imposing no limit upon the monarchical power, testified to the actual position that Bonaparte occupied, and legalised the assumption of the imperial crown. By a vote of 3,000,000 to 2500 France confided to him the government of the French Republic with the title of Emperor, and declared the imperial dignity to be hereditary in his family. The fiction of the Republic was still retained, but superimposed upon it was a

new institution, the Empire. It is remarkable, as Fournier points out, the distinction that is everywhere made in the constitution between "Empire" and "State." "We know," he says, "what was the French state. The Revolution had given to it its limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. But just how far did the Napoleonic Empire extend? The vagueness of the expression of the constitution guaranteed war and war only; it did not guarantee the peace that all desired so ardently. As long as the Empire lasts it will fight and when it ceases to be victorious it will disappear." The Empire was, therefore, what Napoleon *victor* would make it. It was not a state, it was a personal supremacy; born in the midst of war it depended on war for its very existence.

And war it was to be, almost unbroken war, for ten long, eventful years. England was already committed to the struggle, and had no other recourse than to continue it. But a coalition of the Powers was necessary. Russia, now in the hands of Alexander, who had been deeply offended by Napoleon's arbitrary conduct in Piedmont, Holland, and Switzerland, and by the execution of the Duke of Enghien, made overtures to England, and agreed upon a treaty in 1805 to force Napoleon back within the natural boundaries of France. To enlarge the league of the Powers, Russia brought pressure to bear on Austria, who, though aware that Napoleon had broken his promises by his actions in Italy, and by his seizure of the iron crown of Lombardy, would probably have preferred to remain neutral. Prussia, wavering in policy, with an inefficient foreign office, was tempted by the bait of Hanover, which Napoleon was constantly holding out to her, to declare herself neutral, and at the time when the Third Coalition needed her aid, played a double game, and in the end lost. In the war of the Third Coalition the forces that took part were not equally matched. On one side was a league of states, which, jealous of one another and determined to maintain their individual interests,

were bound together by necessity and an agreement that was only half-hearted ; while on the other was Napoleon, who, determined to provoke by every means in his power the wrath of the old states, had at his command a people, experienced in war, filled with pride of past victories, and strong in the new life and energy that his administration had given to the institutions and social life of their country. The recent reorganisation of Germany had weakened the Germanic Empire, because it had destroyed what little unity remained to it, and had prepared central Europe for conquest by enabling individual states, such as Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg to turn from the support of Austria to an alliance with Napoleon. The war of the Third Coalition, which transferred the scene of the land-struggle from Italy and the territory of the Rhine to the centre of Europe, was characterised by two mighty victories plainly indicative of the peculiar genius of the two greatest combatants. The battle of Trafalgar overthrew all hope of a French naval supremacy, and completed the long list of victories, beginning with La Hogue in 1692, which made England the greatest sea-power in the world. On the other hand the battle of Austerlitz, fought five weeks later in December, 1805, no less determined the military genius of Napoleon on the land. It destroyed the coalition, forced Austria to a peace that excluded her from the affairs of both Germany and Italy, and prepared the way for that grand but impossible scheme, the revival of an empire which, like that of Charles the Great, was limited by no boundaries, and was confined to no single nationality.

Austerlitz prepared the way for a great work of imperial reorganisation by destroying at a single blow the reconstructed German Empire of 1803. The princes of Germany, convinced that the ties that bound the different members of the Empire together were no longer a guarantee for their protection, convinced that the idea of country and of common interest had of necessity disappeared, declared themselves on August 1, 1806,

freed from the imperial union, while those of western and central Germany erected a new confederation adapted to the circumstances of the time, that is, adapted to the supremacy of Napoleon. On the 6th of August the Emperor Francis renounced the imperial crown, declared the imperial ties dissolved, and absolved princes, electors, and states from their allegiance to himself as legal chief of the Empire according to the constitution. The instability and weakness of the central European system was thus officially declared, the Confederation of the Rhine was established, and the opportunity was given to Napoleon of still further manipulating the arrangement of states to his own advantage.

The first stage in the expansion of Napoleon's imperialism had now been reached. The Emperor had refused to confine himself to the natural limits of France, and having extended his interest to the centre of Europe had, in overthrowing the Holy Roman Empire, destroyed one of the oldest and grandest of the state systems of Europe. This system, it is true, was the more easily overthrown, in that it was a mere relic of the past, reduced to impotence by a dominant state sovereignty, based on no national foundation, and supported by no spirit of individualism. By the conquest of Italy and the Empire Napoleon had not seriously endangered the erection of a stable French Empire, an Empire less permanent perhaps than would have been one enclosed within the natural French boundaries, the Rhine and the Alps. But to Napoleon there was no consciousness of a dividing of the ways in 1806. Determined to impose his will upon Europe, partly to satisfy his Caesarian ambition, partly to effect the commercial isolation of England, he did not see that he was beginning to exhaust the national forces at home at the time when he was about to rouse against him the national forces of the other states of Europe. His own military genius, which stood by him to the very last of his battles, and his inability to understand any other state policy than

that of the old *régime*, blinded him to the fact that in his attack on Prussia and Spain he was confronting not only kings but peoples also. When in 1806 he took up the challenge that Prussia had at last thrown down, and effected the downfall of that country in the battles of Jena and Auerstädt, he made inevitable an eventual harmonious union of the Powers against him, made resistance to him the foundation of a new public law for Europe, and provoked, by his want of moderation in his hour of triumph, the desperate resistance of a humiliated people, and disappointed the better elements in France who were hoping for a lasting peace with each recurring victory. And yet, as Napoleon passed on after his contemptuous treatment of Prussia to the bloody victories of Eylau and Friedland and to the peace of Tilsit, which seemed to mark him as the master of Europe, not even the loss of his veteran troops and the employment of the raw recruits that France was sending to take their place could throw doubt upon the apparent stability of his success. It required six years more of war for the Powers of Europe to forget their personal ambitions, and to make the downfall of Napoleon the necessity of the hour. Alexander, who was annoyed at Austria's neutrality, and provoked because England who had promised much had accomplished so little, doubted the expediency of continuing a war that brought him nothing ; and at Tilsit gave way to the grandeur of Napoleon's imperial designs and the fascination of the Emperor's personality. After rescuing Prussia from the complete oblivion to which Napoleon would have consigned her, he consented to the erection of the Napoleonic Empire of the West, and accepted the imperial policy for the downfall of England.

Napoleon's early dreams of empire were rapidly becoming realities. Emperor of a state wonderfully reorganised, its administrative machinery simply and efficiently constructed, its law codified, its educational system remodelled, its peace with

the church made, he had now extended its boundaries to nearly their widest limits. Around France he had begun the erection of subordinate kingdoms looking to him for protection, appanages of the house of Napoleon. The republics of the Directory and the Consulate had been transformed into kingdoms under his generals or members of his family. He had extended the work begun in the organisation of the Confederation of the Rhine by decreasing the number of German states formed in 1803, and, by the mediatisation of the little courts and knightly territories, had strengthened the lesser states. To all members of the Confederation he had given full autonomy, thus increasing the number of independent and sovereign states in central Europe, a condition favorable to his own designs. Furthermore, he had conquered the two most important states of Germany, Prussia, and Austria; and having overthrown Europe to the border of Russia, he had made peace with the only remaining continental Power whose opposition was at all dangerous. From the banks of the Niemen, as he turned back to survey western Europe, he could see no dangerous enemy confronting him on the continent. Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal could be easily reduced to subjection, and Spain he had already determined to make a dependent state, having received at Tilsit, it is supposed, Alexander's permission to do this. With Sweden despoiled, Denmark submissive, and Portugal conquered, with a Bonaparte on the throne of Spain, there seemed to be no obstacle in the way of a revival of the very Empire that he had just shattered in pieces, for Napoleon desired to restore the imperial grandeur of Charles the Great, and to give it a new lease of life.

But the establishment of an Empire of the West would be little better than a dream so long as England had the supremacy of the seas. To meet her on her own element had been rendered impossible by the victories of the Nile and Trafalgar; to conquer her in a single battle was equally impossible

because of her location. Therefore Napoleon never lost sight of that plan borrowed from the Revolution, of overthrowing England by reducing her to industrial and financial ruin. In every extension of the territory of France he had increased the coast-line under his control ; in every treaty that had been made he had imposed his will upon the conquered territory in order to close every harbour of Europe to English trade. The effect of this definite policy was to lead to acts of retaliation by England, and as retaliation was followed by counter-retaliation, the coast-system was changed into the continental blockade. In 1806 England, in order to stop the neutral trade, declared all ports between Brest and the mouth of the Elbe closed to neutrals ; and a little later laid an embargo on Prussian ships in British waters. On October 21, 1806, Napoleon replied from Berlin declaring the British islands to be in a state of blockade, and all English goods or merchandise belonging to England to be prizes of war, and prohibiting any vessel coming directly from England or her colonies from entering any continental harbour. This decree applied to the coast-line from the Baltic to the Adriatic, not including Denmark, Portugal, and the Austrian port of Trieste. To this decree England replied in the first Orders in Council of January, 1807, which ordered that no vessel should trade from ports from which British ships were excluded. This was moderate in comparison with what followed. It was the rapid extension of the continental system between January and November that increased the bitterness of the conflict. The decrees of England, thus far fairly temperate, gave way in November to a declaration of commercial war in the second Order in Council, which placed in a state of blockade all ports from which the British flag was excluded, forbade all trade in the merchandise of the countries to which these ports belonged, and made lawful prize of all such merchandise wherever found. To this Napoleon replied from Milan, in December, denationalising all

ships that should submit to the British rules, and declared that such ships, and all others that sailed to or from England or any of her colonies, should be liable to seizure.

The struggle thus begun between the land power and the sea power seemed for the moment to turn in favour of the Emperor. England had, in reality, overstepped the bounds of legitimate retaliation, and had subjected neutrals to conditions that made neutral trading impossible. The United States at once passed the Embargo Act of 1807, which was a protest against what was considered to be on the part of England an attempt to establish a complete maritime monopoly. Other states, Sweden, and for a time Turkey, fearing British supremacy, closed their markets, and even in England herself petitions were presented to the House of Commons praying for relief. This led to a modification of the Orders, and the total blockade was changed into a rigid blockade of the northern European states. Napoleon's attempt to seal up, hermetically, all foreign markets against England was truly imperial in its grandeur. To effect the commercial exclusion of England his greatest rival, and by so doing to ruin her, was the main object of his efforts; but in the end it was the sea power and not the land power that won the victory. In his endeavour to break the strength of his enemy, Napoleon was led to attempt feats of conquest that could be only momentarily successful. The hostility of the continental states was intensified by the evils and hardships of the system of blockade, and even France, proud as she might be of Napoleon's military successes, could not long endure the grinding of the continental system that was doing more than a dozen defeats to undermine the foundations of Napoleon's supremacy and to effect his final downfall.

Until the year 1807 the career of Napoleon had been almost entirely successful. But at that time was reached the turning point, for then it was that there began the victory of nationalities not only over Napoleon but over the old *régime* as well. ✓

Hitherto the principles of the old state system had prevailed in the internal and external relations of the states of the continent outside of France, and in consequence the kings of Europe, dependent on their own resources and their old system of government, had been easily conquered by Napoleon supported by the united French nation. After 1807 the rôles began to be reversed, the law of nations began to supplant the law of kings, and the states of Europe, such as Sweden, Russia, Prussia, and Spain, began to recognise either by word or deed the principles of national integrity and national honour. On the other hand the Revolution, which had declared war on kings and proclaimed peace to the nations, was changing its attitude, and, arrested and fixed in France in the form of a military despotism, was threatening the peace that it had proclaimed, and was antagonising the nations whose independence it had desired. It is a striking and all-important fact that at the time when the kings of Europe were calling to their aid the national element of their respective states, thus turning against the Revolution its own arms, Napoleon was taking on more and more the character of a prince of the old *régime*, and was gradually disclosing to France as well as to the rest of Europe the fact that it was his personal supremacy for which France was fighting and not the principles of 1789. Before 1807 Napoleon had posed as the champion of democracy ; after 1807 he stood forth as a despotic ruler, whose principles were those of the princes of the eighteenth century state.

He was beginning to show in his relations abroad a disregard for the rights of princes and the integrity of states that exceeded the worst offences of Louis XIV. At the meeting with Alexander at Tilsit, and later at Erfurt, he entered upon a scheme of dismemberment and despoilation involving a bargaining of principalities and a neglect of binding engagements, acts which proved him to be a master of eighteenth century diplomacy. In the accomplishment of these ends he was be-

ginning to depend on dynastic alliances and the support of kings, and for the sake of increasing his personal strength, to plan coalitions, in which schemes there existed no thought of the union of powers for the common good of Europe. His annexations of territory, which were made necessary by the obligations of the continental system, were arbitrary and irritating actions, defensible on no other ground than that of force. His attitude toward the papacy was impolitic in that in his endeavour to obtain the submission of the Pope and to create a Gallican church that would represent his will, he drove France into ultramontanism. At home he abused his power in his frequent proscriptions, in his insult to the church at the council of Savona, in his insult to the legislature in the dissolution of the *Corps législatif*, and in his utter disregard for the obligation of contracts and in his subordination of justice to his own personal feelings of resentment.

If this conduct aroused indignation among the people of Europe and made common action easier in the final day of reckoning, no less did it disturb the people of France, who had thus far supported Napoleon because they saw in him the glory of the French nation and a protection from the anarchy that had preceded the imperial *régime*. After 1806 there was a general longing for a peace that never came. The *bourgeois* classes, losing confidence in the face of increasing destitution owing to the prolongation of the war, began to waver in their loyalty. Many of those high in authority were becoming uneasy because of the very grandeur of the imperial plans, and were beginning to doubt the solidity of an institution based as it was on the life of a single man or the fate of a single battle. Some of the generals upon whom Napoleon had depended were dead or were soon to fall on the field of battle as in the case of Masséna, Lannes, and Duroc ; some were estranged from him as in the case of Bernadotte, Moreau, and later Murat ; while others of inferior ability were placed in positions for

which they were not fitted. The army of the Revolution, created in the *levée en masse* of 1793, had given place to an army of young troops that lacked the tenacious endurance of the old veterans, and of foreign contingents that had nothing of the national spirit of the army of the Directory. Lastly, the constant levies of men, steadily increasing until the years 1812 and 1813, were gradually extended to every part of the population, and were not only exhausting the vitality of France, but were leading to a general and deep dissatisfaction.

This was the situation at the time when Napoleon was about to begin a commercial war with England. His determination to force the Continent to obey his will, that there might be no loophole of entrance for British trade, led the Emperor to his first important step after Tilsit, the attack upon England's ally, Portugal, in part to affront England, in part to force upon Portugal the continental system. But to conquer Portugal it was necessary to gain the consent of Spain to a safe passage of French troops across the Spanish peninsula. This was accomplished in the treaty of Fontainebleau in October, 1807, and before the end of the year the prince-regent of Portugal had fled to Brazil and abandoned his country to the invading army. These events had momentous consequences, for Napoleon having gained a foothold in Spain, went farther, and adopted that policy of aggression that roused the Spanish nationality against him; and England, already determined to strike at her enemy on land as well as at sea, was roused to the defence of her ally, and, rejecting all proposals for peace, accepted the Portuguese coast as the seat of operations, and began the prosecution of the peninsular war. Thus the commercial antagonism of England was brought into combination with the national antagonism of Portugal and Spain. The twofold project of Napoleon, the enforcement of the continental blockade, and the subjection of the rising nationalities, became the drag upon his imperial career. It divided and exhausted his resources;

it exasperated the people of the coast country of the North Sea, increased the hostility of Austria, and weakened the friendly attitude of Prussia, because of the economic hardships that it entailed ; it compelled the Emperor to enter upon wars that involved him in certain defeat ; it roused the national spirit in Prussia, and the hope of independence in the Austrian states ; and finally it precipitated a conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, because of the refusal of the Pope to accept the continental system,—a conflict that led to the annexation of the Papal States, the excommunication of the Emperor, and gave to the movement in Spain and later in Austria the character of a holy crusade.

Thus we see that when in 1808 the two Emperors, Alexander and Napoleon, met at Erfurt to complete the work of Tilsit, the situation in Europe had materially changed. The centre of the movement was transferred from the east to the west. Whereas at Tilsit Napoleon had his eyes fixed, as in 1797, upon the greater Britain in India and at the Cape, at Erfurt he was compelled to recognise the futility of his imperial dream for the conquest of England through her colonies, and to turn his attention to the uprising of the Spaniards, whose strength and endurance he estimated as much too low as he rated his own prestige in France too high.

Spain was a united state with pride, spirit, and a glorious past, and even in the later days, when her greatness had departed, the inefficiency of her kings tended to make the people more self-dependent and reliant. To a certain extent local autonomy still existed, because Spain had never suffered from the bureaucracy and excessive centralisation that was hampering national development in Prussia. In common with other European states she had entered upon a period of reform in the era preceding the French Revolution, but with 1792 a reaction set in under Aranda and afterwards under the infamous Godoy ; and the Spanish government, instead of promot-

ing measures of amelioration, instead of adopting a healthy foreign policy and building up a strong monarchy, spent itself in impotent acts of spite at home and contradictory intrigues abroad, which resulted in financial bankruptcy and administrative corruption. This it was that had made possible the disgraceful treaty of Fontainebleau. On account of the weakness of her monarchy, Spain, the most monarchical of countries, was obliged to seek safety in the strength of her people; and the very ecclesiasticism that had in the past weighed upon the country intensified the national struggle by giving a religious aspect to the war, and by adding religious hatred to outraged national pride.

In 1808, by the intrigue of Bayonne Napoleon swept from the throne of Spain both the old king Charles IV. and the young prince Ferdinand, and placed his brother Joseph in their stead. Almost immediately Spain rose in protest; appeals were made to England; local committees were formed; and so intense was the excitement and so prompt the action that in the encounter at Baylen Napoleon met his first reverse in the capitulation of Dupont's army on the 20th of July, 1808. This event, coupled with Sir Arthur Wellesley's victory over Junot at Vimeiro in Portugal on August 21st, not only stirred to its depths the patriotism of the Spaniards and made possible the freeing of Portugal, but it also proved for Napoleon an ominous beginning of that struggle of the nations that was to lead to his overthrow. The Emperor, however, saw in it only a temporary reverse, and turning back from Erfurt he put in motion his disciplined troops, and advanced against the disunited and untrained Spaniards. On December 13th Madrid was captured, and before the end of the year the Emperor was hastening westward to the reconquest of Portugal, and the destruction of the English, whom he hoped to meet at last face to face on land.

But the issue proved to be otherwise, for Napoleon was no longer the entire master of his own actions, and he was not

destined to confront his greatest adversary until the eventful day of Waterloo. Even while he was engaged in following the retreating English under Sir John Moore through northwestern Spain, he was summoned back to eastern Europe by the rising of Austria. This government, already three times defeated and three times dismembered in territory, was finding the burden of Napoleon's will too great to be borne. Shut out from foreign commerce by the now hated continental blockade, deprived of her Italian and Adriatic territory by the treaty of Pressburg, which had followed the battle of Austerlitz in 1805, driven from leadership in the affairs of Germany by the control that Napoleon exercised over the Confederation of the Rhine, Austria found herself isolated and reduced to inactivity in Europe. She seemed to herself to have fallen from the headship of a mighty empire to be a mere middle kingdom between Russia and France. The irritability engendered by the situation found a relief in the hopes aroused by the national successes in Spain, and under the new minister Stadion was begun a pseudo-national movement for the resurrection of Austria as the head of a united Germany. It marks the importance of the growth of the national idea that this state, with no national interest of its own properly so called, should have adopted as the policy of its archducal administration a patriotic and national propaganda, in the furtherance of which patriotic literature was circulated and appeals were made to the enthusiasm of the German portions of the Austrian provinces. A *landwehr* was enrolled, assistance was promised by both Bohemia and Hungary, patriotic songs were written by Arndt and others, and the proclamation of the Archduke Charles, the commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces, spoke of the war as a movement for the deliverance and unity of the German people.

This was the movement that compelled Napoleon to hand over the pursuit of Sir John Moore to Marshal Soult, and to hasten to Paris to enter upon the new campaign. The outlook

was in more ways than one threatening for Napoleon. The insurrection in Spain was every day taking on a more alarming form ; the Austrian army was commanded by a general second only to Napoleon in European reputation ; Prussia for two years under Stein and Scharnhorst had been preparing for the struggle ; England was ready to help on the coast of the North Sea as well as in Portugal ; part of Napoleon's army was occupying Prussia, part was scattered in Spain, where every captured town had to be garrisoned, and part was massed to meet the new danger. But the great states were still seeking their individual interest rather than the common interest of Europe, and were seemingly unaware of the importance of a European concert. When Austria rose, after the Spanish movement was well under way, the Czar, holding to the treaty of Tilsit, looked on complacently. Prussia, resisting the patriotic impulses of her people, put off for four years the national uprising that might have made the Austrian movement in 1809 successful, and not only rejected the patriotic plans of Stein and drove him from her borders to Russia, but also adopted a policy of complete inaction at a time when doing so was almost criminal. England, too, the only ally of Austria in 1809, seemed unable to realise the importance of the peninsular war, and dissipated her energies in a tardy and useless expedition, which resulted in the capture of Flushing, and the destruction of the troops by the fevers of the island of Walcheren. Austria, thrown back on her own resources, was defeated in that mighty shock of battle at Aspern and Wagram in May and July, 1809. For the fourth time the house of Habsburg succumbed to the might of the French Emperor and suffered serious curtailment in the territory over which it ruled. The Emperor of Austria bound himself more firmly than ever to maintain the continental system and to give up all relations with Great Britain. The European Powers had yet to learn that lesson in unity of action, without which resistance to

Napoleon was ineffectual. Napoleon carried the day not merely because he was the first military genius in Europe, but also because he was able to meet a divided enemy.

At this juncture Napoleon seems to have recognised the instability of the imperial structure that he was erecting, and to have become convinced of the need of a firmer support than his own personal supremacy. European political alliances had been too easily ruptured in the past for him to feel confident that a permanent ally could be obtained without the aid of a tie of blood. Aware of the importance of a dynastic alliance that would strengthen his political position in Europe he turned instinctively to Russia, with whom he wished to preserve the *entente cordial*. This was important in that the agreement of Tilsit had been strained already by old dissensions, by the inactivity of the Czar during the Austrian campaign, and by the enlargement of the Duchy of Warsaw, an act offensive to Alexander. To a man with Napoleon's ambition, a family relationship with the Czar was attractive, because it would be a bond of union between the Empires of the East and the West, and the Emperors would become brothers instead of merely friends or allies. Napoleon, however, knew of the hostility of the empress-mother, to whom Paul I. had given the right of disposing of her daughters, and even before the formal request was made to Russia, he had begun to sound Austria on the same subject. Metternich, the new Austrian minister, encouraged the imperial plan, for knowing that a Franco-Russian alliance meant ultimate ruin for Austria, he determined to substitute a policy of diplomacy for a policy of war, and to bind Napoleon to the Austrian house by the offer of an Austrian archduchess in marriage.

The willingness of Austria to enter into a dynastic alliance with Napoleon pleased the French Emperor, whose main desire was to obtain an entrance into the European family of kings. As, therefore, the Czar delayed the answer, which, according to

Napoleon's idea of promptness, should have been sent in forty-eight hours, first for twenty days and then for forty, the Emperor began to talk about Byzantine duplicity and was ready to sacrifice the stronger alliance for a connection with the more ancient imperial line. His pride was wounded by the delay rather than by the refusal which eventually came from the empress-mother, and he determined to satisfy his *amour propre* by an appeal to Italian cunning. On April 2, 1810, the man that Metternich considered to be "the Revolution incarnate," married the granddaughter of the Empress Maria Theresa, and this was, perhaps, the most important event in the latter days of Napoleon's career. The placing of an archduchess upon the throne of France, only sixteen years after Marie Antoinette had perished on the scaffold, was, says M. Sorel, "for old Europe the most extraordinary event in the whole history of the Revolution." For new Europe it was no less extraordinary, in that it involved an entire recasting of Napoleon's continental relations. It marked a momentous advance in Napoleon's imperial ambition, and showed how fully he had committed himself to the ideas and methods of the old *régime*; it antagonised Russia, and introduced the policy that resulted in the expedition to Moscow, for as Cambacérès said in conversation with Pasquier, "ere two years have fully gone by we shall be engaged in a war with the Power whose daughter the Emperor will not have married"; it bound Napoleon irrevocably to Austrian rather than to Russian interests and lulled him into a confidence in his father-in-law that was unwarranted, inasmuch as Metternich was even at this time the arch-conspirator against him, and was employing this marriage as one means whereby to destroy the man whom he considered the greatest enemy of Europe.

Thus by 1810 the position of Napoleon was less strong than in 1809, and he was becoming more and more dependent on his own personal genius as an administrator and a strategist,—a

genius that seemed to become greater as the hostile forces increased in number. Having already roused against himself the national spirit of Spain, Portugal, and Russia, he had by the marriage with Marie Louise undermined the dynastic support upon which he now depended. He had discarded the Russian alliance, and in consequence Alexander was already considering the arrangements of Tilsit as broken, and was anticipating, even in 1810, a war with France. He had bound himself to Austria, thus playing into the hands of Metternich, who was ready, when the suitable moment arrived, to break the trust imposed in his Emperor, Francis II. In Spain the brigand warfare, with its intermittent success and failure, was dividing Napoleon's forces, and was wearing out the troops to whom was entrusted the conquest of the peninsula. In Prussia the patriotic endeavours of Stein, Scharnhorst, and Hardenberg were only for the moment neutralised by the conservatism of the Prussian government and the presence of the French troops occupying Prussian fortresses. Sweden was preparing to range herself on the side of the opposition, when, after the insurrection of March, 1809, and the death of the heir-elect to the throne, Marshal Bernadotte, who had been on the worst possible terms with the Emperor, was chosen as prince-royal. And England, with the war party once more in power in 1810, was encouraged to persevere in the war, and was pursuing under Wellesley that terrible peninsular struggle in which the victory of Busaco, September 27, 1810, and the retreat of Masséna from before the lines of Torres Vedras in the same month roused the enthusiasm of Spain and the courage of the German patriots. In some respects more influential than all else was the quiet yet merciless grinding of the continental system, which began to be most injurious to the continent after 1809. To the genius of one man and the fear inspired by previous success, there was therefore opposed the antagonism of Russia, the diplomacy of Metternich, the untried strength of Spain

and Prussia, the bitter hostility of England, and the inflexible laws of trade and commercial intercourse that Napoleon had so imperiously violated.

The continental system, which had already affected the political relations of the Emperor with Portugal, Spain, Austria, the Papal States, and the territories bordering on the North Sea, was now destined to alter seriously his relations with Russia and Sweden. With Russia the situation was already strained. Alexander was in no wise pleased with the form that Napoleonic imperialism was taking. The Emperor of the French, he thought, was showing little consideration for the interests of Russia. In his desire to control the North German-coast line Napoleon had annexed Oldenberg, to whose duke the elder sister of the Czar had been betrothed. Then too his consenting to the election of Bernadotte angered the Czar, because it seemed to indicate French control of Sweden; his adding of Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw pointed to a possible resurrection of Poland, or at least to an increase in the territory of a state under French control on the borderland of Russia; and his insisting on Russia's adherence to a ruinous trade policy was increasing the economic distress of the Russian people, who were far more injured by trade isolation than was France. In Russia paper money began to depreciate alarmingly, and the rouble from 1808 to 1810 fell in value one-fourth. Gold left the country, and colonial wares rose to practically prohibitive prices. The economic situation in 1810-1811 convinced the Czar that the continental policy could not be maintained. A contraband trade was impossible, because of the bulky character of Russia's staple articles, for timber, grain, hemp, etc., were not well adapted for secret export. In 1812 Russia broke the terms of the treaty of Tilsit and the agreement of 1810 by assuming a position of neutrality, thus practically destroying Napoleon's work by opening a breach for English goods.

Although, as we have seen, Napoleon's personal hostility to Alexander, due to the failure of the Russian marriage project and the Czar's inactivity in the Austrian campaign, must be taken into account in considering the Russian campaign, yet the secession of Alexander from the continental system was the vital cause leading to the advance upon Moscow. Napoleon knew that Alexander was under the influence of councillors hostile to himself—the empress-mother, Pozzo di Borgo, and Count Nesselrode—and he was aware that the opposition of the Czar was increasing. Furthermore, in joining with Austria he had revived the policy of the restoration of the Western Empire, and was beginning to look on Russia as a legitimate object of attack. The Tilsit project of dividing the world began to give way to the older project of conquering the world, and Napoleon's ambition extended even to the overthrow of that Power whose alliance he had been glad enough to gain in 1807. This act more than any other that had gone before betrayed the entire want of sympathy that Napoleon felt for France. Had he so desired he might even now have retired from his career of conquest, and have retained the main territories that he had conquered. But it was no part of Napoleon's plan to settle down as Emperor of the French and turn his attention solely to the building up of a great and stable Empire. He saw only war, not peace. For France as such he cared nothing ; he admitted that the war with Russia was injurious to the French interests, yet he was urged on to the fatal issue by the very terms of his own imperialism. For him there was no abiding place, he belonged to no nationality, he had no sense of national pride ; no country could claim him as its own ; he was, as Metternich said, cosmopolitan.

With Russia there was no hesitation. The breach between the Emperors became the wider as the position of the Czar became more favourable for resisting attack. So long as he was on hostile terms with Sweden, on account of Finland, and

at war with Turkey, on account of the Danubian principalities, a war with France meant a serious dividing of Russia's forces. But Bernadotte, finding that the continental system was ruining Sweden, entered into secret arrangements with Alexander in 1812, in the hope of eventually obtaining the throne of France for himself; and in the same year Turkey, acting under English advice, signed the treaty of Bucharest, and threw off the spell of the French influence. Alexander was enabled, therefore, to concentrate all his forces upon the one point of attack from the west, and announced his determination of allowing the French, if they so desired, to cross his frontier. Reluctant as he was to provoke war, nevertheless he felt that with 300,000 of Napoleon's troops in Spain the time was favourable.

There was no declaration of war. Napoleon advanced to Dresden, assembled there the sovereigns of the vassal states, stated the number of auxiliary troops that he needed, and then concentrating his forces on the Vistula prepared for entrance into Russia. In May, 1812, the Niemen was crossed by an army of 325,000 men, of which 155,000 were French. Nothing can better indicate the diplomatic and military genius of Napoleon than the fact that out of the 600,000 men who made up the Grand Army, the rear guard, and available contingents, only 200,000 were Frenchmen. The remainder came from Germany, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, Holland, and the minor states. Under Napoleon's leadership, western Europe with a mighty army was prepared to overthrow the only state remaining unconquered on the continent. On August 18th Napoleon took Smolensk. The Russian policy of delay, which was continued under Barclay de Tolly until September, gave way to the more active policy of Kutusoff, and the battle of Borodino was fought. Such a battle, so far from the base of supplies, was rather a loss than a gain for Napoleon, and it would seem that he was led on to Moscow less from design

than from a desire to destroy the Russian army, and to gain sustenance for his troops. Moscow was reached by September 14th, and there the silent city showed that the Russians understood that the surest way to accomplish Napoleon's ruin was to cut him off from supplies. The burning of the city only intensified the situation; it did not create it. For a month the Grand Army lingered, but Alexander gave no sign, and offered no terms. Isolated at St. Petersburg, away from Napoleon's influence, the Czar made no agreement for an armistice and, acting under the advice of those who were opposed to Napoleon, rejected all overtures. The man whom Napoleon had considered pliable at Tilsit, still devoted to him at Erfurt, had become his implacable foe at Moscow. Napoleon had firmly believed in his ability to break down the opposition of the Czar, and to effect a treaty with him at Moscow, as he had done with Francis II. at Vienna, and Frederic William III. at Berlin. Upon this one calculation he had based his hopes. This error of judgment in one of the greatest of the world's undertakings carried with it momentous consequences,—consequences inevitable, not because of Alexander's refusal to yield, but because Europe was waiting to take advantage of Napoleon's failure. The fall of Moscow had accomplished nothing; there was but one course to follow, and that was to retreat, and with every step in that famous march the hopes of Europe rose. Before the 6th of November, Napoleon's army had dwindled away by losses in battle, want of food, and the distresses of the march to 55,000 men, and this number was reduced by the cold and storm to about 20,000 men, of whom but 3000 were Frenchmen.

Napoleon's retreat was coeval with other reverses and was the signal for still more. While the "great criminal," as Stein called him, was wrecking one army in Russia, Wellesley, now become the Duke of Wellington, was defeating another in Spain. At Salamanca, July 22, 1812, Marmont was overcome in a spirited contest, Madrid was temporarily evacuated, and

Joseph fled from the city. Although Wellington was unable to maintain his position because of the stupidity and inefficiency of the Spanish radicals, nevertheless his success both encouraged England, and threw for the moment the control of the Spanish government into the hands of the revolutionary party. Though England, involved in a war with the United States, as one outcome of her attempt at a maritime monopoly, had been inclined to favour a discontinuance of the struggle, the battle of Salamanca brought her once more loyally to Wellington's support, and led the radical party in an excess of democratic zeal to draw up a constitution, showing, it is true, the influence of the French revolutionary ideas, but one-sided, unbalanced, impracticable, and constitutionally unsound. The situation is a striking one. Although the Spanish patriots were foisting upon a monarchical country an ultra-democratic constitution, and were hampering Wellington by ill-advised and jealous actions, nevertheless, by means of their tenacity, their persistent warfare, and national enthusiasm, they were able to keep the large French army that Napoleon was obliged to maintain in Spain constantly engaged in profitless campaigns.

To attribute Napoleon's final overthrow to the consequences of his expedition to Moscow is to take a superficial view of the forces that were working against him in Europe. This truth becomes evident when we realise that unparalleled though that disaster was, nevertheless Napoleon lost little in the control that he exercised over France and the other states. France, instead of deserting her Emperor, once more prepared to sacrifice herself, and stood firm in her support of him. Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Confederation of the Rhine gave no sign of defection, and Austria declared that she would respect the alliance of 1810. The results of the expedition were, however, momentous in that they encouraged Alexander to continue in his opposition to Napoleon, and roused a

determination in the Prussian people to strike once more for the liberty of their state. The union which was effected between Russia and Prussia was due not to any natural drawing together of the two states, but to the conviction on the part of Stein and the people and army of Prussia that the issue must be fought out with Napoleon, and that Prussia, though bound by treaty to fight on the side of France, must aid Russia to overthrow the Emperor. Aware that he would be supported by the people of Prussia, General Yorck dared to receive in a friendly manner the Russian advance that was pursuing Napoleon and to treat with it in the Convention of Tauroggen, December 30, 1812; and Stein dared to accept the governorship of East and West Prussia under a commission signed not by the King of Prussia, who was still outwardly the faithful ally of Napoleon, but by the Czar.

Thus the first step in the union of the Powers against Napoleon, the first step leading to the treaty which began the reconstruction of Europe, was the resultant of two treasonable acts against the King of Prussia, for which under ordinary circumstances the authors ought to have been severely punished. But the circumstances were not ordinary; as Yorck said, "The army wants war with France, the people want it, and so does the king; but the king has no free will. The army must make his will free." That the king was held in restraint, and was in reality favourable to the policy inaugurated by Yorck and Stein is evident from the rapidity of his change of face. Having ordered Yorck to be court-martialed on January 19th, on the 22d he withdrew from Berlin to Breslau, away from the French influence, and made from there his first appeal to the Prussian people, which authorised the arming of the population. On February 12th Yorck was given the chief command over the forces of Prussia and Pomerania, and on the 27th was signed the treaty of Kalisch, which marked the final separation of Prussia from the alliance with France, laid the foundation

for the fourth great coalition, and by its secret terms began the rearranging of the map of Europe, completed at Vienna two years later. According to these terms Prussia, having renounced all claim to Hanover, thus making easier the alliance with England, was to be restored as regards population, territory, and indebtedness, to the position she had occupied before 1806. With the declaration of war on March 16th and the famous appeal to the people of Prussia on the 17th, the first war of liberation was begun. The popular forces of Prussia, Spain, and Russia were now ranged against Napoleon, and the first step was taken leading to the union of the Powers, a union based upon the common desire of all the states to be freed from the yoke of France. The victory of Napoleon at Lützen May 2, 1813, was very different from those of Jena and Friedland. The all-important test of the situation was not whether the allies could defeat Napoleon in a single battle, but whether the new union could be maintained. Were the Powers willing to sink all party differences and political jealousies in the one great task of forcing Napoleon back into France? Were they ready to complete the work begun at Kalisch and to make that treaty the first of a series of agreements by which common resistance to Napoleon would be made an interest higher than those of state and a union would be formed that would outlast the circumstance to which its formation was due, a union that would determine not only the fate of Napoleon but also the relation of the European states in all diplomatic intercourse in the future? Herein lies the importance of the Fourth Coalition; those which had preceded belong, properly speaking, to the diplomatic history of the eighteenth century; the Fourth Coalition begins the diplomatic history of the present day.

The test of the situation was soon made. Already, as early as March 3d, Great Britain had promised to furnish Sweden a subsidy of a million pounds sterling in case she entered the

war, and agreed to support her claim to Norway in the final reconstruction. Therefore ten days after the defeat at Lützen Sweden joined the allies and sent 25,000 men to their aid in Germany. Again were the allies defeated, this time at Bautzen, May 20th, and again was the victory barren of advantages to Napoleon. The nations were now thoroughly roused. England on the 14th and 15th of June signed the treaty of Reichenbach with Prussia and Russia, and the three Powers strengthened the accord of Kalisch by mutual agreements in regard to the purposes of the war and the furnishing of money and men. Moreover Austria was wavering, and Wellington, a month after the defeat at Bautzen, won the battle of Vittoria in Spain over Jourdan, Soult's successor, drove King Joseph into France, and on June 20th defeated Soult himself, who was returning to the relief of Pampeluna. The events of the summer of 1813 leave us with the conviction that forces beyond Napoleon's control were slowly driving him step by step back from his conquest in the east, and that the very people whose importance he was inclined to belittle, were destined to crush him in the end.

But as yet the union of all the Powers had not been effected, for Austria still remained outside the coalition. The experiences of eight years were, however, gradually changing the attitude of the states of Europe toward one another. Common danger was creating a common interest, and private advantages were beginning to be set aside in the interest of the one absorbing need of the moment. Austria had taken no part in the first war of liberation, not because she did not hate Napoleon, but because Metternich was playing a cool, calculating, and essentially selfish diplomatic game. He was determined to adhere to the alliance that bound Austria to Napoleon until the opportunity should arise that would enable her to join the coalition, not merely with reasonable hope of success, but also with the certainty of holding the leadership in all

future actions of the Powers. He had no desire to be the liberator of Europe, but, working solely for the interest of Austria, wished to be then, as later, the arbiter of Europe. When, therefore, on June 4th, Napoleon granted to the allies an armistice—the “fatal” armistice of Pleiswitz—partly that he might recruit his shattered forces with new French levies, partly to gain time to bring up the army of Italy to intimidate Austria, he played directly into Metternich’s hand. The latter, assuming the rôle of mediator between the opposing forces, let it be known to the allies that if Napoleon rejected the conditions upon which Austria’s plan for a general peace was based, then that government would join the coalition. On the 26th of June, in a famous interview with Napoleon, Metternich became convinced that the French Emperor was doomed to failure if he continued the war; and on June 27th he signed a secret treaty with Prussia and Russia at Reichenbach, in which Austria promised, in case of Napoleon’s refusal of her terms, to declare war against France, and to aid the allies with a force of 150,000 men. Napoleon having accepted Austria’s mediation on the 30th, arrangements were made for a congress to meet at Prague to discuss the terms of the peace. There is little reason to believe that either Metternich or Napoleon was sincere in the matter; each knew that war was inevitable, and each was working to gain time to strengthen his military forces. When, therefore, the last hour of the 10th of August arrived, the date fixed for the close of the negotiation, and Napoleon still withheld the credentials of his representative, Metternich, putting the finishing touches to the war-manifesto of the Austrian Emperor, caused the beacons to be lighted which proclaimed to the army on the Silesian frontier that the negotiations had failed, and that the mighty struggle of the states of Europe against Napoleon was about to begin.

The favourable conditions under which Austria entered the

alliance in consequence of the defeat of Bautzen, the skilful diplomacy of Metternich, and the character of Alexander and Frederic William III., made it possible for Austria to define in her own terms the rules of conduct that were to govern the actions of the allies. These rules were based not on any recognition of the national movement that was making a successful resistance to Napoleon possible, but rather on the old state system that subordinated the people to the state, and the state to the person of the prince. The policy of Austria was the policy of Metternich, whose leadership in the affairs of Europe dates from the beginning of the second war of liberation. His doctrine differed from that of the old *régime* only in the elimination from it of the element of rivalry that had hitherto prevented a union of the Powers. Metternich looked with suspicion upon the Prussian national movement as revolutionary, and neither Alexander nor Frederic William was favourable to Stein's doctrine of the rights of a nation. Therefore they made no allusion to recent popular uprisings; they demanded the rejection of all revolutionary schemes, and insisted on the supremacy of princes and the preservation of the integrity of states. Thus while the people, to whose efforts were due the only effective blows thus far aimed at Napoleon's supremacy, were actuated by the new ideas, the rules that were to govern the future conduct of the war and the relation between the Powers were those of the past, not of the future. The struggle at Leipzig may have been the battle of nations, but the diplomacy that controlled the issues of the battle was the diplomacy of princes.

The second war of liberation began in August, 1813, and lasted until the allies stood upon the frontier of France in November of the same year. On one side or the other were ranged forces from every country in Europe except Turkey. Though in plan, strategic movement, and energy Napoleon showed no decline of military genius, he both underestimated the strength

and the unity of the allies, and he placed too much confidence in his own forces, who were no longer the veterans of Wagram and Moscow, but the untried troops of the conscriptions of 1812 and 1813. He had too little regard for the changed circumstances under which he was fighting, and he does not appear to have informed himself fully of the numerical strength and position of the enemy. His contempt for the military tactics of his opponents leading him to formulate a plan of campaign that took no recognition of possible defeat, he failed to prepare substitute movements—as he had been accustomed to do in all his earlier campaigns—to be used in case of any disarrangement of his original scheme. He reckoned without a true estimate of the difficulties of the situation ; for he did not know, what is clear to us to-day, that the allies had resolved not to enter into any engagement with troops of which he was personally in command, but had agreed to concentrate all their energies upon his lieutenants. In consequence of this arrangement, Napoleon was obliged to see his plan thwarted early in the campaign by successive defeats, and losses so heavy as to render impossible the execution of the contemplated movement.

The campaign that followed is divided naturally into two parts by the stipulations of Töplitz. In the first period the allies acting, in a sense, separately, engaged with Napoleon's generals, and defeated Oudinot, Macdonald, Vandamme, and Ney in a series of well fought battles in August and September, 1813. But a defeat which the Austrian general Schwarzenberg suffered at the hands of Napoleon himself made it clearer than before that however successful the allies might be in defeating Napoleon's subordinates, a change of plan was necessary before the issue could be fought out with Napoleon himself. With the Emperor at bay, and acting on the defensive, with his troops massed together at the centre of operations in Saxony, more united efforts than before were needed if suc-

cess were to be attained. Furthermore, as the Powers came to believe that with concerted action the downfall of Napoleon was inevitable, they found themselves face to face with the problem of European reconstruction, and began to desire a more definite understanding upon this question. Therefore, on September 9th, the allies met at Töplitz, and enlarged the agreements made at Kalisch and Reichenbach, and defined the present and future policy of the alliance. England now came into the common accord, and the four chief Powers agreed upon concerted action, promising not to conclude peace, armistice, or convention without the common consent. This agreement, founded though it was on military necessity, is the first common act marking the transition from the public system of the eighteenth century to that of the nineteenth. Jealousy and rivalry there still were, but the need of union was stronger than either of these. To this need everything else was subordinated; each of the three continental Powers guaranteed to each of the others the integrity of its own state; Austria and Prussia retained the extent of territory possessed in the year 1805, and eastern Europe was restored to the condition it was in before the battles of Jena and Auerstädt. At the same time, in order to rescue central Europe from the influence of Napoleon, the allies guaranteed to each seceding member of the Confederation of the Rhine absolute freedom. Independent sovereignty, which had not been legally possessed by these states in the days of the Holy Roman Empire, Napoleon himself had offered as a reward to the states of Germany, when after the dissolution of the Empire he effected the erection of the Rhenic Confederacy. Metternich in accepting this *status quo* and confirming the full sovereignty of the individual states, acted with a double purpose. He wished to offer terms most likely to attract the separate states to the side of the allies; and at the same time he was determined to resist the national policy of Stein, who was endeavouring to remove barriers to

German unity, not to create them. In this act Metternich fixed the course of German history and postponed the consolidation of German nationality for fifty-three years.

Having regulated these important matters, the allies prepared to unite their forces in a combined attack upon Napoleon's position at Leipzig. For three days, October 16th, 17th, and 18th, the battle raged, and finally ended in the overwhelming defeat of the Emperor and the downfall of his personal supremacy and of the Empire outside of France. His mastery beyond the Rhine vanished; the members of the Rhenic Confederacy withdrew from him their allegiance and the Confederation ceased to exist; the kingdom of Westphalia fell with the flight of its ruler; Holland rose against the French quartered on her soil; the Italian states began to bestir themselves either for the return of their old rulers, or for unity and a republic. Gradually the allies cleared the western German provinces of French troops, and in the early days of November pushed forward to the frontier of France. The people that Napoleon had so grievously affronted were now ready to enter France itself, upon whose soil no hostile foreigner had trod for twenty years. France was encompassed on the south as well as the east. Along the Rhine were the armies of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and the minor states; while on the southern frontier was Wellington, who during the autumn months had captured the French garrisons of San Sebastian and Pampluna, and with the way thus opened into France had terminated the peninsular war by defeating Soult at St. Pierre on French soil, and compelling him to retire to Bayonne.

An important question now presented itself for solution. Should the allies enter France, or should they treat with Napoleon and allow him to retain his Empire and his dynasty? The object of the war of 1813 had been attained. The pressure of foreign rule was removed, the Confederation of the Rhine was dissolved, Napoleon was driven back into his own terri-

tory, and defensive measures were no longer needed. In fact, events had moved so rapidly for the allies that they could hardly realise that the grand imperial structure had fallen ; and so very rapidly had it crumbled to pieces that they were brought to take the offensive before even their plans for defence were fully matured. To be suddenly transformed from conquered to conquerors, to have seen Napoleon, stripped of allies, in flight, and depending upon the resources of France alone, was to attain to a sudden and unexpected prosperity before they were ready for it, and to stand face to face with new problems and new situations before arrangements had been made to cope with them. It is little to be wondered at that the allies disagreed as to the best course to be pursued ; for the perplexity natural under the circumstances was increased by the attitude of the Powers toward each other. Austria was unquestionably jealous of Prussia and Russia, and Metternich, inasmuch as he considered these countries to be too much influenced by liberal ideas, looked with suspicion upon all plans they advanced. Therefore Metternich, who, as we know, practically controlled the diplomatic situation, was for peace and the preservation of the Napoleonic Empire within reasonable limits. In this view the smaller German states concurred, and England also, having no economic interest at stake and actuated by no spirit of revenge, was opposed to rousing France to a greater fury, and was content if the imperial territory were restricted. On the other hand, the war party, consisting of Russia and Prussia, felt that as long as Napoleon remained in power, no matter how small the territory left to France, he would always be a menace to the peace of Europe. No boundaries had satisfied him in the past, and no boundaries would satisfy him in the future ; furthermore, so great was the power of his personal magnetism that in all probability France would follow his leadership in any emergency, even against her own will. Thus argued the war party, influenced, it may be said, by a desire to

retaliate; and to them, therefore, nothing save the dethronement of Napoleon seemed adequate to meet the emergency. Prussia, still burning with indignation at the remembrance of the insults heaped upon her, was not satisfied to let her conqueror go unpunished, and Alexander wished to invade France because Napoleon had invaded Russia. As for the moment, however, the war party yielded to the opinion of Metternich and consented to treat for peace, proposals were agreed upon at Frankfort and issued on the 9th of November. The terms now offered were not so favourable to Napoleon as those made to him before the second war of liberation. In the summer of 1813 the allies would have left the Emperor many of the gains of Pressburg and Tilsit; but at Frankfort, with the battle of Leipzig no longer uncertain, and with Napoleon back once more within the boundaries of France, they felt that to talk of his controlling any territory outside of France was absurd, and agreed to go back to the treaty of Lunéville in 1801 and to offer France her natural boundaries, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, as limits satisfactory for a great and stable empire. In addition, it was decided to offer freedom to Germany, Italy, and Holland, and to restore the old dynasty in Spain, thus beginning the restoration of the European states.

There is, however, every reason to believe that Napoleon had no intention of accepting the very favourable terms offered to him. Why this was true we can only conjecture. Doubtless he hoped that the differences of opinion soon leading to dissension among the allies would bring about a dissolution of the coalition. Having possibly become aware that his tenure as Emperor depended on his showing a bold front, he may have felt that to abandon his war policy would be an indication of weakness. Perhaps his confidence in his own astonishing good fortune prevented a clear insight into the threatening character of the situation confronting him. Whatever the cause may have been, it is evident that to him negotiations

were only useful as an expedient to gain time. Now, as ever, he consulted his own interests, and thought nothing of the welfare of France or the happiness of her people. Even though many indications of discontent might have made a wiser man pause, Napoleon did not understand the new mood of the French people. Though he accepted the proposal of a congress to meet at Mannheim, he carefully avoided committing himself to the terms of the allies.

The delay of Napoleon and the growing conviction among the allies that no real peace was possible, led to the victory of the war party, and the determination to withdraw the proposals already made. On December 1st the Emperor was informed that the armistice was closed, and on the 13th the combined forces crossed the Rhine. From the east and south four large armies, three of the continental Powers and one under Wellington, entered the French territory to maintain the cause of outraged nations against a Power that in its foreign relations for more than a decade had violated nearly every principle of justice and law. That to Napoleon the invasion was a surprise in the promptness with which it was executed and in the unanimity with which the allies acted, appears from the fact that he made no attempt to guard the frontier, and left nearly 150,000 men in fortresses in Germany. Of all the allies Austria alone seems to have been anxious to postpone the final issue, and it is true that the Austrian army neither moved nor acted with the vigour and enthusiasm of the armies of Russia and Prussia.

The campaign that followed was the first that was conducted on French soil. Two aspects of it are worthy of notice: the superb defence made by Napoleon, and the increasing severity of the demands of the allies, due to their determination, which increased as the weakness of Napoleon became more apparent, to restore the political boundaries of Europe as nearly as possible to the form they had taken before the Revolution.

The position of the Emperor was most discouraging. The exhaustion of France was becoming every day more alarming, and he was able to gather together no more than 60,000 men, of whom few had vigor and experience. Expressions of discontent were common enough in Paris, and even in the *Corps législatif* the report of the committee contained strong words against imperial absolutism, and asked for some limitations upon the imperial power. The propositions made by Napoleon to Spain and the Pope, for the purpose of weakening the allies and of checking, if possible, the advance of Wellington from the south, were rejected; Holland had already driven all the French troops and imperial officials from her territory, and had recalled the Prince of Orange; and, most important of all, Murat, King of Naples, Napoleon's brother-in-law, who might have turned the issue of the campaign by threatening Austria from the side of Italy, concluded a treaty with Austria and England, and in the hope of becoming dynastic king of Italy joined the allies. The situation seemed wholly favourable to the enemies of the Emperor, and Blücher's victory at La Rothière on February 1st, in strengthening the conviction that Napoleon's downfall was at hand, led Schwarzenberg, as head of the Austrian forces and representative of Metternich's policy, to propose a renewal of the peace negotiations. The basis of such negotiations had been discussed at some length at Langres about a week before, and so positively had Alexander and Metternich disagreed as to the conduct and purpose of the war that at one time Austria threatened to withdraw her army. But the Czar, yielding to the persuasions of the peace party, consented to the opening of a peace congress at Châtillon, February 8th. To this congress Napoleon sent his envoy, Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicence, with full powers to negotiate for a peace. Unfortunately the Emperor seems to have been labouring under the conviction that the congress of Châtillon was simply the congress of Mannheim postponed, and that the Frankfort proposals

were to be made the basis of every treaty of peace. On the other hand, Alexander still persisted in his determination to dethrone Napoleon, and to place on the throne of France either Bernadotte or the Bourbons. In the presence of such differences of opinion, agreement was practically impossible; and as Austria, England, and Prussia, although resolved not to return to terms as favourable as those of Frankfort, were at this time opposed to the extreme measures of the Czar, the work of the congress dragged, and Alexander, by the withdrawal of his representative, forced a postponement before any agreement had been reached.

Then began Napoleon's series of victories. The Prussians under Blücher and Yorck were defeated in the valley of the Marne in four battles, February 10th to 14th, with a loss of 20,000 men. On the 17th two Russian corps under Wittgenstein and Wrede were almost cut to pieces in a bloody combat at Nangis, and on the 18th, the main army under Schwarzenberg was attacked near the junction of the Seine and the Yonne, defeated, and driven back to Troyes in a battle famous, not only as one of the most stubbornly contested of the campaign, but also as the last of Napoleon's victories. Metternich somewhat disdainfully calls this a skirmish, but it was enough of a victory to impress Napoleon with the belief that the allies, disorganised and demoralised, were in full retreat across the Rhine. The victory, coming as it did between the first and second periods of the congress of Châtillon, essentially altered the situation; for on February 17th, when the congress reopened and the allies presented to Caulaincourt the terms according to which a treaty would be drawn up, Napoleon was in a position, so far as his own view of the situation was concerned, very different from that occupied two weeks previously. Then, defeated at La Rothière, he had sought for peace to save Paris, although it is probable that even then he would have repudiated any agreement that his envoy might have made

based on terms less favourable than those of Frankfort. Now, however, as conqueror he took a more definite stand. He was willing to make peace, and to allow the allies to depart for home unmolested, but only on the condition that France be allowed to retain in full her natural limits. Any other proposition he rejected with scorn. But the allies, not discouraged by defeat, had equally made up their minds that the Frankfort terms should not be offered to Napoleon; that the only possible basis of agreement was not the territorial conditions of 1801, but those of 1791, that is, France without Belgium, Savoy, and the Rhenish provinces. A deadlock was, therefore, inevitable. Caulaincourt, hoping that Napoleon would see the necessity of a compromise, for ten days used every device to gain time. On February 29th a definite answer not having been returned, the allies determined to bring the conference to a close, and for the second time Alexander recalled his representative. Hope of an agreement with Napoleon was now practically abandoned, and a new necessity presented itself arising from the fear lest Austria, who had consistently opposed a vigorous war policy, should withdraw from the coalition. A closer agreement between the Powers was necessary, a more definite treaty to bind the allies more firmly together. The treaty of Chaumont, signed March 1, 1814, was for a purpose similar to that aimed at in the treaty of Töplitz, but its terms are of greater importance to the student of the period, in that they were intended to govern not only the aggressive action of the allies in the emergency that confronted them, but also in all relations offensive and defensive for the future. The treaty is the most important thus far made, for upon it rests the common accord existing among the European states of the present time. After promising to act harmoniously for the restoration of peace to Europe, to sign no treaty save by common consent, to furnish 150,000 men each for the prosecution of the campaign, England adding a subsidy of £5,000,000, the Powers agree

“that the present treaty, having for its object the maintenance of the equilibrium of Europe, the peace and independence of the Powers, the prevention of the encroachments which have hitherto desolated the world, is intended to last for twenty years dating from the day of signing, and then, if circumstances demand, a convention will be called three years before its expiration to discuss the question of further prolongation.” This article marked, in the history of the European state system, a constitutional advance of the most important kind; for it looked forward to the period beyond the fall of Napoleon, beyond the general congress agreed upon at Töplitz, to the Europe of the future. It interpreted in a manner unknown to the old *régime* the doctrine of the balance of power, in that it proclaimed for Europe a public law that recognised, not only the sovereignty of the individual states, but also a common interest of Europe that each state was obliged to respect. The treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, Töplitz, and Chaumont mark stages in the gradual building up of a new European system, and indicate a steady progress toward a higher conception of the obligations under which the Powers stood to each other. Although these new principles, founded as they were on military necessity, and imperfectly developed amidst selfish rivalries, have been employed as well for the arrestment as for the advancement of society, they have, nevertheless, made it possible to create a European equilibrium truer and more stable than that of the eighteenth century.

The negotiations ended with the signing of the treaty of Chaumont, and the close of the congress of Châtillon two weeks later. The allies had made their last real attempt to bring about a peace, and Napoleon had lost his last opportunity of retaining the throne of France. War was renewed; but again a difference of opinion arose among the allies as to the plan to be followed in the new campaign. Prussia insisted on a combined advance of the three armies in the direction of

Paris, but Austria, timid as usual, and unwilling to risk the fate of the campaign on the chance of a single battle, preferred gradually to wear out Napoleon's strength by separate movements. Either plan would undoubtedly have succeeded in the exhausted state of Napoleon's troops. Events were, however, now moving too rapidly to be affected by the rivalries of the allied sovereigns, for the hostile armies were fast surrounding the Emperor. Wellington, pushing up from the south, was compelling Soult to retire beyond the Garonne, and was aiding the royalists in Bordeaux in their attempt to proclaim as Louis XVIII., the Bourbon Count of Provence; while Blücher by a fine side movement hurried to join the army of the north, and in conjunction with Bülow defeated Napoleon at Laon, March 9th and 10th. The Emperor in desperation turned southward, and with only 40,000 men gave battle to Schwarzenberg's division of 100,000 men at Arcis-sur-Aube, but in the encounter that followed he saw the uselessness of prolonging the battle, and for the moment revived the plan that had occurred to him after the defeat at Leipzig of cutting off the connection of the allies with the rear, rescuing the garrisons imprisoned in the German fortresses, and rousing the old Confederation of the Rhine to come to his aid. In that desperate scheme he reckoned too much on the irresolution of the allies when he concluded that they would not dare to move forward with an enemy in their rear. This was, however, exactly what they did dare to do. Disregarding the Emperor's movement eastward toward the Vosges, they put into practice the lesson that he himself had taught them, and pushed on to seize the capital. Having defeated Mortier and Marmont at La Fère-Champenoise in the most successful battle fought since the beginning of the campaign, the combined armies passed down the Bondy and La Bourget roads leading to Paris, which they reached on March 30th. Napoleon hurried back from Doulevent to save his capital, but when he was within fifteen miles of the city, he

learned that, after ten hours' fighting in the outskirts of the city on the part of the French troops, his brother Joseph, lieutenant-governor of Paris, had given authority to the marshals to capitulate, and had left the city. On the same day the terms of capitulation were signed, and on the next, March 31st, the allied armies entered Paris.

Now at last Napoleon was ready to make such terms with the allies as would save his throne and dynasty. But their demands had grown with their success. If at Châtillon they would have left Napoleon his dynasty and his Empire within the French boundaries of 1791, at Paris they demanded an unconditional abdication. For some time the question had been before them, and the difficulty lay in the fact that in this, as in so many other matters, they disagreed as to the best course to be followed after final defeat was assured. There can be little doubt that the Austrian Emperor would have preferred to leave his son-in-law in possession of his throne. Metternich had said to Caulaincourt, "You must be aware of our views, principles, and wishes. . . . these are for a dynasty so closely bound up with our own;" and Talleyrand reports a similar speech in which Metternich said that it was not possible to think of the Bourbons as the new sovereigns, because of the personal character of the princes of that family. Castlereagh, the English minister, and Hardenberg the minister of Prussia, were inclined to favour the same view. In support of the dethronement of Napoleon stood Alexander, although he was by no means committed to the cause of the Bourbons; indeed, from a personal repugnance to that family he was inclined to support the cause of Bernadotte, in whom, however, the other Powers had no confidence. Stein, interestingly enough, was in favour of restoring the Bourbons, for, as he says, "I supported their cause on all occasions, regarding their restoration as the effect of their hereditary right to the French throne, which not having been extinguished in any valid manner was to be main-

tained in all circumstances ; and considering all other solutions, such as a completely new dynasty—there being no eminent man towering above all others who might be the founder of it—absolutely inadmissible.” Pozzo di Borgo thought the same, and both agreed with Talleyrand that nothing remained but Bonaparte or the Bourbons, and that any attempt to create a regency or to appoint Bernadotte was a mere intrigue. The opinion of Stein, who since the retreat from Moscow had become a favoured adviser of the Czar, had considerable weight with Alexander, who, beginning to recognise that Talleyrand’s judgment was the better, not only entered into communication with him, but also took up his abode at his house. In point of fact, however, all the allies were agreed that Talleyrand was best able to frame and carry out the plan suited to the emergency ; and he, finding that the decision lay in his hands, supported the Bourbons because he knew that only their restoration could reconcile Europe to France. As president of the Senate, he convened that body, the old Senate of the constitution of the year VIII., which alone of all the legislative divisions had remained intact during the autocratic rule of Napoleon. On April 2d, rejecting Napoleon’s offer to abdicate in favour of his son, this body voted in favour of his deposition, and retirement from the exercise of all powers, and erected a provisional government with Talleyrand as its presiding officer. When Napoleon heard of this action of the Senate he abdicated unconditionally on the 6th of April, and accepted the conditions of the allies that were embodied in a treaty signed five days afterwards.

By the terms of the treaty Napoleon was allowed to retain the now meaningless title of Emperor, and was given in full sovereignty the island of Elba as his place of sojourn, with a yearly revenue of two millions of francs to be paid by whatever government France established. The duchies of Parma, Plaisance, and Guastalla were given in full sovereignty to the

Empress Marie Louise, and to the various members of the family, including the ex-Empress Josephine, large annuities were granted. A safe conduct was allowed to all who wished to go with Napoleon to Elba, an escort of the imperial guard was provided to accompany him to the place of embarkation, a corvette was furnished for his exclusive use at the island, and a body guard of one hundred faithful men was permitted to remain with him. On the 12th Napoleon ratified the treaty, and, remaining at Fontainebleau until the 20th, lingered long enough to realise what appears to have come to him as a painful surprise, that he had long ago lost the support of the better elements of France. Deserted by his generals, who gave their adherence to the new government, by his councillors, many of whom were prominent in the government itself, and by his wife, who returned to her father, he suffered a last insult in the attack by the mob of royalists at Orgon on his way to Elba. And yet, even before he left the soil of France, the sound of party conflict, the murmurs of the people and the army, who hated the *émigrés* and were unfavourable to the restoration of the Bourbons, may have reached his ears, and have assured him that if his own personal supremacy in Europe was at last ended, France had not gained the peace and satisfaction for which she had been so long waiting.

CHAPTER III.

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM.

WITH the departure of Napoleon to Elba and the return of the Bourbons, France to all outward appearance was approaching the position she had occupied before the Revolution. The *émigrés*, led by the Count of Artois, who had been one of the first to leave France in the early days of the Revolution, were crowding back, and were taking their places once more in the state and the army; the white cockade was already supplanting the tri-colour; the territory of France was to be but little greater than it had been in the reign of Louis XVI., and a Bourbon king was once more to sit upon the throne of his ancestors. The work of the Revolution and of Napoleon would seem to have been undone; each step in the outward expansion of the power of France from 1792 to 1812 had been retraced in the rapid retreat after the Moscow campaign. The political boundaries of the majority of the European states were to be restored as nearly as possible to what they had been before the Revolution; and in consequence, the face of Europe, politically distorted by Napoleonic conquest, was to take on a more familiar form. In France, save in the administrative, judicial, and financial organisation, apparently little trace of Napoleon's work remained. The Bourbons and the *émigrés*, with no appreciation of the real work of the Revolution and the Empire, cast from them the memory of all recent events, and prepared to enjoy once more a *régime* of legitimism and prerogative.

But it needs only a brief examination to show that such an appearance was only on the surface, and that Europe had passed through a period in which an organic change had taken place both in the social structure and in the ideas and expectations of the people at large. War had diverted, deflected, and, in some instances, retarded the progressive tendencies of the period before 1789, but it had in no sense destroyed them. Napoleon fell because he could not withstand the strong national feeling that his aggressions had quickened in the peoples of Europe outside of France. But it is only in the history of the next fifty years that we can find the demonstration of the propositions laid down by the Constituent Assembly. National unity and individual liberty, constitutionally defined are the terms that indicate the forces that the Revolution set loose. In watching the working of these forces we shall be studying the history of Europe.

The work of restoration was not, however, based upon the ideas that were stirring in the minds and hearts of the people of Europe. Such ideas were not capable of immediate application, partly because they were not recognised by the diplomats, who had before them the task of reorganisation, partly, because they were as yet ill defined and too closely identified with the recent violence of the French not to be dreaded by those who desired peace. This fear of popular movement was well expressed by Metternich when it was proposed to leave the selection of a ruler to the choice of the people of France. "The plan of calling the nation," he said, "to deliberate on questions concerning the foundations of the social edifice of France, would unchain the Revolution again, and can never be the object of the alliance [of the Powers] or the meaning of their deliberations." Here we see expressed the fear that the conservative statesmen entertained for the popular movement. The example of the Revolution had not inspired them with confidence in the rule of the masses, while the aggress-

sions of the French nation under Napoleon had only strengthened the governments in their belief that to recognise the claims of the people was to endanger the peace and order of Europe. It is not strange that a majority of the statesmen should have been unable to appreciate the importance of the new principles, and, considering them dangerous, should have turned from them to a policy that involved nothing new, and that had for its object restoration, not revolution. For this doctrine, a new term, legitimism, was invented, which meant the legitimacy not merely of kings but of governments. "A lawful government," says Talleyrand, "be it monarchical or republican, hereditary or elective, aristocratic or democratic, is always one whose existence, form, and mode of action have been consolidated and consecrated by a long succession of years. . . . The legitimacy of the sovereign power results from the ancient status of possession." Such a doctrine seemed wholly admirable to the supporters of the old state system, and they accepted with satisfaction the first application of it in the return of the Bourbons to France. In this Talleyrand professed to act in defence of the new principle of prescriptive right inherent in some particular family ; but in reality he used "legitimacy" as a convenient political catchword, whereby to advance the best interests of France. He believed that the return of the Count of Provence as Louis XVIII. was the wish of the French people, and that in no other way could France be restored to her place in the European brotherhood of kings. The return of Louis XVIII. was due in the first place to Talleyrand, then to the importunities of royalists and *émigrés*, and lastly, and in the smallest degree, to the allies. With the actual summons of the Bourbons the allies had nothing to do ; their share was the official recognition of the new government, which they believed to represent the will of the nation.

After the entrance of the king, Louis XVIII. into Paris, and

the issue of the declaration of Saint-Ouen, in which he promised to adopt a liberal constitution, the first important duty was to determine the conditions of reconciliation that the allies would accept, and so draw up a treaty of peace. This treaty also was the work of Talleyrand, who had been appointed by the new king minister of foreign affairs, and he defends its conditions bravely in his *Mémoires*, maintaining that the treaty was far from unfavourable to France ; that it was not to be expected that the state, "drained as she was of men, money, and resources, invaded on all her frontiers at the same time by innumerable armies composed of people animated with a spirit of hate and vengeance," should expect tender treatment at the hands of the allies. He takes pride in the fact that by this, the first treaty of Paris, ratified April 30, 1814, France not only received back the greater part of her colonies, but in retaining Avignon, the county of Venaissin, the county of Montbéliard, and all the districts formerly belonging to Germany that had been annexed to France before January 1, 1792, she was also gaining much more in the way of a frontier than had been offered to Napoleon at Châtillon. In the latter case the conditions of 1791 had been the basis of agreement ; in the former, the conditions of 1792.

In addition to questions affecting French interests directly, the allies debated and embodied in the text of the treaty certain important matters looking to the reconstruction of Europe and the common interest of the nations. Switzerland was declared independent ; Holland was restored to the house of Orange, with the promise of an increase of territory ; Italy, outside the limits that were to remain Austrian, was to be composed of sovereign states ; while the decision of Töplitz, guaranteeing the independence of the separate German states was confirmed, and the important additional statement was made that the future government of Germany should be of a federal and not of an imperial character. Of the matters of common interest the

most important related to the navigation of rivers that separated or crossed different states. In order to facilitate intercourse among nations, the Rhine was declared to be free to all nations, and the Scheldt, in a secret treaty signed the same day, was also thrown open to all. Furthermore, the allies made important additions to the private international law of Europe when they declared that no inhabitant of countries restored or ceded should be held liable either in person or property on account of his conduct, political opinion, or attachment previous to the signing of the treaty ; and that all foreign or native residents of such countries should be allowed six years in which to dispose of their goods, and to remove to whatever country they pleased.

Important as was the treaty of Paris it could not settle all European questions, and therefore it expressly arranged for a general congress that should complete the work of reorganisation. " Within the space of two months," says the text of the treaty, " all the Powers that have been engaged on either side in the present war, shall send plenipotentiaries to Vienna to regulate in a general congress, the arrangements that are necessary to complete the dispositions of the present treaty." Here were to be discussed and drafted in one general treaty the rearrangements of territory that had been agreed to either in the treaties of Kalisch, Töplitz, Chaumont, and Paris, or in special treaties that had been made, mainly in 1813 and 1814, between individual states.

In September, 1814, in consequence of this agreement, there assembled at Vienna diplomats from nearly every state in Europe. There were present not only the accredited representatives of the European Powers, but also an extraordinarily large number of the sovereigns of Europe. In size, in brilliancy, in the extravagance of the entertainments, and the activity of the social life during the period of the sitting, the congress of Vienna was the most elaborately organised con-

gress that had been held up to this time in Europe. Claims of work that it accomplished it stands second only to the *ci* as the that framed the treaty of Westphalia ; in the adroitness of its indiplomats, of whom none was more clever or more successful than Talleyrand himself, it is without equal. Arriving a few days after the others, Talleyrand found that the representatives of the four Powers, apparently assuming that the congress was but a continuation of the alliance of Chaumont, had already agreed that neither France nor Spain nor any Power of the second order should take part in the deliberations, but that all decisions should be made by the allies. Talleyrand, soon showing that this arrangement was contrary to the article of the treaty of Paris providing for the congress, gained his first success in securing for the representative of France a share in the deliberations on a footing equal to that of the representatives of the allied Powers. Having thus raised France, who had been conquered only five months previously, to what he considered was her proper place in Europe, he next applied his genius as a diplomat to the enforcement of his doctrine of legitimacy, and his skill as an intriguer to creating dissension among the allies. In both particulars he was eminently successful. Although throughout the congress he was apparently proclaiming and supporting his favourite principle of legitimacy, in reality he was using it to conceal the efforts that he was making to advance the interests of France. He used the question regarding the disposal of Saxony to break up the quadruple alliance ; and he insisted upon the restoration of the King of Naples to gain for France an ally in Italy ; he supported the neutrality of Switzerland, thereby to strengthen the French frontier at its weakest point ; and even in agreeing to such decisions as the union of Holland and Belgium, or the annexation of Genoa to Sardinia, which seemed directly aimed at France, he believed he was doing his country more good than harm. On the whole we may agree with him when he says that, " notwithstanding

most im- advantages of the position in which France found her-
 or cross the opening of the congress, she succeeded in taking in
 ✓ among deliberations such a leading part that the most important
 all questions were decided according to her views, and after the
 principles that she had established and sustained."

We can better appreciate Tallyrand's remark as we examine in greater detail the work of the congress, the chief features of which were the restoration of rulers and governments based on the principle of legitimacy ; the redistribution of conquered territory, and the granting of indemnities ; the reorganisation of Germany, and the settlement of certain matters of an economic and commercial nature foreshadowed in the agreement of Paris. In the discussion of the questions embraced in the first group no serious difficulties presented themselves, for the allies had in the main already determined upon the policy to be followed, and had made their first application of it in returning Louis XVIII. to France. They also confirmed the restoration of Pius VII. to the Papal States, and Ferdinand VII. to Spain, that Napoleon had effected before his downfall. Victor Emmanuel was restored to the kingdom of Sardinia, and in view of the fact that there were no heirs and the direct line was in danger of dying out, the right of inheritance was transferred to the collateral line of Carignan. This, in the mind of Talleyrand, was a safeguard against any claim to the Sardinian throne, to which Austria might have been entitled by marriage. Furthermore, Bernadotte's title to the Swedish throne was assured ; the exiled princes of Germany were put in full possession of their principalities, according to the arrangement of Töplitz and Chaumont ; the house of Brunswick was re-established in Hanover, the house of Habsburg-Lorraine in Tuscany, the house of Orange in Holland, and the house of Braganza in Portugal ; Switzerland was declared independent and neutral forever, and finally Ferdinand IV. of Naples was made Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies. In the latter case the allies, espe-

cially Austria, were in duty bound to defend the claims of Murat, who had been promised the Neapolitan throne as the price of his defection ; but Metternich, convinced that an independent state under the old Napoleonist would be a hindrance to absolute Austrian control over the peninsula, effected Murat's overthrow in May, 1815. Thus, so far as the dynasties were concerned, no important change that had been brought about by Napoleon was allowed to remain ; all usurping dynasties were swept from the face of Europe.

When, however, it came to the question of the distribution of territory, the solution was neither simple nor easy. It was, in fact the most difficult of all the problems presented to the congress, for it gave every opportunity for jealousy, rivalry, and friction. The simplest matter to be settled was the distribution of territories that had been taken by the chief Powers during the war, the right to which had been confirmed by treaty. Russia retained Finland, Bessarabia, and the Persian border provinces ; Austria retained Lombardo-Venetia, as had been agreed upon at Paris, and the Tyrol, Salzburg, and Liechtenstein in accordance with a secret treaty with Bavaria ; Bavaria retained Ansbach and Baireuth, which Prussia in 1813 had agreed to concede to her ; Prussia returned to the position occupied before 1806, except that she had gained the island of Rügen and Swedish Pomerania, by surrendering Lauenburg and paying 2,000,000 crowns to Denmark, who, in the first instance, had received them from Sweden as indemnity for the loss of Norway.

The second group of distributed territories included such as were added to restored states in order to preserve the balance of power and to build up a strong defence against France. According to the agreement made at Paris that Holland should be enlarged, the Belgic provinces were placed under the control of the house of Orange, thus uniting under one dynasty two peoples, who differed in race, religion, and economic interests ;

the promise made to Bernadotte by Alexander, and confirmed by England, that Norway should be added to Sweden was fulfilled; and Genoa was annexed to the reconstituted kingdom of Sardinia, in order to make more powerful, as it seemed to the allies, the state that controlled the entrance from France to the plains of Italy. Even Talleyrand agreed to this, because he thought that the erection of a strong state in the north-western part of Italy would act as a counterpoise to any attempt of Austria to extend her power southward. Lastly, three new cantons, Geneva, Neuchâtel, and Valois, were added to the nineteen existing cantons of Switzerland, thus completing the number of the cantons as they are to-day. In nearly every case these cessions were the result of previous agreement.

The settlement of the questions that came up in connection with the third group of distributed territories involved the allies in a long and bitter controversy. The territories concerned, Poland and Saxony, one of which had been erected by Napoleon into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, while the other had held consistently to the cause of Napoleon to the end of the Leipzig campaign, were at the disposal of the allies. The difficulty that arose was a most natural one. Russia wanted the Duchy of Warsaw in order to re-establish the kingdom of Poland as a free state under a Russian protectorate; Prussia wanted all Saxony as a suitable indemnity for her sufferings and her losses. But the other Powers, believing that the equilibrium of Europe would be endangered if Prussia were allowed to have an enormous extension of territory in central Germany, and Russia to extend her western frontier nearly to the Oder, were quite unwilling to grant the claims of these two states. Alexander, yielding to the opinion that a Poland almost entirely in the possession of Russia, would be a cause of continual anxiety to Europe, and Talleyrand, with characteristic sophistry (arguing that where the interest of one state was evidently involved the principle of legitimacy did not hold good, the Polish

question was settled without serious result, and a division was agreed upon. Russia obtained by far the larger share, thereby pushing her territory westward to its present frontier ; Prussia, although she lost considerable of what she had received in the third partition of 1795, gained enough to give her a well-rounded eastern boundary ; Austria acquired Galicia and the salt mines of Wieliczka ; and the territory of Cracow was declared to be free, independent, and neutral, the congress expressly decreeing that the Poles were to have a representation and national institutions guaranteed them by Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

But the Saxon question was far more difficult to settle. If the harmony of the congress had been disturbed by the discussion over Poland, it was broken by the discussion over Saxony. Now was the time for Talleyrand to show his power of intrigue. Knowing that Russia and Prussia would stand together, he applied himself to the task of winning England and Austria to the French point of view, which was to preserve Saxony and to restore her king. England was at first inclined to favour annexation, desiring a strong state in northern Europe as protection against Russian aggression. Austria did not oppose this, although Metternich had little sympathy with many German patriots in their desire to effect the annexation with the hope of furthering the cause of German unity. The matter might have turned out differently had not Prussia refused to join England and Austria against the Russian project in Poland. The western Powers, fearing an increase of Russian strength, were anxious to draw Prussia away from the alliance with that Power. When, therefore, Prussia and Russia began to assume an attitude of defiance, and it was learned that they had entered into new treaty arrangements November, 1814, Talleyrand seized his opportunity, and by the formation of a secret alliance between France, Austria, and England, according to which each agreed to furnish if necessary 150,000 men

to check Russo-Prussian ambition, won his greatest diplomatic victory. This treaty satisfied the ambition of Talleyrand in that it completed the victory of France. That state recently so humbled was now acting in close concert with two of the greatest states of Europe, England and Austria, and with three second class Powers, Bavaria, Sardinia, and Hanover. There was also a prospect that other states would enter the alliance. In less than one year from the treaty of Chaumont (March 1, 1814 to January 3, 1815) France had become the chief and soul of a coalition of her own against the signers of the treaty of Kalisch. But Talleyrand carried his diplomatic zeal too far. We may well believe with Pasquier that the advantages of this alliance for France were more apparent than real, and that the loss of the friendship with Russia, who had been the most instrumental of all the allies in effecting the return of the Bourbons, was hardly compensated by the union with England and Austria, who during the war had been the bitterest enemies of France, and had to the last resisted the dethronement of Napoleon. In another and still more important particular was Talleyrand lacking in political foresight. In consequence of his insistence, in which he was supported by Austria, a compromise on the Saxon question was agreed to. The king was restored, but his kingdom was dismembered, and Prussia received about one-half of the whole, with compensations for the remainder in the neighbourhood of the Rhine. Inasmuch as these new provinces lay along the French frontier, Prussia was made by this action of the congress the natural guardian of the Rhine, and became in consequence a central rather than an eastern German state ; Austria by giving up her Netherlandish provinces, taking in place of them Dalmatian and Italian territory, was moving in a south-eastern direction away from Germany ; and Prussia was pushing westward into the heart of Germany. This movement, which had begun with the settlement of the Jülich-Cleve question in the seventeenth century, had been checked by Na-

napoleon, who sought to push Prussia eastward in order to make impossible German unity under Prussian leadership. The restoration of the western provinces began the undoing of Napoleon's work, for Prussia now returned to her former position with increased territory.

The third group of problems related to the reconstitution of Germany, than which no state in Europe had suffered greater changes. In 1803 the imperial constitution had undergone an entire alteration, and the old Holy Roman Empire had become in a sense Germanic. The ecclesiastical estates were secularised and distributed; the small principalities began to disappear, and the large states began to grow larger. Having overthrown the Empire in 1806 and enlarged the lesser states by mediatising the lands of the knights, the lowest class of the feudal order, Napoleon transformed some of these states into kingdoms and gave them independence and sovereignty, knowing full well that in strengthening their spirit of particularism he was placing a serious obstacle in the path of German unity. After the treaty of Tilsit he gathered thirty of these states into his enlarged Confederation of the Rhine, begun in 1805, a preliminary work that greatly simplified the task of the congress. The Powers, accepting the situation as Napoleon left it, and recognising the sovereignty of the members of the Rhenic Confederacy, declared in the treaty of Paris that the Empire should be replaced by a federal body. The discussion of the form that the German constitution should take had begun in November, 1814, but interrupted, first by the Saxon question, and again by the return of Napoleon in March, 1815, it was finally taken up and carried to completion in May and June of the same year. There were three possibilities for Germany: an hereditary empire, a strong centralised federal government, or a loose, weakly compacted federal league. Prussia and Bavaria opposed the revival of the imperial dignity, because, as Hardenberg frankly said, an empire as strong as was necessary

would be disadvantageous to the independence of Prussia ; while a weak empire would be useless. But a strong federal government was possible, and many of the lesser princes looked to Prussia as the suitable leader. The Duke of Saxe-Weimar and his minister Gersdorf advocated a union of a portion of Germany, somewhat after the plan of Frederic the Great's league of the princes, to become the germ of a larger confederation made up of those states whose position and character were not opposed to the spirit of the original confederated states. But such a scheme would have required more sacrifices than most of the South German states were willing to make. A treaty of confederation had been drawn up by Hardenberg and Humboldt, the Prussian representatives, based upon an elaborate and well-defined scheme for a strong government. But Metternich, who sat with the representatives of Prussia, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Hanover on the committee appointed on German affairs, having opposed the plan, because it promised too much and was too liberal in its character, on May 7th himself presented a counter-draft based on the idea of a loose confederation of states with full sovereignty under the presidency of Austria. This draft was modified because of the negotiations with Prussia, and another was presented by Metternich on the 13th, which, in its constitutional features, closely resembled the treaty as finally adopted. Though severely criticised by Humboldt, it was made the basis of discussion, because Metternich refused to make any concessions ; and on May 14th, a fatal day for German unity, it was practically accepted, in the absence of the other members of the committee, by Prussia and Hanover. On the 26th the plan was officially laid before the princes of Germany, to whom Metternich said, in explaining the vagueness of the scheme, that the more detailed development of the constitution must be left for the Diet of the Confederation to complete. The discussion that ensued in the larger gathering of the German states, which

lasted from May 29th to June 3d, betrayed at once the difficulties attending any attempt at German unity. There was no talk of sacrifice, and the deputies concerned themselves with questions of sovereignty, rank, and precedence. Bavaria in particular was constantly threatening to remain outside of the Confederation. On June 4th, Prussia, influenced by the approaching end of the congress, agreed to sign the draft, reluctantly, however, for though both Hardenberg and Humboldt believed that inasmuch as it contained the main point sought for—the federation of Germany—it was better to accept it than to allow it to be farther weakened by discussion, or to be put off until after the congress had adjourned, yet both felt keenly how inadequately it represented the opinion of the people of Germany. The document was then voted upon, and on June 8, 1815, was finally signed by all except Darmstadt and Saxony. Thus there was established the Germanic Confederation, a body made up of forty sovereign states, six kingdoms, seven grand-duchies, nine duchies, eleven principalities, four free cities, and three states belonging to Denmark and Holland. These states were to be represented in a Diet sitting at Frankfort. Of this organisation as a whole it can only be said that it was hastily put together, and entered upon its career of evil for Germany with unmistakable signs of weakness and incompetency.

The policy that Metternich was thus applying in the case of Germany was adopted by the congress in its treatment of the Swiss question. Each of the nineteen cantons of Switzerland that had been organised into a fairly centralised state by Napoleon in the Act of Mediation of 1803, had with the fall of the Emperor resumed its claims to full independence and sovereignty. The situation was wholly to Metternich's liking, for, fearing that a compact and democratic state would be a menace to Austria and a refuge for radicals, he was determined to prevent the formation of such a state in Switzerland. The

Powers having in consequence declared that the full sovereignty of the individual cantons was to be made the basis of the Helvetic system, the cantons, now twenty-two in number, in August, 1815, drew up a constitution, in many ways strikingly like that of Germany, and erected a government in which the only federal bond was an inefficient and practically powerless Diet, and the only limitation upon the cantonal sovereignty was the denial of the right to make alliances hostile to the interests either of the Confederation or of the individual cantons. This decentralised government, by relegating all political and economic reforms to the initiative of each canton, arrested the development of Switzerland for more than thirty years; and by its want of control over religious matters made possible the Sonderbund war of 1847.

The last group of subjects discussed in the great congress indicates clearly the growth of new ideas regarding the relation of man to man, and of state to state. In a declaration dated from Vienna, February 8th, the eight Powers, England, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Portugal and the Brazils, Prussia, France, and Austria, declared it to be their wish to put an end to the slave trade, "that scourge which," they say, "has so long desolated Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity." While this declaration was only morally binding in that it left to each state the selection of its own time for abolishing the slave trade, nevertheless the Powers asserted that they would concur "in the most prompt and effectual execution of this measure, by all the means at their disposal," and would act "in the employment of these means with all the zeal and perseverance which is due to so great and noble a cause." Furthermore, the regulation of the treaty of Paris regarding the navigation of the rivers was made to apply to all the western rivers within the disposition of the Powers assembled. It was determined that such rivers should be free along their whole course from the point where each of them became navigable to

its mouth ; that they should not, with respect to commerce, be prohibited to any one ; and that all rules that should be established at any time should be framed alike for all, and be as favourable as possible to the commerce of all nations. Such acts were undoubtedly the outcome of economic necessity ; and though it may be said that the Powers were wholly selfish in seeking to check the traffic in slaves and to promote commercial intercommunication, yet the fact remains that at the congress there was introduced a new principle of a higher order controlling the diplomatic intercourse among the nations. Eighteenth century ideas regarding the relation and interests of states were breaking down. The mercantilist doctrine that what one state gained another state lost, was giving way to the truer economic doctrine, that everybody's gain is nobody's loss. Mercantilism did not admit the possibility of a steady growth in the wealth and resources of all the states simultaneously, and scarcely recognised any international principles in industry and commerce. In respect of these matters the policy of the Vienna congress was broader than that of the eighteenth century diplomats, who, concerning themselves with public rather than private international law, were blind to other interests than those of state. Such questions as those dealing with the slave trade, the navigation of rivers, and the right of aliens were to be left no longer to the decision of individual states, but, affecting as they did the common interest, they were to be settled by the common agreement of the Powers.

The fact that the plan of entrusting questions of international importance to the Powers sitting in council was inaugurated at the congress of Vienna, warrants the statement that its work marks an important stage in the development of a more equitable public law for Europe. It is true that mistakes were made by them. Talleyrand's principle of legitimacy was of no historical value ; territories were moved about with no regard to national or religious sentiments ; the union of Belgium to

Holland and of Norway to Sweden, the division of Poland and the reconstruction of Germany were in the interest of dynasties and not of the people ; no attention was paid to Italy's desire for unity ; and the one liberal action, the establishment of the independence of Cracow, was undone within thirty-two years. But with these particulars aside, we must recognise that the attempt to give Europe even the beginnings of a political organisation was a step in the direction of progress, for the congress of Vienna determined the political status of the states of Europe under the collective guarantee of the great Powers. The fact that by this act the peace of Europe was secured for thirty years is sufficient evidence to prove that the existence of such a council of the Powers, the object of which was to anticipate and control any differences arising between state and state, was itself a benefit to civilisation. We may regret that the diplomats at Vienna had so little political wisdom as not to see that the desire for national independence and constitutional liberty sprang from something deeper than a mere love of revolution and anarchy ; but it must be remembered that the majority of the diplomats knew no diplomacy save that which Napoleon had used,—the diplomacy of the old *régime*, and that it is not easy for us to appreciate the tenacity with which they clung to the old ideas in the presence of the fearful disturbances that the rising of the French people had brought upon Europe.

And the fears of the Powers were not allayed by events that were taking place during the sittings of the congress. On the morning of March 7th the news was brought to Metternich that Napoleon had left the island of Elba, and was approaching the continent. Talleyrand thought that he intended to land in Italy and operate among the disaffected Italians in Parma and Lombardy, but Metternich, with truer knowledge of Napoleon, said that he would go straight to Paris, for France alone could furnish him with the aid that he needed.

The motives for this famous movement of Napoleon are not far to seek. Before the diplomats had begun their work at Vienna, Napoleon had settled down as sovereign of the island of Elba. His untiring energy found an outlet in the almost feverish activity that characterised his ten months' residence in the island. He commanded, organised, constructed, inspected, walked, and rode, as if to forget the past in incessant movement, which gave him the illusion of action. He had his army, his navy, his ministry, his court life, even his troop of actors. Yet at the same time he did not lose sight of continental affairs. He knew of the unpopularity of the Bourbons, and was aware that the entrance of the *émigrés* into France had given rise to an intense dissatisfaction, particularly in the army, where old soldiers had been dismissed, and old names had been struck off the officer lists. He knew that the old nobility had been rewarded, that the Count of Artois had assumed the place of lieutenant-general, that old court ceremonies had been revived, and that every attempt had been made by *émigré* and *chouan* to blot out the memory of twenty-two years. At the same time he was watching another body than the French army. He knew of the disputes in the congress of Vienna, and of the bitter feeling among the plenipotentiaries. Believing that the alliance, to which the allies had adhered when Europe was in a state of war, might now be broken in a time of peace in the controversy over the spoils, he thought that the chances were in favour of a dissolution of the congress. He had also his personal grievances that made him uneasy at Elba. It was an open secret that Pozzo, Wellington, and Talleyrand were planning to remove him from his island to St. Lucia or some other place more distant and more secure. Louis XVIII. was not at all disposed to pay the annuity of two million francs allowed in the treaty of Fontainebleau. The Emperor of Austria had removed from him his son, and Metternich had succeeded through the attractions of

Count Neipperg in dissuading Marie Louise from joining him. He feared that Talleyrand was plotting to put him in close confinement, or even to assassinate him. These grievances furnished him with a pretext, and probably made his return more sudden and precipitous than it otherwise would have been. The actual cause was the hope of success to which the condition of France had given rise ; while over and above all else was the fact that he was Napoleon Bonaparte, still in the prime of life.

The startling character of the report acted as a tremendous force binding the allies once more together, and giving harmony to their actions. The alliance of January, that diplomatic triumph of Talleyrand, which nearly dissolved the congress,—a dissolution which Napoleon seems to have thought had already taken place—was undone in an instant, and all Talleyrand's efforts to build up a French coalition came to nothing. In this emergency Talleyrand's first thought seems to have been to prevent Austria from going over to the support of Napoleon, by forcing from the eight Powers who had signed the treaty of Paris a declaration of common hostility to the exiled Emperor. The allies of the Fourth Coalition verbally renewed the conditions of the treaty of Chaumont, and on March 13th issued their declaration that "Napoleon Bonaparte, in breaking the agreement by which he was established in the island of Elba [had] destroyed the only safeguard attached to his existence. In reappearing in France with designs of disorder and revolution he [had] by his own act deprived himself of the protection of the laws and [had] manifested to the world that neither peace nor truce [could] be made with him." The Powers consequently declared that Napoleon had "placed himself beyond the pale of civil and social relations, and that as the enemy and disturber of the world's peace" he had "delivered himself up to public justice." On March 25th, after it was known that Napoleon had arrived at Paris, the verbal agreement of March 7th was

replaced by a formal treaty of alliance, in which the Powers, after engaging to maintain the conditions of the treaty of Paris and the stipulations thus far signed at Vienna, placed their armies on a war footing. In a short time all the other states of Europe had joined the alliance, and the last coalition against Napoleon was formed.

In the meantime what was the attitude of France, upon whom alone Napoleon could depend? It was evident that he would not be supported by all France, for opposition to him had been gaining strength for some time before the battle of Leipzig. It was also evident that his main strength would lie in the army, and the poorer and more revolutionary classes. On his march northward from the bay of Jouan he met with astonishing success; the peasantry of Dauphiné received him with open arms; the troops despatched by the governor of Grenoble refused to resist him; Labédoyère and Ney deserted to his side; regiment after regiment abandoned their allegiance to the Bourbons; the old guard in a body deserted the Duke of Reggio; and finally the troops of Paris began to waver until not a regiment remained to protect the king. Louis XVIII., after declaring to the Chamber of Deputies that he was ready to die in defence of France, fled to Lille; but the spirit of defection had spread into the north also, and as the generals in command at Laon, Lille, and Noyon were already planning a military uprising, the king, in fear of imprisonment, hastened to foreign soil, settling at Ypres and afterward at Ghent. But while the army and the poorer classes supported the Emperor, the *bourgeoisie*, desiring peace, and fearing that Napoleon's return meant a continuance of the war, looked on with coldness and suspicion. Among them were those who not only sought for peace as necessary for the security of capital and the increase of wealth, but also wished to retain and advance the political liberties granted by the charter that Louis XVIII. had already issued. This the constitu-

tional, party worked hard to impress upon the people the real gains of the Bourbon government, to show that their liberties were better secured by the new *régime* than by the old ; but its efforts were in vain. The Bourbons and their *clientèle* had succeeded in one short year in destroying in the minds of the people at large all gratitude for the reforms inaugurated ; the nation preferred glory with Napoleon to liberty with the Bourbons. Then, too, Napoleon came to France with peace and liberty upon his lips. To each class he uttered well chosen words. To the peasants he promised protection from the nobility, relief from conscription, and security in the possession of their lands ; to the capitalists he said that he was weary of war, that the Empire now meant peace, liberty, and repose ; to the constitutional party he promised the maintenance of a constitutional government, and he declared that he would meet the desire of the French nation for greater political liberty by a modification of the constitution of the Empire. In the hope, therefore, of drawing the constitutional party to his side, he caused such an amendment, the *Acte additionnel aux constitutions de l'Empire*, to be drawn up by Benjamin Constant and Regnaud de St. Angely, which in the main followed the Charta of Louis XVIII. and guaranteed freedom of religion, of the press, and of the individual, responsibility of ministers, and the security of the person and property. How this attempt at a limitation of absolutism would have ended can only be conjectured. It was never put to the test. Liberal professions were incongruous in the mouth of Napoleon, and representative government was in no sense in harmony with Napoleonic ideas.

While Napoleon was thus declaring to France his peaceful and liberal intentions, he was also endeavouring to enter into negotiations with the allies ; but here he met with absolute failure. No attention was paid to his declarations ; his couriers were turned back, and Caulaincourt was informed that the allies would hold no communication whatever with his master.

Each side, therefore, continued its preparations for war. Napoleon never showed greater activity, greater genius for administration, than when he attempted, in the months of April, May, and June, to get ready an army to defeat the allies, restore the Empire, and establish the Napoleonic dynasty once more upon the throne of France. Not only had he to organise a government and equip an army, but he had to do this in the face of apathy, disloyalty, and even treachery on the part of many of those upon whom he was obliged to depend. Yet in spite of this he succeeded in getting together a force of 200,000 men, consisting largely of veterans strong in the experience gained from earlier campaigns, and making up one of the best armies that he had had for many years. To this force the allies were able to oppose in all about 900,000 men, who, however, were scattered from Belgium to Savoy. Two possible plans were open to Napoleon: one was to allow the allies to enter France and advance toward Paris, thus giving the Emperor more time wherein to raise, equip, and drill an army; the other to act on the offensive, and in a series of brilliant strokes to defeat the separated allies, somewhat after the manner of the earlier campaigns. The condition of France made imperative the adoption of the second plan, for the tenure of Napoleon was too uncertain, the discontent too great, the opposition from within too imminent, to permit the admission of a foreign army to the soil of France. Therefore, Napoleon determined in one quick, aggressive movement to attack first the Prussians under Blücher near Ligny and Charleroi, then the English, Dutch, and Belgian troops under Wellington, lying between the Scheldt and Brussels; and finally, having defeated each in turn, to move southward with the utmost rapidity against the Russians and Austrians on the upper Rhine. Even Fouché, already treacherously plotting against him, believed that he would win the first two battles, but prophesied defeat in the third.

To carry out this plan of campaign, therefore, he left Paris on the 11th of June, and started for the northern frontier. In the first encounter with the Prussians at Charleroi on the 15th, the Emperor won the day, and compelled the Prussian advance to fall back to Ligny. On the 16th, Ney began his attack at Quatre Bras, which lay between Charleroi and Waterloo, and was held by the Dutch and Belgians under the Prince of Saxe-Weimar. The gradual arrival of the British troops saved the day, and Ney was driven back toward Charleroi, with a loss of 4000 men. But in the meantime the Prussians, attacked by Napoleon himself, had been forced to retreat from Ligny northward toward Brussels. At this point, with Wellington's forces exhausted and exposed and Blücher's in retreat, Napoleon neglected to follow up the attack. He probably thought that the Prussians had retreated south-eastward toward Namur instead of northward, an error which made it possible for Wellington to move northward from Quatre Bras to Waterloo, and for Blücher to make good his escape to Wavre. The matter of supreme moment in the minds of the allies was to keep together for mutual aid, a fact that explains Blücher's movement northward on a line nearly parallel to the Brussels road. Wellington, trusting in Blücher's promise to support him, had taken his stand along the high ground near Waterloo, and was prepared to accept battle if offered. It had now become plainly evident that Napoleon planned to force his army between the allies to prevent their union. He had sent Grouchy on the 17th to follow the Prussian retreat; but that general, instead of bending toward the west to intercept the Prussian flank movement toward Waterloo, made the attack at Wavre, and in so doing failed to check the Prussians, because he engaged with their rear-guard only, and was too far away to be of use to Napoleon at the critical moment. When, therefore, on the 18th the Prussians at Wavre heard the cannonading which announced that Wellington had accepted Napoleon's attack,

they began their movement from Wavre westward, a bold and dangerous movement, because in case of Wellington's defeat it left them exposed and far removed from their communication on the Rhine. The attack on Waterloo began about noon on Sunday, the 18th, and the battle was waged with alternating success and failure around the farmstead of Hougomont and along the crest of la Haye Sainte for more than four hours. Soon after four o'clock began the famous cavalry charges in which the flower of Napoleon's horsemen beat in vain against the squares of Wellington. The arrival of the Prussians gave new life to the English resistance, and made more and more hopeless the advance of the French horse. Finally, at seven o'clock, Napoleon made the last and most famous attempt to dislodge the allied troops, but it was met with the same stubborn determination that had characterised the fighting of the preceding seven hours. Then, as the imperial guard fell back before the fire of the English, Wellington ordered a general advance. The Prussians hurled themselves on the French right, and the British cavalry supporting the advancing infantry wrought havoc and defeat as they swept down the valley. With the fall of Planchenoit, the last point defended by the French, the rout became general, and the battle of Waterloo was over.

Neither England nor Prussia can take to herself the credit of the victory of Waterloo ; Wellington could not have won without Blücher, nor could Blücher have won without Wellington. The battle is famous not because it was a defeat for Napoleon—for eventual failure was inevitable—but because as a defeat it was sudden and overwhelming. Napoleon had come into contact with only one of a series of mighty armies drawn in an arc about France, under the leadership of men who had learned the importance of united action. Europe was determined on the overthrow of the man who had once more threatened its peace, and neither armistice nor compromise was possible. The reappearance of Napoleon in no way altered the course of

events, except as it bound the allies more closely together, quickened the diplomatic lethargy at Vienna and involved France in a heavier punishment. The question of the future of Europe and the destiny of Napoleon was settled not at Waterloo but at Leipzig, and the more famous battle only made impossible the continuation of his personal supremacy over France. After the flight from the field of battle, only one course lay open to the defeated Emperor, and that was to abdicate absolutely. As France would have nothing more to do with him, he fled to the coast with the intention of embarking for America; but finding that he was watched by British cruisers, he placed himself under the protection of the English. By a formal agreement, the Powers handed him over to England for safe-keeping, and under her escort he was taken to St. Helena, where he died in 1821. The comparatively trifling hardships of Napoleon on the British island, the French hostility to the commonplace government of the house of Orléans, the French love of great deeds, and the bitterness of party conflict kept alive the Napoleonic legend until there arose, forty years later, a new Napoleon, a ghostly resemblance of the old, to testify to the wonderful personality of the man who for twenty years had been the centre of the interest of Europe.

With the final withdrawal of Napoleon from European politics, there came once more before the allies the necessity of solving the problem regarding the position of France. Matters had now taken on a different aspect, for the Powers of Europe held France responsible for the short but bloody campaign of the Hundred Days. The renewal of the coalition on March 25th made the Powers once more the armed arbiters of Europe, and as the object of this quadruple alliance had been the overthrow of Napoleon, who had been supported by Louis XVIII.'s "misguided subjects" as Louis himself called them, so the first task was the settlement of the terms of reconciliation. Preliminary to such treaty-arrangements was the restoration of the

Bourbons as the only guarantee of peace, the establishment of a stable government with Talleyrand as the minister of foreign affairs, and the regicide Fouché, whose nomination was a disgrace to the royalist party, as minister of police. The Duke of Richelieu, in whom the Powers had the greatest confidence, was appointed the French representative to negotiate the terms of peace, the most difficult of which was that relating to the boundary of France. In regard to the question as to whether France should be reduced to helplessness by an extensive curtailment of territory, the Powers again differed. Wellington opposed the demand for a great cession of territory, and advocated a military occupation of French fortresses, for a sufficiently long time to give strength and security to the government of the king. In this view Russia concurred, arguing that a war undertaken to maintain one treaty of peace ought not to result in the substitution of another less favourable. Though Austria agreed with the others that the campaign had not been for conquest, yet, believing that a military occupation was insufficient, insisted that some cession of territory should be made. Prussia alone, already defeated on the Saxon question at Vienna, and burning with a spirit of revenge for old and new wrongs, declared herself in favour of a territorial weakening of France. Hardenberg wrote that a sure and durable peace could only be obtained by taking from France all territory east of the Vosges along the Meuse to the sea, a policy that meant of course the cession of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. In the Prussian declaration of August 4th he added these prophetic words: "Let us not lose the moment so favourable to the weal both of Europe and France which now offers of establishing a peace. At this moment we can do it. The hand of Providence has visibly offered us this opportunity. If we let it slip, streams of blood will flow to attain this object, and the cry of the unhappy victims will call us to give an account of our conduct." This is a striking foreshadowing of the struggle

that did take place fifty-five years later. But again Hardenberg had to abandon his position as he had done on the Saxon question and in the controversy regarding the form of the Germanic constitution. A compromise was effected and France was left very much as she had been in 1790, although in some directions her territory was reduced to an extent less than it had been a century before. The fortresses of Philipeville, Marienburg, Saarlouis, Saarbruck, Landau, and the territory of French Savoy were to be surrendered, but Alsace and Lorraine in their entirety were left to France. By far the heaviest burden was the war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, to be paid in five years without interest, and the requirement to furnish 50,000,000 francs per annum for the equipment, clothing, and incidental expenses of the allied troops, which to the extent of 150,000 men were to occupy the soil of France for a period not to exceed five years.

Thus, generally speaking, the war of the Hundred Days cost France dear in territory, money, and prestige; but this was not all she suffered. The Prussians, Bavarians, and Würtembergers behaved outrageously in Paris; bivouacs were planted in the garden of the Tuileries; warehouses were plundered; and the recently constructed bridge of Jena was threatened with destruction. The works of art which, with the exception of the Victory of the Brandenburger gate in Berlin, had been left to France in 1814, were now taken away from the Louvre; the bronze horses of St. Mark's were returned to Venice; the "Transfiguration" and the "Last Communion of St. Jerome" to the Vatican; the "Apollo Belvedere" and the "Laocoon" to St. Peter's; the "Venus de' Medici" to Florence; the "Descent from the Cross" to Antwerp, and Memline's "Last Judgment" to Dantzig. Perhaps no one of the acts of the allies so touched the pride of the French people as this wholly justifiable restitution of property. It might well have been expected that the Powers of Europe would wreak a just ven-

geance upon France for the new miseries she had brought once more upon the nations ; nevertheless, they showed a striking spirit of moderation, and treated France with the magnanimity befitting a mighty conquering state. Even while they demanded sacrifices they left the country strong and without serious humiliation, to take its place once more as a European Power. If they erred it was on the side of too great liberality ; for it might have been better in the end for Europe had France been made to suffer a greater curtailment of territory.

With the signing of the Final Act of the Vienna congress, June 9th, with the sending of Napoleon to St. Helena, August 15th, and with the signing of the second treaty of Paris, November 20th, was completed one great period of European history. The period had been one of intense excitement and action, because of the marvellous energy and genius of one man, whose movements had disturbed the normal order of society, had diverted the gradual economic and social development of European civilisation, had waked in states a sense of common interest and common duty, and in nations a consciousness of their influence and their powers. The era upon which Europe was about to enter was an era of peace. The nations were exhausted. The spring of action, strained to the utmost, now broke, and with the passing away of the vehemence and violence of the revolutionary age, there arose in the hearts of all a desire for a cessation of the horrors of war, a longing for tranquillity and repose. The peace that followed, which was the more intense as the warfare had been the more widespread and active, was created neither by the congress of Vienna nor by the policy of reaction ; it was possible because of the languor that follows excessive excitement and of the weariness and distress of the nations composing the European family. It was the general fear of a disturbance of this peace, and of an outbreak of the old revolutionary forces that made it possible for the policy of princes to dominate the new national aspira-

tions, and to keep in check all attempts on the part of reformers and *doctrinaires* to change the existing constitutional order. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that the conservative spirit would have been less unyielding, and the resistance to all popular movements less positive and inflexible, had it not been for the almost fanatical persistence of one man, Metternich.

So intense had been the feeling roused by the despotism of Napoleon, and so great was the need of popular support on the part of the princes of Europe, that the period from 1813 to 1815 was an era of appeals, and of promises that seemed to favour national unity and constitutional liberty. Political reforms, national greatness, and constitutional government continued to be the subject of a good deal of discussion during the years from the first war of liberation to the Carlsbad decrees in 1819.

In 1813 Frederic William, needing the support of his people, had held out hopes of a national assembly, and had spoken with fervour of the new national life of Germany; and Alexander, at this time the most liberal-minded of all the sovereigns, had made the appeal of Frederic William much more efficient by proclaiming to the Germans in the same year that he would support them in their struggle for liberty. Austria also, through General Nugent, the leader of the imperial troops, had in plain, straightforward, and apparently honest language, held out to Italy the promise of independence and unity. Talleyrand, in a memoir drawn up and presented to Louis XVIII., had defined constitutional government in liberal terms, alleging that his opinions were those of the ministers and diplomats generally. Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies, also, had entered upon his reign with promises of peace, concord, and oblivion of the past, had declared himself in favour of reform, had proposed changes in the fundamental law, and had given his people to believe that he was in favour of a constitution. In one form or another, Russia, Prussia, and Austria were either sincerely or hypocritically expressing sympathy with the

constitutional and national ideas that were dominating Europe. Each Power had promised either directly or indirectly to those states that lacked national unity somewhat of that which they desired. The result was that in Germany and Italy particularly, there existed great animation and expectation, and that liberals everywhere were greatly encouraged by the grant of a liberal constitution to France by Louis XVIII., and by the attempt of Prussia and Russia to fulfil their promises. On May 22, 1815, while the congress of Vienna was still sitting, Frederic William issued an ordinance in which he repeated the pledge already given to the Prussian people, and definitely promised a constitution by means of which should be established a representative government of the people. On June 21st of the same year, the cannon at Warsaw announced that Alexander had restored the kingdom of Poland. To it he gave a constitution, which promised a strictly Polish administration and a national representation; which guaranteed the liberty of the press and religion; which assured equality before the law to all citizens without regard to class or condition; and which made ministers responsible to the national court for all breaches of its conditions.

There is no doubt that even at best the reorganisation of the old governments along constitutional lines would have been difficult and slow; but the obstacles were increased by the opposition of Metternich, who not only controlled the policy of his own state, but who influenced also the actions of those European sovereigns who had thus far shown themselves more or less in sympathy with a moderate liberalism. Against all liberal movements Metternich deliberately set his face. He was a man of little elasticity of mind, to whom stability and the existing order were the only conditions of peace. He was a statesman who lacked far-sighted statesmanship, a diplomat who saw only one class of political interests, and those the interests of the governments. He accepted the doctrine of the

Metternich

progress of the human mind, but believed that this progress had not been accompanied with a corresponding growth of wisdom; that there had on the contrary developed a spirit of presumption, "the natural result of the rapid progression of the human mind toward the perfecting of so many things"; and that to "the presumptuous man, to whom knowledge seemed to come by inspiration, for whom experience had no value, to whom faith was nothing," was to be ascribed "the erection of false systems supported by passion and error." To Metternich, therefore, all uprisings of the people, all expressions of the principles of the French Revolution in the form of popular demands, seemed dangers and menaces to the public order. He drew his horror of the Revolution from his long struggle with Napoleon, and, unable to discriminate between the Emperor and the Revolution itself, he concluded that in every country with which Napoleon had come in contact seeds of the Revolution had been sown from which had sprung a revolutionary spirit that was concealing itself under the mask of patriotism. In his mind there was no distinction between liberalism and anarchy; each stood for independence of authority and the destruction of governments. Having held such doctrine from his youth up—for he tells us in his *Mémoires* that when but nineteen at Maintz he felt that the Revolution was the adversary he should have to fight,—he continued in times of peace, as the enemy of the doctrines of popular sovereignty and democratic government, to oppose all that the Revolution had done for Europe. Although he was a thorough egoist, superficial in judgment, unprogressive in political ideas, and immovable in his own convictions, he was undoubtedly possessed of great persuasive power and considerable personal magnetism, and must be ranked among the great diplomats of Europe.

Thus Metternich, representing a counter-revolution of peace and conservatism, and confident of the stability of Austria, sought first to control his Emperor, and then, by protecting

his country from the agitations going on without, to prevent it from becoming in any way influenced by revolutionary ideas. Hoping thus to render Austria the type of law and order, he next endeavoured to maintain the position that Austria had gained in the second war of liberation, and to secure for his Emperor, and for himself as his representative, the position of arbiter of Europe. This he was able to do, after the war had closed, by the new political system that the congress of Vienna had established for Europe. Instead of a group of states loosely connected and constantly struggling for the maintenance of a European equilibrium, as had been the case in the eighteenth century, there was now a federation under the control of the four chief Powers (or five with France), which guaranteed the peace of Europe. Thus Europe could be looked upon as a great family, governed by a self-created congress of the Powers, which had as its principle of action the preservation of rest and quiet to each member of the family. Metternich interpreted the task of such a congress to include interference not only in the relations between states but also in the internal life of states, and thus demanded that the congress intervene to protect each individual state in which stability was endangered by uprisings of any kind whatever. In accepting this interpretation the congress claimed the right to interfere actively in the affairs of any state in order to secure public order, and to preserve the integrity of treaties and the principles of legitimacy laid down at Vienna. Neither the system of congresses nor the dogma of interference was the product of any single man's mind ; both resulted from the many enforced experiments that had been made to obtain harmonious action, and their continuance was deemed necessary to prevent any further outbursts of the revolutionary spirit.

The name, the Holy Alliance, that has been given to this union of Powers, comes from a curious incident that took place during the negotiations regarding the terms of the second treaty

of Paris. This alliance has become famous far beyond its deserts. It was the work of Alexander, who, as Emperor of all the Russias, occupied a leading place among the sovereigns because of his share in the recent overthrow of Napoleon. This man had during his earlier years been brought under the influence of such liberal and progressive men as La Harpe, Czartorysky, and Stein, and from the date of his accession in 1801 had shown a strong tendency toward liberalism. Before Tilsit, and again in the first war of liberation, he sought to pose as the liberator of Europe. Now that which in the earlier period had expressed itself in sympathy with the popular cause, tended, in consequence of the tremendous pressure of events in the following years, to become sentimental and religious. In 1814 he had come under the spell not only of a mystical romanticism but also of the strong religious reaction that swept over Europe; and for some time had been on intimate terms with Baroness de Krüdener, the wife of a Russian diplomat, who made a deep impression upon him. With her he entered into long discussions upon dogma, confession, penance, and the like. The effect of such conversations was the greater because Alexander never forgot the circumstances of his accession to the throne, which had come about through the assassination of his father. In consequence of these influences he began to exemplify Metternich's judgment that he was possessed of a character which showed "a peculiar mixture of masculine virtues and feminine weaknesses," and was always influenced "by fanciful ideas," seizing "upon them as if by sudden inspiration and with the greatest eagerness." Looking upon himself as the angel whose sword had struck down the Corsican Satan, and with a sincerity that has led some to ascribe to him symptoms of insanity, he seemed inclined to pose as the religiously appointed guardian of the affairs of Europe. As the result of these new sentiments, he drew up a kind of formal expression of his religious enthusiasm applied to politics, and presented it to Aus-

tria and Prussia. Frederic William signed it willingly enough, but Metternich, according to his own statement, modified it considerably, because it was, as he said, nothing but "a philanthropic aspiration clothed in religious garb," "a loud-sounding nothing." Nevertheless he advised the Emperor to sign it, partly because he was unwilling to affront Alexander at a time when he wished to make use of him, and partly because he could really make the Holy Alliance further his own ends.

The document thus sent out in the name of the three monarchs was signed in turn by every European Power except England, Turkey, and the Pope. The last named did not sign it, in the first place, because he was not asked; in the second place, because he was too dogmatically religious to believe that a union between a Roman Catholic (Francis), a Greek Catholic (Alexander), and a Protestant (Frederic William) could come to any good end. England did not sign it because, as Castlereagh said, it was "a simple declaration of Biblical principles, which would have carried England back to the epoch of the saints, of Cromwell, and the roundheads." The prince regent, however, compromised by writing to the Czar that he approved of the principles contained in the document. Probably no one of the European sovereigns except Alexander and Frederic William took the document seriously, and it was, therefore, of no political consequence, except as it gave a certain amount of strength to the union of the Powers already established for the preservation of peace.

As this European system looked backward to the earlier war alliances for its inception, so it looked forward to a series of peace congresses in the records of which its rules of action were to be expressed with elaborate minuteness. A definite agreement was, however, necessary, and this was made at Paris, November 20, 1815, when the four chief Powers entered into a treaty of alliance and friendship of a very different character from that contained in the text of the Holy Alliance. In

this treaty, which was the legal warrant for the summoning of all future congresses, the Powers, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, resolved to give to the principles laid down at Chaumont and Vienna the application most suitable to a time of peace, and agreed to renew their meetings after fixed intervals. The object of these meetings was, the document says, "to consult upon their common interests and to consider the measures which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." But there is no indication in the text of the agreement of the policy to be followed. Upon this question the Powers were by no means agreed, and there was every reason to suppose that the first congress, whenever it should be called, would not present a picture of unruffled harmony. Russia was likely to prove obstinate, for in all previous experiments Alexander had stood opposed to the Austro-English attitude, and it was largely for the purpose of overcoming this obstinacy that Metternich had humoured Alexander by joining the Holy Alliance. It was a politic move and proved successful in the end; and perhaps no phase of the diplomacy from 1814 to 1821 is more interesting than the manner in which the Austrian chancellor won the Russian Czar to the cause of reaction. Metternich's success, disastrous as it was in many particulars for liberalism in Europe, did confer one unquestionable blessing upon the nations. The repose of Europe was threatened not only by what Metternich called "the power of rebellion and outrage," but also by the danger of a disagreement in this council of sovereigns, which, had it come about, might have divided Europe into two hostile camps. Such a division Metternich prevented; for by his diplomatic skill, his power of persuasion, his sophistry, and confidence in his ability to influence others, he was able to make his policy supreme in Europe for a decade, in Germany for nearly twenty years, in Austria

until his downfall in 1848. He it was who called the congresses and was the soul of their action. He strengthened the new European system by bringing the sovereigns and their ministers to a recognition of the necessity of harmony for the maintenance of peace.

After 1815, the first opportunity that arose for the testing of the new system and of Metternich's ability to control its decisions was in 1818, when a congress was called to determine the question of the evacuation of French territory, which, through the wise administration of the Duke of Richelieu, was agreed to by the Powers two years before the final date named in the second treaty of Paris. At this congress not only was the evacuation satisfactorily arranged by the withdrawal of the foreign troops from France, but the union of the great Powers was completed by the invitation extended to France to take part in their deliberations, present and future. The treaty was signed on October 9, 1818; on November 4th the invitation to France was sent; and on the 15th the final declaration, which marked the last step in the establishment of the new European state system, was agreed to by the five Powers. By this declaration the sovereigns announced their object to be "the maintenance of peace and guarantee of all transactions hitherto established." They bound themselves "to observe the principles of the law of nations, which alone could efficiently guarantee the independence of each government and the stability of the general association." They solemnly acknowledged "that their duty toward God and toward the people that they governed required that they give to the world, so far as they were able, an example of justice, harmony, and moderation"; and they considered themselves "happy to be able to devote their efforts in the future to the protection of the arts of peace, to the increase of the internal prosperity of their states, and to the re-awakening of those sentiments of religion and morality, the supremacy of which had been weakened by the evil of the time."

Any one reading this public declaration might well have believed that the allies were acting in perfect harmony for the welfare of Europe ; but he would not have been so optimistic had he known that in the same day the four Powers renewed the war alliance against France, "in order to resist the unholy influence of the new revolutionary uprising which might threaten her." This was called out by the rapid growth from 1816 to 1818 of the liberal movement in France, and though it was meant to be entirely secret, it was known to Richelieu and through him to Louis XVIII.

In spite of appearances to the contrary, Canning, home secretary of England, and other clear-sighted liberals believed that the union of the Powers was a menace to liberty. It is true that the public acts of the congress of 1818 did not justify them in this opinion, but their worst fears were fully realised in the acts of the congresses of Troppau and Laibach, which were convened in 1820 and 1821 to suppress the popular risings in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain. Metternich, who was the ruling spirit at these congresses, was able to impose his policy upon the assembled sovereigns, though matters at first did not go entirely to his liking. He found Alexander, and particularly his minister Capodistrias, opposed to his policy of intervention ; and England, who was unwilling to recognise the right of the Powers to cross the boundaries of another state, inclined to a policy of neutrality. But by dint of urging, by references to the spectre of revolution, he managed to separate the sovereign of Russia from his minister. Capodistrias refused to submit to Metternich's influence, and consequently became in the mind of the Austrian statesman "not a bad man, but, honestly speaking, a complete and thorough fool, a perfect miracle of wrong-headedness." Alexander, who finally submitted to Metternich's persuasions and accepted the policy of suppression, "behaved excellently well," although it required a transference of the congress to Laibach to complete the imperial change of

mind. When this had been accomplished the three Powers agreed on their statement of principles. They claimed in their circular issued from Troppau the incontestable right to take common measures of safety against states in which the government had been overthrown by rebellion. Such an uprising they considered as an infraction of the peace of Europe, an attack upon the European system to be met by pacific or coercive measures as the case might be. They resolved to recognise no governments founded on revolution, and in inviting England and France to co-operate, expressly declared that their only desire was "to preserve and maintain peace, to deliver Europe from the scourge of revolutions, and to obviate or lessen the ills which arise from the violation of the precepts of order and morality." Putting their principles into immediate practice, the congress authorised Metternich to send eighty thousand men into the Neapolitan kingdom, and thus, although England and France refused to co-operate, advanced a step beyond the position taken at Aix-la-Chapelle. They followed Metternich's creed that all that was legally established must be preserved by joint-action, without regard to right, justice, or the character of sovereigns and courts. Perjury, cruelty, and disregard for the duties of kingship went for nothing in the face of the fact that popular movement was revolution, and popular demands, presumptuous interference. These principles the Powers declared on May 21, 1821, to be the permanent guides of their action.

However permanent the Powers may have intended this policy to be, nevertheless it was in fact to have but one more trial. The intervention in Naples prepared the way for intervention in Spain, where a military revolution had broken out in 1820 against the restored Ferdinand VII., who in 1815 had overthrown the constitution and had since been conducting himself in a brutally arbitrary manner. In close connection with this movement there began in the Spanish colonies in

America outbreaks that eventually resulted in South American independence. In 1822 the Spanish constitution of 1812 was proclaimed by the successful revolutionists, and Ferdinand in Spain, like Ferdinand in Naples, nephew and uncle skilled in the arts of duplicity alike, took the oath to the constitution. Once more the arbiters of European peace knit their brows over a successful revolution, and a congress was summoned at Verona in 1822 at which were present the two Emperors, the kings of Prussia, Sardinia, and Naples, the lesser princes of Italy, and the representatives of France and England. The conditions were favourable for an application of the new principles. Alexander had now completely gone over to the side of Metternich. The man who in 1815 had granted Poland a constitution, and had compelled Louis XVIII. to grant a charter to the French people, now wished to dispatch a Russian army into Spain to overthrow a revolution whereby Spain had obtained a constitution. France, also, through a political change which had brought the Ultras into power, wished to enter upon a campaign for the protection of the Spanish Bourbons, and asked the Powers whether in case the French ambassador were withdrawn from Madrid and a war were begun, their assistance could be counted upon. But while Russia and France were thus committing themselves to the doctrine of intervention, England was taking a stand against it even more definite than before. Although at Troppau Sir Charles Stewart had not positively declared England's separation from the policy of the continental Powers, yet, notwithstanding the support he would have received from the reactionary tendencies of the home government, he found himself unable to accept their decisions. At Verona, however, the breach was made. Wellington rejected the proposal to intervene in Spanish affairs, and Canning, now foreign minister, soon made it clear that England intended to recognise Spain's revolting colonies across the seas, and to employ every effort, save that

of actually resisting Spain, to prevent an unjust war. From this time a fundamental difference appeared between the attitude of England and that of the governments of the Continent. Castlereagh, who had been foreign minister from 1810 to 1822, in sympathy as he had been with so many reactionary phases of continental politics, had begun in his later years to see the injustice of the doctrines governing the acts of the congresses, and had already proposed the policy that Canning, his successor, defiantly followed. The congress of Verona sanctioned the restoration of Ferdinand VII. by the French, but England no longer followed the common accord. The system of a union of the Powers to regulate the affairs of Europe remained intact, but the principle of interfering in the internal affairs of states was applied for the last time at Verona. Events were moving rapidly, and the attack on the doctrine in which England stood opposed to Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France, was soon to result in a breach in the alliance of a character so serious as to make impossible its retention as a political law of Europe.

That which effected the overthrow of Metternich's supremacy and the doctrine that he supported was the Greek revolution, the first of those revolutions in the decade following the congress of Vienna that represented a true national movement. Stimulated by an intellectual revival that gave new life to the desire for independence, and by the ideas of the French Revolution, which had penetrated even to the Hellenic peninsula, the Greeks, maddened by the barbarous cruelty of the Turks, rose with determination against their oppressors, and entered in 1821 upon their famous struggle which tested the tenacity of the Greek people and won the sympathy of liberals everywhere. Starting with an uprising in the Morea, the insurrection spread rapidly to continental Greece; but suffering from jealousy, ill-faith, and even treachery, from want of united action and efficient leadership, it was not evenly or continuously sustained. At first Alexander, under the influence of

Metternich, was wholly antagonistic to the efforts of the Greeks, as, to be consistent, must have been the man who had aided Austria at Laibach to put down the uprising in Naples, and who had been anxious at Verona to march 150,000 men into Spain. Metternich's hand was upon him, and toward the Greek revolution Metternich felt only hatred. Its origin was to him "in the plots of disorganised factions that menace all thrones and all institutions." Fearing that any attempt to repress the revolt according to the method employed in Naples and Spain might result in a breach of the alliance, he recommended to Alexander the advisability of leaving Turkey to terminate the struggle alone. This advice Alexander at first followed, as did, in fact, all the other states of Europe. But as the Greeks persisted in their efforts, and it became evident that a whole nation was heroically resisting the tyranny of the Ottoman Empire, the people of the west were roused to an enthusiastic support of the revolution; all nationalities began to be represented in the Grecian army, money began to pour into Greece from all lands, and even the governments began to change their attitude. Canning did not conceal his own sympathy with the Greek cause, and England took into consideration the advisability of abandoning her position of neutrality. In 1824, Alexander, fearing the growth of English influence, proposed the division of Greece into three parts, Morea, East and West Hellas, tributary to the Sultan, but otherwise self-governing. This of course meant a Russian protectorate, and Metternich, as well as Canning, saw through the scheme. The former was now driven to take a definite stand, and refusing to consider any compromise measure, insisted upon entire submission or entire independence for the Greeks. Both he and Canning began to speak of war for the purpose of resisting Russian aggression. Russia began to draw apart from Austria, and after the death of Alexander in December, 1825, his brother Nicolas,—bound by no tie to the

past, free from all connections, sentimental or political, with the policy of the Austrian statesman, and interested in one subject only, the strengthening of Russia at home and abroad,—began to listen to the English overtures. Under the influence of Wellington, whom Canning sent to St. Petersburg, an alliance between the two Powers was formed; and on April 4, 1826, was issued a protocol of conference between the British and Russian plenipotentiaries, in which the mediation of England was accepted between the Ottoman Porte and the Greeks. This act, as Metternich confessed, drew “a definite line between the past and the future.” The Holy Alliance was almost hopelessly shattered; the doctrine of intervention might still be applied by individual states, but it could no longer be the governing principle of the European state system; England and Russia stood opposed to Austria, Prussia, and France, and “everything,” as it seemed to Metternich, “was going wrong.” Nor had the end of the “wrong-going” yet been reached; for in 1826, when it was decided to hold a congress in London to settle the question of Greek independence, Metternich found his supremacy gone. His instructions to the Austrian ambassador, based on the principles of 1822 and 1823, from which the ambassador was under no conditions to depart, were repudiated by Russia, because they were at variance with the principles of the protocol of April 4th. Metternich had lost his cunning; and the congresses of Europe were no longer to be bound by the principles of legitimacy, stability, and intervention that had characterised the earlier congresses of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona. Even France, who was in the hands of the reactionists and ecclesiastics, saw in the support of the Christian Greeks a crusade against the Mohammedan Turks, and deserted Metternich for the opposition. The treaty of London, July 6, 1827, was signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia, Prussia alone remaining faithful to Austria. The mediation of the Powers was now offered to the Greeks and the

✓ Turks, and on the refusal of the latter to accept the situation the battle of Navarino, October 20, 1827, in which France, England, and Russia intervened to protect the Greeks, made sure the independence of the Hellenic nation. The "terrible catastrophe," according to Metternich, the "untoward event," according to Wellington, introduced a new era in the history not only of the Greeks but also of the public law of Europe.

So effectual was the check given to the reactionary policy in the matter of the Greek revolution, that almost no attempt was made to apply or even defend the principle of intervention as a European policy when the next occasion for its maintenance arrived. In 1830, immediately after the revolution which overthrew the Bourbons in France, Belgium rose in revolt against the rule of the house of Orange, and determined to undo the work of the congress of Vienna by gaining independence as had Greece. It was at once a national and religious movement, for the Roman Catholic clergy of Belgium, resenting the Protestant rule of Holland, aided the people in their uprising. It was a strange combination of forces, this union of the ultra-conservative ecclesiastics with the ultra-liberal opposition to effect the separation of Belgium from Holland; but it was a successful combination, for Holland was unable to make head against it, and the appeal of King William to Prussia for aid called forth from Louis Philippe of France a firm declaration of non-intervention, which deterred Prussia from coming to the aid of the old policy of Metternich. Through the diplomacy of Talleyrand, who was sent as minister to England, this doctrine of non-intervention became the basis of an alliance between the two Powers, and was sufficiently strong to overcome England's desire to support the union of Belgium and Holland, the plan which Castlereagh had advocated in 1814. When it became evident that Louis Philippe would not support any proposition to unite Belgium to France, either by actual annexation, as many Belgians desired, or by a dynastic connection,

such as the election of his son to be king of Belgium, a new relation of the Powers was entered into. At the congress or conference of London, December, 1830, to which all the five Powers sent representatives, the policy of Troppau and Verona was reversed; Belgium was declared independent, and a new law governing the European state system was proclaimed. In this congress the more liberal and progressive notion of non-intervention supported by France and England won its first great victory over the reactionary ideas of Austria and Prussia, to which Russia, on account of her hostility to France, was inclined to adhere when her own interests were not at stake. It was Talleyrand's last great stroke of diplomacy.

The doctrine of intervention which was thus practically given up as a law governing the diplomats at a general congress, continued to be maintained by the three eastern Powers for twenty years longer. Russia had supported the opposite principle in the case of the Greeks for purely selfish purposes; for Nicolas had no particular love for Greek independence as such, and he returned willingly to the older doctrine when it was to his interest to do so. Prussia, though rapidly advancing through internal social and economic reforms to a position of greater self-reliance, was still under the power of Metternich, and continued to recognise officially the principle of intervention. In 1833, after the revolutions in France, Belgium, Italy, and Poland, and after the abortive conspiracy at Frankfort, the three Powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia met at Töplitz and Münchengrätz and renewed their fidelity to the principles of Troppau and Verona. A treaty was drawn up, October 15, 1833, in which it was declared that the courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia recognised the right of every independent sovereign to summon any other independent sovereign to assist him in putting down revolution; that no other Power had the right to interfere to prevent this; that in case such interference were undertaken, the three Powers would interpret it as an act of

hostility against themselves, and would take prompt measures to repel such aggression. This triple alliance was kept strictly secret.

No opportunity of applying the doctrine as laid down in 1833 was given until the revolution of 1848 and the uprising of Hungary. But that the principle of intervention to suppress liberalism of any kind whatever was still maintained by the eastern Powers is evident from other events of an important character. In 1835, Austria sent financial aid to Spain to assist the Carlists in their struggle against the constitutionalists under General Quesada, and she would probably have gone further had she not been deterred by the attitude of France and England. In 1836, in consequence of the continued agitation in Poland, and the use made of the independent city of Cracow as a refuge for revolutionists, the three Powers determined to occupy the city, and Austria was commissioned to reduce it to order. This was but the preliminary step to the final overthrow of its independence, which took place in 1846 after the Poles in Galicia, stimulated by the desire for national separation and by a spirit of revenge, began to organise, and encouraged the inhabitants of Cracow to drive out the Austrian regiment of occupation. In consequence of these actions, with the consent of Prussia and Russia, the city and environs were annexed to Austria.

Finally, in 1847, Switzerland, whose neutrality had been guaranteed in 1815, seemed to call for the attention of the Powers. After a political and religious agitation of thirty-two years the Helvetic republic was confronted with the danger of disunion because of the separate organisation of the Sonderbund, a league of the seven Roman Catholic cantons against the progressive and reform tendencies of the other states of the Union. Metternich, aided by Guizot, who having broken with England was favouring reactionary methods, rose to the defence of the principle of full cantonal sovereignty and threw his

support on the side of the Sonderbund. In so doing he undoubtedly increased the difficulty of a peaceful settlement between the Sonderbund and the Union, because he led the Roman Catholic cantons to believe that in case of war Austria and France would certainly interfere. No action of the Powers was, however, actually taken until after the Sonderbund war of 1847 and the victory of the radical party, although Guizot was accused in France of sending arms and ammunition from Besançon to the aid of the conservatives. In consequence of the overthrow of the Sonderbund, which Metternich characterised as "a triumph of radicalism over principles incontestably legal" forming "the only practicable basis of the life of states," the Powers (without England) offered their mediation. This was refused by the Swiss Diet on December 7, 1847, and it was therefore decided to hold a conference at Neuchâtel to settle the Swiss question, although it was well known that England would not co-operate in any policy of intervention and might refuse to send a representative. It is perfectly clear from Metternich's statements that the other Powers were in accord on the question of interference, and of applying coercive measures if necessary. "The foreign governments," says Metternich, "do not intend to *intervene* in the affairs of the Confederation, but they do intend to *intervene* to preserve against the dangers, with which the radicalism of the Swiss threatens their territories, the repose which they feel it their duty to assure to the peoples entrusted to their care. If this be intervention, and if for this we lay ourselves open to blame, then we put ourselves on record as decided to commit this crime." This is the last statement of the old doctrine of Troppau and Verona, but it was destined never to be carried out. Switzerland, though she dreaded the new situation more than the crisis through which she had just passed, was saved from foreign interference by events of a more momentous nature. In the general revolution of the next year Guizot and Metternich were both driven from office, and the

doctrine of interference in the affairs of other states was lost sight of in the necessity under which each state felt of looking after its own affairs.

Only once more was the principle of intervention applied, and then it was intervention as defined in 1833 and not the intervention of Troppau or Neuchâtel. When in 1848 the Hungarians attempted to win independence from Austria, that Power applied to Russia for aid according to the conditions of Münchengrätz. With this request Russia complied, and the overthrow of Hungary at the hands of Paskiévitch proved to be the last attempt to apply the doctrine of intervention in the interest of absolutism. This temporary revival of the Holy Alliance, of which Russia, the only eastern Power untouched by the revolution of 1848, became the inspirer and guardian, proved to be of short duration. In 1852, on the assumption of the imperial title by Louis Napoleon, Frederic William IV. of Prussia, in his letters to Baron Bunsen, his ambassador at London, made every effort to effect a union of the four chief Powers for the guaranteeing of their respective territories against the new Napoleon, offering to put 100,000 men into the field if a military convention were agreed to. But the other Powers refused to respond, and Russia, whose decision was of first importance, determined, although with unconcealed ill-humour, to recognise the new government, thus preventing the last attempt to put into operation the principles of the Holy Alliance. To this alliance the Crimean war gave the death-blow; for in that war all the Powers of Europe were either neutral or aggressively antagonistic to Russia. In the diplomatic rearrangements that followed the year 1856 England, perceiving the growing intimacy of France and Piedmont, and fearing French aggrandisement, drew away toward Austria, while Prussia, under the guidance of Bismarck, began to assume a friendly attitude toward Russia. In this reshaping

of the relations of the Powers a new period was begun in the diplomatic history of Europe.

After this brief sketch of the European system and the diplomatic relations of the Powers for half a century let us turn to the history of the individual countries, in order to trace the political, social, and economic changes that preceded and made possible the revolutionary movement of 1848.

CHAPTER IV.

FRANCE DURING THE RESTORATION.

FRANCE more than any other European country had been altered by the events of the period from 1789 to 1814. There had the old state been destroyed and the old society shattered in pieces ; there the forces set loose by the Revolution, checked though they had been by Napoleon's absolutism, were still active, resolute, and persistent. France was at bottom in the year 1814 a state inclined toward democracy. Its feelings, thoughts, customs, and forms of expression savoured little of the narrowness and inequality of the eighteenth century. The Revolution had done its work thoroughly, and although its principles had as yet found no adequate expression in government, yet the seed had been well sown, and the French people at large were under the spell of a new and liberal influence.

To this end Napoleon had in no small part contributed. Although his government had been the opposite of democratic ; although it had insulted every principle of the Revolution ; although it had throttled the press, stifled all independence in commerce and trade, allowed corporations to exist only on the fulfilment of heavy conditions, subordinated every official to itself, and ordained that the end of education, of religion, of life itself should be Napoleon and the state—although it had done all these things, nevertheless it had strengthened in many parts the work of the Revolution. It had made merit the test of value ; it had raised to high positions of rank men of the

burgher and peasant classes ; it had made it easier than ever before for men of talent without regard to birth, wealth, or belief to become prominent in the state and in the army ; it had relieved trade of the old gild restrictions, and had overthrown the narrow municipal policy that was hampering free competition ; it had freed the peasant from the compulsory services of the century before ; it had broken up the great estates, and, although it is not probable that the numbers of actual proprietors had thereby increased, yet the acquirement of estates of a moderate size had undoubtedly been made easier ; and lastly, in the *code Napoléon*, it had erected a body of law that was favourable in matters of inheritance to the development of a democratic rather than an aristocratic community. Into this state, whose people were dominated by the democratic spirit of the Revolution and whose government was the completely centralised system of Napoleon, came the Bourbons with their ideas of royal prerogative drawn from the eighteenth century. Unable to enter into full harmony with their political environment they made legitimism and the right of kingship too often the bases of action and substituted the "divinity of kings" for the "power" of Napoleon and the "law" of the Revolution.

It was soon made known to the Bourbons on their accession to power that the new dynasty must recognise the wishes of the people of France, and must make an effort to reconcile parties and to bring liberty of the individual into harmony with centralised government. In consequence of this there was issued on the 4th of June, 1814, a constitutional charter, in which Louis XVIII. frankly acknowledged, what many of the *émigrés* would not, the fact that there had been a Revolution, and that the France of the Restoration was a different country from the France of the old *régime*. In this he had been instructed by Alexander and Talleyrand, the latter of whom had definite ideas as to the manner in which the new

government should be carried on. "We have to consider," says the Charta, "the effects of an ever increasing progress of knowledge, the new relations which this progress has introduced into society, the direction given to the public mind during half a century, and the serious troubles resulting therefrom. We have perceived that the wish of our subjects for a constitutional Charta was the expression of a real need, but in yielding to this wish we have taken every precaution that this Charta should be worthy of us and of the people whom we are proud to rule." Yet while thus limiting monarchy, this same Charta took good pains to preserve the rights and prerogatives of the Crown. * The king alone was invested with executive power; as head of the state he commanded the army and navy, declared war, and concluded treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce; he appointed all the officials of the public administration, and issued regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws and the safety of the state. He was the fountain of justice, in his name it was administered by the judges whom he appointed, and by him the rights of pardon and commutation of punishment was retained. But, although the executive powers were exercised by the king alone, and justice emanated from him, the legislative functions were shared with two chambers, the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies. The former body, composed of members appointed by the king and holding their office for life, formed a high court of justice for trial of treason, and held its sessions, both legislative and judicial, in secret. On the other hand, the Chamber of Deputies, composed of members so elected that one-fifth of the number retired each year, who themselves paid a direct tax of 1000 francs and were chosen from the various departments by electors paying 300 francs direct taxes, held their sessions openly, and passed all measures by majority vote. Plans of taxation were submitted to them first, but all other measures could be submitted

to either body as seemed best. Although the king had the exclusive right of initiating legislation—a right that soon fell into disuse—and of sanctioning and promulgating the laws, nevertheless either Chamber could petition him to submit a law on any subject desired. In matters relating to the rights of the French citizens there is to be found in this Charta nothing new to those who were familiar with the constitutions of the Revolution. All citizens were equal before the law, liberty of worship and of the press was guaranteed, and trial by jury was preserved.

Though it can be said of this Charta that it was inferior in many respects to the constitution that Alexander had granted to Poland, and contained many defects, yet it must be allowed that it promised more liberty than France had possessed at any time under Napoleon. It is true that it imposed an excessive restriction upon the right of suffrage; admitted a possible abuse of the royal power when it gave to the king the right to issue ordinances necessary for the safety of the state; strengthened the position of the ultra-conservative party when it declared in Article 71 that the ancient *noblesse* might resume their titles; and lost something of its value in the eyes of the people when it was seen to be a gift from the king and not a constitution accepted by vote of the nation. Nevertheless it erected a government that was in itself strong and on the whole liberal, for if it made reservations, it also guaranteed rights, and it was retained, with some revision, as the constitution of France for thirty-four years. No organic weakness of its own, but the attacks that were made upon it and the strained interpretations to which it was subjected, made a revolution inevitable,—a fact that the circumstances leading to that revolution will indicate clearly.

Louis XVIII., the giver of the Charta, a man of the best and most peaceful intentions, desiring above all else to avoid further disturbance, inclined toward that policy which in a sense

Napoleon had followed of creating a strong and a peaceful France by uniting all parties. Dominated by no blind political passion, Louis thought to accomplish his purpose by standing above parties and making concessions to liberalism. But unfortunately skeptical, cold-blooded, lazy, indifferent to the business of state, and wanting in personal magnetism, he also lacked the force that was necessary to control so serious a political situation, and became, as time went on, increasingly dependent on the opinion of others. Furthermore, he was hampered by conditions and circumstances beyond his control. He can hardly be held responsible for the intolerance of the *émigrés*, who, under the leadership of his brother, the Count of Artois, were rousing against the king and his government the opposition of France. Nor could it be expected that he would be entirely free from the traditions of the past that he represented. It was not easy for a Bourbon to become a constitutional king, to throw over the divine right of government in order to accept the principles of a movement in which he had taken no part. France had accepted him, particularly in the second restoration, at the hands of the allies, and he was supported in his position by the fact that France was willing to recognise his title based on legitimate right. He was, therefore, the real head of the state, possessing full and extensive powers, and in law no figure-head ; yet he could never be the real governor of France as had been Napoleon. France was governed by parties that the king was unable to control, and, in general, the party in power was more liberal or more conservative than the king himself. However positive might be his wishes he was unable to obtain the support in the Chambers that he wished, and he found it impossible to establish a government strong enough to oppose the extreme liberals on one side and the ultra-conservatives on the other.

If the king had not succeeded under the favourable conditions of the first restoration, much less likely was he to succeed

under the unfavourable conditions of the second. The Hundred Days and the events preceding them had been exceedingly disastrous to the Bourbon government. In 1814, Louis XVIII. had been received with the joy that accompanies the promise of peace and the hope of a freer government. Party differences were hushed ; the wearied nation had but one desire, to be relieved of the pressure of Napoleon's despotism and the anxieties that had attended the long-continued warfare. But in the short space of one year a marked change had come over the spirit of France. The attempt of the royalists to thrust themselves into positions of prominence in the state that they might control the government, their scorn of the Revolution, their insulting hostility to all things Napoleonic, created party schism and started party issues that menaced the peace of the country. The return of Napoleon and the defeat at Waterloo, aided by the impulsive character of the French themselves, increased party bitterness and intensified the conflict of classes. After November, 1815, harmony was no longer possible, and the feeling of a large portion of the French people for the Bourbons had materially altered. The allies had summarily placed Louis XVIII. back upon his throne, and in adding the burden of a money indemnity and a military occupation had made it inevitable that the people should associate the restoration of the Bourbons with the idea of punishment. The party hostility thus aroused was increased by the fact that the old nobility and the conservatives generally identified themselves with the monarchy by demanding rewards for their faithfulness, while those who had supported Napoleon, aware that they had been defeated, were by virtue of this feeling hostile to the monarchy. When, therefore, Louis XVIII. began for the second time to govern France, there were already existent well-defined parties, whose struggles for control of the government make up the history of the fifteen years under consideration. On one side were the conservatives, the party of reaction ; on the other the

radicals, the revolutionary Left ; while between lay the two Centres, made up of moderates.

The party of reaction, the Ultras, represented not merely the social traditions of the old *régime*, but also its political and religious doctrines, which were once more reaffirmed as imprescriptible truths. These doctrines were maintained and defended by a group of writers who stood for a counter-reaction against the doctrines of the Revolution. On one hand these writers opposed the opinions of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Condorcet, and endeavoured to prove that a natural religion, a social compact, sovereignty of the people, and a progressive perfectibility were false in theory and disastrous in practice. On the other they taught that sovereignty and authority emanate from God alone ; that as He rules the world, so the Pope has authority over the Church, the king over his people, the father over his family ; that institutions may mature but they cannot change their character ; that inasmuch as stability is the divine desire the existing order must be permanent, or if by the evil in man it be overthrown, it is the duty of man to restore it to its former condition. With this political creed went also a theological creed, which contained all the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church, and the union of the two creeds made up a body of doctrine that rendered the Ultras the bitter enemies of the new democratic spirit in France. The triumph of the papacy, the restoration of the Jesuit order, the brilliant writings of de Bonald, de Maistre, and Lamennais threatened the position of Protestantism, opposed the romantic tendencies already becoming prominent, and strengthened the growing opposition to the Charta and the liberal party. The Ultras rose to the defence of the throne and the altar, and they considered the Charta as the chief obstacle in their path. They advocated an unlimited monarchy, but the very existence of a constitution made such a monarchy impossible ; they believed in the restoration to the nobility of all their old privileges, but the Charta only restored

the titles of the *noblesse* and denied them their special functions in making all Frenchmen equally eligible to civil and military positions; they wished to extend the belief in the absolute truths of the Roman Catholic faith, but the Charta allowed freedom of religion; they desired the supremacy of the ecclesiastical ministry, but the Charta and successive laws took away from the church the control of education and marriage. To men of this class compromise was treason, moderation a lapse from faith; to them there was but one order, one divinely appointed system, that of the old *régime*; for them the only course was to return to the institutions which the Revolution had overthrown. Truly these *enragés* conservatives had forgotten none of their past privileges, and had learned none of the lessons which recent experience should have taught them.

Over against this party of reaction stood the party of the other extreme, the revolutionary Left, composed of republicans, who were without fixed ideas or plans, dissatisfied imperialists, anarchists and opponents of law and order, all of whom found themselves somewhat loosely bound together in a common opposition to monarchy in general and to the restoration of the Bourbons in particular. Many of these men had been soldiers and adherents of the Empire, some were of the lower classes in the cities and a considerable number of the higher classes. Lafayette, Manuel, Constant, Grégoire were more or less closely connected with this party, which in process of time was destined to sub-divide into definite parties with more pronounced and positive opinions.

It is, however, in the parties of the Centre that we are to find the real interest of the period to 1822, for in them lay the support of the government, and upon them the Charta depended for protection. The members of the Centre were, taken as a whole, those who wished to enjoy the real benefits of free and representative institutions, who desired a more practicable application of the principles of 1789 than had been made during

the Revolution, who wished to maintain the Charta because they believed that it embodied these principles. They were divided into two groups, of which one, the Left Centre, may be defined as the constitutional party of progress, the moderate liberals. To these men, sometimes called even at this period the *doctrinaires*, whose theory was to hold fast to that which is good but never cease to struggle for something better, the Charta, though insufficient in itself, was a step in the direction of a better government. They were determined to use it as a guarantee, and to build up by slow stages a system more perfect from the standpoint of constitutional theory. In so doing they supported the monarchy of the Bourbons although they were not satisfied with it. Having opposed the Left because that body represented rather the methods than the philosophy of the Revolution, and the extreme Right because it accepted nothing of the Revolution, they found in the Right Centre their natural allies, so long as that party gave to them its confidence. With the Left Centre were identified Royer-Collard, Guizot, Camille Jourdan among the deputies, Broglie among the peers. The other party, the Right Centre, accepted the Charta unconditionally, following unreservedly its guidance, and desired to change it only so far as it was necessary in order to preserve it. The members of this party agreed with the king in his policy of compromise and reconciliation and thus became the main support of the monarchy. They did not sympathise with the reactionary excesses of the Ultras, because such excesses disturbed the harmony of the nation ; they had no sympathy with the party of the Left, because it was hostile to the monarchy and the Charta. Members from the Right Centre formed the government from 1815 to 1822 and its best representatives were Richelieu, de Serre, Pasquier, and Decazes.

These were the party lines that were being sharply drawn during those first unfortunate years of Bourbon government, 1814 and 1815. But the return of Napoleon created some-

thing more than the political opposition of parties ; it roused the religious and social hostility of classes. Scarcely had Waterloo been fought than the ultra-royalists in certain parts of France rose to take their revenge upon the revolutionists and the followers of Napoleon. Marseilles, Avignon, the territory of the Gard with its capital Nîmes, were the scene of a reactionary rising known as the White Terror, which was not confined to an attack upon the revolutionists, but extended to a fanatical onslaught upon the Calvinists as well. Few persons, about 130 in all, counting those on both sides, were killed, but reactionary spite vented itself in ferocious attacks upon the vanquished party, and sated its spirit of revenge by the murder of two notable men, Marshal Brune, who was murdered at Avignon on the 2d of August, and General Ramel, who was struck down by a crowd of bandits at Toulouse two weeks later. The massacres were serious enough, but of greater moment and more embarrassment to the government was the long duration of the movement in the department of the Gard, where still lingered traces of the old religious antagonism of the sixteenth century when Huguenot and Catholic looked upon each other as legitimate prey. Here the trouble lasted for four months, until it was finally put down by a detachment of Austrian troops. In these excesses France as a whole had no part. Even the royalists did not dare to applaud in public acts committed in their name.

The White Terror can hardly be said to represent the victory of reaction in France, for it was the result of local quite as much as of general causes. Much more serious was the result of the elections of 1815, when the people were called upon to send deputies to the first Chamber called under the Charta. In consequence of the defeat of Napoleon, which caused large numbers of the men of the Revolution and the Empire, who were frightened and persecuted, to stay away from the polls, and of the high suffrage established by the Charta, which dis-

franchised thousands of the old soldiers and members of the poorer classes, the elections almost everywhere turned in favour of the reactionary party. The majority of the new Chamber consisted of *émigrés* from the country, gentlemen of the provinces, soldiers of La Vendée or their sons, quondam officials and merchants with strong legitimist tendencies, representatives all of the intolerant ignorance of the ultra-royalists, of the resentments against the Revolution and the Empire, of the regrets for the old *régime*. Immediately the fate of the Talleyrand ministry which Louis XVIII. had accepted the June previous was sealed, for made up as it was entirely of men who had served during the Revolution or under the Empire, and including not a single member of the party of the *émigrés*, it had, needless to say, incurred the strong hostility of the royalists. Talleyrand, hoping to save himself, dismissed Fouché, but in vain ; and finally he, too, retired, not without the hope that he would be recalled. In his place entered the Duke of Richelieu, whose residence in Russia had made him a favourite of the Czar, and whose known moderation gave him the confidence of France.

The Chamber—called “undiscoverable” because the king could scarcely believe that such a Chamber had been discovered—began at once on organisation to pursue the policy of the White Terror under a constitutional form, and first of all demanded the punishment of traitors. Proscription lists had already been drawn up as early as July, but of those there named some had fled from France, Labédoyère had already been shot, and Lavalette had escaped from prison. But the Chamber vented its wrath upon Mouton-Duvernet, Chartran, General Bonnaire, the brothers Faucher, and others, while Marshal Ney fell a victim to the reaction of terror that seized upon the better elements of the Chamber of Peers, by which he was tried. On the other hand, of the assassins of the White Terror, criminals against justice and humanity, some never

were punished at all, while others went free for many years ; the Terror seemed to have frozen the law.

In addition to these constitutional murders—for they can be called nothing else—the Chamber endeavoured to undo by constitutional means the work of the Revolution, and to restore France once more to the church and the throne. The Chamber sought to suspend individual liberty, to restore confiscated property, to make the right of suffrage depend on property only, to put on trial not only those who had voted for the death of Louis XVI. but also a number of those who had served as military or administrative officials of Napoleon, and they would have liked to make the day of the execution of Louis XVI. a day of national mourning. Before the passage of the amnesty bill, which Richelieu brought forward early in December, the prisons were filling with suspects, and the *prévôt-courts*, made up almost exclusively of generals and captains of the old *régime*, were conducting arbitrary trials without jury and without appeal. The amnesty bill itself was only saved by nine votes from being ruined in the passage by exceptions that would have given legislative support to every expression of royal hate. Furthermore, the army was reorganised, and the *émigrés* and their followers took the place of the old soldiers of the Empire. Friends of legitimism filled important administrative posts, and a system of espionage and denunciation threatened the tenure of any one known to be in sympathy with the doctrines of the Revolution.

But revenge for the past was in the opinion of the “undiscoverable” Chamber only a part of its appointed work ; there was the further duty of securing the future by making possible the supremacy of the Crown, and through it the supremacy of the Church—throne and altar inseparably bound together. To this end worked a body standing for systematised reactionism, the Congregation, originally a small order of faithful men and women, organised for the purpose of keeping alive Catholicism

during the supremacy of Napoleon and the captivity of Pius VII. Meeting together in secret, its members endeavoured during the conflict between Napoleon and the Pope, to keep up the courage of the followers of the church and to furnish to the Pope assurance of faithful attachment. In consequence of the return of the Bourbons and the rapid increase of the converts to Roman Catholicism, this body entered upon a career of propaganda. It became, under the leadership of the Count of Artois, in a sense a political body, to which laymen and ecclesiastics alike belonged. While most admirable and legitimate was the work of many of the other associations that were formed side by side with it for the purpose of extending Catholicism in France, nevertheless all alike suffered from the suspicions which the Congregation proper incurred. The people came to believe that all these organisations taken together formed behind the throne a secret system, whose head was the Pope and whose arms were the Jesuits; whereas, in fact, the Congregation alone, although it had nothing to do with the Jesuits and its interference in political affairs was mainly the work of the *émigrés*, was deserving of suspicion. Its one object was to restore the Roman Catholic Church, to maintain her old rights, and to extend the influence of her principles; and to this end it imposed espionage upon its members as a duty of conscience, and it employed not only people of the higher classes, but artisans and petty merchants as well. Montlosier said that he had seen in Paris chamber-women and footmen who declared themselves to be in the service of this society. In the "undiscoverable" Chamber it made its first attempt to remodel France in the interest of ecclesiasticism, by planning to make the clergy a landed estate, as before the Revolution, through the restoration of their lands, and by proposing to put the University under the control of the bishops and to give the lesser clergy the control over local instruction and the care of the registry lists of births and deaths. Of all the propositions

that were made two only were carried out ; the law of divorce was repealed, and all married priests were deprived of their pensions. Had the reactionary measures of this Chamber become laws, France would have been thrown into the hands of the church and the Ultras ; free thought and free education would have been sacrificed to ecclesiastical intolerance ; and the gains of the Revolution, as expressed in the Charta, would have been cast aside in the interest of a revived mediævalism.

But the Chamber in its excess of zeal so far overreached itself as to bring about its own destruction. More ultra than the king, these ultra-royalists had passed the bounds of the royal forbearance. Louis XVIII., seeing that representative monarchy was in peril, and realising that the reactionist policy would, if maintained, lead to revolution, if not to civil war, influenced, too, by the advice of his ministers, notably Decazes, determined, in accordance with the authority granted him by the Charta, to dissolve the Chamber. This he did on the 5th of September, 1816, and by so doing gave to the Bourbon monarchy fifteen more years of life. This act fell like a thunderbolt upon the Ultras, who received it with indignation and wrath, and condemned it as a political stratagem ; but among the mass of the people joy was everywhere evident, for, except in the west and the south where the Ultras had some following, the hostility to the reactionist policy was very general. More broadly speaking, the royal ordinance brought to an end the counter-revolution, for it announced to the people that the king was dissatisfied with the deputies they had sent up, that he had broken with the Ultras, and would follow the policy of the moderate party. In 1816 a moderate minister and a sensible king saved the country from a revolution that a fanatical Chamber seemed determined to provoke, a state of affairs quite unlike that of 1830, when a fanatical minister and a narrow-minded king facing a liberal Chamber brought on the revolution that dethroned the Bourbons.

Besides bringing joy to the people at large, the royal ordinance had the good effect of sobering the body of electors, and the new Assembly fully justified the hopes of Richelieu that a second reactionary Chamber was impossible. The result of the new elections showed that the power lay in the hands of the middle classes, and with them as his support, Richelieu entered definitely upon his own policy, which had been so seriously endangered by the late intractable Chamber. His chief aim was to reconcile the nation and the monarchy, or, as it has been otherwise expressed, to "royalise the nation and to nationalise royalty"; his secondary purpose, to reconcile France with Europe and to begin the undoing, in the relations with the other Powers, of the evil work of the Hundred Days. For the purpose of creating harmony in France many important measures in the years 1816 and 1817 were passed: the law suspending individual liberty was modified, a new electoral law establishing a direct suffrage was established, the army of France was put upon a respectable footing, and the Count of Artois was deprived of his authority over the national guard of the kingdom. Many of these measures, which indicated the growing strength of the liberal party, were the work of Decazes, who had become the favourite minister of the king. But the most important act of the ministry was the work of Richelieu alone. By the confidence that he had inspired in Alexander, and by the statesmanlike manner in which he conducted the negotiations at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, he succeeded that year in relieving France of the burden of foreign occupation imposed upon the country by the second treaty of Paris. At this congress, where the new European state system was successfully launched, the Powers consented to the evacuation of the French territory at the end of the third year of occupation. France was then invited to take her place as one of the great Powers of Europe, and to join in all future deliberations. Inasmuch as in 1817 the state had already es-

established its financial credit, and was enabled to negotiate a loan wherewith to pay off the indemnities due to the foreign Powers, it is evident that under the rule of the moderates not only had the internal condition improved, but also the external relations were becoming once more harmonious and peaceful.

But this victory of the moderates brought evils in its train. The new elections held in the year 1818, the very year of the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, proved exceedingly disquieting to the upholders of the moderate policy, and especially to Richelieu. Already, in 1817, "independents" of the Left had appeared in considerable numbers in the Chamber, but now in 1818 prominent leaders of the most advanced liberalism, such as Lafayette and Manuel, were returned. If Richelieu had seen with dismay the ultra-royalist majority in the "undiscoverable" Chamber, he was no less disturbed by the prospect of an Assembly, that might at any succeeding election contain a majority opposed not only to the ministry but to the monarchy itself. But Richelieu was too good a royalist to have any intention of playing into the hands of the revolutionary Left, whose avowed policy was hostility to the Bourbons, and he determined, even if the plan involved a reconciliation with the Right, to urge a union of royalists of all degrees of opinions for the purpose of resisting the invasion of revolutionary doctrines. His fears were not, however, shared by other members of the ministry, notably Decazes, so that when he began to approach the Right for support and agreed to a modification of the electoral law, a division in the ministry was inevitable. It was clear that either Richelieu or Decazes must give way. The latter consented to accept the ambassadorship to St. Petersburg, and Richelieu endeavoured to form a new ministry. But having failed in this he resigned in December, 1818. In the reorganisation that followed, Decazes, serving as minister of the interior under General Desolles, practically con-

trolled the government, and true to his disregard of Richelieu's fears, continued without hesitation a moderate policy.

The tendency in French politics was now markedly toward liberalism. The country at large was reaping the benefits of stability and repose. Commerce, industry, and agriculture were feeling the good effects of a re-established credit and the advantages of a country freed from the occupation of foreign armies. The government of Decazes was proving most successful in attempting to develop a moderate policy under a constitutional monarchy, and a law on the liberty of the press gave joy to the journalists, who were already becoming more outspoken and fearless, and proved the exemplar for later legislation. But under this appearance of repose there existed the most intense party feeling. The Ultras, who were roused by the failure to reap the reward they had expected from Richelieu's attitude, attacked the moderate measures. The popular anger at the work of the *prévôt-courts* strengthened the opponents of the government. The Left was maddened by the "never" of Count de Serre and Decazes, when the ministry was petitioned to bring forward a measure pardoning the regicides; and at the same time in the Centre itself the division took place that was to result in the opposition of the *doctrinaires* to the party to which they had hitherto given their support. Party feeling was running high when the elections of the year 1819 showed that the tendencies toward a radical liberalism were too rapid for the well-being of the country. Of the thirty-five new liberal members one was the son of a regicide, another one of the proscribed of 1815, while twenty had held administrative or military offices during the Hundred Days. But the election that nearly provoked a civil war in France was that of the Abbé Grégoire, constitutional bishop of 1791, one of the most violent of the old revolutionists, a member of the National Convention, and a regicide morally though not technically. On the election of this man the royalists uttered a cry of horror,

and even the king, who had not objected to a Fouché four years before, expressed his displeasure. The Powers of Europe, already in the mood that brought them together at Troppau a year later to suppress the Neapolitan revolution, looked on doubtfully at such an evidence of radicalism in France; and Metternich began to wonder whether France did not need the attention of the quadruple alliance. But France was quite able to take care of herself, and the Chamber with little opposition declared against the admission of Grégoire, largely on the ground that his election was an insult to the king. Decazes took into consideration the reforming of the electoral law, and the king, though evidently unwilling to be led by the passions and prejudices of the ultra-royalists, was ready to make concessions to the Right.

It was now hoped that in consequence of these acts the crisis had been safely passed, when an event took place that turned the tide of liberalism, brought about the fall of the Decazes ministry, and eventually gave the victory into the hands of the party of reaction. On the evening of the 13th of February a fanatical liberal, named Louvel, murdered the Duke of Berry, the younger and more intelligent and courageous of the two sons of the Count of Artois, the last hope of the Bourbon dynasty, and the only Bourbon competent to rule France wisely. But Louvel's dagger did more than strike down a man, it murdered a policy as well; for the act seemed to the Ultras and the conservatives to be but the natural outcome of the recent liberal successes. "You ask me," said Nodier, "whether the knife which murdered the Duke of Berry was a dagger or a saddler's knife. I saw it and I call it none of these; it was a liberal idea." In consequence of the clamour that rose among the Ultras, unappeased by the various concessions that Decazes was ready to make, the king allowed himself to be influenced against his favourite, and suffering sentiment in a moment of weakness to blot out other considerations decided that any new

combination of ministers with Decazes as leader was morally impossible. When, therefore, the Ultras pleaded for the removal of Decazes, and the *doctrinaires* looked on coldly, making no sign of approval or disapproval, Louis yielded, and removed Decazes, though he left the ministry otherwise intact and made no change in his policy. Richelieu, whose attitude in 1818 seems to have satisfied the Ultras that he was still strongly opposed to any increase of liberalism, was summoned for the second time to take his place at the head of affairs ; and he resumed once more the policy of moderation, which he believed to be under the circumstances the only one possible for France.

But the situation had become altogether different. The political tide had turned, and however much the minister might wish to pursue a middle course he was forced by circumstances to lean toward the Right, just as in the period from 1816 to 1818 he had been obliged to lean toward the Left. In the reorganisation of the ministry that followed the fall of Decazes, a union was tried between the Right Centre and the Right. In this new combination it will be noticed that the *doctrinaires*, that is, the Left Centre, were not included, a fact which shows that the breach between the two wings of the moderate party had become complete. In abandoning the Right Centre at this critical period the *doctrinaires* must bear in large part the blame for creating a situation from which the Duke of Richelieu was unable to extricate himself. By drawing away toward the Left, on the ground that the Right Centre was committing itself too much to a stubborn acceptance of the Charta, they left the ministry of Richelieu to the mercy of the ultra-royalists, and forced it to adopt a policy of concession in the vain hope of forming a constitutional party of the Right. To this end the ministry brought forward measures to limit the suffrage and fetter the press. Prefects and sub-prefects of a liberal type were removed, and their place was filled by men of more pronounced royalist opinions. The army was reorganised by

the purging of the disaffected officers in the hope of making it a loyal ally to the monarchy. Richelieu even proposed abolishing the annual elections, by means of which the recent liberal gains had been made possible, and invited Villèle, a moderate royalist, to be a minister without a portfolio, and Corbière, an ultra-royalist and a man of no great honour, to be minister of public instruction, an act that raised a storm of protest from the liberals.

But this desire to maintain peace and harmony carried in train concessions that were impossible. Richelieu, though anxious to unite all supporters of the monarchy against the revolutionary spirit, was convinced that such a union could be beneficial only in case all would agree to work for the strengthening of France and the monarchy, and not for the triumph of party. But the Ultras were determined to take advantage of the situation in order to gain the control of government. When, therefore, Richelieu as a last concession tried to form a fusion ministry by summoning Villèle into the cabinet, he found that neither that royalist nor Corbière would accept positions unless such further concessions were made as would give to the Right the control of the departments of the interior, war, and public instruction; and his refusal to grant these demands practically lost him the support of the Right, and left his ministry in a difficult and critical position, politically isolated. He could not turn to the Left Centre, for that party would certainly reject him after his attempted reconciliation with the Right. The only course that remained was to pursue such a policy as to attach to him all those of the royalist party who had not determined beforehand to oppose him, and at the same time to conduct affairs with such wisdom as to give the country confidence in the ministerial policy. In this way he hoped to gain a ministerial support in the coming elections of 1821. But in this he failed. The new elections resulted, it is true, in a general defeat of the liberals, and a

consequent increase of royalist deputies ; but these seem to have been men of little enlightenment, most of them strangers to politics, and, as Richelieu said, "accustomed to conduct themselves more by impulses of the heart than by reflections of the mind." The new members, therefore, instead of coming to the rescue of the struggling ministry, fell under the intriguing influence of the ultra-royalists of Paris, and allowed themselves to be led by the Count of Artois and his advisers. The Right and the extreme Right now came into complete accord, and Richelieu found himself confronting a Chamber whose first act was to frame an address full of charges against the ministry. The policy of the ministry that aimed at the tranquillity of France was sacrificed to the intrigues of a party which saw in the concessions and overtures which Richelieu had made only weaknesses to be utilised, and which, forgetting the welfare of France, acted for the selfish interests of nobility and church. To make the isolation of the ministry complete the king himself, now beginning to come under the influence of the Countess du Cayla, herself an agent of the ultra-royalists, deserted his minister. In this crisis Richelieu, thinking a reorganisation of his ministry dishonourable, and seeing no hope in an appeal to the country, gave up the struggle, December 14, 1821, and let the control of the government pass into the hands of the Right.

Of this momentous change, which defined the political history of France for nearly a decade and retarded her constitutional development, Pasquier, one of the sacrificed ministry wrote as follows : " In 1822, the house of Bourbon committed a most unreasonable act ; it broke at a moment when it could have been most useful to it the instrument which had already rendered such great services. The destruction of the second ministry of the Duke of Richelieu was more than a political fault, it was a veritable crime." That which had been destroyed was not merely the ministry of Richelieu, it was also

the last trace of the moderate spirit of 1816; that which took its place was not merely the ministry of Villèle, it was also the revived spirit of 1815, the spirit of the "undiscoverable" Chamber, of the party that was commissioned to withstand and overthrow the liberal movement in France.

With the entrance of the Ultras into power the tranquillity that the country had enjoyed under the rule of the moderates came to an end. Commotion, agitation, conspiracy began to disturb the country, and it was not long before the liberal and revolutionary elements were in arms against the royalist aggressions. The Ultras in the name of the church declared war upon society, and society returned to the church war for war. "Deplorable chaos followed, in which good and evil, the true and the false, the just and the unjust were," says Guizot, "confounded and indiscriminately attacked." France was now destined to suffer the evil effects of the narrow policy of reaction that had already attempted to silence liberalism in the other countries of Europe.

The policy of the new government, in no wise different from that of the "undiscoverable" Chamber, was now more accurately defined. The Jesuits began a thorough and far-reaching propagation of their principles; the Congregation, with renewed confidence in its strength, extended its system, enlarged its field of activity, and in the person of the Count of Montmorency entered the Villèle cabinet. An attack was at once planned whereby the altar and the throne, too long outraged by the Charta, might be reconstituted in true mediæval form. At the University, where the liberal opposition to the Ultras had been most defiant, the lectures of Royer-Collard, Guizot, Cousin, and Villemain were suspended by order of the Abbé Frayssinous, whom the ultra-royalists had made grand-master of the University, and, after Chateaubriand, minister of ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction. Contrary to law, colleges were established by the Jesuits in order to counteract the influ-

ence of secular teaching. The laws of 1820 against individual liberty and freedom of the press were rigidly enforced, and it became evident as early as 1822 that the new government was determined, by one means or another, to limit and annul the most important guarantees that the *Charta* had made to the public liberties of France.

But while the mission of the *Ultras* was to strengthen the altar by active propagandism and to weaken all opposition to their purposes by laws of censure and arbitrary arrest, it was also their work to strengthen the throne. To this end events worked in their favour. Death removed from their path dangerous political opponents, Camille Jourdan, Richelieu, de Serre. The dynasty of the Bourbons was strengthened, and the loss of the Duke of Berry neutralised, by the birth of a posthumous son, Henry, Duke of Bordeaux, later Count of Chambord. Thus the dynasty was sure of an heir. The imperialist party, against whom the wrath of the *Ultras* had been vented in 1815, had suffered a vital loss in the death of Napoleon in 1821, an event that gave to the royalists special cause for rejoicing. So firmly fixed had become the reactionary government, of whose policy the most extreme version of the doctrine of legitimism was an integral part, that when in 1822 the Powers of Europe met at Verona to consider the question of the Spanish revolution, France took an attitude essentially different from that she had assumed at Troppau and Laibach. With Louis XVIII. still possessing a will of his own, guided in 1820 by Decazes and in 1821 by Richelieu, France had expressed herself in favour of non-intervention. In 1822 and 1823, with Louis XVIII. wholly under the spell of du Cayla and Artois, and with the *Ultras* controlling the government, a vigorous policy of intervention for the purpose of upholding the throne of Ferdinand, a Bourbon and a bigoted Roman Catholic, was determined on, and France, practically for the first time, entered seriously into the deliberations of a European congress.

At the head of her representatives was Montmorency himself, and by his side Chateaubriand, both men who were ambitious to imitate Austria's action in Italy. Here was an opportunity for a military crusade to save the descendant of Louis XIV., to defend the altar and the throne, and to expel the Revolution from its last stronghold in Europe. Montmorency's arbitrary conduct, aided by Chateaubriand's duplicity and Metternich's encouragement, carried the day at the congress, and committed France to a policy which Louis XVIII. opposed and even Villèle considered unnecessary. Ultra-royalist successes in the elections of 1822 led to the adoption of this policy by the Chambers. A striking feature of the debate was the reply of Manuel to the argument that Ferdinand VII. was in danger of suffering the fate of Charles I. and Louis XVI. in words that were interpreted as an apology for the regicides. For this he was forcibly ejected from the Chamber, an arbitrary action, itself a practical violation of the parliamentary liberties of a deputy, and a worthy counterpart of the decision to send 100,000 men into Spain to overthrow the Spanish constitution. Acts like these indicated the temper of the Ultras, and roused a bitter hostility among the liberals throughout Europe. But the Ultras became really supreme in France when on September 24, 1824, Louis XVIII., who had ceased to be the real ruler of France in 1822, died, and the Count of Artois, the old *émigré* and arch-ultra, became king as Charles X. The man who had been the first to leave France on the outbreak of the Revolution, he whose whole life had been opposed to the Revolution, at the head of a powerful organisation whose avowed object was the overthrow of the Charta, was now, by right of succession, the king of France; and what is more striking, he ascended the throne without any opposition on the part of the nation, so well had the movement that had begun with the fall of the second ministry of Richelieu accustomed the people to the supremacy of the ultra-conservative party.

The serenity of France was, however, more apparent than real, for while externally the people appeared to be satisfied, nevertheless under the surface there was disquietude and disappointment. The movement, common to all Europe of this period, toward the formation of secret societies for the purpose of spreading revolutionary ideas, had been accelerated in France when political power began to centre in the parties of the Right Centre and the Right. Of the two most important political associations, that with its centre at Saumur had been known by the title *Chevaliers de la liberté* and had had influence chiefly in the region of the Loire, where it numbered about 40,000 ; the other, the Carbonari, founded upon the model of the Italian society of that name, was established for the more definite purpose of opposing the Congregation. The latter of these, large but loosely connected, and affiliated with the other sections of the same order in Italy and Switzerland, had been made up chiefly of members of the army, the bar, and the schools ; and though it had had no fixed principles, its avowed object had been the overturning of the house of Bourbon, in order to erect upon its ruins, as some of the members believed, an empire under Napoleon II. (Duke of Reichstadt), to re-establish the republic as others claimed, or, as a third group seems to have desired, to establish a liberal monarchy under the house of Orléans. Among its members had been many persons of worth and influence, of whom the most notable had been Lafayette, who was the head of the principle wing. In 1820, the two societies had amalgamated, and several conspiracies had been undertaken, which had received their encouragement from the revolutionary uprisings in Naples, Piedmont, Portugal, Spain and Greece, and from the fall of the moderate government of Richelieu. At Saumur General Berton had led a hopeless rising in favour of the Bonapartists, and in the same year, 1822, an extensive conspiracy, in which Lafayette was implicated, had been put down at Belfort. The Villèle minis-

try had been exceedingly vigorous in its opposition to these movements, and had so far succeeded in suppressing conspiracies that at the death of Louis XVIII. there were no revolutionary societies of consequence in existence in France. This, however, does not alter the fact that the serenity which accompanied the accession of Charles X. was due rather to the activity of the government than to the satisfaction of France. The revolutionary and liberal elements had been silenced, not convinced.

In still another particular did the government of Charles X. seem more secure than the actual condition of France warranted. In 1823, the year before the accession of the Count of Artois, the liberal majority in the Chamber of Deputies had dropped from 110 to 19. It might well seem that such a royalist Chamber indicated a general contentment throughout the country with the Bourbon government. But a brief examination shows that what seemed to be an expression of the will of the people was but the result of an outrageous abuse of administrative power on the part of the government. Local functionaries were threatened, frauds of the most barefaced type were practised, election lists were tampered with, false tickets used, while the electoral law of the "double vote" of 1820 gave undue influence to the proprietary class. No wonder that the elections, directed, dominated, and falsified by the ministry, resulted in the return of a large majority of royalist members, who considered the Charta the fatal legacy of a detestable epoch. Thus the government and the ministry were living in an atmosphere false and dangerously deceptive as to the true condition of France. They were seeking only to strengthen their power, and to employ it so as to render public opinion powerless, and to increase by counter-revolutionary measures the authority of the landed aristocracy and the clergy. To enable them to attain these ends, there had been passed in the year 1824 a new law, which abolished the old custom, established by the Charta, of returning annually one-fifth of the Chamber, and which de-

creed that the Chamber then sitting and the ministry then in power should remain for seven years, at the end of which time a renewal of the entire Chamber should be effected. This act, which was passed before the death of Louis XVIII., assured the supremacy of the Right, and completed the breach between that party and the nation.

Inasmuch as Charles X. had been the practical ruler of France since 1822, and was supported by a minister and a chamber that seemed to be willing to promote the ultra-royalist policy, there was no reason to suppose that a policy different from that of the preceding three years would be adopted. And yet for the moment matters looked otherwise. Charles X. seemed to heed the last words of his brother, "Preserve the crown for this child" (the Duke of Bordeaux) and issued a program of his intentions, in which he declared his devotion to the Charta. This statement, followed by the pardon of a number of prisoners and the re-establishment at Grenoble of the faculty of law that had been dissolved because of its opposition to the law of censure, made it seem for the moment as if the king had decided upon a policy of reconciliation, and had felt the need of sinking the partisan in the king. From the 24th to the 29th of September, 1824, the Count of Artois for the first time in his career roused a feeling of satisfaction among the people of France, and the new reign became in a sense popular. But a reconciliation between the Charta and the Ultras, who had declared war upon all that was liberal and progressive, was impossible. The party of the Right could no more become a constitutional party in 1824 than it could in 1822; and whether its leader were the Count of Artois or Charles X., the presumptive heir or the King of France, he was equally unable to realise that a king could not be king of a party, and that all France belonged to him as he belonged to all France. He carried to the kingship all the predilections of party, and openly declared that the Chambers were simply an advisory board, and

that in case of a difference of opinion the king's will was absolute. It is undoubtedly true that he considered it dangerous and humiliating for the Crown to make concessions to popular opinion, and he is to be credited with a sincerity in his belief, false though it was, that the reconstruction upon its old foundations of the authority of the throne, the aristocracy, and the clergy, was essential to the safety of the monarchy and of France.

The good impression made by the auspicious opening of the new reign was soon neutralised by the introduction of superannuated forms of etiquette and titles of the old *régime*, and by the solemn coronation that took place at Rheims, where mediæval ceremonial was accompanied with an ostentatious exhibition of relics, and the oil of Clovis was employed to anoint the forehead of a nineteenth-century king. The entrance of the king into Paris was a theatrical display, which, while harmless in itself, left an unpleasant impression upon the minds of the people, who feared that this fondness for mediævalism in external things might be but a prelude to a fondness for mediævalism in policy and government. Confidence was not strengthened when the people saw the king surrounded by his old advisers, and submitting to the influence of men of the most positive ultra-opinion ; when they saw him, from motives of economy, dismiss one hundred and sixty-seven generals who had begun their career under the Republic and the Empire ; when they saw him discontinuing the pension granted by Napoleon to the mathematician L'égendre because the latter had refused his vote in an academic election to the candidate recommended by the government, and when they saw the last rites of the church refused to an actor, whom the people had honoured and praised.

The hostility aroused by these impolitic actions was greatly increased by the deliberate declaration of the policy of the government in the acts passed by the Chambers in the years

1825 and 1826. Villèle, who found himself wholly unable to resist the pressure of the mediæval forces acting in politics, demanded of the Chambers the passage of four measures of the most remarkable character, measures, which though never as a whole actually put into operation, were nevertheless clear indices of the character of the party in power. Villèle first asked on behalf of the *émigrés* for an indemnity for the estates that had been confiscated during the Revolution. On one side it was claimed that such indemnity was the only means of establishing union in the French nation ; on the other, it was argued that if the principle of indemnity were admitted, then the descendants of all dispossessed persons from the earliest times of French history would have a claim upon the government. The measure was, however, carried, and 988,000,000 francs were appropriated for the purpose. Secondly, Villèle demanded the re-establishment of religious communities for women, to be effected simply by royal ordinance. This demand for nunneries was planned as a precedent for the re-establishment, in the near future, of monasteries, and the legalising of the order of Jesuits, whose reappearance in France had never been legally recognised. Although this law was passed, the opposition of Pasquier led to such an amendment of it as to render it harmless. Thirdly, and most remarkable of all, was the demand for a law of sacrilege, whereby it was proposed to punish the theft of sacred vessels from a church by death, the profanation of the host by amputation of the hand, followed by death. This measure, supported by de Bonald, was opposed by Pasquier in the Peers and Royer-Collard in the Deputies. It was branded as a return to the barbarism of the Middle Ages, as introducing theology into legislation, inasmuch as it involved the legal recognition of the doctrine of transubstantiation ; and it was shown to be contrary to the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Charta. Behind all these measures appeared the Congregation and the Jesuits, whose insistence in this particular

was checkmated by the fact that the sacrilege law, though passed in a modified form, was never put into force. Lastly, in 1826, the ministry demanded the restoration of the rights of primogeniture, involving the entail of property in the eldest son. This measure was stigmatised as attacking the idea of equality before the law, and to the liberals it appeared as a monstrous encroachment upon the law of nature and reason, and a violation of public morality. Fortunately the law was rejected by the Chamber of Peers, and Paris in consequence gave itself up to joy and festivity.

These measures roused everywhere the feeling in France that the government was endeavouring to do by parliamentary means what the Congregation had been attempting to do by more unofficial methods. The people, however, believed that the Jesuits were promoting all these evils, and were doing all in their power to place France under the yoke of a narrow-minded clergy; and that which the people at large felt came to be in a less exaggerated form the opinion of many of the moderate royalists, for the unity of the Ultras was breaking under the heavy strain to which it was subjected, and a rupture between the *parti-prêtre* and the *parti-royaliste* was fast approaching. It seemed as if the former were endeavouring by every means in its power not only to increase the hostility that the revolutionary and liberal elements felt towards it, but also to alienate the party of the moderate royalists, upon whose support in the Chamber it depended for a parliamentary majority. Should such majority be lost, and should the Ultras persist in their mediæval policy, there would be no other resource for them than an appeal to measures either positively illegal or based upon a strained interpretation of the constitution. The history of the four years from 1826 to 1830 furnishes the solution of the intricate problem which the situation offered, and presents the striking picture of a nation and its authorised government gradually drawing farther and farther apart from

each other, until a revolutionary movement was needed in order to restore the country to itself.

That which precipitated this conflict between the two wings of the royalist party was the presence of the Jesuits in France contrary to law ; for their boldness, rapid growth, wealth, and power, which, due in large part to the favour that had been accorded to them by the Restoration, was exciting the jealousy of the old *noblesse*. In the session of 1826 Count Montlosier, himself an *émigré* and partisan of the old ideas, began an attack upon the Congregation and the Jesuits, whom he denounced as a menace to the state, a danger to public order, and an enemy to religion in France. Montlosier, coming from a province where the leading families had been Jansenists, did not believe in the dominance of ecclesiasticism in politics. His memoir upon the Congregation, in which was set forth the methods whereby that body gained information and converts, produced a tremendous effect in France, and gave to the opponents of the ecclesiastical party a new weapon of attack. Although the matter was not brought to a parliamentary decision, the outcome of the debate in the Chamber was a moral defeat for the ministry and the *parti-prêtre*. The government confessed that the Jesuits had no legal right to exist, and when the matter was brought before the *Cour royale* of Paris, a judgment was obtained which declared the presence of the Jesuits illegal but referred the matter to the police. In consequence of this attack by the moderate royalists, the rupture between them and the *parti-prêtre* became complete, and the latter hurled its anathemas at justice, the press, the moderates, and at all that smacked of liberalism, which one pious prelate characterised as "the diabolical fury of the men who found their happiness and glory only in war against God and kings, in the bloody disturbances of the people, in the disorder of hell, where sat enthroned the prince of insurrection, the angel of evil." This was Bishop Tharin, of Strassburg, the man chosen by the

Bourbons to be the teacher of the Duke of Bordeaux, the heir to the throne of France.

Notwithstanding the indignation roused by such statements among the people of France, Villèle, now hopelessly committed to the policy of the extreme reactionists, continued in his efforts to guard the royal power and to maintain the supremacy of the ultra-party. By a process of elimination he succeeded in freeing the ministry of all members of a moderate character, but in so doing he largely increased the number of his political opponents. In 1827 was proposed a new law against the press, in accordance with which the journals and irregular publications were to be subjected to close scrutiny, and a breach of the law was to be followed by excessive fines. Had the law been passed not only would the press of France have been practically destroyed, but printing and publishing and all the dependent interests would have been ruined, and literature, learning, and the professions would have been seriously injured. Fearing the effects that such a law would have, the French Academy entered a protest, but Charles X. refused to receive it and some of the members of the Academy were punished for their boldness. The general opinion was well expressed in the speech of Royer-Collard. "The law which I oppose," he said, "bears witness to the existence of a faction within the government as surely as if that faction had drawn the curtain and had allowed itself to be seen. I do not ask what it is or whence it comes or whither it is going, I judge it only by its works. In this instance it proposes the destruction of the press; last year it untombed the mediæval right of primogeniture; the year before the law of sacrilege. In religion, in political and civil organisation it is returning to past times. Whether one calls it a counter-revolution or not matters little, it is a return to the past. It is hastening by fanaticism, privilege, and ignorance back to barbarism and to a dependence upon the forces to which barbarism gave birth." In consequence of this intense opposition

and of the fear that the law would be rejected or thoroughly amended by the Chamber of Peers, Villèle withdrew the measure. But he could not efface the impression that the mere proposal of such a measure had made upon the people of France. Opposing royalists, liberals, and the people at large felt that the withdrawal of the law was cause for public thanksgiving. Fireworks, torchlight processions, music, balls, and patriotic songs showed how deeply the popular feelings had been stirred, and even the national guard in returning from the Champs de Mars, after a general review held by the king, dared to express its sentiments by shouting "Down with the ministers!" "Down with the Jesuits!" before the windows of many members of the cabinet and the carriages of ladies of the royal family. This act carried with it consequences of a serious character; for immediately the ministers brought forward a measure, which, of all the errors of the Restoration, became most serious in its consequences, a measure for the disbanding of the national guard. This measure became a law, and 20,000 men, the flower of the *bourgeoisie* of Paris, wounded in honour, hostile to the royalists by temperament and industrial interests, were changed from defenders of the city and the throne to enemies of the king and opponents of the house of Bourbon.

But the time was rapidly approaching when the ministry was to have its reckoning with the people whose wishes it had so long defied. Within the Chamber of Deputies there had now arisen from a constantly increasing and hostile minority a demand for the dissolution of the Chamber, on the ground that the septennial law, passed in 1824, did not apply to the existing Chamber that had been elected in 1822 for a term of five years. That term, it was claimed, had now expired, and a dissolution should take place. Villèle, confident that a new election would return a Chamber more in accord with the royal policy, acceded to this demand, and transferred some sixty of the most reactionary members of the Chamber of Deputies to

the Chamber of Peers in order to prepare the way for the expected royalist majority in the Deputies, and to overcome the opposition that the Peers had shown to the policy to which he had committed himself. In the mind of the government all preparation had been made to continue the ultra-royalists in power for an indefinite period.

Never was a minister more mistaken in his estimate. The elections of 1827 offered the opportunity for the expression of the popular opinion, which had hitherto acted more or less sporadically. For a long time the liberals had been awaiting the occasion, and had been making extensive preparations for the electoral struggle. The general direction of the contest was taken by a society called *Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera*. This society, founded by certain old Carbonari that had been converted to constitutional ideas, and numbering among its members men of all classes and opinions under the leadership of Guizot, Broglie, and others, had for its one object the creation of a liberal majority in the Chamber, and the overthrow of the Villèle ministry. In order to effect this result, it made every effort to prevent electoral frauds, to scrutinise the composition of the electoral lists, and to stimulate the zeal of the electors ; and it was aided in its work by a general coalition of liberals and disaffected ultra-royalists under the name of the constitutional opposition. Indeed the nation at large stood ranged against the *parti-prêtre*, for radicals and revolutionists acted together with constitutionalists and Ultras. In consequence of this active campaign, an imposing constitutional majority was rolled up against the ministry. Villèle, brought face to face with a hostile Chamber hoped, by sacrificing many of his colleagues and replacing them with men less unpopular, to save himself ; but this attempt to form a ministry in harmony with the new Chamber failed. Finally, on January 5, 1828, it was announced that the Villèle ministry had resigned, and a new ministry had been formed under the leadership of Martignac,

a man of sagacity and moderation, who had opposed the policy of the government in the last few years of the Villèle ministry.

The Martignac ministry, although not a politically homogeneous body, in the main represented the party of the Right Centre acting in conjunction with the moderates of the Right. As a concession made by the king to the liberal majority in the Chamber it was a failure, because the country was practically committed to an opposition to the king, and to any ministry that he might appoint. Nor did Martignac ever possess the confidence of the Crown. In not a single measure was he supported by the king, and at court he was obliged to war against a crowd of enemies and rivals. Like Richelieu in 1821, he received no support from the Left Centre. Yet in spite of this isolation the ministry showed itself wise and skilful, and made a great and honourable effort to surmount the difficulties of the situation. Censorship of the press was abolished, an improved electoral system was introduced, and the Jesuits were deprived of their control over education ; but all these measures were unable to gain for Martignac the confidence of the Chamber. By refusing to consider a measure for the reorganisation of the communes he increased the liberal opposition. But in this act he was justified, for he knew that the king would refuse to sanction another liberal measure, inasmuch as his signature to the acts against the Jesuits had already overstrained his royal conscience and had brought down upon his royal head the bitter reproaches of the ecclesiastics. Thus Martignac stood helpless between the two extremes ; the liberals accusing him of a breach of faith began to withdraw their support, while the king who had already many times regretted the existence of a ministry that was obliged by virtue of the composition of the Chamber to make concessions to liberalism, finally determined to change his cabinet at the first opportunity. When, therefore, in August, 1829, the majority in the Chamber was found to be against the government, the ministry was informed that it had

ceased to exist, and on the next day the *Moniteur* contained the royal ordinance announcing the new ministry.

Having failed to satisfy the representatives of the country, though he had done more to appease popular discontent than he deemed consonant with the dignity of the throne and the royal prerogative, the king determined in the new appointments to satisfy himself by adopting a policy of rigid and strict conservatism. The head of the new ministry, Polignac, a man greatly disliked by the people of France, a positive and bigoted reactionist in matters of church and state, represented the *émigrés*, the ultra-clericals, and all others who had taken their oath to the Charta with a reservation saving their religious obligations; Labourdonnaie, minister of the interior, quarrelsome and passionate, was a defender of the ideas of the old monarchy and a deputy always advocating proscriptions against the liberals and the Bonapartists; while Bourmont, minister of war, old chief of the *chouans*, who had deserted to the enemy on the day of Waterloo, and had borne witness against Marshal Ney at the time of his trial, seemed to the people a man without principle and without courage. In creating a ministry composed of men of this character, the king deliberately declared war upon liberalism, war upon the Charta, and war upon all that the Revolution had accomplished; for inasmuch as Polignac could not hope for a majority in the Chamber, it could only follow that parliamentary government was to be given up, and a government by royal ordinances substituted; that the rule of law was to be supplanted by the rule of arbitrary royal commands. A struggle between the Crown and the Country was inevitable; and the liberals, particularly those of the middle class, braced themselves to meet the coming events, the issue of which the neutral elements of France awaited with terrified expectation. Many state officials, who had held places under Martignac, resigned their posts; Lafayette made an extended tour of the provinces for the purpose of forming associations in

the various cities to resist unconstitutional projects ; the society *Aide-toi* prepared, in case of a dissolution of the Chamber, to watch the elections and to prevent fraud, and in this it was aided by the laws passed by the Martignac government ; the newspapers entered into the struggle with fearlessness, and their activity was increased by the failure of the government in a suit brought against the *Journal des Débats* for an article upon the existing situation.

The first passage at arms between the king and the Chamber took place at the opening of the new session, March 2, 1830. The king closed his speech from the throne with these words : " The Charta has placed the liberties of France under the guardianship of the rights of my crown. These rights are sacred, and I am under the obligation of handing them over intact to my successor. Peers of France, deputies of the country, I do not doubt that you will aid me to realise my good intentions ; that you will repel the shameful insinuations which malevolence has sought to spread abroad. If any conspiracies attempt to put obstacles in the way of my government, such as I do not wish to foresee, I will find the means to remove them in my own determination to maintain the public peace, in a just confidence in the people of France, and in their declared love for their king." This speech, made more menacing by significant accentuations upon certain of its phrases, was thought by many, both within and without the Chamber, to contain covert threats at the system of parliamentary government. Outside the Chamber the newspapers, notably the *Constitutionnel*, answered the speech, and Thiers, for the express purpose of combating "enthroned reactionism," started, in conjunction with Mignet and Carrel, the *National*, and formed, with Dubois and Rémusat, controllers of the *Globe*, the nucleus of that band of journalists, "young philosophers of liberalism," as Mazade calls them, to whom was so largely due the checkmating of the counter-revolution.

The opposition to the speech within the Chamber found expression in an address, which after a spirited debate in secret session was carried by a vote of 221 to 181. In this address, the formal answer to the speech from the throne, the signers declared their lack of faith in the new government. They stated their belief that the Polignac cabinet was dangerous and menacing to public liberty, and assured the king that the only way to establish constitutional harmony between the various parts of the government was to dismiss the ministers. The address of the Chamber of Peers was but little less positive. The committee sent to carry the address of the deputies to the king was received in such a manner as to leave no doubt of the king's intentions. "I have listened to your address" he said to Royer-Collard, who was the spokesman of the deputation, "and my heart is troubled that the Chamber refuses to aid me in my good intentions. Gentlemen, I have expressed my resolutions in the discourse pronounced at the opening of the session. These resolutions cannot be changed." On the next day the Chamber was prorogued for six months, and it was generally understood that it would not be summoned again. The royalist and ecclesiastical party was overjoyed; but the ministry, though outwardly confident, betrayed its misgivings in making overtures to such moderates as Decazes, Pasquier, and Martignac to enter the service of the state. But these men wisely refused to join a ministry that seemed to be on the eve of its downfall, and besides were too conscientious to support a policy with which they were not in sympathy. Polignac determined therefore to go straight forward in the course that he had mapped out, and in doing so showed a blindness, a fanaticism, a misunderstanding of the situation that is incredible. That he depended on superhuman aid to bring him safely through the crisis is evident, but at the same time he undoubtedly underestimated the seriousness of the situation. He told the king that though there was a certain amount of political

unrest, he believed it to be confined to a small group of men whose interests led them to meddle in politics; assured him that the mass of the people was not engaged in agitation but attended to its business, applied itself to industry, and was safe from the seductions of the political parties; and persuaded both himself and the king that the country would not support the demand of the Chamber for the dismissal of the ministry. While he discouraged a *coup d'état*, he confirmed the king in that state of mind, which Molé so well characterised as "rather rash than resolute." It is evident that in the early days of 1830, though the ministers were blind to the real character of the situation, they still had sufficient sense not to resort to extreme measures.

The result of the elections held in June and July effectually destroyed the illusion that the people at large would support the king. For these elections both parties had made extraordinary preparations. The government, having successfully carried through a war with Algiers, hoped that such a victory and the adding of new territory to France would win many adherents. But while the king, ministry, and *parti-prêtre* rejoiced, the mass of the people remained untouched by the new glory. The matter turned out as the liberals had anticipated; their opponents destroyed the good results of their success by the extremes to which their enthusiasm led them. Not only did the ecclesiastics greet the victory as showing the hand of God raised for the defence of the king, but the government also gained audacity with success, and felt that the time was fitting for a purging of the cabinet. Courvoisier and Chabrol, the only members with any political wisdom, were dismissed, that the ministry might be "strengthened" by men of the Polignac type,—an action interpreted by all as a preliminary step to resolute measures. The struggle at the polls became more intense; prefects, ecclesiastics by their pastoral letters, members of the royal family by actual solicitation, and even the king

himself entered the lists on the side of the government. But all their efforts were in vain. Not only were the 221 signers of the address returned to the new Chamber, but the ministerial minority was so far reduced that the ministerial support became insignificant. But this was not all. Eminent men in science and education were passing over to the ranks of the opposition, and even those who had been most active in placing the dynasty on its throne now turned against it. Talleyrand, considering that legitimacy had "betrayed her own principles," turned from the support of the Bourbons, and even the personal friends of the dynasty entered the hostile ranks.

In the presence of such a situation the ministry deliberated as to the best course to pursue. The king rejected Polignac's proposition to reorganise his cabinet, and proposed that the fourteenth article of the Charta should be examined to see if it would not offer a means of escape. After long discussion it was decided to meet the situation by a series of ordinances, based on this provision of the Charta, which authorised the king to issue the regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws and the safety of the state. In reply to the query whether such an act would not provoke a violent resistance, the ministry still persisted in affirming that on account of the high suffrage the people at large took so little part in the elections that an ordinance touching the electoral system would not rouse them, and that the interests of a free press concerned so small a number of individuals that no danger was to be feared from an ordinance of censure. Still believing that the people were generally content, and that the opposition was the work of a small group of ambitious malcontents, chiefly journalists, it concluded that even if a disturbance should occur, the military forces would be able to meet the emergency. In consequence of these discussions, there was issued from St. Cloud on July 25, 1830 and published in the *Moniteur* the next day, a series of royal ordinances that have

become famous in the history of France, because by means of them the counter-revolution was brought to an end, and the principles of the old *régime* ceased to be a factor in French politics. Accompanying the ordinances was a report which gave the reason why they were issued. "A turbulent democracy," it said, "is endeavouring to put itself into the place of the regular power. It dominates the elections by means of newspapers and associations; it endeavours to fetter the rights of the Crown and to dissolve the Chamber. A government that has not the right to take measures for the safety of the state cannot exist. That right is older than the laws, because it exists in the nature of things. An imperious necessity demands its application, and the moment has come to take measures which are without doubt in accord with the Charta, but which pass above the ordinary order of legislation." Then followed the five ordinances in succession. The first declared that the liberty of the press was suspended, that no journal of any kind whatever was to appear in the future without the authorisation of the government, and that this authorisation was to be renewed every three months; the second declared that the Chamber already elected but not yet in session was dissolved; the third modified the electoral law, reduced the legislative term from seven to five years, and introduced again the yearly renewal of one-fifth; the fourth convoked the Chambers for the month of September; and the fifth summoned to the council of state a certain number of ultra royalists and men belonging to the *parti-prêtre*.

In issuing these ordinances the king was guilty of an unwarranted extension of the royal prerogative, and brought to a crisis the movement that had been gradually gathering strength ever since the appointment of Polignac had been made known to the Parisian world. To have allowed the ordinances to stand would have been to destroy the parliamentary system of France; for it would have made possible, by means of a system of arbitrary commands, the reestablishment

of the autocracy of the old *régime*. It is, therefore, the more remarkable that at first the ordinances caused little disturbance, a fact due in part to the small circulation of the *Moniteur*, in part to the timidity of the deputies of Paris, who met at the house of Casimir Périer, but separated without reaching a decision. Until the evening of the 26th Paris as a whole remained so calm as to discourage the more violent deputies from taking aggressive action. But the journalists, upon whom the blow fell most heavily, acted with promptness and decision. Forty one men, representing eleven papers, drew up and signed a protest which charged the ministry with a violation of the law, and called upon the citizens to take the first steps in resisting illegal violence. Two journals only, the *National* and the *Temps*, dared to print the protest, and copies of these papers were scattered in all quarters of the town, and read everywhere by printers and compositors. These men, roused to fury, took the lead in the agitation, and were soon joined by a number of men, ex-members of the Carbonari, who were disgusted with the persistent inaction of the liberal deputies. Although only indirectly affected by the ordinances, these men met at the house of Cadet Gassicourt and there formulated plans whereby the uprising should be conducted with unity and dispatch. Insurrectionary committees were appointed in each of the twelve arrondissements to rouse the people to build barricades and to procure arms. In consequence of the activity of this revolutionary element and the passions aroused by the protest of the editors, the city on the 27th began to show signs of popular agitation, and the excitement was increased by the appointment to the command of the royal troops of General Marmont, whose desertion of Napoleon in 1814 made him a traitor in the eyes of the people. The national guard took its place on the side of the populace, and even the regiments of the line were unwilling to turn their arms against the people. On many occasions they even refused to obey their commanders, partly, no

doubt, because of the demoralising influence of the hot July days and the persistence with which they were kept under arms, but in greater part, because of their sympathy with the popular cause. Even on the 28th, the king still trusting in the justice of his cause, and in the expectations of divine aid quite as much as in the force of his arms, refused all concessions ; and it was not until the 29th, when the Tuileries had fallen into the hands of the insurgents, that he consented to withdraw his ordinances and to change his ministry.

Events had, however, passed beyond the king's control. The future of the dynasty lay in the hands of the deputies, who after seven consecutive meetings had gained sufficient courage to discuss the situation soberly, and to put the national guard under Lafayette's leadership for the defence of the city. A little later a provisional government named by them with Lafitte as chairman, established itself in the Hôtel de Ville and assumed the command of the city. Paris at last having a provisional government and an organisation for defence, was ready to take up the question of a permanent government. This was, however, a difficult matter. That the idea of a conflict between the ministry and the Chamber had entered the minds of all no one would for a moment dispute ; but it is equally clear that no one expected a revolution, or at first even thought of driving the dynasty from the throne by force. Before the defeat of the troops on the 29th the deputies and the journalists would have been content with a parliamentary victory, but after the evacuation of Paris by the soldiery, the victorious revolutionists made up their minds that the result of their uprising could be made permanent only by a change of rulers. Thiers and Mignet, who had left the city to avoid arrest, took on their return a stand emphatically against accommodation, and with them Lafitte agreed ; but it required the efforts of another day to convince the majority of the deputies, who were still willing to treat with the king, that no such compromise was possible.

On the night of the 29th, Thiers and Mignet, as the representatives of a group of journalists that was gradually forming itself into an influential party, began to put into operation the ideas with which for some months past they had been endeavouring to familiarise the people through the medium of the *National*. They had constantly hinted that to save the Charta it might be necessary to change the dynasty; and, sure of the constitutionality of their position, they had already made up their minds as to the course to be pursued in case a conflict were precipitated. In the unsigned placards that were posted throughout the city on the night of the 29th, they briefly but emphatically expressed their determination that Charles X. should not enter the city, because he had shed the blood of the people; and having taken the position that a republic would embarrass France by exposing her to frightful discord and division at home, they showed that the only possibility for France was the Duke of Orléans, of the younger branch of the Bourbons, who was devoted to the cause of the Revolution, had never fought against France, had borne the arms of the first republic at Jemmappes, had fought under the tri-colour, was willing to accept the Charta, to interpret it as France wished, and to hold his crown from the French people.

The influence of this positive action and the failure of the king's representative, Duke of Mortemart, to appear at the meeting of the deputies on the 30th, wrought the required change in the opinion of the deputies; and it was unanimously resolved to summon the Duke of Orléans to accept the position of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. In the address drawn up by Benjamin Constant were the words, "It is necessary to labour without relaxation that France may obtain the guarantees necessary to make the Charta an entire and complete reality." To this the duke replied that, "Henceforth the Charta would be a reality," and accepted the office of lieutenant-general. The provisional government had accomplished a very important part of its work, but it had yet to reckon with

a populace that desired a republic, and a king that had not yet abdicated. Lafayette's acceptance of the Duke of Orléans either won over or entirely set aside the republicans, although for a time it looked as if the new arrangement would provoke a second revolution. On the other hand, the king, despairing of the situation, abdicated the throne in favour of his grandson, the Duke of Bordeaux, and the Duke of Angoulême gave up his claims to the throne. The royal office was therefore thrown open, and when the news of the abdication came to the Chamber of Deputies that the Duke of Orléans as lieutenant-general had convoked, it was decided to call the Duke of Orléans to the throne under the title of Louis Philippe.

The revolution of 1830 was a political revolution, essentially different from that of 1789. It did not spring from any deep-seated wrongs of France, for the country was rich, at peace, and industrially prosperous. It wrought no great change in the condition of France, because it concerned only the political liberties of the French, and not their economic or social welfare. It was a conflict between ideas rather than classes, between conceptions of government rather than theories of social and economic relations, between political parties rather than between industrial groups. It was made necessary because the traditions of the old *régime*, represented by the party in power, were opposed to the principles of the Revolution embodied in the Charta. Inasmuch as the whole Restoration was a reaction, a conscious and deliberate act of revolution was needed to place again the principles of 1789 in the ascendant. Under the Restoration, monarchy and the church were tending towards supremacy. The dominance of monarchy meant the suppression of representative government, that is, of political liberty; and the dominance of the church meant the suppression of religious toleration, that is, liberty of thought. Though this reactionary program was not carried out in detail, yet it was evident that it would be in case the dynasty were preserved.

There was, therefore, but one course to pursue—to overthrow the dynasty in order to save the Charta. In passing judgment upon the course of events, one must blame those who restored the Bourbons quite as much as the Bourbons themselves ; and must remember that the ultimate cause of the uprising of 1830 was not the incompetence of the ministers of Charles X., or the series of errors of which he himself was guilty, but the attempt to bring into harmony the political ideas of two periods of time separated by the revolution of 1789.

CHAPTER V.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ABSOLUTISM IN ITALY.

THE problem that confronted the people of Italy was of an essentially different character from that which the people of France were endeavouring to solve. In the latter case, as has been seen, a struggle of parties followed the restoration to power of representatives of the old *régime* and the application of a doctrine of government that was antiquated and reactionary; in Italy, on the other hand, we are to see a proud and liberty-loving people, influenced by the doctrines to which the French Revolution had given birth, endeavouring to gain constitutional recognition and national unity.

Italy had dreamed of unity in the past but had never possessed it. Thomas Aquinas, Dante, and Savonarola had longed for it, and the Popes had at times striven for an ecclesiastico-political unity under their leadership; but although geographically formed to be the home of a single people gathered together under a common government of her own, Italy had remained for fifteen centuries broken and disunited. As a state she had been little more than an appanage of the Holy Roman Empire; her kingship had been absorbed into the headship of the Empire, the representative of which rarely concerned himself with matters Italian and in no way stood for the national feeling. The great cities, free to a large extent from the burden of feudalism that hampered municipal growth in other countries, became the centre of an active and progressive local life, but at the same time, in so doing, produced excessive decentralisa-

tion. The papacy, head and centre of a universal church, could aid but little in a movement toward national unity, for, of no nationality itself, it could identify itself with none.

At the time of the Revolution but two of the Italian states, the kingdom of Sardinia and the States of the Church, were under princes whom we may even approximately call native; in all the other states were foreign dynasties, Habsburg or Bourbon, each exhibiting in a more or less complete degree all the characteristics of a state of the eighteenth century. In each, notably Naples and Tuscany, there had been taking place a progressive revolution in social and political life, and in each reform movements had been inaugurated; but the reaction of the last decade of the eighteenth century had in Italy, as in Spain and Germany, established the doctrine of absolutism more firmly than ever. However, affairs took a new turn when Italy became the scene of Bonaparte's campaign against Austria, and when the general of the Directory began those experiments that encouraged the Italian people to hope for liberty and national independence. Bonaparte swept away the existing political system. One after another the absolute states fell before the tide of his military success, and in their places appeared that succession of republics, the founding of which indicated the desire of the Directory to reproduce along the border of France the only type of government that it considered worthy of perpetuation. Absolutism and municipal independence gave way for the moment to republicanism and the influence of the French ideas. The cities of Lombardy and the Roman Legations were joined together in the Cisalpine republic; Genoa was converted into the Ligurian republic; the people of Rome, renouncing the authority of the Pope, accepted with enthusiasm the erection of the first republic of Rome; and finally the Neapolitans, roused to a condition of excitement unknown under the Bourbons, welcomed the Parthenopean republic as a release from the despotism of the old king. This arrangement of Italy

into four states after the French model was destined, however, to last only as long as Bonaparte acted as representative of the republic ; for with his elevation to the imperial throne, a group of republican states under the guardianship of France was no longer consistent with the situation. Portions of Italy were, therefore, successively added to the Empire, and the remainder was divided into two parts, the kingdom of Italy, extending from the Alps to the centre of the peninsula along the Adriatic, under Eugène de Beauharnais ; and the kingdom of Naples, including the remainder of southern Italy, first under Joseph Bonaparte, and, after his summons to Spain in 1808, under General Murat. Sicily alone, where King Ferdinand had taken refuge, escaped the influence of Napoleon.

Politically speaking Italy had never been nearer a condition of unity than when, divided into two kingdoms, she began to feel the benefits of compactness and uniformity in government. Into these states Napoleon introduced orderly administration, uniform laws, and a wise system of internal improvement, a work in which he had the hearty support and material aid of the Italians themselves, who took up the task of Italy's betterment with zeal and enthusiasm. They joined themselves to the fortunes of their conqueror, and relying on the promise that he had made, they looked to him for the continuation of the task that promised in its accomplishment the fulfilment of their aspirations. But Napoleon ruled Italy more despotically even than he ruled France. He gave to the Italian people, as he had given to the people of France, social equality, but he denied them political liberty. He gave to them a better organised country and better cities to live in, but he demanded in return the obedience and submission to his will that he exacted from all those that he ruled. He made them partakers in his military glory, but he imposed upon them that heaviest of burdens, military proscription. He gave them protection, but at the same time he made them feel the completeness of his police

system and the reality of his despotism by suppressing the freedom of speech and of the press, and by placing in their path a thousand vexatious obstacles to freedom of movement and trade. That he might have a more efficient force to aid him in his wars he roused hopes and encouraged enthusiasm by unfulfilled promises ; above all, by the promise of unity did he play with subtlety and design upon the chords of the Italian nature. He held out before the eyes of the impressionable Italians the picture of a state freed from foreign princes, applying its energies to its own upbuilding, a *patria*, a fatherland, a national home. Under the spell of this hope Italy waited, trusting to see with each new treaty, each alteration of her governments, each reshaping of the political boundaries of her states, some indication of the favour of her conqueror and master. But Campo Formio gave way to Lunéville, Lunéville to Pressburg, Pressburg to Vienna, and with each successive treaty the conviction began to dawn upon the Italian mind that Napoleon was in reality unfavourable to those very doctrines upon which she based all her hopes. At the time of the retreat from Moscow Italy had awakened to the reality of the situation ; she had discovered that force, subterfuge, and a shameless political intrigue had been the return from Napoleon for her service and devotion, and that she had fallen prey to a reaction that brought once more into supremacy the doctrine of absolutism and aggrandisement. Therefore, after 1812, a spirit of opposition to Napoleon became increasingly prominent. Clergy and nobility desired the success of Austria and the return of the old *régime*, while the people, the reformers, the romanticists, all who had felt the invigorating touch of the newer, larger life of Europe, began to see that the salvation of Italy lay in her own power and resources.

At this crisis, when Napoleon was being forced step by step back to the boundaries of France, a leader was needed. Would it be Eugène or would it be Murat ? The former, nobly refus-

ing to abandon the brother to whom he owed his advancement, put aside the crown of Italy which the allies offered to him as the price of defection. "I will never be king at that price," he wrote to the commander of the Austrian forces, Marshal Bellegarde. But Murat was shaped in a less loyal mould. Ambitious to hold the throne of Naples, and unable to discover a middle course between devotion and defection, he abandoned his Emperor in the hope that the success of the allies would result in making him the king of the entire peninsula. Led on by the persuasions of his wife and the diplomacy of Metternich, who knew the ambitions and the weaknesses of the man, he dared to negotiate with Napoleon in order to give to his treachery a certain legal character. But Napoleon left him to his fate, and in January, 1814, he signed the treaty with Austria and thus bound himself to serve the man who had already resolved that no outward trace of the Napoleonic *régime* should survive, and that Murat should be involved in the downfall of his Emperor. Metternich was determined that Italy should have no other master than himself, no other unity than that which came from dependence upon Austrian rule; and hardly had Murat declared his independence of Napoleon and to all appearances secured his position as king of southern Italy, when the allies, acting through Lord Bentinck, the English representative in Sicily, declared for the return of Ferdinand to the Neapolitan throne. Murat was caught between two fires; his treason to Napoleon, which Pasquier declared had contributed more than anything else to encompass the total ruin of the Emperor, had thrown him into the hands of the allies, and now they were about to repudiate him for the legitimate prince. Murat had sacrificed his honour only to be caught in the intrigues of the Power whose cause he had supported. With the final downfall of Napoleon and the return of the Bourbons, it became plainly evident that among the diplomats meeting at the congress of Vienna none would be found to sup-

port the cause of the ex-Napoleonist. Austria would not allow an independent king in Naples; Bourbon would support Bourbon. Therefore Murat began to take measures to maintain the kingdom of which he was king; and having gathered forces—some sixty thousand men—upon the frontier of his state, he watched with anxiety and determination the issue of the conference.

That each of the Powers wishing to win the support of the Italian people appealed to their desire for liberty, is a striking proof of the longing that Italy of the years 1813 to 1815 had for peace, independence, and national consolidation. Napoleon had discovered that the catch-word of liberty was an open sesame to the hearts of the Italians. Bentinck had appealed to them as Italians loving liberty and not tyranny when he sought to further the cause of Ferdinand IV. "Holland, Portugal, and Spain," he said, "can testify to the disinterestedness of our efforts. Shall Italy alone remain in chains? Shall Italians war against other Italians to aid a tyrant to destroy their liberty? Italians, do not hesitate, be Italians!" And now Austria, in order to consummate the most unpardonable of all her acts, took up the same cry. General Nugent in 1813, and again the next year, and Marshal Bellegarde in 1814, touched the same chord when they promised liberty and independence to the Italians as the reward for their support of the allied cause. "We come to you as liberators," said Nugent, "long enough have you groaned beneath the weight of oppression. You shall be an independent nation, happy if only you prove true to those who love you and will protect you." "Do not fear," he repeated, "that under new masters you will be forced back into the old condition of weakness and dependence. No, Italians! this is not the purpose of the allied Powers. Your independence, the maintenance of your civil and political existence are among the causes of the present war, to the end that you may be among the peoples around you

a single body, a single nation worthy of the respect of others, and free from the dominance of foreigners."

To a people who were already feeling the evil effects of Napoleon's rule, who were impoverished by his heavy taxations, whose industry and agriculture were almost at a standstill because of his military exactions, whose foreign trade and commerce were hampered by the restrictions imposed by the continental blockade—to a people suffering from these burdens such words came to satisfy the greatest longing of their hearts. Such appeals quickened the natural wish for peace, for free institutions, for country, and roused in the children the hope that Napoleon had excited in the fathers, a hope now the stronger because of the military and administrative unity that had already been created by the shedding of their blood in a common cause on every battlefield of Europe. Piedmontese, Lombards, Romagnols, Tuscans, Romans, and Neapolitans were beginning to feel the need of a union of forces and interests, of a state worthy of the respect of Europe, in which all local hostilities should be given up for the common good, all differences reconciled in the one fraternal desire to work for the welfare of a fatherland. Italy perhaps more than the other states of Europe was expectant and hopeful in that period that preceded the gathering of the Powers to decide upon the rearrangement of the European states in the interest of peace and a political equilibrium.

It is wholly problematical what would have been the result of a free gift to the Italians of those privileges that would have enabled them to construct a free state. Italy was certainly not ready for the full exercise of those rights that the French Revolution had proclaimed as fundamental for man, and it is more than likely that she would have failed to make a proper use of liberty had it been granted to her. The Italians needed the hard experience of resisting oppression and absolutism before they could reach the point of realis-

ing the necessity of subordinating local interests and personal ambitions to the one great work of creating a united state. The spirit of particularism that had created marked differences of habit and speech, and had developed forms of government as unlike as were those of the republics of Genoa and Venice and the kingdom of Naples, would also, in all probability, have produced such differences of opinion as to prevent the adoption of any common plan of action. In the light of such a probability it cannot be said that it was the failure of the congress of Vienna to carry out all the promises made by those who, speaking in the name of the Powers, promised Italy unity, that is deserving of condemnation. It is rather the completeness of the reaction upon which, as far as Italy was concerned, it saw fit to enter; it is the fact that in the consideration of Italy's future not a thought was taken whereby the object of Italy's earnest prayers was to be ultimately attained; it is the fact that in the application of the doctrine of legitimacy it did not impose a single condition or limitation upon those who were restored to their thrones, or endeavour to lighten the oppression by a recognition in its final statement of the needs, if not the rights, of a high-strung, enthusiastic people. Italy would have been satisfied with less than autonomy. She would doubtless have accepted joyfully even the old rulers, had guarantees been given to save her from the evils of despotism, had the new European council taken as its guiding principle a doctrine, no matter what its imperfection, more in accord with the spirit of the nineteenth than with that of the eighteenth century. But speculation is idle. In whatever way we may believe that Italy would have used her liberty; whatever the congress of Vienna might have done for the amelioration of the condition of a long-suffering people; the fact remains that the diplomats of the congress did the very worst thing possible, and did it so effectually that the treatment was not only worse than the disease, but it brought the

patient into a condition more serious than before. The absolutism of 1815 and of the years following was more complete than it had been in the era preceding the conquest of Bonaparte. Even the good results of the progressive revolution of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, were swept away in the determination to destroy as effectually as possible all traces of Napoleon's influence.

Upon this principle the congress acted ; it determined to restore the legitimate sovereigns to their rightful thrones and to bind them by no limitation or qualification. In the spring and early summer of 1814 Victor Emmanuel returned to Turin from Sardinia, where he had been holding a petty court at Cagliari. The joy of his people at receiving their own king was turned to doubt as they saw old institutions and customs restored, and even officials of twenty years before given full powers ; as they saw monasteries and nunneries revived and the Jesuits in full control of the royal conscience. Francis IV. returned to Modena, and before the expiration of a year, had begun the rehabiliement of autocracy and the restoration of the Roman Catholic Church. The Habsburg Marie Louise was established in Parma and the Bourbon Marie Louise in Lucca, and though both followed a temperate policy they were wholly under the control of Austria. Pius VII. returned to Rome and once more all administration was put into the hands of ecclesiastics ; the Jesuits were recalled, feudal privileges were restored, and a general air of theocracy began to pervade the city of Rome, the Legations, and the nineteen provinces into which the Papal States were divided. Ferdinand III. came back to Tuscany, and here alone was any attempt made to preserve the reforms of the earlier period and to give a milder character to the autocracy of the prince. Good government prevailed, the church was kept in subjection, and the people were unmolested in the pursuit of their ordinary vocations. In consequence of this moderate policy, which at least brought

prosperity if not a guarantee of liberty, Tuscany became the envy and even refuge of those who were suffering from oppression in other parts of the peninsula.

But of all the states of Italy, Lombardo-Venetia and Naples were the special objects of Austria's care and attention. In one case she possessed the right to administer affairs directly, in the other she was determined to prevent the continuance of a Napoleonic dynasty, and by the overthrow of Murat to effect the restoration of the legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand, to the throne. The return of Lombardy to the house of Habsburg was a restoration agreed to by the Powers at Paris in 1814, and confirmed by the diplomats at Vienna when the final arrangements were completed. The transfer of Venice had been demanded by Metternich at Töplitz, and it is little to the credit of the allies that they agreed to the extinction of a republic, first overthrown by Bonaparte, that could look back upon an unbroken existence of over a thousand years. The acquisition of these provinces was Austria's compensation for the territories along the Rhine, which she now resigned permanently. In order to make possible a harmonious agreement between the Powers, these two historic states were denationalised and were brought directly under the control of the country that had thus far suppressed every attempt of its own people to effect changes in the interest of free institutions. Austria extended her political boundaries to the Po and established in northern Italy a typical Austrian administration. Her methods, though not always bad, aimed at the suppression of all local privilege, and sought to create out of disaffected Italians loyal and obedient Austrians. To this end a military system was employed, punishments became frequent and severe, and judicial tribunals were often managed in the interest of absolutism. The Austrians introduced their own dispensatory system, their own coinage, their own code of law; and driving native Italians from professional chairs, notably at Milan, they introduced foreigners who could

scarcely speak the Italian language. Although the Lombards and Venetians enjoyed many advantages in the way of equality before the law, equality of taxation, universal toleration, and absence of arbitrary government, nevertheless, as Count Strassoldo wrote to Metternich, "they abhorred and detested the uniform system of administration by which they were put on a level with Germans, Bohemians, and Galicians." The industries of the country hampered by petty restrictions tended toward decay ; trade was directed by motives of policy rather than by rational economic laws ; and commerce, the historic interest of Venice, was neglected altogether. That the economic deterioration of the two provinces, which were given over in the main to agriculture and small trading industries, was not greater than it was during the ensuing thirty years, was due to the natural richness of the countries themselves.

In regard to Naples the case was otherwise. Here lingered the kingdom of Murat, the last of the old Napoleonic dynasties, and here was centred the last military opposition to Austrian supremacy that Italy was to show for many a year. But Murat's dethronement had already been agreed upon by the Powers, for although England had in 1814 disavowed Bentinck's interference, she had become convinced that Murat was not to be trusted and had thrown her influence on the side of his enemies. Murat, knowing the decision of the allies, took advantage of the return of Napoleon from Elba to offer his services to the Emperor, although at the same time he was bound by his treaty with Austria. In order to forestall any advance attack from the latter Power he pushed his army across the papal frontier without waiting for instructions from Napoleon, and at the same time appealed to the Italian people to rally to the defence of their liberties. But save for the co-operation of a few towns this appeal was wholly without result, and having been badly defeated by the Austrian troops at Tolentino, May 3 and 4, 1815, he fled first to France and then to Austria.

Finally, in October of the same year he made one more attempt to win back his kingdom ; but captured in Calabria by Ferdinand, who was now restored to his throne, he was condemned to death, and fell under the fire of a platoon of Neapolitan soldiery. After the defeat of Murat the Powers had restored Ferdinand, had overthrown the constitution of Sicily that Ferdinand had granted through the influence of England, and had united the two states, Sicily and Naples, under a common administration as the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Furthermore, the establishment of Ferdinand as the first king of the new kingdom made him wholly dependent on Austria, and he bound himself still further by making a treaty with Austria, in which he promised to introduce no constitution into his realm, and to hold himself aloof from all union with other Italian states. Austria's influence in Italy was now as complete in the south as in the north.

The death of Murat removed the last hindrance to the complete supremacy in the peninsula of the principles of the restoration. So far as possible the old dynasties were in their old places and the old methods of government were in full operation. Scarcely a thought had been given to the Italian desire for independence. Instead of a free government the Italians were brought face to face with one the more despotic, because it depended for its maintenance upon a stronger Power, to whom rulers looked for encouragement in the application of a narrow-minded oppression. In consequence of this attitude of the Powers the Italian situation took on a new form. The people in general began to recognise the true character of the doctrines that guided the actions of the diplomats of Europe and that formed the fundamental principles of the chief of the diplomats, who saw in Germany and Italy the countries most needing a judicious but firm application of his doctrine of repression. They began to see that to Metternich the restored rulers were but convenient instruments, whereby all traces of French influence could

be rooted out and ecclesiasticism and legitimism introduced, all such indications of disorders and popular madness as freedom of the press and representative government be set aside and discouraged, and order and tranquillity be maintained. As this conviction began to seize upon the minds of the people, Italy became transformed from a country ready for the national rest that follows satisfied hopes into a country ready for rebellion and revolt. If there was calm upon the surface, if to the travelling observer the administration seemed regular and systematic ; if Lombardy appeared prosperous and the Roman states contented, all was due to the thoroughness with which absolutism had done its work, and not to any universal popular peace and satisfaction. What Count Strassoldo told Metternich of the northern province may well apply to all the states. "Our Italian possessions," he wrote, "are guaranteed to us by physical force only ; a moral force is entirely wanting to us here." In fact, everywhere underneath the surface were currents of unrest. From 1816 to 1820 the increase in popular agitation in different parts of the country was steady and persistent. Northern Italy with its nationality held in check by a rigid Austrian system was ready for revolt against the house of Austria ; central Italy, once more under the rule of the papacy, was secretly organising against ecclesiasticism ; while southern Italy, which had fallen into the hands of the Bourbons, was more active than were any of the other states in preparing rebellion for the purpose of winning constitutional rights. Metternich's opinion that a proper application of Austrian methods would turn public opinion in favour of Austria, cause discontent to disappear, and persuade the Italians generally to regard Austria as the only government that could afford a sure support to public tranquillity, was hardly warranted in the face of his own declaration that there was a great ferment in the minds of the population and universal discontent.

This discontent, of which Metternich speaks, was fostered by

secret societies. Italy was the motherland of scores of these fraternities, many of them baneful in their influence, divided in their plans, and often lacking organisation, purpose, leaders, and, in fact, all the means necessary for carrying through a successful revolution. They flourished under grotesque names in the universities, the army, among the higher classes and among the lower, and formed chapters in other countries also for the promotion of the cause of revolution. Of all these societies the most famous and widespread was the Carbonari or society of the charcoal-burners, which would appear to have taken on an organised form during the reign of Murat, about the year 1811. This association, which may be taken as the most typical and influential of all the Italian societies, represents both the undercurrents of popular agitation, and, in its higher and most worthy aspect, the influence of the revolutionary ideas and principles that had been evolved out of the events of the preceding twenty years. Italy had been shaken to her very foundation, and it was impossible that the national elements should rearrange themselves as they had been before. Therefore Carbonarism is for the student of Italian history not a great political movement, not even a great organised revolt, but a widespread political symptom indicating the spirit of the newer life that was everywhere dominating the mind of the people of western Europe. Carbonarism was not limited to Italy; it included the popular elements in neighbouring countries, in France, as we have seen, in Switzerland, and Spain, and established its branches wherever it could find a following. In this way there was formed a network of secret organisations, working for the attainment of different ends in the different countries, but everywhere dominated by the one definite policy of opposing legitimism, despotism, and reaction. In France it protested against the Restoration, in Spain against the wretched government of Ferdinand VII., while in Italy it opposed Austria and everything for which that state stood. It took as its

cardinal principles individual liberty, constitutional government, and national independence ; and for its instruments of action, agitation and revolution. Its chief defects were the character of its organisation, the method that it employed, and the aim that it placed before itself ; for each was vague, insufficient, and unsatisfactory.

In organisation it was secret, cosmopolitan, and ceremonious, three characteristics that were fatal to the ultimate success of the cause for which each Carbonaro laboured so courageously. In form the system was a republic, but the facts did not always bear out the theory. The territory of activity was divided into provinces, in each of which was one or more lodges whose numbers were increased as rapidly as possible. The members were also divided into "tribes," and there was a senate and a house of representatives that were supposed to make the laws for each "tribe." In point of fact, however, the constitution of the Carbonari was never very rigorously followed, and in practical working the system became rather oligarchic than republican. Instead of unity and free intercourse there was little or no communication between the lodges. Initiated members did not know their leaders, often did not know their fellow-members. Instead of common co-operation in the making of laws, obedience was demanded to rules the origin of which was kept a secret, and power was concentrated in the hands of a few men, to whose councils few were admitted and whose identity was in the majority of cases a secret. Thus Carbonarism not only preserved its principles and actions from the knowledge of the world outside, but it also showed its lack of faith in its own members by denying to them the full confidence of the order. Then, too, it was cosmopolitan, and not Italian. It believed in the propagation of its doctrines throughout Europe, and did not concentrate its efforts upon the redemption of Italy alone. It was, therefore, a part of the general European liberal movement with its centre in Italy, a connection that weakened

its strength, and prevented its holding a secure place in the hearts of many of those who desired Italy's salvation, and who were willing to sacrifice themselves for her cause but not for the cause of Europe. To many of these Carbonarism appeared dangerous, and they were inclined to support the view of the conservative and reactionary element, that Carbonarism was the promoter of disorder, lawlessness, and revolution. It consequently became associated in their minds with all movements that employed assassination and sought to overthrow the existing social order. And, finally, the impressive and elaborate ceremonial with which Carbonarism surrounded itself may have had the effect of inspiring awe, but it did not help to rouse the loyal devotion and co-operation of all those who entered the order. The candidates were terrified by the ordeal of initiation and by the oaths which they were obliged to take. Every step symbolised the duties of the new members, and by various formalities, many grotesque, many trivial, the principles of the order were impressed upon their minds.

In the main the weaknesses of the order can be easily determined. The leaders having little confidence in the members acted secretly according to the exigencies of the moment; and this method, involving secrecy within secrecy, prevented ready and enthusiastic action, and created a situation dangerous to any society, in that it made difficult the development of an *esprit de corps*. As there were no general gatherings, and few opportunities for interchange of opinions, and as there was almost no way of determining the loyalty of members, suspicion and distrust not infrequently entered the ranks. With such a diverse and heterogeneous following treachery was inevitable, and the spy system became of necessity a regular part of the administration. Cases are on record where members were put to death for breach of faith or for causes known only to the leaders, who played the part of autocrats, a rôle contradictory to the essential principles of the government of the order. In scope the

movement was too general, in action too limited ; its members believed in the universal success of the liberal doctrines but made the application too local. Perhaps they could not do otherwise. They were also eager for Italian independence, but they were inclined to look for aid outside of Italy as well as within her borders, and so grew to depend too much upon the co-operation and support of the liberal element in France. Furthermore, they were far from agreed as to the form that the government should take after independence had been won. The majority looked forward to a single republic as their ideal government, and saw in the government of the order a type of their ideal ; others believed in a federal state made up of the different states of Italy ; while a third class was inclined to believe in the superiority of a constitutional monarchy. This uncertainty as to the party program gave a certain aimlessness to the struggles of the Carbonari. But notwithstanding these objectionable features, the order gathered to itself supporters from every class and rank, seemingly seeking strength from numbers rather than from character. Soldiers, students, priests, officials, and men of letters were enrolled in its lodges, and threw in their lot with its cause. They hated Austria, autocracy, and ecclesiasticism, and they saw in the order the only means, inadequate though many considered it, whereby agitation for the cause of liberalism could be maintained.

The first notable outbreak of the Carbonari was in Naples and Piedmont in the year 1820, an important year in Italian history, for in it occurred the first attempt of the people to gain constitutional liberties. Although the movement failed in the end, it taught the Italians many lessons in the craft of princes, and also showed them the futility of the methods that they were employing. It made evident their strength and their weakness, and disclosed—had they but known it—the obstacles that the liberal movement had to overcome before ultimate

success could be gained. To understand the uprising in Naples we must look back for the moment to the year 1812, when the Spanish Cortes, encouraged by the successes of Wellington and acting under the spell of the French revolutionary ideas, issued a constitution which though noteworthy as expressing the democratic sympathies of the Spanish liberals was a failure in so far as it tried to outline a form of government adapted to the character and needs of the Spanish people. Government of one chamber, national sovereignty, universal suffrage, supremacy of the Roman Catholic Church, and retention of the Salic law were among the contradictory provisions of this constitution, which in fact was modelled after that of 1791 in France. It was abolished in 1814 on the return of Ferdinand VII. to Spain, but in 1820 in a revolution—the first properly so called after the congress of Vienna—the liberals were so far successful that they were able to force the king to accept the old constitution. Immediately the Neapolitans, quick to respond to any stimulus from Spain, began to clamour for the introduction of this constitution into the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and, in so doing, ignored the much better form of constitutional government that Ferdinand I. (then Ferdinand IV. of Naples) had conceded to the Sicilians in 1813. But to this constitution, which, as we have seen, had been set aside when Naples and Sicily were joined in 1815, the Sicilians were loyal, and they resented the Neapolitan choice of the Spanish constitution. For the moment, however, everything seemed hopeful. At the first appearance of an organised popular revolt, Bourbonism in Naples yielded to the clamour, and conceded all that the Carbonari demanded. Ferdinand I., advised by his minister, promised the constitution, and on July 13th took a solemn oath, which he concluded with these words: "Omnipotent God, who with thine infinite gaze readest the soul and the future—if I lie or intend to break the oath, do Thou at this instant hurl on my head the lightning of thy vengeance."

These promises and solemn oaths gave to the act of the king every appearance of sincerity, and roused the people to a frenzy of joy and enthusiasm. It was the heyday of Carbonarism, because to that order redounded the victory. The Carbonari stepped to the front as the leaders of liberalism, and their lodges and membership increased rapidly.

But the victory so easily gained had to be maintained in the face of a double opposition, that of the king, who had most disgracefully perjured himself, and that of Metternich, who saw in the Neapolitan movement, not only a local uprising in Naples but a disorder fostered by all the worst elements of Europe. He saw in it the reign of anarchy, not of law, and was convinced that if a proper example were not immediately made of it, the German courts, feeling its influence, would soon be aflame with a desire for constitutional government. Above all he feared for its influence upon the Czar, whose sympathy the liberal element was reckoning on at this time. To Metternich it was therefore a critical moment, and the congress of Troppau was called to sound the opinion of the other European Powers, particularly that of Alexander, regarding Austrian interference. It was his uncertainty as to whether the Czar would or would not oppose his doctrine that led him to say in his communication to Count Rechberg that the Austrian "fire-engines were not full in July, else we should have set to work immediately." The result of the congress convinced him that Alexander was more amenable than he had dared to hope he would be, and was gradually opening his eyes to the soundness of the Austrian doctrine. A postponement of the congress having been decided upon, in order that a second meeting might be held nearer to Italy at which the King of Naples might be present, a short statement of principles was drawn up, and an agreement was made to meet at Laibach in the January following. Metternich arrived at Laibach on January 4, 1821, and during the months that followed brought every form of pressure to

bear upon the Czar. "My words," he says, "sounded like a voice from the other world." "If ever any one from black became white it is he." In consequence of this change of mind, there was sent out on March 15th a "laconic order" authorising 80,000 Austrian soldiers to march to Naples to put down the revolt. The fact that Alexander placed 90,000 Russians at Austria's disposal was worth to Metternich all the promises of the Czar, for he felt that this action would "prevent disturbers from counting so readily on the Emperor Alexander in the future." On March 23d Naples fell, and Ferdinand, agreeing to all that the congress had done, returned to his kingdom to take up once more the old routine of despotism and proscription. The constitutional government to which he had sworn allegiance and which he had promised to defend was swept away; the leaders of the recent movement were condemned; the army was reduced, and the execution, imprisonment, and exile of all co-operators in the revolution turned to miseries the joys of the year before. Naples was given over to bad government, corrupt administration, financial bankruptcy, conspiracies, and brigandage, and this condition of things was supported by the military power of Austria.

While the movement in Naples was thus being extinguished, an uprising in Piedmont brought added distress to the Austrian chancellor because it seemed to be of a more alarming character. However reactionary Victor Emmanuel had been after 1815 in reviving old methods of government, he was, nevertheless, obstinate in his determination to resist an Austrian protectorate. This Metternich knew, and hence his disquietude. The king really loved his people, he had shown himself loyal and patriotic, and notwithstanding the fact that he had married an Austrian wife, he had rejected every Austrian proposal for a treaty. When, therefore, the liberals, who represented a more scholarly and intelligent class than did the revolutionists of Naples, made their demands for a constitution, and the Car-

bonari of Turin added the influence of an agitation which threatened to become a revolution, the king found himself in a dangerous predicament. Anxious to conciliate his people and to prevent bloodshed on the one side, he was nevertheless convinced by the report of his minister, San Marzano, who had been at Laibach, that the allies would prevent a constitutional government in Piedmont as they were about to do in Naples, and that any concessions to the agitators would be followed by direct Austrian intervention. Unable himself to solve the difficult problem he avoided the responsibility of a decision by abdicating the throne, after having appointed as regent Charles Albert, prince of Carignan, during the absence in Modena of his brother Charles Felix, the heir to the throne. Between the newly appointed regent and the new king there were important differences. Charles Albert, belonging neither to the age of despotism nor to the age of constitutional government, wavered between the two extremes, his sympathies in the main being on the side of the liberals, while tradition, environment, and education drew him to the ranks of the supporters of the old *régime*. Charles Felix, on the other hand, was uncompromisingly on the side of reaction, and in this he was supported by the Duke of Modena, with whom he was connected by blood and marriage. The attitude taken by these men in this emergency was characteristic of the opinions that each held. Charles Albert, aware that he had been made a sacrifice to the monarchy and the revolution, took the decided step of sanctioning the promulgation of the Spanish constitution and accepting the program of the liberal party; but at the same time he sent a report of the situation to Charles Felix, asking for instructions. The answer of the king was not unexpected to the regent. Immediate word was returned that all that had thus far been done was null and void, and that if necessary Austrian troops would be employed to force the liberals into submission. Furthermore, the hint was thrown out that if

Charles Albert refused to obey, he might lose his chance of the succession to the throne, inasmuch as the wife of the Duke of Modena, niece of Victor Emmanuel, was the next heir, if the Salic law were not applied. To these commands the regent submitted. He, too, abdicated; and leaving Turin for Novara on the evening of March 22d, the day before the Austrian troops entered Naples, passed into exile, distrusted by the liberals and mocked at by the reactionists. Little wonder is it that the next step in his career should carry him into Spain to serve in the army of those who were overthrowing constitutionalism there. On April 8th the punishment meted out to rebels fell on the Piedmontese liberals. Their forces concentrating at Novara were defeated by an army made up of Austrians and royalists, and the second effort of Metternich to suppress the demand for constitutional liberty ended in success.

Thus the two movements that had begun with great promise of success were brought to an end, and to all appearances reactionism was as firmly established as ever. As far as the constitutionalists could see there remained no advantages to bear witness to the efforts that they had put forth, no liberal gains to encourage further uprisings. The policy of Ferdinand I. after 1821 was more despotic than before, while that of Charles Felix had none of the kindly love and affection with which Victor Emmanuel had tempered the excesses of his autocratic rule. Well might the liberals and the revolutionists, reduced to inaction, begin to consider wherein lay the causes of their failure, and to inquire why, when at first they had been so eminently successful, they had lost in the end all that had been gained. The attempt to obtain a more liberal government had failed not because of the armed interference of Austria, the perjury of Ferdinand, or the bigotry of Charles Felix,—these obstacles to victory were to be taken as matters of course,—but because of the defects inherent in the character of the Italian people, and in the organisation through which they sought to accomplish

their objects. As a people the Italians were earnest, yet excitable, and of a low grade of civilisation, though their leaders were often men of ability and intelligence. They were lamentably ignorant, particularly of political and constitutional matters; their standard of life, notably in southern Italy, was low, their economic condition deplorable, their environment unhealthful and degrading; sickness and poverty were common among them, and agriculture was unprofitable. Their excitability and ignorance made them most susceptible to revolutionary influences, but at the same time decreased their chances of success in case they actually revolted, and prevented them from profiting by success in case they were victorious. Furthermore, in the cities were collected large numbers of those who were ready at a moment's notice to enter upon any undertaking that promised possible betterment. Revolutionary by nature, this class was encouraged by the rapid increase in the number of those who were forced by the oppressive attitude of Austria and the local rulers to employ revolutionary means. The methods employed to suppress revolution drove the people to madness, and also caused many who wished for peace and tranquillity to ally themselves with a cause, the plans of which they did not always approve. Imprisonment only served to extend the membership of the Carbonari, and persecutions drove men of prominence over to the side of the people. Thus there was gathered a mass of easily roused insurrectionists, who were working together, not so much from conviction as from a desperate feeling that no other course save one of revolution was possible. Where unity and harmony of action were wanting, success could hardly be attained.

But failure was due not merely to the instability and heterogeneity of the rank and file, but more directly to the lamentable want of proper leadership, to the absence of any common and definite policy, and to the inefficiency of the revolutionary organisation. There was plenty of enthusiasm but no unity of

direction. Those who should have been united were divided into parties, and wasted their strength in mutual recrimination and jealousy. Muratists and loyalists opposed each other in Naples; the Sicilians, themselves divided into Palermitans and Messenians, and angry because of the rejection of their own constitution, entered upon a civil war for independence that lasted from July to October, 1820. In Piedmont republicans disliked the policy of the moderates, who in turn objected to that of the republicans. Every elevation in rank roused the jealousy of those passed over, every effort at conciliation with monarchy started the cry of treachery, every compromise was branded as a concession. What one accomplished another sought to undo, success in one direction led to hasty exultation, that was followed by failure in some unexpected quarter,—and there was in general a great waste of energy and action. As the various parties failed to support each other, so the petty states of the peninsula, in their jealousy and selfishness, acted in isolation, refusing to give that aid which, had it been opportune, might have brought success out of failure. Thus it was possible for party to be set against party and state against state; and there was much truth in Metternich's aphorism that Italian hatred never expressed itself against a cause, but only against a person.

In general, then, the Italian movement failed because the inexperienced and untrained forces of liberalism were trying to gain a victory over the old and tried forces of reaction. The supporters of the old *régime*, convinced that their doctrines were still too firmly fixed to be easily uprooted by the revolutionists, rejoiced in the fact, and hastily concluded that the tide of liberalism had turned. The "era of salvation," which Metternich dated from the first intervention at Carlsbad in 1819, had as yet shown no signs of approaching an end. The constitutional movement in Prussia had lapsed into hopeless inactivity; the Spanish revolution was not very prosperous; the Ultras in

France were gradually making Richelieu a reactionist in spite of himself and his moderate sympathies ; while the Greek revolution had hardly passed out of the first stage and was as yet considered harmless by the Powers. The Italian failure was simply in keeping with the ill-success of liberalism everywhere, and time alone could remedy some of the defects of the liberal movement. The attempt in Italy shows that Carbonarism and secret associations generally were incompetent to prepare a people for independence and constitutional government, and that Italy had to pass beyond the stage of mere agitation if she were to lay the proper foundation for a strong government. In consequence of their failures, the Italians themselves became aware that Austria was the great enemy to be resisted, and realised that as long as particularism was encouraged by the Austrian influence, and as long as the national forces were rendered ineffectual by party division and scattered uprisings, a successful accomplishment of the purpose that Italy had so close at heart could hardly be expected.

But the greater internal strength that the Italians needed was impossible so long as the Carbonari were the chief upholders of the Italian cause, and Austrian interference was inevitable so long as Europe maintained the doctrine of intervention as the principle governing the councils of its diplomats. But during the period from 1821 to 1831 important changes took place. At the end of the decade Carbonarism, though never ceasing to be an active factor in the agitation for independence, had practically lost its supremacy and was gradually being supplanted by Young Italy, a new association of higher aims and nobler principles ; and the doctrine of intervention was strictly maintained only among the eastern Powers. England had declared against it at Troppau and still more positively at Verona ; Canning was already declaring in favour of the independence of the South America republics in 1824-25 ; the quadruple alliance had been overthrown in 1827 ; and France, in

1830, driving reaction from its position at the head of the state, had made non-intervention a cardinal principle of the July Monarchy. Europe of 1830 was gradually reorganising its public law; and Austria, although declaring that she would never recognise and never yield to "the so-called principle of non-intervention," was already weakened by the withdrawal of the moral support that up to this time she had received from the practical unanimity of the Powers.

But after all, hope for Italy lay not in the changed attitude of the Powers, not in aid from France or from any other liberally inclined country; it lay in a steady internal improvement, in a gradual elevation of the standard of education and experience, in greater unity of purpose, and in the creation of a national *esprit de corps* that should be sufficiently strong to impress upon the minds of Italians and foreigners alike the fact that Italy was a nation and not a group of divided states. But the time had hardly come when the results of such a regeneration of Italy were to be seen. In 1830, owing to the stimulus of the success of the revolution in Greece and France, and, a year later, in Belgium, an effort was made in Piedmont, Modena, Bologna, and the Papal States to throw off the burden of reaction and absolutism. Once more recurred the phenomena of the decade before; once more the movement took a revolutionary form; once more the party divisions, the ill-judged confidence in princes, the want of common action, led to hopeless failure followed by bitter reprisals, imprisonment, exile, and death. Tyranny and inquisition gained rather than lost, and absolutism settled down upon the agitated states more heavily than ever.

Among those that were suspected of complicity with the movement was a young man, Joseph Mazzini, who was arrested by the government of Genoa, because, as he himself says, he "was a young man of talent, fond of solitary walks at night, and habitually silent as to the subject of [his] meditations";

and because, he continues, "the government was not fond of young men of talent, the subject of whose meditations was unknown to it." Mazzini fell a victim to that doctrine, accredited to the Emperor Francis, that obedient subjects, not talented men, were wanted by the state. He was imprisoned at Savona, and there it was that he began to lay his plans for the establishment of a new association, Young Italy, which was to accomplish through the education of the younger generation, what the Carbonari had failed to accomplish—the regeneration of Italy. Acquitted of the charges against him, Mazzini hastened to Marseilles; and there, surrounded by exiles from Modena, Parma, and the Romagna, he prepared to carry out his design. He was determined to avoid the faults of the Carbonari, whom he believed to be actuated by principles dangerous as they were erroneous. He opposed their "complex symbolism, their hierarchical mysteries, their political faith"; he hated their "tyranny of invisible chiefs, their ignoble blind obedience, their spirit of revenge." Having been persuaded to become a member of the order he was saddened by the emptiness of the oath, "a mere formula of obedience, containing nothing as to the aim to be reached, not a single word about federalism or unity, republic or monarchy." He declared that the only weapon of the association was a mere negation, a war upon government, nothing more; that it was destructive not constructive, calling on men to overthrow the old, but wholly unable to build up a new edifice upon its ruins; that the order possessing no real doctrine or principle substituted for it "a variety of strange and incomprehensible symbols." He opposed the order as "a body, huge and powerful, but without a head, an association in which not generous intentions but ideas were wanting; deficient in the science and logic which should have reduced the sentiment of nationality pervading its ranks to fruitful action;" and above all he opposed it because it was cosmopolitan and not Italian. "Cosmopolitanism," says Mazzini,

"is a beautiful word, if it be understood to mean liberty for all men ; but every lever requires a fulcrum, and while I had been accustomed to seek for that fulcrum in Italy itself, I found the Carbonari looked for it in Paris."

This antagonism which Mazzini felt for the Carbonari he felt in even greater degree for all those who could be classed under the head of "moderates," that "absurd and hypocritical name adopted by our Italian copyists of every evil thing in France, as if there could exist *moderation* in the choice between good and evil, the truth and falsehood, advance and retrogression." This bitterness of feeling arose from his intense dislike for the July Monarchy in France and for the policy that it advocated. He hated the selfishness of the *bourgeoisie*, who were to him the moderates *par excellence*. Drawing his illustrations from French history, he inveighed against moderation as leading to inconsistency, compromise, and concession, all of which he considered immoral and dangerous ; and believing that no good could come from the actions of ministers and congresses, he attacked with equal ardour diplomacy as a bargaining of principles. "We shall not seek," he said, "the alliance of kings, nor delude ourselves with any idea of maintaining our liberty by diplomatic arts or treaties : we shall not ask our salvation as an alms from the protocols of conferences, or promises of cabinets. We are of the people and will treat with the people. They will understand us."

Thus, by the elimination of all these objectionable features, the way was prepared in Mazzini's own mind for founding a new association, whereby Italy's redemption might be hastened, if not attained. In his writings he gives a careful and detailed statement of the characteristics of the new order. It was to be simple in organisation, entirely free from symbolism and graduated degrees ; it was to consist of central and provincial bodies, and to have in each city an organiser, aided by propagandists. Thus there were to be but two grades, the affiliators

and the affiliated. The order was to be based on a definite principle—one that became an article of faith to the members—the establishment of a free and united Italy, an independent nationality composed of twenty millions of men “strong in a good cause and an inflexible will.” The new state was to be independent, that is, from its soil was to be driven every hostile foreigner ; and it was to be republican, that is, privileges were to be abolished, clerical aristocracy was to be suppressed, the class that bought and sold labour was to be diminished gradually, individual faculties were to be developed, and a system of legislation was to be inaugurated that should be “adapted to the wants of the people and calculated to promote the unceasing progress of national education.” Mazzini believed that monarchy was no longer possible as a permanent state ; that it was but one of a series of progressive transformations taking place in Europe and not the final one ; and that if it were established as the political order in Italy, the inevitable result would be another revolution or a number of successive revolutions, by means of which the republican principle, destined by the law of God and humanity to be supreme, should be enthroned as the law of the state. Monarchy, he maintained, was imperfect : if elective, it tended to generate anarchy, if hereditary, to generate despotism ; only republicanism insured the future and guaranteed the sovereignty of the nation, and such must be expressed in a single state, not a federation of states. That Italy should be a unit was foreordained by the physical characteristics of the country, that she should be the home of a great and free people was predestined by her natural limits ; and to gain this was the mission of Italy. Without unity no real national life was possible, without it Italy would be impotent, a prey to particularism ; for as federalism involved multiplicity of aims and consequently the supremacy of privilege and caste, unity alone could guarantee equality, could develop the life of the nation. But such unity must not be political

only. "Without unity of religious belief and unity of social pact; without unity of civil, political and penal legislation, there can be no nation. . . . Young Italy would have the administrative organisation designed upon a broad basis of religious respect for the liberty of each commune, but the political organisation destined to represent the nation in Europe should be one and central."

Secondly, the association was to depend for its strength not on mere numbers but rather on "the perfect concordance of its members as to the path to be followed, and the certainty that the moment of action [would] find them ranged in a compact phalanx, strong in reciprocal trust, and bound together by unity of will beneath a common banner." Those who made up the body were to be the people, for revolution must be made by the people and for the people, as upon the people only can a nation be built. By "the people" Mazzini understood the youth of the nation, individuals under forty years of age, men carefully selected, of good character and thoroughly in sympathy with the aims of the order. Such an association must expect nothing from foreign governments. "They will never be really willing to aid you," he said to his followers, "until you have shown that you are strong enough to conquer without them." Italy could work out her own salvation, if only her people could learn to be constant and united in their efforts. Her regeneration could only be achieved by a truly Italian revolution and no real or lasting liberty could be given by a foreigner. In this vein Mazzini inveighed against all support from outside, on the ground that liberty so gained must always be dependent upon the state of things abroad and could never be lasting.

The method whereby these results were to be obtained was through education and insurrection, and one was to supplement the other. Education was to teach the need of insurrection, insurrection was to become a means of national education.

That Italy should learn and act at the same time, the new organisation was to spread its doctrines freely, to make them known to the people. Secret though it might be, its principles were to be wholly public and proclaimed through Italy and indeed through the world by a system of propaganda. In fact the organisation was to become a publishing association, for the disseminating of articles upon "the political, moral, and literary position of Italy, with a view to her regeneration," that the nation might be prepared for insurrection.

These are the main features of this famous organisation, which was endowed in its own eyes with a double mission, public and secret, educational and insurrectional. Its success was immediate and astonishing. "From student to student, youth to youth, the confraternity extended itself with unexpected rapidity." Its publications, sent forth from Marseilles by every opportunity that offered itself and spread through Italy in the face of governmental opposition, took the place of personal influence, creating a new enthusiasm and rousing new aspirations. From Genoa, along the two Riviere to the Neapolitan kingdom on the south and the Austrian provinces on the north, the writings of this handful of unknown men spread, until the Italian governments were forced to appeal to the government of France to break up the headquarters at Marseilles. But before this was done the work had been accomplished. In less than one year Young Italy had become the dominant association throughout the peninsula. "It was the triumph of principles," says Mazzini, in an oft-quoted passage, "the bare fact that in so short a space of time a handful of young men, themselves sprung from the people, unknown, without means, and openly opposed to the doctrines of all those men of standing and influence who had hitherto possessed the confidence of the people and directed the popular movement, should find themselves thus rapidly at the head of an association sufficiently powerful to concentrate against itself the

armed persecution of seven governments, is, I think, in itself enough to show that the banner they had raised was the banner of truth."

Noble as were these ideas, and influential as they became in rousing the Italians to a greater consciousness of their shortcomings, and to a knowledge of the causes to which were to be traced the failures of previous revolutions, nevertheless their influence, moral rather than political, was limited to the more intelligent element among the people. Young Italy was neither a secret nor a revolutionary organisation, properly so called. It was an educational not a military society, and Mazzini was never a successful man of action or a ready and energetic organiser. He was too obstinate in adhering to the doctrines that he set forth, too uncompromising in dealing with the more practical sides of life, too inexperienced in the affairs of the world to succeed in any of his attempts to make a practical application of his ideas. He was able to inspire the youth of Italy with a greater confidence in the task that lay before them, with an almost religious faith in the cause of Italy's liberation. His writings, spread through the peninsula, gave moral unity in the midst of political disunity and created a common feeling of loyalty to a common country. They gave harmony to the thoughts of thousands, who, scattered through the different states of Italy, had hitherto failed to grasp the real meaning of a united Italy, and had wasted their time in abortive attempts because they did not see clearly the work that had to be accomplished. Mazzini pointed out what this work was, and did it in no half-hearted way. But when it came to the actual working out of this plan by the organisation that he had founded, then the defects of the whole scheme became clear. Young Italy never succeeded as a revolutionary body, nor was the insurrectionary part of the program ever successfully carried out. In 1834, because of the persecution in Piedmont of members of the order by Charles Albert, who had come to the

throne in 1831 after the death of Charles Felix, an invasion of Savoy was attempted from Switzerland, but proved a lamentable failure. From 1841 to 1844 a series of attempts was made to rouse the Neapolitans and the inhabitants of the Papal States; but the watchfulness of the governments and wholesale arrests and condemnations prevented the movements from coming to any definite result. In 1844 the Bandiera brothers, sons of a noble family, who, roused to a patriotic frenzy by Mazzini's appeals, attempted, despite the protests of those with more information and better judgment, to excite a revolt in Calabria, were captured and executed by the Neapolitan government. This unfortunate episode checked the revolutionary propaganda, and seriously injured the cause that Mazzini still continued to promote. The party of action, as Mazzini called his followers, practically ceased after 1844 to be a political factor, and its work became more underhand and indirect. While Mazzini in London was weaving unpractical plots, the organisation in Italy pursued its work quietly, often effectually, generally maintaining a position of hostility to all efforts that aimed at Italy's redemption through the co-operation of princes. Although the members of Young Italy took part in the revolutionary movement of 1848 and supported Piedmont in the war against Austria, nevertheless, they greeted with satisfaction the final overthrow of Charles Albert at Novara in 1849. When, also, in 1855, they saw Cavour, as they thought, hastening the destruction of monarchy by entangling Piedmont in the Crimean war, they rejoiced; and when after 1856, Cavour endeavoured to draw the less fanatical of the members to the side of the King of Sardinia, Mazzini and the other leaders entered upon a series of intrigues to weaken the Piedmontese government. By its moral efforts Young Italy undoubtedly hastened the cause of independence and unity, but by its political narrowness and encouragement of unsuccessful revolutions it retarded the work of others possessing better

judgment and greater insight, and brought down upon itself a condemnation so great that in the decade from 1850 to 1860 it was denominated by leaders among the moderates "one of Italy's scourges."

The period from 1835 to 1845 is, taken as a whole, one of the saddest of that earlier struggle which preceded the general uprising of 1848. Patriots were endeavouring to gain some successes by movements that had little result other than the sacrifice of lives. Governments increasingly watchful were suppressing every popular manœuvre; despots like Ferdinand II. of the Two Sicilies, who had succeeded his father in 1830, were growing each year more tyrannical: while others, like the Grand Duke of Tuscany, with liberal tendencies were leaning toward a stricter application of the principles of paternalism. Austria was advancing her troops to Ferrara in order to protect the Papal States against forced concessions, while France was occupying Ancona, in order to protect the authority of the Roman See and to encourage the reform of the Roman States. This was in many ways an unfortunate venture, as the officer in command favoured the liberals and protected refugees. The presence of the French in Ancona was a source of constant irritation to the Pope, Austria, and Europe alike, and had the effect of bringing down upon the liberal cause, which the French really wished to aid, the increased wrath of the absolutist princes, and of making the work of the moderates more difficult. In the Lombardo-Venetian provinces the police system was extended, and a military administration kept the popular elements from making any effort of importance. Espionage was common, censorship of the press, of education, of all independent thought or action was strictly imposed; and the provinces were rapidly becoming as stationary as were the other Austrian states. Having with so much difficulty established this order and stability, Metternich was on the alert to see that nothing disturbed it. Of Naples he had no fear, for

popular movements there threatened nothing. Brigandage was fast overrunning the country, but as it did not aim at constitutions, the government, that was becoming increasingly severe in checking the slightest indication of liberal feeling, was hopelessly lax in matters of crime. Only in Tuscany and Piedmont did Austria find cause for anxiety and the liberals cause for hope. Leopold of Tuscany listened to Austria's rebukes, but refused except in a few comparatively unimportant matters to accede to Austria's wishes. He encouraged education, looked after the welfare of his people by improving the lands of the kingdom and encouraging charitable organisations, kept out the Jesuits, and prevented the church from interfering in affairs of state. Piedmont also showed signs of an interest in liberal reforms. It is true that there the church was all-powerful, the mode of administration antiquated, and the king himself vacillating and inconsistent; but at the same time the law had been improved, trade and commerce put on a better footing, a system of railroads begun, reforms of a social character promoted, and art and literature encouraged. Charles Albert, bound by a compact made with Austria in 1824, was unable to enter upon any great constitutional reform without deliberately breaking with that country; but by taking a firm stand in 1845 upon the subject of commercial intercourse between Lombardy and Piedmont, he showed that he had no intention of being a slave to Austria's wishes. When it was represented to him that he was incurring Austria's ill-will, he replied, "If Piedmont should lose Austria, Italy would gain thereby and then—Italy would act for herself"; and again later he said to d'Azeglio, "if the occasion presents itself my life, the lives of my sons, my arms, my treasure, my army, all shall be devoted to the cause of Italy." In the midst of the universal reaction the states of Tuscany and Piedmont became the centres of expectation, for there alone appeared to be any sympathy for the national welfare, any willingness to resist the encroachments of Austria.

While thus in the greater portion of Italy the old struggle between revolution and reaction was continued, while Mazzini was endeavouring without success to carry out his program of insurrection, and the absolutist princes were guarding their power by new methods of repression, there were taking place other movements that were literary rather than revolutionary in character. The plan that is always made use of in any era of public excitement when freedom of speech is forbidden or restricted, namely, that of stirring the loyalty and patriotism of a people by means of literary works, was resorted to in this crisis of Italian affairs. Writers of novels, poems, memoirs and histories, animated by a liberal and sympathetic spirit can preach against autocracy, define political doctrines, and stimulate political aspirations with as great success under a literary guise as in open and direct speech. In Italy the literary struggle began, as it had elsewhere, in a war between the classicists, whom Mazzini called "the supporters of a literary despotism, dating its origin and authority two thousand years back," and the romanticists, "who sought to emancipate themselves from the tyranny of classicism in the name of their own individual aspirations." In the issue the classical writers, defenders of conservatism in letters as well as in politics, were driven from the field by the romanticists, who grew stronger and more influential as their aim became more definite. Foscolo in the earlier period, Niccolini, Pellico, and Manzoni a little later, Guerazzi and Giusti toward the middle of the century, were all representatives of the newer school, and struggled with Monti and the older generation of writers, who still clung to the stiff, unelastic models of the theological and scholastic past. Skilfully woven into the very texture of the literature, mingled with beautiful descriptions of nature and tales of the romantic past, were lessons in patriotism and in loyalty to Italy. By striking situations, carefully chosen incidents, and subtle suggestions the literature of the period, notwithstanding the strictness of

the censorship, became text-books of liberty instructing Italians in their duty towards their country, and roused a consciousness of the imperfectness of the present by increasing their interest and pride in the history of the past. Stimulated by the patriotic ideas that were expressed in many of these writings, notably in *The Betrothed* of Manzoni, the Italians eagerly read works which have now in a measure lost their interest because of the changed social and political conditions. In spite of Leopardi's pessimism they read with enthusiasm his patriotic odes, and found his doctrine of despair an incentive to improve the condition of Italy.

These writers, however, had only an indirect political influence; their aim was in the first place literary, and their part was to give life to Italian letters, that had for two centuries, from Tasso to Alfieri, fallen into decadence. But during the period from 1840 to 1850 a group of writers arose whose first object was to influence the public opinion of their countrymen, and who used letters only as a means of effecting political reform. This school, which came to be called the Piedmontese school, was composed of conservative, high-minded Italians, men of intelligence, who were fully aware of the greatness of the task that lay before them and at the same time possessed an insight into the causes of the evil and an ability to discover more practical remedies than had hitherto been advanced. Although these men differed regarding the form that Italy, when united, should take, nevertheless they agreed in general that Italy was not ready for a republic. Believing the Mazzini schemes to be impracticable, they set about planning an order that should not only be in touch with the longings of the Italian people, should not only represent national unity and independence of all foreign control, but at the same time should be reasonable, practicable, and adapted to the character and conditions of Italian life. Two parties arose, led by Piedmontese publicists, of which the first, under its leader Vincent

Gioberti, who had been banished from Piedmont in 1833, received the name of the Neo-Guelphs because of its desire to revive the political headship of the papacy. This party advocated a federation of states under the leadership of the Pope, and the Gospel of the party was Gioberti's book *On the Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians*. Supplementing this work of Gioberti's, but of a more practical and suggestive character and appealing rather to the reason of the Italians than to their emotions, was Balbo's *Hopes of Italy*, which can hardly be classed in the strictest sense of the word as a Neo-Guelph publication. Nevertheless it agreed in many of its essential features with the ideas of Gioberti, in that it advocated a federation of states and not a single united state. These men, discarding the republic on one side and a single constitutional monarchy on the other, supported the establishment of a federation of conservative monarchies that should be bound together by deliberative assemblies, composed of the most intelligent and upright men of the different states. These states were to recognise the importance of a free press controlled by a sympathetic and honourable censorship. The princes, who were to be men of good faith, were to be guided in their government by the acts of the deliberative assemblies. According to Gioberti, who laid chief stress upon the restoration of the Pope to his old position of pre-eminence, these assemblies were to be under the general presidency of the Pope; but to Balbo this question of papal primacy was of far less importance than the more immediate question of what should be done with Austria. Gioberti proposed admitting the Austrian Emperor into the federation of princes, giving to him a position similar to that which he occupied in the Germanic Confederation; but Balbo, believing that the hope of Italy lay in the entire withdrawal of the Emperor from Italian affairs, refused any such concession. He was unable to see clearly how this withdrawal was to be effected. It could be forced or voluntary. Expul-

sion by force might be accomplished by a combination of Italian princes, by the people rising *en masse*, or by the intervention of a foreign Power; but to Balbo none of these schemes seemed practicable in the existing condition of Italy. He hoped, therefore, for a voluntary withdrawal through some rearrangement of the European situation. Balbo, who was an intelligent observer of European politics, appreciated as early as 1844, when the struggle of the Ottoman Empire with Mehemet Ali was still fresh in the minds of the statesmen of Europe, the possibility of a redistribution of territory in the east. He noticed the gradual transference of Austria's political supremacy from the north-west to the south-east, and with true historical insight he judged that in all probability her control over northern Italy would be eventually given up for a more permanent authority in the region of the Danube. He hoped, therefore, that in the fall of the Turkish Empire, and in the partition of territory that this would involve, Austria would be induced by the Powers assembled in a new European congress to give up her hold upon Italy, in case adequate compensation should be given from the lands wrested from the grasp of the Turk.

The second of the two parties was led by a statesman more directly connected than either Balbo or Gioberti with the actual accomplishment of Italian unity. Massimo d'Azeglio, artist, romanticist, and man of affairs, is one of the triumvirate with Cavour and Victor Emmanuel II., to whom Italy owes the actual fulfilment of her hopes. This party, basing its plans neither on religious regeneration nor on papal supremacy, was convinced that Italian independence could be obtained in no other way than by the promotion of conservative reforms that would bring about a steady constitutional growth in the more liberal states, notably in Piedmont. D'Azeglio hoped to rouse Italy to a realisation of her defects by statements of fact and by sound argument. He repudiated secret societies, none of which he had ever joined, but he apologised for them as

“the fruit of the blind, stupid, and retrograde absolutism of the restoration.” He believed in so influencing public opinion that it might see that to proclaim the Spanish constitution in Piedmont—“as if Spain and Piedmont were twins and could wear each others clothes”—were madness. “Revolutions conducted by violence,” he says in his *Ricordi*, “have not my sympathies. I have, however, always admired those revolutions that operate through the agency of a passive resistance. Conquests of this nature, the only ones that can be called true revolutions, have always seemed to me the most meritorious, the most noble, the best assured.” To accomplish such a work d’Azeglio laboured; and in 1845 published a pamphlet on *Recent Events in the Romagna*, with the hope of so far rousing public opinion, as to drive the various rulers to a policy of moderate reform. By its brief, logical, and direct presentation of facts the pamphlet soon came to be known very widely throughout the peninsula. It brought the people to a realising sense of the evils of insurrection, by portraying the serious danger attendant upon such an uprising as that of Renzi in 1845, which only increased party hostility and the jealousy of states. At the same time the author gave the other side of the picture; he dissected the papal government and showed its injustice, weakness, and dishonourable character. The work marks the starting point in the development of a more healthy public opinion; it opened the way to further investigation into the condition of Italy, to careful studies, especially in the period from 1850 to 1860, into the economic, administrative, and educational condition of the country; it set the Italians to thinking less about ideas and more about facts; and by increasing a knowledge of the actual condition of Italy was able to make clear the remedies to be applied.

Other members of one party or the other, Canuti, Capponi, Durando, advanced various schemes for the reorganisation of the state. Nor was it an unhealthy sign that there was

still great diversity in the schemes proposed. Construction had taken the place of destruction, and the problem of Italian unity had advanced a long way in the direction of a solution. Whether a united republic or a federal republic were advocated, a single kingdom, a dual kingdom, or a triple kingdom, it made but little difference ; all plans were of value in that they served to familiarise the people of Italy with the idea of a change of government, helped to make clear the fact that Austria was the greatest enemy of Italian unity, and showed the need of progressive and conservative reform. The advance in political intelligence is steady as we pass from the Carbonari to Young Italy and from Young Italy to the party of reform. By studying the condition of other countries, the reformers saw the backwardness of Italy, and began to investigate the reasons therefor. In consequence of the new spirit actuating the leaders of public opinion, the period from 1845 to 1848 presented many important movements of a character most encouraging to the patriot who desired Italy's regeneration, and to the statesman who believed that a passive resistance and a gradual reform would give to the new state a more enduring foundation than insurrection or military agitation. In the face of the progressive revolution that was to sweep over Italy during these years, the comments of Metternich, chancellor of a state forty years behind the other states of western Europe in economic, administrative, and financial methods, show the shallow statesmanship of the man. "Two parties reign to-day [1847] in Italy, the liberal party, which reckons on the weakness of governments and seeks to display its reforms before their eyes ; the other, the radical party, which addresses itself to popular passion and dins the word deliverance into their ears. Between these parties there exists no other difference than that between the preface of a book and the book itself. That truth applies perfectly to the chiefs of both parties. Between a Balbo, a Gioberti, an Azeglio, a Petiti, and a Mazzini and his acolytes

there is no other difference than that which exists between poisoners and assassins, and if the intentions of the men differ, that difference disappears upon the field of their activity."

As the party of the Neo-Guelphs, who looked to the Pope as the future head of a federation of Italian states, had been the first to formulate its doctrines, so it was at Rome that the first indications of a new era began to appear. As long as Gregory XVI. lived there was little expectation of making real the doctrines of Gioberti. "I would subscribe entirely to your *Primacy*," wrote Borsieri, one of the Milanese plotters of 1824, to Gioberti, "if it were possible for you to become Pope and for me to be, unworthily, your secretary of state." But in 1846 Gregory XVI. died, and a ferment of interest arose as to his successor. In the College of Cardinals a bitter struggle took place between the supporters, Sanfedesti or Gregoriani, of Cardinal Lambruschini, a loyal believer in the policy of Gregory XVI., and the more moderate cardinals, who, feeling the necessity of making some concessions to the popular desire for reform, endeavoured to bring about the election of Cardinal Gizzi, who was the favourite with the people of Rome. It was found impossible, however, to elect either candidate, and a compromise was effected whereby Jean Mastaï Ferretti, bishop of Imola, was chosen to the pontifical throne. Mastaï was almost unknown even to many of his own colleagues, and this obscurity was one cause of his success. Although connected with the liberal party of Gizzi, he was able to command the support of the reactionists, who saw in him a candidate easily influenced; while his sincere piety, his loyalty to the church, his large-hearted liberality won for him the votes of those of the college, who, with less defined political opinions, desired to bring about the purification of the Roman See. To those, too, among the reformers, who had watched the career of the bishop of Imola, the election of Mastaï was a source of gratification, for he had shown himself in his earlier years to be of a

liberal and sympathetic spirit, and had won for himself the good-will of the people of Imola by his independence and desire to improve the condition of the people. It was, therefore, a natural inference that the new Pope, who, as Pius IX., was about to enter upon one of the longest and most eventful pontificates in the history of the papacy, would show himself favourable to reform. The followers of Gioberti began to believe that their leader had spoken the truth and that a federation of liberal states under the presidency of the Pope was about to become a reality. Even the followers of Mazzini were not displeased with the turn of affairs, for the situation seemed to be a kind of exemplification of the maxim of their leader, "God and the People."

Except to the critical observer the first acts of the Pope in that year 1846-47 appeared to express a loyal and consistent desire to further the cause of better government in the Papal States, and consequently the cause of better government in Italy generally. On July 18th Pius IX. made his first claim to public confidence by publishing an amnesty for all political offenders, exiles whom the policy of Gregory XVI. had driven from their country. Though this amnesty roused the enthusiasm of the people of Rome, it was but an incomplete measure in that by demanding from every one pardoned a promise in writing never again to offend against the papal government it prevented many eminent exiles from returning. Nevertheless, the amnesty showed that the new Pope had broken from the policy of his predecessor, and that he was willing to consider sympathetically the needs and wishes of his people and would certainly not content himself with this single act. Already had he begun the purification of the curia by suspending special privileges awarded by Gregory and by deciding that priests should not be exempt from regular taxation. Later in the year the good work was continued. In September the tax upon salt and flour was removed, a committee on reforms was instituted, and

lay tribunals took the place of ecclesiastical tribunals ; laymen were introduced into the council of the Pope, a committee of four laymen and one ecclesiastic was established to supervise the press, and greater liberty of publication was permitted. The measures created very great joy, but the people were almost frenzied with delight when in July, 1847, the Pope entered a vigorous protest against a renewal of the Austrian occupation of Ferrara, which had been terminated nine years before, and despite Austria's explanation continued for some months to oppose the occupation and to deny Austria's right therein. The popularity of Pius IX., who had to all appearances broken with Austria as well as the Gregorians, was now firmly founded, and the world looked on with interest to see the character of his political reforms. In October, 1847, a decree was issued, which instituted the municipality of Rome, under a senator (mayor), eight assistants, and a hundred members ; on the 15th a council of state was created composed of twenty-four members named by the Pope from lists voted upon by each of the provinces ; and, finally, on December 29th, a decree was issued defining the powers of the council of ministers. Though these new measures provided that the greater proportion of councilors should be laymen, it may be noticed that in no respect did the Pope admit that sovereignty lay anywhere else than in his own hands. However willing he might be to gratify the wishes of his subjects, he did not abate one jot of his absolute authority.

While thus the Pope was winning the good-will of his people by a policy that was liberal in appearance, even if it were not so in fact, two other states were also feeling the influence of the new spirit and were undertaking promising reforms. Tuscany was the home of some of Italy's most intelligent leaders. For years under the mildly paternal rule of its grand duke it had enjoyed peace and prosperity. In the decade after 1840 men of such widely diverse views as Capponi, author of

The Actual Condition of the Romagna and a Giobertist, Ricasoli, a believer in the sovereignty of the people although an aristocrat, Giusti and Niccolini, the radical *littérateurs*, Mantonelli the legist, and Guerazzi, a follower of Mazzini, were living in Tuscany and exciting unrest among the people and scattering widely the sparks of discontent. The news from Rome started the sparks into flames, and in order to avoid a conflagration Leopold yielded to the popular demands. Between May, 1847, and the end of the year he modified the press law, appointed a commission to revise the law codes, summoned an advisory body of notables, and finally agreed to the formation of a municipal guard. He discarded the Austrian uniform and donned the Tuscan dress, and began the work of reorganising his cabinet by the introduction of two men devoted to the work of reform. The enthusiasm in Tuscany knew no bounds, and the grand duke vied with the Pope in popularity.

Piedmont was slower, but it, too, came into the ranks of the reforming states. Charles Albert, who had always wavered between his respect for kingship and his regard for tradition on one side, and his sincere desire to promote the welfare of his people on the other, came by degrees to the determination that he would act with his people. He was already in dispute with Austria over the salt and wine duty, and this event of the year 1846 had begun a conflict with Austria that was to end only in actual war. The relation became more strained with the occupation of Ferrara, and Charles Albert so far showed his appreciation of the stand that the Pope had taken as to send him letters of congratulation, offering aid and saying, "Whatever may occur, I will not separate my cause from yours." To his people he said, in a letter written to the Count of Castegnète in 1847, "If Providence sends us a war for Italian independence, I will mount my horse with my sons, I will place myself at the head of my army. What a glorious day it will be in which we can raise the cry of a war

for the independence of Italy." It mattered little that the king explained his words as applying to the liberation of Piedmont, that he had hardly as yet reached a positive decision in his own mind as to what he ought to do ; the feeling spread, particularly among those reformers who like d'Azeglio had supported the cause of the constitutional monarchy, that Charles Albert would be the future liberator of Italy. They believed that firmness and decision would come to him in time, and that when the important moment arrived the King of Sardinia would not be found on the side of Austria. This conviction became stronger as the king began to respond to the pressure of popular opinion, and to improve by one measure after another the administration of the state. He reorganised the cabinet by dismissing unpopular councillors ; in October consented to the revision of the civil code, and in November authorised the reorganisation of the police system and increased the local powers of the communes ; and afterwards promised other changes that were greatly needed. In reality, Charles Albert had renewed the liberal protestations of his youth, and was rapidly committing himself to a promise to support the cause of Italy, should revolution or war again break out.

The year 1847 was therefore a year bright with hope for Italy, a year in which the Italians might well be proud of the progress they had made in the direction of a more honourable and a more permanent political organisation. They were rapidly raising themselves to a position deserving of the respect of Europe. While Metternich was announcing in a circular letter to the Powers that Italy was but a geographical expression, and that the complete sovereignty and independence of each separate state of the Italian peninsula must be maintained, Lord Palmerston, the English foreign minister, was communicating to the several princes the satisfaction that the English government felt at the reforms thus far carried through.

The progressive revolution that was exemplifying so suc-

cessfully d'Azeglio's doctrine of passive resistance based on educated public opinion, had not yet reached its height. In the first month of the year 1848 the people of the various Italian states, roused by the concessions thus far made, and excited still more by the Sicilian uprising of the 12th of January, which may be said to have given the signal for revolution throughout Europe, pressed harder than they had done before upon their rulers for further concessions. For nearly a year Sicily had been in a state of ferment, and finally in January, after a number of incipient attempts, an uprising took place which soon became an organised revolution. Naples, responding to the cry from Sicily, raised the tri-colour, and started a movement in Salerno that threatened to embrace the whole of southern Italy. Ferdinand, who was reduced to helplessness because he could make no head against the revolution himself and was deprived of foreign aid, since the papal secretary, Cardinal Ferretti, positively refused to allow Austrian troops to cross the papal territory, promised, on January 29th, a constitution to the province of Naples. On February 10th the constitution was promulgated, and on the 12th the king extended it to the province of Sicily also. The constitution, a weakened form of the French revised Charta of 1830, was not a very liberal one, but it provided for two houses, one named for life by the king, and the other elected by the people, and guaranteed a limited freedom of the press, and amnesty for political offences.

Such was the popular regard for a written constitution that when central and northern Italy heard the news from Naples, excitement knew no bounds. The idea of gradual reform began to give way to the idea of a constitution. Men who a month before had been satisfied with a few changes, now began to clamour for the sweeping changes that a constitution entailed. In Tuscany, Leopold, who though he had already conceded much seemed willing to concede more, consented to consider the petitions that came in to him ; and finally when the people

became impatient, agreed to grant them a representative government. When, on February 17th, the constitution was promulgated it was found that the grand duke had done better than Ferdinand, for he had added to the other liberal constitutional provisions religious toleration and commercial and industrial liberty. In Rome, Pius IX., tortured by the fear of going too far in his work of reorganisation, was as ever inconsistent, and wholly unable to determine how far he should tolerate the demands of his people. But events were pressing hard upon him, and fearing a popular uprising he continued his work of increasing the lay party in his ministry. By this means he hoped to satisfy the popular demands, but when the news of the revolution in France of February 24th reached Rome, the excitement was so great that he was obliged to yield, and grant a constitution. The movement was gradually passing from the south to the north, and Sicilian, Neapolitan, Roman, and Tuscan were filled with hopes of constitutional government. And Piedmont was not behind in reaching the goal, even though Charles Albert found it more difficult than had even Pius IX. to face the situation. The question was not wholly one of reform; it involved a constitutional change in the presence of Austrian troops in Lombardy. The possibility of war with the Austrian Power made Charles Albert hesitate. But gradually the pressure increased; the cry for a constitution passed from the people to the official body, from the municipal council of Turin to the king's own advisers, to such men as Balbo, Cavour, d'Azeglio, and the decision could not be postponed. Charles Albert at length gave way, and having decided to break the pledge that he had made to Austria twenty-four years before, he made a promise that he never broke, that a constitution should be granted. On February 8th the news got abroad, and Turin, Piedmont, and all Italy rejoiced. Acclamations, processions, festivities of all kinds showed to the king the joy of his people. For three weeks the

councillors of the king were busy preparing the text of the document that was issued on March 4th. That Piedmont gained from the care, intelligence, and political knowledge of her statesmen is evident from the fact that the document, which was put forth in this time of excitement and after long hesitancy on the part of the king, is the present constitution of the kingdom of Italy. It has been slightly amended in order to make it conform to existing conditions, but in the main it is to-day as it was when it was first promulgated. Religious toleration, responsibility of ministers, bicameral legislature, popular elections, control of taxes by the elected chamber, co-operation of the two houses and the king in passing laws, freedom of the press, and individual liberty and equality before the law were the main provisions of this liberal charter, which represents the highest point reached in this era of political education. The body of reformers who had seen no hope either in the doctrines of the Carbonari or of Mazzini had now succeeded through a revolution practically bloodless, save in Naples, in gaining for four of the Italian states constitutional government. The first great phase of the struggle was over, and Italy had won for many of her subjects constitutional liberty ; but the next phase of the struggle was close at hand, for she had still to gain independence and unity.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT IN GERMANY.

THE desire for national unity and independence, which the wars of liberation had created in Germany, was quite as strong, though probably less widespread, than was that in Italy from 1813 to 1815. The German people, who were constantly mindful of their noble past and of the proud position that the Empire had held as a great moral power in Europe, finally realised on the downfall of Napoleon how seriously his supremacy had threatened their nationality. The Confederation of the Rhine, representing fourteen millions of people, had for nearly a decade given itself over to the supremacy of France. In the north-west German speech had been almost driven out of business circles and French officials had filled administrative posts. The intrusion of the foreigner touched the German pride and strengthened the determination of the people to work for the upbuilding of the German state. Men of the most diverse opinions recognised the need of unity, and were willing to sacrifice local prejudice and individual preference if only Germany might once more become a land of brothers. But the task was not so easy of accomplishment as it seemed to those hopeful idealists in whose writings the aspirations of the people found voice. It was one thing to condemn with righteous indignation the low estate into which Germany had fallen and to rouse enthusiasm for the united Germany of the future ; it was another to give these ideas and hopes a practical political application and to overcome the obstacles which the existing

situation presented. The states of southern Germany, which had come late into the war of liberation, had little sympathy for those who advocated the gathering together into a common state of all who spoke the German language ; the German patriots had no clear and definite plan regarding the work to be performed, the form of the new state, or the limits of the new fatherland ; the statesmen of the time, with more directness of purpose and definiteness of aim, were divided in their opinions, many giving the problem up in despair, many looking to Prussia for leadership, others proposing that Austria and Prussia should be made equal, dividing the leadership between them. One proposition after another was made in the vain attempt to solve an insoluble problem ; but each new suggestion found more enemies than friends, and it is more than probable that any system that sought to change in any degree the existing order would probably have had to win its way by force. " Political unity can be obtained in only one way and that is by the sword," wrote Clausewitz, not long after the wars of liberation. Others doubtless felt the same, and memories of Frederic the Great and his military methods were not wanting to those who looked to Prussia as the state most worthy to redeem Germany.

But however this may have been, the fact remained that the future of the German states was to be determined not by a military power but by a peaceful congress sitting at Vienna under the direction of that European statesman, who, seeing no good in such idle discussion about national unity, had made up his mind that Austria's supremacy should be maintained and that the *status quo* should be altered as little as possible. Metternich's position as the most influential and powerful of all the German statesmen had already been established, and however much German patriots might wish for a better order of things their longings and plans for constitutionally uniting the scattered states were considered of little importance by the diplo-

mats at Vienna, and especially by Metternich, who was resolved to prevent the creation of any strongly compacted state that might threaten Austrian leadership. Everything worked in his favour; he was aided by the traditions of the Empire, by the hereditary control that the house of Habsburg had exercised for centuries over the affairs of Germany, and by the jealousy of the lesser states, who looked with suspicion upon Prussia and who, having enjoyed autonomy as members of the Confederation of the Rhine, were wholly unwilling to be co-operators in any scheme that threatened to absorb them into a larger state.

When, therefore, the matter was brought by the Prussian representatives at the congress to the practical form of a constitutional draft, the efforts of Metternich were directed to one definite end. He determined to reduce all propositions of a positive character to terms so general and vague that it would be possible to interpret them according to the interests of the dominant power, who, he trusted, would be himself. Popular aspirations, he thought, were one thing, practical government was another, and from the time when in March, 1815, Prussia presented through Humboldt and Hardenberg her scheme, which expressed, not very satisfactorily indeed, the wishes of the North German patriots, to June of the same year when the final act was signed, Metternich, scaling down by one counter-draft after another the Prussian propositions, succeeded in forcing the Prussian representatives further and further away from the popular wishes. The desire for representative government had been expressed with emphasis by such men as Arndt, Feuerbach, Dahlmann, and K. E. Schmid. "All classes in the state," said Feuerbach, "burgher as well as noble, the free possessor of unfree property as well as the owner of free estates must be equally represented before their sovereign before the nation can be considered a representative nation"; said Schmid, "The collective people are the last sources of the

supreme power"; and Hardenberg had expressed his sympathy with the popular view by saying that "democratic principles in a monarchical government seemed to constitute the plan most in harmony with the spirit of the age." Therefore Prussia in the draft drawn up in the beginning of April stated that "in all the German states the existing representative government [would] be upheld or a new one established in which [would] be preserved to the estates the right of levying new taxes, of deliberating on the laws of the land which concerned possession and personal freedom, the right of complaint in case of a misuse of power, the right to defend the constitution and to guarantee to each individual the privileges conveyed by it." Though incomplete, and not promising representation in the modern sense, this was certainly definite, too definite, indeed, for the Austrian chancellor, who reduced it to the following empty form: "In all the countries belonging to the Confederation assemblies will be established based on the system of estates." Such a clause offered little opportunity for an argument concerning popular representation such as the German patriots desired, and it omitted all definition of powers such as the Prussian representatives were willing to concede. Metternich in 1819 freely declared that the congress "never supposed that the unambiguous principle of representation by diets should be changed into pure democratic principles or forms." This modification, though the most important of those made by Metternich, is but one of many.

When, therefore, during the last three months of the congress, the question of the constitution was taken up seriously Metternich rejected all propositions for an empire or for a dual directory in copartnership with Prussia, and presented the scheme of a confederation already foreshadowed at Chaumont and in the first treaty of Paris. His scheme, after discussion, criticism, and hesitation on the part of the Prussian ministers, was accepted, and incorporated as part of the final act of the

congress. In consequence, a constitution was forced upon Germany of such a kind as to lead Count Bernstorff in later years—as Sybel tells us—to declare that it was “the immature result of over-hasty negotiation.”

That the underlying principle of the new government should be the sovereignty of each individual state had been the condition, agreed on at Töplitz, upon which the South German States had entered the war of liberation; and it was their insistence upon the maintenance of this principle that gave Metternich his strongest argument against Prussia in the preparation of the final draft. According to this, each state of the Confederation was to have full autonomy and equal rights, and to be limited in action only by its pledge to protect Germany as a whole and each fellow state of the Confederation against attack, and to act with the others in mutually guaranteeing their entire possessions. Furthermore, each was to bind itself not to enter into any engagement that should be directed against the safety of the Confederation or that of any other state within the Confederation, or to make war upon each other, but in all cases of dispute to submit to the arbitration of the Diet. The object of the Confederation was to be the maintenance of the external and internal safety of Germany and of the independence and inviolability of the individual German states. No attempt was made to define the limits of the legislative, executive, or judicial functions, or to determine with any exactness where these functions lay. These matters were left open for settlement at a later time. Austria was given the presidency of the Confederation, but so far as the constitution was concerned her place was simply that of a presiding officer, possessing the deciding vote in case of a tie. The fundamental laws of the Confederation were to be left undefined until the Diet should meet; then they were to be drawn up, and at the same time departments for the regulation of foreign, military, and interior affairs were to be organised. Special attention was to be paid to the drafting

of laws for the freedom of the press, for the security of authors and editors against piracy, for the regulation of internal commerce and navigation and for the improvement of the civil state of the Jews. No guarantee, however, was given that such laws would be passed. Supreme tribunals were to be established for all states containing 300,000 inhabitants and for all groups of states whose aggregate population reached that number. Religious equality was guaranteed.

✓ The most important part of the constitutional machinery was the Diet, that substitute which Metternich and the congress of Vienna foisted upon Germany instead of the strong and national central authority that the German people and the Prussian statesmen desired. ✓ The Diet was not a sovereign body endowed with full executive or legislative authority ; it was not even a body made up of representatives to whom power had been delegated by the different states ; it was merely the mouthpiece of the princes, a kind of voting machine through which the members of the Confederation made known their wishes to Germany. No deputy had power to act in any emergency without full instructions from the government, whose wishes he repeated to the other members of the Diet. To the princes sitting in the persons of their representatives in the Diet the constitution gave not only legislative but constituent powers. The Diet was to concern itself with all matters of general concern, with the regulation of war with outside Powers, with all arrangements necessary to promote intercourse between the Confederation and all foreign states, and with the settlement of all disputes between the states of the Confederation. In this definition of functions no attempt was made to confer on the Diet in a clear and definite manner either the power to enact or the authority to carry out suitable and necessary legislation. The Diet could not compel a recalcitrant member of the Confederation to obey its decrees, although Metternich claimed in 1819 that if one member of the Confedera-

tion refused to fulfil his common duties the Confederation had the right to coerce him.

The machinery of the Diet was as complicated as its powers were uncertain. Although a single body, it sat under two different forms, one for the transaction of ordinary business, the ordinary assembly or close council (*engerer Rath*), the other for extraordinary business, the general assembly or Plenum. As ordinary assembly the Diet considered all legislation of any kind whatsoever, and decided what measures were to be reserved for the occasion when it sat as a general assembly. In the main, the difference between these two forms lay in the number of votes allotted to each member, the number required for passing a measure, and the character of the measures discussed. In the ordinary assembly there were but seventeen votes cast ; and inasmuch as there were thirty-nine members of the Confederation, it is evident that there was a large amount of collective voting. The eleven larger states had one vote each ; the remaining twenty-eight were arranged in six curias, to each of which was allotted one vote. Single states had, therefore, from one-half to one-twelfth of a vote each, and unity in casting the vote of each curia was demanded. When the vote was taken in this way a majority carried, and it will be seen that any three of the lesser states in combination with the smaller states could out-vote the five kingdoms with Austria ; that is, states possessing only one-tenth of the population of Germany could out-vote the states possessing nine-tenths of the population. Thus in the ordinary assembly state sovereignty without regard to extent of territory held the balance of power. This did not, however, hold true in cases relating to the adoption and amendment of fundamental laws, to the organic institutions of the Confederation, to individual right, or to matters of religion. In these cases a unanimous vote was demanded.

When fundamental laws of the Confederation were to be enacted or measures were to be adopted relating to the Act of the

Confederation itself, then the Diet sat as a general assembly or Plenum. In this capacity it cast sixty-nine votes, and to each state, no matter how small, was given one vote. But as there were but thirty-nine states, it is evident that a considerable number possessed more than one vote. The distribution was, however, in this case based on the territorial extent of each state, although no attempt was made to apportion the votes with any exactness. Austria and the five kingdoms, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and Würtemberg had four votes each; Baden, Electoral Hesse, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, Holstein, and Luxemburg had three votes each; and Brunswick and Mecklenburg-Schwerin had two votes each. For the passage of ordinary measures a two-thirds majority was required; that is, the six kingdoms with three other votes could block legislation favoured by all the other states. In all matters in which unanimity was required in the ordinary assembly, unanimity was also required in the general assembly.

The defects of the Diet may be readily determined. In the first place its organisation and functions were vague and indefinite, and the articles of the constitution were open to various interpretations. Metternich, who, as we have seen, was determined to control German affairs and to repress all expressions of national feeling, was able to make it a constitutional machine to carry out his policy. Having no will of its own, it simply sanctioned and gave legislative efficiency to the measures that Metternich was applying throughout Europe. If in Spain and Italy he employed the congresses of the Powers to support him in his work of repression, in Germany he employed the Diet of the Confederation to the same end. In the second place the organisation of the Diet was ill-adapted to an efficient exercise of executive and legislative functions. It never won the support even of the German princes whose instrument it legally was, and from the beginning to the end of its career it seemed to the people but a means of oppression, an appliance of tyranny.

Its deputies were named by the princes or their governments and never by the people either as individuals or as estates; they were under instructions drawn up by the princes and were liable to be recalled by them at any time. As no powers were delegated to these deputies, and as the states resigned none of their control over matters of common concern, and vested in the Diet none of their sovereign powers, the Diet was practically impotent. The machinery of the assembly neither ran smoothly nor accomplished its work with dispatch; rapidity of movement was unknown, and the passage of the most important measures was practically impossible. Inasmuch as unanimity was demanded for all measures touching changes in the organic law of the Confederation, amendment of the constitution was out of the question. The result of such a system was inevitably a great dragging of business, endless bickering and discussion. It was difficult for the curia to get its members to agree; delegates were constantly sending home for instructions; and often the home government would leave its representatives uninstructed, and months would pass before a particular delegate would be able to cast his vote. Delays were, therefore, of daily occurrence, and business was referred to committees or was pigeon-holed, and important measures lay forgotten, buried in the records. Never could the Diet act definitely, positively or rapidly, and in consequence during the dreary fifty years of its existence it accomplished scarcely one good thing for Germany and nothing for German unity.

✓ This was the body that was set up by Metternich and the lesser states to satisfy the longings of the German people for unity. So far as the letter of the constitution was concerned, there was no hope of anything better. ✓ Appointed to meet on September 1, 1815,—though in point of fact it did not meet until November of the following year—it was to be permanent and never to adjourn for more than four months at a time. In it particularism was in the ascendant and individualism could

scarcely get a hearing. In Germany, as in Italy, the popular desire for a fundamental law that should express the national need was almost entirely overlooked. As regards the famous clause that guaranteed assemblies in the different states, Stein could well say that by it every principle was abandoned "upon which the political arrangements of the nation might be based."

✓ Religious liberty was guaranteed, freedom of the press was promised, and the subjects of the confederated states were given certain rights in respect of property and emigration ; but these were a poor recompense for the wars of liberation, a scant return for the sacrifice and suffering of the preceding period. It is little wonder that this "empty document," as Sybel calls it, "was received by the people of Germany partly with cold indifference, partly with patriotic indignation."

✓ By this constitution Austria and the lesser states had made known their determination to defend particularism and the rights of princes at every point, and to resist the democratic tendencies that were showing themselves so prominently in Germany as well as in Spain, Italy, and France. ✓ Though by no means partial to a written constitution, the statesmen of Prussia, convinced of the necessity of making concessions to popular feeling, had shown themselves markedly in favour of representative institutions, and had tried to gain for their fatherland a more liberal constitution. In this they failed. It is interesting, therefore, to turn from the work of the congress of Vienna to Prussia herself to determine how far she was able to give to the people of her scattered provinces that which she was unable to obtain for Germany as a whole. In the affairs of the Prussian state Metternich could not interfere, and the opportunity was offered for the establishment of such a form of constitutional government as would set a standard for liberalism in other states of the Confederation. And Prussia seized the opportunity. On May 22, 1815, three weeks before the close of the congress of Vienna, while the committee on

German affairs was busily engaged in modifying the Prussian draft Frederic William, King of Prussia, issued an ordinance, countersigned by Hardenberg, in which he declared that a written constitution should be granted to the people of Prussia and a representative assembly of the people should be established. The members of this assembly, the ordinance continued, should be chosen from the provincial estates, which were to be restored where they had already existed and to be organised where they did not exist ; that to this representative assembly should be granted the right of deliberating upon subjects of legislation which concerned " the personal and proprietary right of the citizens of the state including taxation " ; and that in order to carry out this promise a commission should be appointed to meet in three months after the promulgation of the ordinance to organise the provincial estates, to arrange the system of representation, and to elaborate the new constitution.

This document breathes the spirit which prompted the drawing up of the Prussian drafts for a federal constitution, and characterises the liberal policy of Prussia from 1813 to 1815. Although to the extreme liberals it seemed to make but meagre promises and to present an outlook far different from that which they in their dreaming had anticipated, by the people it was received with demonstrations of delight, and by the conservatives with consternation and dismay. No sooner was the ordinance issued than a cry arose from certain influential circles that were animated by the spirit dominant at Vienna, against any representative constitution. " One might possibly get into shape the provincial estates," said Ancillon, " but for Heaven's sake let us have no common estate." " We have," said Klewitz, " the best king, we are rich in most promising princes. In their virtue and in the education of future kings, we have a constitution and greater security against abuse than this [representative constitution] can ever grant." To the

view of these men, each of whom was to be a member of the future commission, Frederic William was inclined to listen, and Hardenberg seems to have lacked from the beginning sufficient strength and determination to resist the opposition that arose. Suggestions from Metternich began to come in from Vienna, and so energetic was the reactionary party that by effecting the postponement of the commission for a period of two years it succeeded in winning a first victory, thus gaining time for the party of reaction to recruit its forces. Finally, however, the question could be no longer postponed; in the spring of 1817 a commission of twenty-two members was appointed, and three commissioners, Altenstein, Klewitz, and Beyme were sent through the provinces to find out what the inhabitants thought of the project. The work of these men was slow and arduous, and the results were so varied that from the opinions gathered it is almost impossible to determine whether the provinces wished a representative constitution or not. The weight of opinion in Westphalia and along the Rhine was in favour of a representative assembly; in the east, farther away from the influence of France, it varied; and in many quarters great ignorance of the subject was found to prevail. While the commission was thus carrying on its investigations, Frederic William was feeling more and more the influence of the reaction that was spreading through Europe. Upon the king's pliant nature Metternich played with all the subtlety of a trained diplomat, and the court and aristocratic party brought its influence to the aid of the Austrian chancellor. The latter advocated the establishment of provincial diets only, and inasmuch as the members of the proposed central assembly were to be chosen from the local diets and not from the people, it followed that the adoption of his plan was possible without violating the ordinance, for it would be, naturally, the first step to be taken in case the ordinance were to be carried out. The real question was, would the king go any further than this?

As time went on, as the work of the commission dragged wearily along, and the real difficulties of the task became increasingly apparent, the feeling grew that a central assembly was under the circumstances impracticable. In 1818 and 1819 ✓ the spirit of reaction increased in Prussia as well as in the rest of Germany, the aristocratic and landholding class gained steadily in influence, the king listened more readily to Metternich's suggestions, and Hardenberg gradually lost the royal confidence. Liberals whose hopes had been raised by the promises of 1815 lost heart as they saw month after month passing and no attempt made to put the ordinance into execution, and as they saw Prussia, too, enter the ranks of the reactionary states.

With the failure of the statesmen of Germany to win the sympathy and support of the liberal forces by a policy of even moderate concession, these forces began to gird themselves for a struggle. "It will be now German Confederation against German Nation," said an anonymous writer of 1815; and already was the nation preparing itself for the conflict, under the leadership of a small group of its people, in whom still burned the fire of the days of the liberation wars. This was the class of students, who turning back to their student work after the wars were over, bore with them the glory and scars of conflict. Feeling that they had been deceived by the German princes, who during the wars had promised so much and after the wars had accomplished so little, they became revolutionary agitators in their determination to exercise freedom of thought and speech, freedom of meeting and association, freedom of fraternal co-operation. As early as 1807 the Tugendbund or league of virtue had been founded for the purpose of keeping alive the national life of Germany during the period of Napoleon's supremacy. Jahn, in organising the gymnastic associations, gave direction and purpose to much of their activity; the muscular strengthening and Spartan training of

the German youth were in the mind of his followers a preparation for the restoring of German freedom. But more influential than anything else was the Burschenschaft or association of students, which originated at Jena in Saxe-Weimar. Here was the centre of the literary life of Germany; here lived and wrote Herder, Goethe, and Schiller; here had gathered the free and independent spirits who were attracted by the liberality of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar; here constitutional government was free and representative; and here in this centre of German national feeling were high-mindedness, enthusiasm, and joyful anticipation of the future. The Burschenschaft thus organised took on a national character; it threw off all sectarianism, all provincial narrowness, and pledged its members not only to lead upright lives but also to work for the national upbuilding of Germany. In the midst of drinking beer and smoking pipes they made vows for the liberation of Germany and swore oaths against the Holy Alliance. Through the press and public utterance they expressed their opinions, idealistic and impractical; and that they might make a more open and united declaration of their love of liberty and hatred of reaction, they combined with certain of the followers of Jahn to celebrate on October 18, 1817, the three hundredth anniversary of the Reformation and the memorial day of the battle of Leipzig at the Wartburg, the castle to which Luther had retired after the Diet of Worms. In the hall of the Minnesingers, where according to tradition the old song contests had been held, the main exercises took place. "After the singing of 'Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott' a representative of the Jena Burschenschaft, who had won the iron cross at Waterloo, welcomed the guests; they, he said, as a living symbol of national unity, had come together to celebrate jointly the memory of two great events of the past, the renaissance of free thought and the delivery from foreign oppression, and to inspire themselves with high resolutions for working out a better future of

the fatherland. There followed speeches in honour of Luther, of the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, of the heroes of the war of independence, of the teachers of the German youth. Not a single word was spoken, which by fair-minded men could have been construed as an expression of unlawful or unreasonable aspirations. And even the lamentable event which was to mar the close of the festive day was an act of juvenile folly much more than of premeditated malice. In childish imitation of Luther's burning of the papal bull at Wittenberg, some members of the Burschenschaft took occasion of the torchlight procession in the evening to throw a number of reactionary writings, which had excited the patriotic anger of academic circles, into the fire, and to perform a wild farcical scene around the burning *auto da fé*. But how ridiculously harmless even this performance had been became soon apparent, when the perpetrators confessed that they had not even read the books on which they had vented so much of moral indignation, and that they had burned not the books themselves but a number of old rubbish, dictionaries, novels, and the like, bought in second-hand book stores, with the titles of the offensive writings affixed to the covers." ¹ Harmless as the meeting was and barren of any danger to Germany, nevertheless it was enough to draw from Metternich an expression of his opinion regarding the Prussian representative scheme and the threatening character of all student societies and all gymnastic associations ; and it strengthened, in no small degree, his determination to force upon the diplomats at Aix-la-Chapelle the policy of repression as part of the public law of Europe. It was the unfortunate fate of German liberalism, that in the events which followed this innocent outburst of student enthusiasm ✓ Metternich found the desired opportunity to apply this law to Germany.

Another centre of the Burschenschaft movement was the

¹ Kuno Francke, *Karl Follen and the German Liberal Movement*.

✓ university of Giessen ; but here the character of the student life was essentially different. Stern, unrelenting, and joyless, that life stands in marked contrast with the freer and more generous spirit that dominated the Burschenschafters of Jena. Of the leaders at Giessen none was more determined in his revolutionary views, more positive in his radical convictions than Karl Follen. Fanatical in his belief in the injustice of all existing forms of government, he was equally uncompromising in the measures that he advocated for the accomplishment of his ends. Lying, assassination, and rebellion were all pardonable, he believed, in the struggle for liberty, and "murder and perjury" became the maxims of the "Unconditionals," as Follen's intimates were called. Inasmuch as these Burschenschaft Nihilists were small in number they were not able to carry out any of the many schemes that were at one time or another drawn up for execution ; but their fiery eloquence, their irresistible fervour and zeal won over many disciples who brooded over the woes of Germany, and were willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause of German liberty.

While the Burschenschaft organisation was gaining associates in northern Germany, and while the brothers Follen by their simple earnestness and steadfastness of purpose were strengthening the faith of the Unconditionals, the party of reaction, which was already beginning to boast of its victory over Frederic William of Prussia, was claiming a greater conquest in the conversion of the Czar Alexander to the cause of repression. While in reality this victory was not yet complete, to the liberals, who based their opinion upon the results of the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and upon a pamphlet of a Wallachian named Stourdza, it seemed to be quite so. This pamphlet, in which Stourdza prophesied a German revolution, and declaiming against the universities on the ground that they were centres of agitation recommended an entire change in the methods of instruction and a restriction of the freedom

of the press, had been distributed among the ministers at Aix-la-Chapelle, and was supposed to have received the sanction of the Czar and to represent his views. At once a great outcry arose against those, who, as was supposed, had influenced the Czar to desert the liberal cause, and suspicion fastened upon a journalist, Kotzebue, who having in his earlier days been on the side of the patriots against Napoleon, had turned reactionist and taken Stourdza under his protection. The liberals branded him as an apostate, a turncoat, a spy in the pay of despotism. His position as Russian *staatsrath* in Germany, which called for frequent political reports to the Czar, laid him open to the charge of having circulated extravagant and even false statements at the Russian court. To the Burschenschafters he was the most hated man in Germany and to the Unconditionals a man deserving of their vengeance. On March 23, 1819, Karl Sand, one of Follen's intimate friends and a member of the Burschenschaft at Jena, a man of pure life but unbalanced mind, entered Kotzebue's house at Mannheim and stabbed him to the heart. Three months later an apothecary, Löhning, who had come under the influence of the Giessen spirit, and had been in close contact with the radical members of the Burschenschaft, attempted to murder the Hessian minister of state, von Ibell, at Schwalbach, but failed to accomplish his object. "It is impossible," says Francke, "not to trace both these events back to the teaching of Karl Follen;" and there is reason to believe that Follen knew beforehand of Sand's intention.

✓ The opportunity that Metternich had anticipated had now come. Had he not always warned the German princes against the dangerous Burschenschaft and the Turnerbund, and against the evils of freedom of the press and a liberal government? And had not the proof now been given that his suspicions were correct? It is true that he had always expressed great contempt for revolutionists of the pen, but that did not alter the impor-

tance for him of the present occasion. Liberal statesmen at once recognised the lamentable character of these unfortunate acts. Hardenberg, already discouraged about a Prussian constitution, gave up all hope of carrying through his measures; Vanhagen von Ense feared for their effect on the Czar and on all ministers of state in Germany, who would now stand in dread of attack at any time; and Gersdorf, regretting the unfortunate affair, sought to persuade the princes, notably the King of Prussia, that there was no danger of a student revolution; but his efforts became wholly vain when after the attack on von Ibell a reaction of fear seized upon Germany. Thus was the way prepared for Metternich's intervention. He was in Florence when Kotzebue's assassination took place and was not informed of it until the end of the first week in April, when Gentz's dispatches, dated April 1st, finally reached him at Rome. He saw in the murder the spectre of a monstrous conspiracy concocted in the universities. Not that he feared that the revolution would be engendered by the universities, but he saw that by them "a whole generation of revolutionaries" would be brought into existence. Therefore his aim was directed against the professors, whom he considered most unsuited to be conspirators but dangerous as instructors of the youth. Convinced by Müller's statement that the "murderous band" would not allow itself to be intimidated by a few measures, he determined to apply his policy with the utmost rigour. "It will be my care to draw from the affair the best possible results," he wrote to Gentz, "and in this endeavour I shall not be found lukewarm." He rejoiced at the embarrassment of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar and thought at once of the good effect that "this loving treatment of his *staatsrath*" would have on the Czar. He therefore proposed the calling of a congress at Carlsbad, to which the German states should send their representatives, and drew up a careful statement of the remedies that he thought the occasion demanded.

The congress met on August 6, 1819. Metternich had already completed his victory over Frederic William in a meeting at Töplitz in July, when he had refused to aid the king against demagogic uprisings unless the latter relinquished his determination to introduce a central representative government into his kingdom. He had charged the king with the responsibility for all that had happened, and had so far succeeded in turning him away from the Hardenberg policy that it had been possible to bring about a common agreement between Austria and Prussia for the regulation of the internal affairs of the Confederation. As this "punctuation" embodied Metternich's own remedies, he was able to come before the congress of Carlsbad assured of the support of Prussia. Thus strengthened he felt confident that his recommendations would be accepted. The sequel proved him to be right; by all the representatives the necessity of common agreement was acknowledged.

The measures passed by the congress, made up of representatives of only the larger states, related to the universities, the press, and such disturbance as might break out in the future. For the universities, the special objects of Metternich's alarm, regular state supervision was to be established. A state officer was to be appointed to enforce the law, to overlook the instruction, to eject professors, whose influence over the youthful minds was deleterious or whose doctrines seemed to be "hostile to the public order or subversive of existing governmental institutions." This same official was to put into force all regulations—hitherto more or less of a dead letter—"against secret and unauthorised societies in the universities, and to pay special attention to the Burschenschaft," since, as the decree says, "the very conception of this society implies the utterly unallowable plan of permanent fellowship and constant communication between the various universities." No professor once removed could be reinstated or allowed to hold a position in any other university in the Confederation, and no student once

expelled could enter any other university. Regarding the press the regulations were equally severe and reactionary. Upon this point Metternich had already expressed himself very strongly, and agreed with Gentz that the press was the most disintegrating influence in the Confederation, the mainstay of the liberal party. Gentz had already drawn up an elaborate paper on the subject based on the proposals of Metternich, and this was made the basis of the work of the congress. All daily and serial publications of less than twenty-four pages were to submit to the censorship of the state officials. If at any time unsuppressed publications were allowed to appear, which in the opinion of the Diet seemed inimical to the honour of the Confederation, the safety of the individual states, or the maintenance of peace and quiet in Germany, the Diet had the right to suppress such on its own authority. Other publications were liable to suppression in case complaint were entered by any individual state against them as obnoxious. Lastly, an extraordinary committee was to be appointed to sit at Maintz for the purpose of investigating all associations and plots of a revolutionary character. Aided by the local authorities this commission was destined to become an elaborately organised detective bureau, established to collect evidence and follow up clues. It was to furnish the Diet with information upon which to base repressive legislation. As a system of espionage it was eminently successful, for it not only placed Austria, and consequently Metternich, at the head of an organised committee for terrorising Germany, but it also gave to the chancellor the practical control over the separate states of the Confederation, which were pledged by this measure to submit to the higher authority of the commission. This struck down the foundation principle of the Confederation, the sovereignty of the individual states. As a detective bureau the commission failed signally. Although it sat for many years and watched with eagle eye for evidence of plots and conspiracies, it never succeeded in accomplishing any single important result.

When completed the decrees were placed before the Diet for acceptance. Here pressure was brought to bear upon the smaller states, which, hearing of the Carlsbad measures for the first time, were not wholly disposed to accept them. They saw in them a danger threatening their sovereignty, and looked with ill-favour upon an action which promised to increase the power of Austria and the larger states. Particularism stood face to face with an increase of centralised authority exercised by Austria and Metternich, and it is little wonder that while the latter obtained a formal vote from the Diet in favour of the new measures, a considerable minority of the representatives secretly adopted a protest against them.

With the acceptance of these tyrannical measures the work of the Carlsbad congress was brought to an end: but even yet the remedies of Metternich and the propositions contained in the "punctuation" of Töplitz had not all been acted upon. The time had now come when it would be safe to do that which Metternich in 1815 considered dangerous—because of the prevalence of liberal opinions in Germany—that is, to elaborate the organic law of the Confederation. Beginning on November 9, 1819, a series of ministerial conferences was held in Vienna, at which representatives of all the German states were present, to determine, as Metternich said in his opening address, "the functions of the Diet, the extent of its jurisdiction, the limits of its powers and the forms to be followed in the most essential part of its work." This of necessity involved the revision of Article XIII., upon which Prussia and other states had based their right of establishing representative assemblies. That Metternich and the German Ultras intended to use this conference as an instrument of further oppression there is no doubt, but, fortunately for Germany, the upholders of state sovereignty joined with the liberals to oppose any interpretation which might increase the power of Austria. In consequence the victory at the conference lay rather with the moderates than

with the extreme reactionists, and many attempts of Metternich to construe the letter of the constitution in the spirit that dominated at Carlsbad proved unsuccessful. In the main the upholders of state-rights won the victory, and as might have been expected the popular cause received no more consideration at Vienna in 1819 and 1820 than it had in 1814 and 1815, a fact that becomes evident from the new interpretation put upon Article XIII; "Inasmuch as the Germanic Confederation," so runs the new article, "with the exception of the free cities, has been formed by the sovereign princes, the fundamental principle of that union demands that all sovereign powers shall abide in the supreme head of the government, and by the term assemblies of estates (*landeständische Verfassung*, the term used in Article XIII.) it is to be understood that the sovereign is bound to permit the co-operation of the estates only in the exercise of certain specially determined powers." In such an interpretation representation of the people found no place and sovereignty of the people was denied without reserve. Particularism had saved Germany from extreme and oppressive reaction, from a repetition of the Carlsbad decrees, but it had retained for itself all the results of the victory. The Vienna Final-Act, drawn up May 20, 1820 and made a fundamental law of the Confederation by a resolution of the Diet passed on the 8th of June following, marks the final downfall of the liberal hopes in Germany.

But the disappointment of those who were longing for German unity based on a broad constitutional foundation was not yet complete. Although to the student of the period it has long since become evident that Frederic William of Prussia had broken with Hardenberg and the moderate liberals, nevertheless the work of the commission that had been appointed in 1817 was still going on for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made by the king. But the murder of Kotzebue, followed by certain uprisings in Berlin in July of the same year, and the

threats and persuasions of Metternich, had changed Frederic William's mind and had made him an easy prey to the reactionary projects which Metternich had made to him at Töplitz. With the passage of the Carlsbad decrees and the Vienna Final-Act the liberals began to realise that a central representative assembly was no longer to be hoped for, and they were entirely convinced of this fact, when in 1821 a new commission was appointed, composed of men of reactionary tendencies under the presidency of the crown prince, for the single purpose of organising the local assemblies of estates according to the principle laid down in the revision of Article XIII. The hope died out entirely when in 1823, after Hardenberg's death, the law organising the provincial estates was promulgated, and it was officially stated that the question concerning the summoning of the general estates—that is the central representative assembly—and its development out of the provincial estates, was a matter that would be postponed until a later period. Thus did the Prussian government evade its promise of 1815, and by its submission to Metternich and the landed classes furnish one more illustration of the strength of conservatism and of class policy.

Thus at the very time that the Ultras in France were winning their victory over the moderates by the fall of the second ministry of Richelieu and the establishment of the ministry of Villèle ; at the time that the Austrian troops were conquering the constitutionalists in Naples and Charles Felix was restoring absolutism in Piedmont ; at the time that the French troops were suppressing the liberal movement in Spain, and the congresses of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona were declaring repression to be a part of the public law of Europe ; at the time that all these reactionary movements were taking place, the cause of German unity was rendered for the moment hopeless by the victory of the landed aristocracy, which demanded the maintenance of privilege and state sovereignty, over the com-

mercial classes, which were demanding reorganisation and reform. The cause of constitutional government was retarded by the all-influencing power of Austria, who sought not only to crush out all traces of liberalism by direct interference but also to persuade the separate states to copy the principles that she laid down for her own guidance. From 1819 to 1830 was the heyday of reaction in Germany as well as in Europe at large.

But at the same time there was evidence during these ten years of the existence of forces as well in Germany as in France, Italy, and Europe generally, that seemed to promise a better future. Politically speaking each state was quiet, watching with alternate anxiety and enthusiasm the course of events in other countries. The reactionists had won their victory, but they had merely forced the radical elements into secret rather than into open action and had quickened rather than destroyed the liberal aspirations. Every movement in France, every stirring of the Carbonari, every success of the Greeks in their struggle for independence against the Turks, every diplomatic victory of Canning, in a word, every expression of hostility to the doctrines of Metternich was noted and studied. Already had the states of Bavaria and Würtemberg granted fairly liberal constitutions to their subjects, and in Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse, and a number of the smaller states that had acted under the influence of the Prussian ordinance of 1815, written charters similar to the French Charta of 1814 had been prepared and put into operation. After 1822 constitution making suddenly stopped, and was not resumed for seven years, but the remaining states of Germany had at least had the opportunity of seeing the advantages of constitutional rule in the states where it had been tried.

Though Germany was for the time being to make no progress in the direction of constitutional liberty, yet the period to 1830 was far from being a time of social or economic retrogression

or lethargy. The princes of Germany were by no means forgetful of the welfare of their people, and there existed in Prussia and all Germany peace and general happiness. It is true that the universities were watched, that professors were occasionally subjected to removal, that publishers were prosecuted and pamphlets suppressed. But these events were of comparatively infrequent occurrence and scarcely touched the mass of the people. It is true that political affairs were temporarily dormant, that there was little to rouse enthusiasm for the cause of liberalism; but there was on the other hand a great deal to rouse enthusiasm in other fields of human activity. There was increasing prosperity and wealth in nearly all the states of Germany. Economic reforms were begun notably in Prussia, and a remarkable revival in literature and art had taken place in larger and smaller states alike. But in no particular was this spirit more active than in the departments of history and philology. The Germans despairing of the present turned to the past, and writing under the influence of the romantic spirit applied their energies to the early history of their race, and by appeals to the greatness of by-gone days endeavoured to rouse a greater pride and loyalty. In this work Germany was contributing most richly to the sum of human knowledge. At the same time the supporters of liberalism grew more hopeful as it became more evident that such progress in art, literature, and the sciences must be followed by a similar advance in the direction of political liberty and economic reforms. The change of ideas brought about by such an intellectual movement was itself a force destined to break down the narrowness of the governments in matters of privilege and constitutional right.

Of far greater importance, however, because more directly connected with the development of German unity and national feeling, was the economic movement known as the Zollverein, or customs-union, which represented in Germany the workings of those same economic forces that had already begun to make

necessary new legislation in England and France. The evils of a restricted intercommunication between the many states of the old Empire had already led the representatives of those states at Vienna to incorporate in the organic act a clause which declared that the members of the Confederation at the first meeting of the Diet should treat regarding matters of trade and commerce among the different states. But nothing had been done looking to a simplifying of the existing tariff-system, and in consequence domestic industry had come to a standstill. Trade could not flourish in the presence of the obstacles that the numerous tariffs and the diverse legislation of the various states placed in the way. ✓ Illegal traffic, smuggling, and evasion of the laws were everywhere prominent. The expenses of so many customs houses, of as large a number of officials as was needed to guard the numerous frontiers, weighed heavily upon the states and the people, while the difficulties of travel and of communication increased the local prejudices and made political unity all the more difficult to obtain. Furthermore, such annoyances and impediments hampered industrial growth, and in the presence of an increasing interest in economic undertakings requiring the employment of large capital, Germany was far behind France and England. Uniformity in economic matters was therefore coming to be recognised as necessary to the welfare of the German people.

The matter had been energetically discussed as early as 1817, but Austria had opposed all measures looking to a commercial union between the states. But while the deputies in the Diet debated and Austria opposed wholesome measures, Prussia, quicker to respond to public opinion, began to act. To her, owing to the scattered location of her various provinces, a closer commercial union had become a matter requiring immediate action. Within the limits of her territory, the boundary of which was 1073 miles in length and touched twenty-eight neighbours, sixty-seven commercial and excise systems were in

full operation, and swarms of smugglers successfully evaded the tariff laws. In 1816 the reform of the customs-system was definitely decided upon, and in 1818 Maassen, a pupil of Adam Smith's, brought forward his scheme for free trade in Prussia, which, later embodied in a law, provided that all internal customs should be abolished, foreign goods that had once crossed the frontier should circulate freely, and domestic goods should pass without restriction. This law, by which Prussia became commercially free, raised a great outcry among the other states, who seeing in it a new division of the fatherland tried to effect the repeal of the law at the conference held in Vienna the next year. In this, however, they were not successful. Having thus reorganised her own system, and confident that the Diet would never take any action favourable to the economic unity of the German states, Prussia began to make commercial treaties with her neighbours. The union with Schwarzburg-Sondershausen on October 25, 1819, was the first step in the formation of the great alliance, which was destined to do much to prepare the way for political unity.

The influence of Prussia was felt outside her own boundaries, and other states began to recognise the need of a freer commercial intercourse. After three years of negotiation between Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and other states, which came to nothing largely because of the fear in which these states stood of Austria's displeasure, a treaty was made between Würtemberg and the Hohenzollern *enclavés*. In September of the same year a treaty was arranged between Baden and the Grand Duchy of Hesse. In 1826 Würtemberg and Baden entered into a similar commercial agreement, and this was elaborated in a formal treaty the next year. About the same time Prussia extended her union by a treaty with Hesse Darmstadt, and thus two commercial groups were formed—the Bavaria-Würtemberg and the Prussia-Darmstadt—each of which sought and successfully, to enlarge its boundaries. By the addition of

other states to one or other of these groups the way was prepared for the final step, the alliance between the two associations and the erection of a single Zollverein to include the greater part of central Germany. After long negotiation, in which fear of Prussia and an unwillingness to accept in full the Prussian system were the main obstacles to action, this was finally accomplished in 1833. Gradually other states of Germany, urged on by economic necessity, joined the association, and by 1836 the latter embraced nearly all the northern and southern German states and the free cities.

The object of the union was primarily the removal of all barriers to intercommunication and trade, the abolition of internal tariffs and customs houses, and the establishment of a common set of officers and a common tariff-list. But in its indirect influences it went much further than this. Because of the community of interest that it developed, internal improvements became possible; roads were made, canals dug, postal arrangements improved, railways and steamship lines constructed, transportation was made quicker and cheaper. Above all, by removing many causes of interstate hostility and controversy, it helped to destroy local feeling and prejudice; it widened the field of economic activity, and created a public weal to take the place of the many petty and isolated interests; in a word, the introduction of a common commercial and trading system not only laid the foundation for the erection of other common organisations, such as the military and the educational, but also prepared the way for the more rapid Germanising of the people. It began to make real what the patriots of the earlier period had hoped and longed for, the growth of the German nationality. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of the Zollverein, but it did at least form a new union outside of the Confederate Diet founded upon interests of a pecuniary and social character, of which Prussia was the recognised head. Such a union could not fail to become in due time

an influence powerful enough to overcome the political inertia of the Confederation. Though to other causes final unity is to be attributed, nevertheless economic unity under Prussian leadership made it easier in the end for the German states to look to Prussia for leadership in political things.

An opportunity came for testing the strength of Prussia's position. The revolution of 1830 in France, with the abdication of Charles X., and the transfer of power from the Ultras and Right to the Centre and moderates, gave the signal for popular agitation and revolt in different parts of Europe. The Belgians rose against the house of Orange, under whom they had been placed by the congress of Vienna; the Poles revolted from the house of Romanoff, to which they had been attached by the same congress; and the inhabitants of Piedmont, Romagna, and Milan began an insurrection. In the presence of so much agitation abroad it would have been a matter of wonder had Germany not shown some signs of disturbance; yet it is remarkable to note how temperately the liberals acted and how in nearly every case agitation took the form of a demand for constitutional government. In Hanover, Hesse, Saxony, and Brunswick the movements were successful, and four more constitutions were added to those already granted. With moderate concessions all further disturbances ceased, a fact that bears witness to the anti-revolutionary character of the German people and to the peace and prosperity that had come as a result of the reforms, economic and social, of the preceding decade. But to the conservative element every movement was a source of anxiety. To Metternich the granting of the new constitutions was "an unpardonable error"; the revolutions in France, Poland, and Italy proved to him that the Europe of 1830 was "a world of ruins," as he wrote to Apponyi at Paris; and he was apparently ready at any moment to join with the Czar Nicolas in a crusade for the defence of legitimism. However, Germany as a whole and Prussia in particular wished for

peace because of the new economic activities in which they were engaged, and it was not until the Belgian difficulty seemed in danger of entangling Europe in a general war that the proposal was made to take measures for a military defence. It is noteworthy that Bavaria and Würtemberg began to arm without regard to the military provisions of the Confederate Diet, a fact which shows that when it came to the test, these and other states had no confidence in the system that the Confederation had set up. It is more noteworthy that these states, which were already negotiating with Prussia regarding the tariff union, and were therefore beginning to look to her for leadership in economic matters, realising that in case of a French attack the weak point of the frontier was along the Rhine, began to make known their desire for Prussian protection and for the organisation of a military defence separate from that of Austria and the Confederate Diet.

This was a striking incident from a number of points of view. It showed that the states of the Confederation believed that the military system established by the Diet was impotent in the presence of danger ; that Austria was not to be depended upon in such an emergency, partly because she had opposed the best interests of Germany in the Carlsbad decrees and had attempted to do the same in the Vienna conferences, and partly because she stood in a sense outside of Germany and had as a state more to do with the south and the southeast than with the north ; that Prussia was already looked upon as the defender of the Rhine and therefore the natural military leader of Germany ; and that the effort to erect a tariff union was already having an influence upon the political destinies of the Confederation. Progress had certainly been made in the decade from 1820 to 1830. But Prussia had not as yet sufficient firmness and self-reliance to take advantage of the situation, although the opportunity was offered of assuming the military headship of Germany. Frederic William lacked the strength of convic-

tion that the occasion demanded, and was unwilling to negotiate with the South German states for a separate military organisation without the permission of Austria. In the interviews that followed, Austria managed to put off the decision until after the Italian revolt was suppressed, and then, flatly rejecting the proposition, reduced Frederic William to submission at Töplitz in 1831, just as she had done at the same place in 1819. Bernstorff, the Prussian minister, failed as Hardenberg had done before him. For the third time Prussia yielded to the influence of Austria, and giving up the idea of a limited confederacy for military purposes, accepted once more to the full the organic act of the Confederation.

Metternich was again victorious and was only waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of his position. "Germany," he said, "is a prey to frightful disorders. The princes by listening to the counsels of the liberals, deceiving themselves with the idea that they are carrying on a democratic rule, have reduced their power to zero. Happily the Confederation exists and we are about to set it in motion." But as yet complete evidence of the "frightful disorders" was wanting. At first, in consequence of the unrest engendered by the revolution in France and the other countries, the Diet contented itself with a revival of the Maintz commission, and with the passage of laws forbidding the spread of political petitions. As a result, many pamphlets were suppressed and newspapers were put under the ban; but as by these means free expression of opinion was prevented the liberals were forced to find some other way of making their demands and wishes known. In the autumn of 1831 public meetings were held at which speeches were made and songs sung. Finally in 1832 a monster meeting was held at Humpach in the Palatinate. "From all parts of the country," says Sybel, "the people streamed in thousands to the slopes of the Schlossberg; German and Prussian banners were unfurled amid loud flourishes of music, and the orators of the

day celebrated approaching liberty, German unity, and the fraternisation of all free nations. Boisterous huzzas followed, spirited songs were sung, many a bottle of the good wine of the Palatinate was emptied; and then after such brave deeds the people dispersed and went home in high spirits. A few days later Prince Wrede appeared with four thousand soldiers to curb the raging revolution, but he was not able to find any revolution anywhere in the Palatinate." This was the evidence for which Metternich and the Diet were waiting. Here was "the first attempt of Radicalism to display itself in all its bare deformity." Between June 25th and July 5th, 1832, reactionary measures were passed by the Diet supplemental to the Carlsbad decrees. All political meetings were expressly prohibited; all revolutionary songs and insignia—the latter referring to the badge of black, red, and gold, the symbol of German unity—were forbidden, under penalty of fine and imprisonment; the press was placed under a rigid censorship; and universities were once more subjected to governmental supervision. Finally, it was decided that the Diet had the right to interfere in the affairs of states if at any time a deadlock occurred between the prince and the estates. This precaution was taken in order as far as possible to limit the privileges of the assemblies in the constitutional states and to rectify the mistake that these states had made in such an unpardonable act as granting liberal constitutions. The significant fact in connection with this attempt to limit the sovereignty of the individual states is that it was received by the states as well as by the people with an ill-grace that augured badly for Metternich's power in the future. So great an increase in the police powers of the central authority was looked upon as a presumptuous interference in the internal affairs of the separate states.

But the reaction was not quite complete. One more evidence was to be given of the "frightful disorder" of Germany, and

Metternich was to have one more opportunity of effectually applying, almost for the last time, his theory of repression, and through the aid of the Czar, who felt bitterly toward the Germans, because of their sympathy for the Poles, of bringing the King of Prussia to an official declaration of belief in the more general and by this time almost discarded doctrine of intervention. In April, 1833, a conspiracy was discovered, a kind of Gunpowder Plot, planned by some seventy radicals of central and southern Germany for the purpose of capturing or blowing up the Diet itself at the place of its meeting, Frankfort. The conspirators hoped for the co-operation of peasants of Hesse Cassel, soldiers of Württemberg, and refugees from Poland. On the spot where the Diet had sat they intended to proclaim the German republic. This was the event that strengthened Metternich's hand. It did not matter that the attempt failed ridiculously; that the conspirators actually numbering only about fifty were captured without difficulty by the Frankfort police; that the remainder of the Germans showed no sympathy for the movement and persisted, contrary to Metternich's expectation, in remaining perfectly quiet. The fact of a conspiracy was enough. The Diet, thoroughly frightened, passed laws forbidding emigration into Switzerland, where Mazzini was planning his attack on Savoy, or into France and Belgium, where revolutionary ideas were rife. It appointed a committee of investigation at Frankfort to examine into the affairs of the individual states. Metternich, who was convinced that a "great network of conspiracy was covering Germany," and that the failure of the first attempt would not discourage the agitators from continuing the revolution, met the representatives of Prussia and Russia at Töplitz and there came to a "complete understanding" with them as to the attitude to be taken in Germany and Poland—all rebellion was to be put down, and the efforts of the Powers were to be directed to the maintenance of peace and order. But Metternich demanded

a more definite expression of opinion than this. In October the monarchs themselves met at Münchengrätz and agreed to oppose any application of "the false and dangerous principle of non-intervention," in favour of which England and France had already declared themselves. Metternich felt that he had scored a great victory against the King of Prussia, for by the formal treaty drawn up a little later at Berlin that Power, which had so recently sought to oppose Austria in the matter of the military affairs of the Confederation, promised to act in concert with the other Powers and to assist when called upon in the overthrow of revolution in any other state. It also promised to consider any attempt of another Power to prevent Russia's or Austria's application of the doctrine of intervention as an act of hostility against itself, and to take up arms to resist such aggression. This was indeed a reversal of Bernstorff's plan proposed three years before.

In January, 1834, the last step was taken. A second conference of German ministers was called at Vienna to strengthen still further the Confederation, in the presence of the revolution abroad and the threatened disorder at home, and to find such remedies as seemed necessary for the states to apply in case of any disturbance of the peace. This meeting was in reality summoned for the purpose of working out with greater definiteness and in greater detail the decrees of 1819 and 1832, and of getting the states to agree to a policy of rigid repression. The conference lasted from January to June, and a final protocol of sixty articles was drawn up, which corresponded and was supplemental to the Final-Act of 1820. The only part of the protocol that was made a law by the Diet referred to the establishment of a court of arbitration, by means of which Metternich hoped to limit the influence of the representative assemblies which he so thoroughly disliked. The establishment of this court was a deliberate and well conceived attempt to uphold the full sovereignty of princes and to destroy the

efficiency of parliamentary government, by making it a law of the Confederation, that in all cases where a dispute arose between the princes and the estates the matter should be referred to a board of arbitrators, chosen of course by the Diet. The other parts of the protocol, in which were repeated the old provisions regarding the press, the universities, and the police, never became law. They remained entirely secret to the western Powers and served as guides according to which each state was to instruct his representative in the Diet. By this act all the German states seemed to give their consent to the policy of the Austrian chancellor and to submit their will to his, although it is worthy of note that not a few of the princes were ashamed of the part they were playing, and sought to atone for their political narrowness by a renewed interest in the social and intellectual condition of their people. Frederic William, however seemed fully satisfied with the political situation. A week after the close of the conference he wrote to Metternich a congratulatory letter, in which he expressed his joy at the result of the conference and ventured the opinion that its work would "add considerably to the moral influence of the Confederation" and would "raise it higher in European estimation."

The work of reaction was now complete and Metternich could well look upon this, the last really important action in which he was to take a leading part, as one of his greatest victories. All hope of an extension of constitutional government in the non-constitutional states was gone for the present in Germany; and seeing that as Frederic William grew older he became more conservative and less willing to consider political changes, the people of Prussia turned their attention to their individual and personal affairs and waited expectantly for his successor. For the time being the country at large was, so far as politics were concerned, quiet; no commotion was disturbing the public order, and the commissions of Maintz and Frankfort found little to justify their existence. But at the very time that the

reactionary party was winning its victory it was rousing new forces against itself. The apparent completeness of its success was productive of good to the liberal cause. The majority of the constitutional governments, seemingly dissatisfied with the position that they had taken at Vienna, sought to turn the thoughts of the people from their political condition by furthering the general happiness and prosperity of their countries. In Hanover, Saxony, Bavaria, and Baden the finances were improved, administration became more efficient, and beneficial measures were passed regarding agriculture and manufactures. Liberal ministers were given the direction of affairs, and inasmuch as many of the princes were showing themselves more progressive than the assemblies, there seemed to be no opportunity for the court of arbitration to interfere. But the reactionary victory from 1831 to 1834 not only promoted in this manner the internal welfare of many of the individual states but it also hastened the growth of the commercial alliance. In 1833 the Zollverein proper was formed by the union of the Bavaria-Württemberg and the Prussia-Darmstadt branches, and from 1833 to 1836 most important additions were made to the union. Furthermore the effect of the reaction upon the people was equally striking. Many thousands who had hitherto been opposed to all agitation were driven over to the side of the liberals, and were now willing to promise that if revolution should break out they would no longer remain passive. Metternich's policy was training the Germans to be radicals in spite of themselves and it is estimated that now nine-tenths of the population of Germany were filled with democratic ideas. The cause of liberalism was becoming steadily stronger, and the period from 1834 to 1840 shows us many indications of increasing firmness and good sense in regard to all matters that looked to the attainment of political liberty.

A striking proof of the growing hostility of the German people to all arbitrary and wilful exercise of autocratic power

was given in Hanover. The king of the state, William IV. of England, yielding in 1830 to the demands of the citizens and students of Göttingen, had granted a liberal constitution, which had been carefully drawn up in 1833 by the professor and publicist Dahlmann. In 1837 William IV. died, and through the operation of the Salic law the personal connection between Hanover and the English Crown was broken and the succession passed to the youngest brother of the king, Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland. The duke was a strong tory in feeling, profligate in character, and had been a source of considerable trouble to the English royal family. He hailed the succession to the Hanoverian throne as a welcome opportunity of gaining money wherewith to pay his debts, and, a man of boundless avarice, he cared little about the means employed, so long as money was forthcoming. Unfortunately for him the new constitution had substituted payment from the civil list for the revenues from the Crown domains; and the duke, thinking that by this arrangement his income would be reduced, determined to nullify the constitution on the ground that he had not agreed to it. The overthrow of the constitution was patiently accepted by a majority of the people of Hanover, although the act was a violation of Hanoverian law and of the Vienna Final-Act. But seven professors of Göttingen—Dahlmann, Albrecht, Gervinus, Ewald, Weber, and the brothers Grimm—protested vigorously against it, on the ground that they were bound by the oath which they had sworn to the constitution, and they refused to accept any other constitution, declaring that they “could not appear before their students as men who had played with their oaths.” In consequence of their attitude, these men were deprived of their positions and three, Dahlmann, J. Grimm, and Gervinus, were banished from Hanover. An appeal was made at once to the Federal Diet by the Hanoverian estates for the restoration of the constitution. Of the seventeen votes cast in the

ordinary assembly eight were in favour of restoration and eight were against it. To Austria, therefore, fell the deciding vote, and she voted with the opposition. Consequently the Diet refused to interfere, and the people of Hanover had to submit to the revival of the old constitution of 1819, somewhat remodelled to suit the king's fancy.

This incident stirred the feelings of the German people very deeply. They felt outraged by the attack on the constitution; they resented the treatment to which such eminent men, standing in the first rank of scholars, were subjected; and they saw no hope for constitutional government anywhere, if at will a prince could overthrow a constitution and be upheld in his act by the Diet. The moderate conservatives began to weaken in their loyalty to the Confederation, and to consider with more sympathy the views of the national liberals. The articles written by Dahlmann and Jacob Grimm in their own defence were everywhere read with approval, and had no slight effect in creating a healthier public opinion. These men were no "abominable Jacobins"; they were learned, thoughtful, and consistent upholders of the law, and their vindication of their conduct led to a good deal more sober thinking than had been done hitherto in Germany. Among the liberals the feeling of indignation was accompanied with expressions of scorn and hate for the dissolute Hanoverian monarch. Mass meetings were held to pass resolutions of sympathy for the banished professors and a society was formed for the purpose of raising a fund to meet their material losses. Public opinion was without exception in their favour; Ewald was at once called to the university of Tübingen by the Duke of Würtemberg, who had voted with the minority at the Diet, and three years later William and Jacob Grimm were called to Berlin. Absolutism had won a Pyrrhine victory. German liberals were more scornful than ever of all things savouring of the policy of

Metternich, and German constitutionalists, notably in the southern states, were more than ever convinced that if the confederate government was powerless to act in the present emergency, then it was high time to abolish it, and to establish in its place a new central authority, stronger and more liberal.

Such was the situation when in June, 1840, Frederic William III. of Prussia died, and was succeeded by his son the crown prince, as Frederic William IV. The old king did not pass away unmourned, for his loyal people were ever ready to ascribe to his ministers the reactionary acts committed in his name. He had always shown a very practical interest in the material welfare of the Prussian people, and a kindly love which, even in the moments of extreme reaction, won their hearts and their support. For forty-three years he had been their king, and the memory of Jena and Lützen and the wars of liberation went far to lessen their disappointment when they found that he did not share their political aspirations. If he had often failed to carry out the promises he had made, and had submitted himself too readily to the will of Austria, he had, at the same time, associated his name with noteworthy movements and reforms in art, literature, administration, and commerce. Under his rule the state had made wonderful progress, and the people were grateful for it. So that while they undoubtedly looked forward with hope to the accession of the new king, from whom it was confidently believed important political changes could be expected, they refrained from troubling the declining years of the old king with useless radical agitations.

The character of Frederic William IV. was a striking contrast to that of his father. Anything but military in nature, he combined with a wide learning and exceptional versatility a magnetic personality that attached to him men of all ranks. Taught in his early years by Niebuhr, Savigny, and Scharn-

horst he became a patron of art and scholarship, and loved to surround himself with such men as Rauch, Ranke, Humboldt, and the Grimms, or Bunsen, Gerlach, and Radowitz. Berlin became through his influence a centre for famous men, and at that time were laid the foundations of its literary greatness. Romanticism had won its final victory over classicism, and in the person of the new king seated itself upon the throne. The condition in Prussia at the beginning of this period of exceptional activity stands in marked contrast to that in Austria at the same time, where there was no encouragement of native genius, no enthusiasm for literature or for art, no independence of thought, no historical investigation, no poetry. Vienna, so far as the literary movement in Europe was concerned, was intellectually dead.

But although Frederic William IV. was a patron of the new learning and a royal enthusiast in matters pertaining to the higher interests of his people, he was in no way different from his father in his conception of government and in his attitude toward all things political. He never lost his hatred for revolution and a bitterness of feeling for all political movements that tended to limit the prerogatives of royalty. Imbued with a love for the past, he rejected all projects that aimed at lessening the power and the glory of monarchy in order to substitute a form of government in which the theory of the divine authority of princes was discarded for the dangerous and erroneous doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. Because of the love he bore his people he was willing to limit the absolute authority which of right belonged to him, and to make concessions to his ministers and assemblies of estates; but he demanded that such concessions be accepted as royal favours rather than as rights belonging to the people, and insisted upon the personal co-operation of the king in all matters of administration. In art, education, literature, in everything that pertained to the material welfare and culture of his people, Frederic William IV.

was an ardent and progressive sympathiser and critic ; but in all matters relating to the political and constitutional government of his kingdom, he belonged to the past, and was opposed to the ideas that were rapidly becoming dominant. He resented any effort to gain by argument or force that share in government which the larger number of the people were beginning to claim as their right.

The reign of Frederic William IV. ushered in that period in the history of Germany during which were gathering those forces that were to produce the momentous outbreak of 1848. Metternich, an old man of wonderful vigour for all his seventy years, was still actively interested in the affairs of nearly every state in Europe ; but the fact was becoming evident that in many quarters his influence was decreasing and his political theories and opinions were less readily received. Beginning to be discredited in Europe the old statesman was still less of a power in Germany, where political, intellectual, and religious interests were stimulating independence of thought, arousing national enthusiasm, and increasing the tendency toward radical agitation. The German people, phlegmatic and slow to move, were at length roused to a pitch of excitement hitherto unknown to them. Schlosser, in his *History of the Eighteenth Century*, appealed to their national spirit, and by portraying in a picturesque yet scholarly manner the immorality of the old state system, increased the hostility to all things absolute, broke down the historical basis of legitimism, and weakened the respect of the people for restored rulers. He endeavoured to impress upon the people of Germany the fact that their redemption lay in their moral and material upbuilding, in their independence of other countries, and in a higher order of native statesmen and publicists. About the same time the religious world was excited over the conflicting opinions that were agitating the people. On the Protestant side Schleiermacher was preaching his brave and patriotic sermons and was bringing peace to the

church in Germany by his doctrine of the harmony of faith and research. Neander, writing the history of the Christian Church, influenced the younger generation of Germany by the depth of his learning, the sincerity of his piety, and the simplicity and purity of his life. Schelling by his mystical pantheistic philosophy in which individuals were recognised as but instruments predestined to carry out the designs of Providence, and Hegel by his doctrine of the supremacy of the Idea greatly increased philosophical speculation. But these philosophies not only brought about a wholesome reaction against the dead abstractions of deism, but stirred up the religious world by their atheistical and fatalistic tendencies.

Their influence was, however, not to be compared with the religious bitterness and fury that was aroused by the publication of the *Life of Jesus* by Strauss, and by the iconoclastic writings of Bauer, Vischer, and others of the Tübingen school, who threatened to undermine the very foundations of faith by declaring the Gospels to be unhistorical and the Epistles uninspired. From Roman Catholic and Protestant came anathema and invective, warfare was waged relentlessly and without compromise on both sides. The Roman Catholic Church appealed to a spirit of mediævalism in matters of faith and sought to strengthen the devotion of the faithful by the exhibition of the "Holy Coat of Trêves." This exhibit had the undesired effect of starting a new religious controversy that led to a schism in the Roman Catholic Church and the inauguration of a reformed Catholic movement. The state as well as the people was drawn into the religious war by the determination of the Pope and the Jesuits to free the church from the control of the civil authorities, and to remove the clergy from the jurisdiction of the secular courts.

The events of the decade from 1835 to 1845 show that the German people, slow to act when political and constitutional questions only were at issue, were quick to respond to anything

that touched their philosophical or religious faith. In consequence of the diversity of views Germany became the scene of angry and violent religious discussion, and this increased the general agitation by stimulating radicalism and generating political discontent. Attempts to suppress the popular feeling led to uprisings of either a political or a religious character in one or other of the states of the Confederation. On the occasion of the review of the municipal guard at Leipzig, August 12, 1845, a crowd gathered before the hotel of Archduke John of Austria, crying "Down with the Jesuits!" and in the encounter that followed seven men were mortally wounded. This incident gave new life and additional numbers to the radical party, which had been for a number of years perfecting its organisation, and in conjunction with the republicans of France, Switzerland, and Poland was spreading its doctrines not only through Germany but through Europe in general. Outside events hastened the crisis. The uprising in Galicia, which was brutally suppressed by Austrian soldiery, and the annexation by Austria of Cracow, increased the sympathy of the German liberals for the Polish cause, and intensified their hostility for all absolute governments. In the north a new influence was to make itself felt. On July 8, 1846, Christian VIII. of Denmark announced in a public letter his determination to extend the Danish law of succession, which recognised female rights of inheritance, to Schleswig, Lauenberg, and some parts of Holstein. This meant the incorporation of the duchies into the Danish state, and at once an outcry went up from Germany against what the liberals considered a violation of the express rights of the duchies. The new controversy, in which all joined either on one side or the other, was not lessened when it was known that the Diet, acting under the influence of Metternich, decided to consider the matter as a "purely internal affair of the kingdom" and to leave the settlement to the judgment of the Danish king; and this, too, in the

face of the fact that Holstein was a member of the Germanic Confederation.

It was at this time when Germany was keenly alive to every new movement in the intellectual world and every new experiment in politics, that Frederic William IV. drew the attention of conservatives and liberals alike to his project of a united provincial diet at Berlin. The circumstances under which this diet was held were these. Prussia had made rapid economic progress in the decade since 1836, and the question of railways was becoming a vital one to a state whose provinces were so widely scattered. Frederic William had always felt a strong desire to promote the material happiness of his people ; and as France, Italy, and even Austria had already begun to grapple with the railway problem and had introduced lines of communication with various points, it behooved Prussia to act with promptness, that her economic welfare, so splendidly advanced in the Zollverein, might not suffer from a want of easier methods of transportation and more rapid means of communication. Railways might be built either by the state or by private corporations, but in either case it would be necessary for the government to negotiate a loan ; for if the work were done by private individuals, the state would be expected to subsidise the undertaking or to guarantee the interest. Now, according to a law which Hardenberg had succeeded in carrying through in 1820, the consent of the estates of the realm was necessary in order to negotiate a loan or to pass a law levying new taxes.

The king was in something of a quandary. He wanted the railways ; but how was he to get the required consent of the estates ? He might summon committees from the provincial diets to meet him in Berlin ; or he might have the matter passed upon by the provincial diets themselves, acting separately ; or he might fulfil the promise which his father had made in 1815, and summon a representative assembly, that is, a gathering of representatives of the general estates at Berlin. The

first method was tried, and proved wholly unsuccessful. But how about the other two plans? During a voyage that he took with Metternich in 1845 up the Rhine from Stolzenfels to Johannisberg, he had talked over the whole matter and had made clear his determination. He told Metternich that he had no intention of summoning a representative assembly because he did not consider it practicable to do so, and because he was certain that there was not a single Prussian who thought that such a system was suitable for the country or wished to see it established. He declared his own intention of bringing together the eight separate provincial bodies at Berlin to treat in common regarding the matter of the loan and the direct tax. Metternich did not wholly agree with the king in his opinion regarding the condition of Prussia, and told Frederic William that if he summoned his 600 deputies as members of the provincial diets they would go home as representatives of the general estates (*comme états généraux*). "Even your majesty cannot prevent that," he added. But the king persisted in his determination. He wished to improve his state by suitable encouragement in all important enterprises, but he wished to do it in his own way. Something had to be done to allay the prevailing discontent, and, at last, toward the end of the year 1846, supported by the favourable report of a commission appointed to consider the question, he decided to summon the provincial diets. On February 3, 1847, the letters-patent ✓ appeared, and on April 11th there gathered at Berlin, in addition to the members of the higher nobility, 553 representatives of the knights, the burghers, and the peasants; representatives in that they had been chosen in each of the eight provinces to represent in the local diets the three estates of each province. In consequence of this form of representation—a very imperfect one from the modern standpoint, because suffrage largely depended upon the ownership of land—very few of the people of the provinces actually took part in the election.

Even before the members came together the popular dissatisfaction with the king's scheme found expression. The United Diet was not a States-General, as had been promised in the ordinance of 1815 and implied in the law of 1820. By the letters-patent it was seen that the Diet was to possess no real legislative functions ; that it was to discuss and approve but not to decide ; to present petitions, but not to initiate bills. Then, too, it was clear that it had no guarantee for the future ; that no assurance was given that it would be summoned again ; that in the mind of the king the summons was an act of royal favour ; and that in all matters the king was to keep the final decision in his own hand. No wonder that a deadlock ensued as soon as the body met for actual deliberation. The king and the deputies were working at cross-purposes ; one was doing everything in his power to avoid putting into force the ordinance of 1815 and the law of 1820, while the others were equally determined that these laws should be enforced ; the king declaring with great vehemence and feeling against a constitutional government in his opening address, was asking for their approval of his measures ; the deputies in their reply saying nothing about loans and taxes, were stating their grievances and demanding the recognition of their rights based on the old laws. In the end the deputies won the victory. Guided by men whose oratory, diplomacy, and parliamentary methods won even Metternich's admiration, the United Provincial Diet rejected the king's proposals and refused to sanction either his tax or his loan. The king was astounded, the people of Germany were delighted, and Metternich was rather pleased than otherwise at the verification of his predictions. For the liberals it was a great moral gain, for the king a cause of disappointment and discouragement, for Prussia, to whom so many were looking for guidance and protection, it meant a serious loss of prestige. With the dissolution of the United Provincial Diet, and the failure of constitutionalism in Prussia,

there was added one more cause of dissatisfaction to the many already agitating the German people.

Thus Germany of the year 1847 was in a condition not merely of unrest but of disquietude greater than at any other time since the close of the Napoleonic wars. The country was distracted by the breaking down of all the old religious and political standards; the commercial and industrial classes, growing each year more powerful and influential, were resenting their exclusion from the right of suffrage and from a share in the government of the state; conservatives were clinging with greater tenacity to the past; and those in authority were searching in vain for principles of government to meet the present emergency. Even Metternich had a presentiment of coming disturbances. "The world is very sick," he wrote to Apponyi, "every day proves that the moral poison is increasing. The general condition of Europe is dangerous; the era in which we live is one of transition and the present moment bears all the characteristics of one of those crises which necessarily present themselves in periods of transition. One can predict what the orderly elements of society will do, but one cannot predict what the disorderly elements will do; and the latter now rule the world. What is clear to me is that things will undergo great changes." This forecast was written on the eve of the revolution of 1848.

CHAPTER VII.

THE JULY MONARCHY TO 1840.

THE question of the constitutional liberty of the individual that had been raised by the revolution of 1789 was settled by the French people earlier than by the other nations of Europe, and with the reign of Louis Philippe France entered upon the solution of problems, quite new in that they related not to the winning of political liberty but to the use of it when acquired. France was not seeking unity and independence as was Italy, nor was it necessary for her to struggle for constitutional rights as were the people of Germany. Both of these stages she had already passed. Under the July Monarchy the people of France were enjoying the advantages of a liberal constitution and an advanced parliamentary system, and were making use of those forces, political, social, and economic, that are the characteristics of the modern state life ;—of forces which were not created by the revolution of 1830, but which existed in spite of it. The democratic tendencies of 1814 had been hastened rather than retarded by the events of the Restoration, and France as a whole had not been altered by the revolution that had followed these events. She had simply thrown off a mediæval incumbrance that had been in a sense forced upon her in 1815, and was now prepared to make another test of the doctrines of the Constituent Assembly. If the only logical interpretation of these doctrines is a republic, then it may be said that the reign of Louis Philippe was a period of transition to the establishment of the second republic ; but if, as is more

true, such principles are quite in accord with a monarchical form of government, then this reign must be looked upon as a period of political experimentation which failed from causes inherent in the character of the government itself.

The reign of the new king opened well, and gave promise of a long life because it seemed to be supported by those of the French people who were committed to the maintenance of the Charta and of the liberties that it guaranteed. In the first session of the Chamber, even before the question of the new head of the government was settled by the election of the Duke of Orléans, the constitution was carefully revised in the interest of liberty, and all that seemed indefinite or reactionary was struck out or changed. Prévôtal courts were permanently abolished; the annual renewal of the Chamber of Deputies was done away with; the age of deputies was reduced from forty to thirty and that of electors from thirty to twenty-five; the property qualification was left to be defined by law; the presidents of the electoral colleges were to be named by the electors rather than the king; and the president of the Chamber of Deputies was to be elected by the Chamber. These were among the minor changes and some of them were of a distinctly decentralising character; but there were others of greater importance and interest. The sessions of the Chamber of Peers were made public; royal initiative in the matter of laws was abolished and the Chambers were admitted to this privilege equally with the king; the article making the Roman Catholic religion the religion of the state was struck out; the liberty of the press was permanently established by the annulling of the censure; and finally the preamble, in which Louis XVIII. voluntarily and by the free exercise of his royal authority granted the Charta to the people of France, and Article XIV. upon which Charles X. had based his right to issue the ordinances of St. Cloud, were removed bodily. In additional articles it was provided that no cockade except the tri-colour

should be worn ; that all who had been made peers by Charles X. should be deprived of their titles ; and that laws should be passed relating to the extension of trial by jury, to the responsibility of ministers, to the organisation of the national guard, to the increase of powers of local government, to public education, and to the definition of electoral qualifications involving the abolition of the double vote. In consequence of these changes the revised Charta marked a positive advance in the direction of parliamentary government, and the acceptance of this Charta became one of the conditions of the elevation of the Duke of Orléans to the throne of France. The July Monarchy was therefore committed to the support of a body of true political liberties, which in the main were not infringed during the whole of the reign of Louis Philippe. But though peace and prosperity were on the whole the fortune of the country for eighteen years, yet in 1848 the Orléans dynasty was driven from the throne. The task, therefore, before us is to examine the character and acts of the government itself, to study the new economic and social forces that the situation created, and to explain why a government, liberally founded and conducted by men of high character and unquestioned ability, was able to stand but three years longer than that of the Bourbons which it replaced.

The events leading to the succession of Louis Philippe are from the constitutional standpoint remarkable. The Chamber of Deputies, chosen in the general elections a month previous, had, as we have seen in discussing the revolution of 1830, been dissolved by the second of the ordinances issued from St. Cloud by Charles X. before it had entered upon its session. Immediately a certain number of the deputies of the opposition who were present in Paris met to discuss the situation ; about forty were at the first meeting, though afterwards the number sank to twenty-five and even to twelve, and but twenty-five were present at the seventh meeting when Lafayette was appointed

head of the national guard. By this small number Louis, Duke of Orléans, was named lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and he in turn, having been invested with authority at the suggestion of a group of journalists, and by a body of men who had no definite warrant from the nation, and whose acts had no validity except as they acquired it from the exigencies of a revolution, summoned the Chambers to meet on August 3d. The Chamber of Deputies thus called together, and sitting with only half its numbers, first revised the Charta, and then, in its turn, called the lieutenant-general to be the King of the French, an act in which the Peers concurred. Louis having taken the oath to the Charta and signed the formula of the oath, ascended the throne as Louis Philippe—a name reminding no one of anything in particular—and entered upon his duties as the head of a new government.

In view of these facts it is evident that the king owed his elevation for the most part to the activity of a small body of men who represented the interests of but a part of the population. His name was connected with no great deeds, and he stood for no principle, either historical or revolutionary. His title did not rest upon tradition and the doctrine of legitimacy as had that of Louis XVIII. and Charles X. ; it had no connection with the pre-revolutionary past ; nor did it rest on military and administrative genius as had that of Napoleon. Louis Philippe owed his election to the accident of birth, and to the belief of a few men that he alone could offer everything that the party of the moderates demanded of the King of France at this juncture. The title was, therefore, neither hereditary nor based on special merit ; it was a gift, and as such carried with it no residuary rights, no peculiar royal privileges born of the nature of things. The king drew his authority from the body of electors who had chosen the deputies by whom he had been named. But even this statement must be qualified. Only about half the deputies had been present when he had been

chosen, and these had represented not all of the French people, but only the upper middle class, which, to the exclusion of the republicans who had been associated with them as victors in the revolution of 1830, had been able to secure for itself all the benefits of the victory. Although the republicans had at once demanded that the choice be confirmed by the nation meeting together in primary assemblies on a universal suffrage basis, the government refused, and the name of Louis Philippe was never submitted to the people at large, or even to the body of electors possessing the right of suffrage under the revised Charta. In consequence, not only the republicans but all the revolutionary elements felt that the entire affair had been pre-arranged and that the nation at large had been deceived. It is true that Lafayette, whose acceptance of the Duke of Orléans prevented further outbreaks on the part of the republicans, did not accept their view, and that Guizot, speaking from the standpoint of the government, denied that the omission of the vote of the primary assemblies was ever a cause of weakness for the Orléans dynasty. Nevertheless, it is equally true that this refusal of the government increased the republican hostility to Louis Philippe and gave a certain basis of right to the republican cause.

From these facts it is evident that Louis Philippe's government rested on the support of the middle class, the *bourgeoisie*, a class ambitious to carry on the work begun in the revolution of 1789. But the *bourgeoisie* had had a very limited experience in government, had little political ability, and was easily swayed by party leaders, of whom Casimir Périer, Lafitte, Guizot, Thiers, and Molé were the most famous. It had no strong convictions, either religious or political, and allowed its economic ambitions, its pretentiousness, and its love of power to blind it over and over again to its duty toward the nation at large. At the same time it was powerful, for, limited to no special class or caste, its members were to be found everywhere.

Though more numerous and influential in the towns, it counted many adherents in the villages and country districts and possessed the greater part of the wealth of France. In its ranks were men of reputation in letters, in the professions, and in industrial circles ; and it included some of the most illustrious, the most intelligent, and the most enterprising of the people of France. It was the sponsor for the new king ; to it he owed his power ; from it he received the Charta. The *bourgeoisie* was, therefore, the sovereign body of the state, and its members adhered to their sovereign rights with all the tenacity of the most stubborn supporters of the doctrine of legitimacy.

On this point of sovereignty, however, there was not complete accord even among the members of the *bourgeoisie* themselves. In a government originating as had that of Louis Philippe it was easy for differences of opinion to arise regarding the position of the king. Was sovereignty wholly in the body of electors, that is, the *bourgeoisie*, or had a part of it been surrendered in the form of supreme rights to the king ? The most natural supposition was that sovereignty lay with those who had actually given the Charta and had elected the king. But such a theory was unacceptable to those who believing it to be inexpedient to reverse entirely the form of government of the Restoration, by recognising full sovereign powers in the people and none in the king, not only supported monarchy as a necessary part of the state system, but also insisted that it ought to be invested with sufficient powers to guarantee the establishment of a strong administration. To men of this opinion the arrangement of 1830 had been a kind of contract between king and people, in which each retained a part of the sovereignty, the two parts making up one whole, indivisible because neither part could exist without the other. " We did not choose a king," says Guizot, " we treated with a prince whom we found beside the throne, and who alone was able in mounting the throne to guarantee our public law and the revolution. An

appeal to popular suffrage would have given to the reformed monarchy precisely the character that we desired to avoid ; it would have put election in the place of necessity and contract." The view here expressed—which may be considered a conservative view—was that which the king himself held ; and it was the doctrine of the government, not because the conservatives were always in power—for they were not—but because the king took a personal part in government and identified himself with the conservative party. Made up of members of the old Left Centre, this party became known as the " party of resistance." It was anti-revolutionary because it believed in the maintenance of peace abroad and of constitutional monarchy at home ; it was liberal because, though it did not believe in a rapid extension of popular or parliamentary liberties, it accepted and respected the essential conditions of free government.

Over against this view is to be placed that of the other wing of the Left Centre, of the opposition, which endeavoured to minimise the personal authority of the king. According to this party the king possessed no other guarantee for his royal rights than the support of the middle class ; he had no right to lay claim to any powers not expressly granted, or to follow any policy that was not closely identified with the interests of the *bourgeoisie* ; and whatever might be the difficulties attending the administration of the new government, they ought not to be due to the king's following a peculiarly royal policy. Such policy, said this party, could not exist, for the king was bound to follow the policy of those upon whom his power rested. In the main the doctrine, which was exactly the reverse of that in which the Ultras of the Restoration had believed, may be stated as follows : the king was the figure-head of the state ; the ministers were the creatures of the majority, the Charta was the gift of the nation, and the policy was that of the prime minister and his cabinet ; or as expressed in the more succinct and famous phrase, " the king reigns but does not govern."

This party became known as the "party of movement," because it advocated an extension of parliamentary and electoral reform in the interests of the people at large. Of the first view Guizot was the best representative, of the second Thiers. In the development of the parliamentary system from 1830 to 1848 those who held the second of these views became the liberals and from 1840 to 1848 were continuously in the opposition. In a strictly parliamentary sense this division of the Left Centre into two well defined groups did not take place until 1836; so that for the first six years the two divisions of the old party worked in harmony, each having members in the most important of the ministries, and in the main agreeing on the policy to be pursued. This unity was made necessary by the fact that the victory of 1830 had been the victory of the whole Left Centre; and that all the remaining party elements, in being opposed to the constitution, were naturally opposed to the victors. The Left Centre could not afford to divide in the presence of this non-constitutional opposition, which became more antagonistic as the government became more *bourgeois* and illiberal.

The old parties of the Right and Right Centre now disappeared, but their members reappeared as the Legitimists or supporters of the Bourbons, that is, of the Duke of Bordeaux and the Duchess of Berry. During the early years of the reign of Louis Philippe they were in a more or less constant state of agitation and caused the government considerable trouble. They were, however, much less to be feared than were the other non-constitutional groups,—the republicans, the old Left of the Restoration, and the socialists, who were at first hardly to be distinguished from the republicans—because the former were warring in favour of reaction, while the others were seeking to reap what they considered to be the legitimate fruits of the revolution. The republicans who, though destined to grow rapidly in numbers and power, were comparatively few and insignificant both in Paris and in the provinces in 1831, considered

the retention of monarchy but a half-way measure, and believed that further agitation was necessary to hasten the movement toward the republic, the only logical form, so it seemed to them, that the principles of 1789 could take. To their minds, progress toward a truer form of government seemed inevitable, and the sooner the July Monarchy should cease to exist, the sooner would the rightful order of things be established. Having aided in gaining the victory they made demands which, too often revolutionary in character, were at first accompanied with threats and conspiracies. They demanded the abolition of the hereditary peerage, the establishment of a universal suffrage, entire freedom of worship, popular election of all officials, administrative or judicial, and the practical supremacy of the Chamber of Deputies. But they accomplished little for they lacked unity; they were divided into secret societies, of which the most important were the *Friends of the People*, to which was in large part due the uprising of 1832, the *Society of the Rights of Man*, which was responsible for the insurrection of April, 1834, and the *Society of the Seasons*, which led a revolt in 1839. These societies denied the right of the government to exist; the government in its turn repudiated their demands, and put down their uprisings by force of arms. Nothing but antagonism could exist between the republicans and the *bourgeois* government.

Thus at the beginning the *bourgeoisie* was opposed by the two extreme elements of the society of France, and at the same time was unable to call in the party of the Right to aid it against the radicals as in 1830 it had called in the party of the Left to aid it against the Ultras. It was opposed by the landed aristocracy, the clergy, the Legitimists, the Bonapartists, the members of the secret societies and all those who were following socialistic or communistic doctrines; it stood confronted by an excited and disturbed populace, which felt that it had reaped none of the benefits of a victorious revo-

lution, and that the new government had not received the sanction of the popular will.

In the presence of this opposition the policy of the government was of a dual character. It was aggressive, in that it resisted all revolutionary uprisings, and all movements against the government; and peaceful, in that it sought to pursue a middle course, and refused to be drawn into war abroad, either by interfering to aid revolution or by co-operating to aid reaction. From whatever point the view be taken it will be seen that such a policy had but one object before it—to maintain order and peace within and friendly relations abroad; and this the government promised to do. But in order to give guarantees for its word it saw that it should be obliged to strengthen itself as an administrative power, to oppose with a firm hand all attempts of party or secret society to overthrow or set aside existing institutions, and, by preserving a definite foreign policy, to show Europe that France did not intend to endanger the European situation; and at the same time to convince the Powers, whose confidence had been disturbed by the recent revolution, that France was able to take care of herself. In other words, the foreign policy of the government was to reassure Europe both without defying her and without showing fear of her. But in adopting this policy the government was not entirely disinterested and unselfish; for if, founded as it was on the July revolution, it was to cease being a provisional and become a permanent government; if it was to pass from a revolutionary to a constitutional state; if it was to have all the force and authority of a regular *régime*; and if as a *bourgeois* government it was to protect its own interests and those of its powerful constituency, it must guarantee to France freedom from disorder and anarchy. The *bourgeoisie* was essentially a capitalist class; it was taking advantage of improvements and inventions to gain wealth; it was promoting transportation and intercommunication; it was extending in-

dustries, manufactures, and commerce ; it was buying, and selling, and speculating in stocks ; it was, in other words, the class with vested interests, whose welfare depended upon the safeguarding of the economic situation, and these interests the government was bound to protect. Therefore, when we take into consideration the origin of the government, and the fact that its policy, distinctly a class policy, could not do otherwise than increase the discontent of those classes that were opposed to it, we are not surprised to find that the dissatisfaction in France tended to increase with every year ; and inasmuch as men of exceptional ability were needed to guide successfully the course of the July Monarchy, placed as it was midway in point of constitutional development between the state of the old *régime* and the state of modern times, and surrounded by enemies, some even of its own household, it is not remarkable that some of those upon whom it depended fell below the standard that necessity set for all.

The history of this monarchy falls naturally into two periods, for during the first period, from 1830 to 1840, the ministries were shifting and the party support was uncertain ; while during the second period, from 1840 to 1848, the government had a definite policy, a single ministry, and an unbroken majority in the Chambers. The governmental program, which required nearly a year for its formation, was brought to perfection by Casimir Périer ; but under his immediate successors it was carried to such an extreme as to lead to a division in the old Left Centre, the party that had up to this time supported the government. This policy, after being alternately accepted and discarded by the rapidly changing ministries from 1836 to 1840, was finally made the fixed policy of the government by Guizot from 1840 to 1848. His ministry, relying upon the support of the conservative element of the old Left Centre, found itself confronted by a general though disunited opposition ; and partly because of its own corruption and doctrinairism, partly

because of the union of the liberals with the republicans and the socialists, it went down in the maelstrom of 1848, and the monarchy was abandoned for a republic. Such in brief is the history of the July Monarchy.

Turning to a more detailed examination of the first period we find that the new government, born of a revolution, began its career in 1830 with no certainty as to its future. The revolutionists in Italy, Poland, and Belgium, who had followed the example of France, were now looking to the French people for encouragement and aid ; and this fact was sufficient so to disturb the revolutionary elements in France as to make uncertain the position of any moderate government. Furthermore, the revolution had directly disturbed the condition of the kingdom ; commercial distress was increasing ; there was a general stagnation in business, a scarcity of work among the labouring classes, and consequent distress among the poor. The first ministry, composed though it was of such influential men as Broglie and Guizot of the conservatives, or party of resistance, and Dupont de l'Eure of the liberals, or party of movement, was quite unable to master the situation. To meet the emergency large sums of money were voted wherewith to provide work for the people ; loans were offered for the purpose of stimulating trade or of relieving necessity ; and in order to undo the injuries of the past, the sacrilege law and the edict against the regicides were repealed, and all press offences forgiven. But although this ministry desired to alleviate the economic distress and to make itself secure by acts of propitiation, it accomplished neither of these things. It was weak both because it had no definite program, and because, containing representatives of parties that held different views regarding the position of the king, it was unable to act with promptness and effect. Its inefficiency became apparent when it was confronted by the revolutionary uprisings. Spanish refugees were stirring up commotion in southern France ; Belgian patriots were appeal-

ing for French aid from the north, and Paris, her streets crowded with hungry labourers seeking for work, her clubs spending their time in tempestuous discussion regarding what France ought to do to aid the struggling revolutionists in other countries, and her populace already demanding the heads of the old ministers of Charles X., shouting "Down with Polignac!" "Down with the ministers!" was a hot-bed of disturbance. Yet on one occasion at least the government did act with boldness and dispatch. When the Belgians, who had been united to Holland by the congress of Vienna, had risen in revolt against the imprudent rule of the house of Orange, and had in consequence threatened to disturb the peace of Europe, a situation was created demanding of France great circumspection. Inasmuch as the government was unwilling to aid the revolutionists, the minister of foreign affairs, Molé, let it be distinctly understood that France would follow a policy of non-intervention; and, when King William of Holland appealed to Prussia for aid, declared that if the Prussian army put a foot upon the soil of Belgium a French army would advance towards the frontier. But this honourable firmness on the part of the king and his ministry, though winning praise even from the republicans, could not unite the discordant elements within the cabinet itself; and in August, 1830, feeling that the fusion ministry was too loosely united to meet the crisis, the king accepted the resignation of the members of the party of resistance, and called Lafitte, who had been the president of the provisional government at the Hôtel de Ville, to reorganise the ministry. This act placed the power in the hands of the party of movement.

But the ministry of Lafitte, of which Thiers, as under secretary of state, was an important and influential member, was not strong enough to ensure the government of July a stable existence. Lafitte himself lacked experience in administration, and in the serious crisis through which the government was

obliged to pass, was without firmness and resource. The inactivity of the ministry, together with its inclination to drift with the tide caused Carrel to dub its policy *par abandon*; but it was rather one of hesitation, one naturally adopted by a cabinet that had not made up its mind how it ought to deal with the turbulent elements that disturbed the peace of the state. Nevertheless enough was done to show that the general policy of the monarchy was gradually undergoing definition, and if maintained and developed was to become a policy of moderation, and of resistance to all that was revolutionary and anarchical. The trial of the old ministers of Charles X. offered the first opportunity for the government to show to France that it meant to avoid excesses and to have nothing to do with men of either extreme, for in its determination to save the ministers who had brought on the revolution of 1830, it became involved in a conflict with the savage mob of Paris which would be satisfied with nothing less than the heads of the accused men. A second revolution nearly followed the decision of the government to banish Polignac and to imprison the others for life, and was only put down by the intervention of the national guard and the courage of Lafayette, who risked his popularity in order to support the municipal authorities.

The success of the government in this particular did not decrease the agitation and unrest. France had been roused by the struggles of the Italians and Poles to a sympathy with other nations that were struggling for independence and unity. The hot-bloods of France were most desirous that their country should take a leading part in aiding revolution at the very time that the government had decided in favour of non-intervention, and cared little for the fact that the government was as yet doubtfully established, that its army was ill-organised, its treasury empty, and its credit ruined; they would willingly have involved France in a war with Russia for the sake of aiding the Poles, with Austria for the sake of aiding the Lombards,

with the Pope for the sake of aiding the Bolognese. Not only were the republicans organising war in the streets of Paris, but in February, 1831, the Legitimists and the people actually came into open conflict. The church of St. Germain l'Auxerrois was pillaged, the palace of the archbishop was sacked and left in ruins, and whatever bore the cross or the fleur-de-lys was the object of the fanatical wrath of the multitude. The excesses sealed the fate of the ministry. It remained in office long enough to pass an electoral law, suppressing the double vote and placing the property qualification at two hundred francs for electors and three hundred for deputies ; but as the revolutionary agitation extended from Paris to the departments and as the ministry, which had already heavily increased the financial burden of France, showed itself incompetent either to check the rioting or to allay the discontent, it lost the confidence of the king and resigned March 13, 1831. With its retirement the history of the July Monarchy as a stable institution begins.

Although France had been making her policy known, she had up to this time been unable to carry it out effectually in matters relating to internal affairs. The country in 1831 was without direction, the general welfare without security, public peace without guarantee. There was but one man who was able to take the leadership and that was Casimir Périer, the president of the Chamber of Deputies ; to him the public turned instinctively, and with him as its chief minister the monarchy took its place as a recognised institution in Europe. Though his ministry lasted less than fifteen months, it left its mark upon the history of France ; for it created a situation, started a tradition, disengaged the monarchy from its perils and its complications, and founded a government strong enough to survive the death of the head of the cabinet. Casimir Périer was a statesman who belonged, properly speaking, to the party of movement. He was a bold man, with the power to command obedience and respect from others, and carried his responsibili-

ties without the show of weakness that had characterised the actions of Lafitte. He did not believe in arbitrary authority or its exercise, and was consequently the enemy of the old *régime*; he opposed recourse to extraordinary measures as indicating feebleness in the government; and he found his strength in resolutely maintaining the law of the nation. "The nation is not a party," he said, "and we are the representatives of the nation." He was convinced that the policy of non-intervention in foreign affairs ought to be upheld abroad, and order and obedience to the law secured at home; and though his indomitable will led him at times into situations that belied his policy, he succeeded in winning the respect of the foreign Powers, and for the people of France temporary peace. In foreign affairs he acted with care and yet with a firmness that at times approached rashness. He co-operated with the Powers to obtain the independence of Belgium, and when King William of Holland marched into that country against the newly elected king, Leopold of Coburg, he sent an army of fifty thousand men across the Belgian frontier and compelled the Dutch to retire without battle. When Portugal, under the usurper Don Miguel, refused satisfaction to France for indignities committed on French subjects, he dispatched a fleet to the Tagus, which destroyed the forts and prepared to bombard Lisbon. In the affairs of Poland he offered the mediation of France; but when Warsaw fell, after the Poles had proclaimed the dethronement of the house of Romanoff, he resisted the patriotic outcry in Paris, and, though the government allowed the country to become an asylum for the Poles and appropriated money to supply their needs, refused to interfere directly. Again, when an insurrection accompanied with serious excesses took place in the Papal States and the Austrians were called in by Gregory XVI. to suppress the movement, Périer, interpreting the doctrine of non-intervention to mean that if Austria would not retire France would enter to

protect the interests of the Legations, sent a fleet to capture Ancona on the Adriatic. But the enterprise, "the whole conception of which," according to Metternich, "outraged the tenderest feelings of the Austrian Emperor" and threatened for the moment to bring about a European war, was chiefly important in that it seemed to the enemies of the monarchy to be a breach of the policy of non-intervention. The early death of Périer prevented the consummation of his policy of compelling the Pope to inaugurate reforms in his provinces, and in consequence it is probable that the occupation of Ancona, which was prolonged for seven years, did more harm than good to the cause that it was sent to support.

In home affairs the ministers acted with vigour and dispatch. When the insurrection, long smouldering in La Vendée, broke out at the instigation of the Duchess of Berry in favour of the Bourbon Duke of Bordeaux, and again a short time after at Marseilles, it was put down with a firm hand. But a more serious difficulty than the opposition of the Legitimists threatened the peace of the kingdom. The rising of the weavers of Lyons was not a political but an economic movement, one based on the misery of the working classes. Foreign and domestic competition in the silk manufacture had injured the business at Lyons and the burden of loss was passed down from manufacturer through the master-weavers to the workmen, who were working eighteen hours a day and receiving but eighteen sous. Complaints increased, murmurs grew louder, until to the cry of "Death or Work!" (*Vivre en travaillant ou mourir en combattant*) 45,000 of the poorer classes rose against the municipal authorities and seized the city. An army under Marshal Soult and the Duke of Orléans finally established order; but unfortunately the harshness of the government, relieved by no expression of pity for the miseries of the people and by no legislation aimed at the relief of the economic situation, tended only to embitter the class that was already seeing in the exist-

ing political and social order a system unjust and repressive. The Périer ministry was undoubtedly efficient and accomplished its work thoroughly and well ; but it failed in one most important particular—it made no effort to search out the causes of the discontent ; it repressed but did not eradicate the evil ; it compelled the insurrectionary forces to be quiet, but it did not convince the republicans and revolutionists of the error of their doctrine or its application. After Périer's untimely death in May, 1832, insurrection again appeared more threatening than ever ; the distresses of the labouring classes received no alleviation, and the men of the Fourth Estate were more ready than before to listen to radical doctrines regarding the obligations of government and the relations of capital and labour. Much as the ministry of Périer has been lauded for its firmness and decision, it left the country open to the same party divisions, the same economic dangers, the same discontent and bitter feeling that it found when it began its work. It did nothing to promote the liberties that the Charta promised and that the monarchy of Louis Philippe was bound to defend.

The best proof of this interpretation of the work of the Périer ministry lies in the revolution that broke out, June 5, 1832, on the occasion of the funeral of General Lamarque. Nearly all the prominent societies in Paris, under the leadership of the *Friends of the People*, gathered in force to the number of 3000, reinforced by the anarchists of Paris and by a number of political refugees from Poland and Italy. To the cry of "Down with Louis Philippe !" "Long live the Republic !" an organised attempt was made to seize the chief buildings of the city ; but with the rallying of the national guard and the entrance of the regular troops into Paris, the insurrection was put down after a bloody struggle continuing for two successive days. As a movement the June uprising gained little sympathy from the people of Paris as a whole, but the harshness of the government, which was successful in so far as it over-

threw the uprising by force, turned the sympathies of the people in the direction of the revolutionists. The ministry placed Paris in a state of siege; prisoners were deprived of their natural judges, and were tried by martial law; and an order was issued commanding physicians and surgeons to report such wounded persons as claimed their assistance. Against this application of the Périer policy public opinion reacted, and so strong was the feeling aroused by this merciless treatment that the government was obliged to withdraw from its position, and permit to the prisoners a legitimate trial according to the Charta.

The Périer tradition was taken up by the new ministry of October 11, 1832, which was made up of members of both parties—Broglie and Guizot standing for the conservatives, and Thiers for the liberals. United by a common determination to resist the Legitimists on one side and all demagogic revolution on the other, it confronted a situation that did not materially differ from that of the year before. But the forces that were arranged against each other were becoming more irreconcilable; the government was inclining more and more toward a policy of repression, the radicals toward a doctrine of socialism, which found support in the writings of St. Simon and Fourier, and a *raison d'être* in the industrial disorder that had not ceased to trouble the kingdom since the revolution of July. As yet, however, the influence of the socialistic writers was rather intellectual than political, and the industrial opposition was disunited and scattered, acting only sporadically. The situation was on the other hand becoming distinctly simpler. The death of the Duke of Reichstadt (Napoleon II.) practically destroyed for the time the hopes of the Bonapartists, for, although they recognised Louis Napoleon as standing at the head of the Bonapartist cause, the people at this time looked upon him as a republican in that he had become a citizen of the Swiss Republic. The cause of the Legitimists also had suffered defeat

in the arrest of the Duchess of Berry and the suppression of the insurrection in Brittany, where the old royalists, rising at the instigation of the duchess, had forced the government to put some six departments in a state of siege.

The Bonapartist and royalist opposition, thus in a degree silenced and unable to continue its agitation, openly fell back into the ranks of the enemies of the government, and though wholly antagonistic to the cause of the republicans, aided them by using every opportunity to discredit and to embarrass the ministry. The republican party was further strengthened by the hostility aroused among those with moderate opinions by the arbitrary conduct of the government, and by the reorganisation and increased harmony of the secret societies, which were fast becoming the centres of revolt and the chief promoters of insurrections. From 1832 to 1834 attempts were made to ameliorate the condition of the poorer classes, and by the increase of public improvements to provide work for the breadless labourers. But concessions of this kind, which the ministry made under pressure of necessity, did not have the effect of attaching the industrial classes to the government, but rather strengthened them in their opinion that the government owed the labourer work, and made them cling more firmly than before to the *droit au travail*, or obligation of the government to provide work for those who were without it, as a cardinal feature of the socialistic doctrine. These concessions were meant in good part, but unaccompanied with any lightening of the cost of living to the labourer, or with any reduction or any shifting of the incidents of taxation, they failed to accomplish the desired effect. The same was true in the case of educational matters. Even the famous law of 1833, whereby primary instruction was extended in the communes of France and free competition was allowed between the religious and the secular schools of this grade, seemed inadequate to those who desired to see the same freedom admitted in secondary

education also. The endeavour to obtain this "liberty of education" was in chief part made by the Roman Catholic Church, which saw in the governmental control of the higher schools and the University the supremacy of the irreligious element, Many of the liberals as well opposed the state control of the University as a monopoly, and charged the institution with intellectual despotism. But the *bourgeoisie* opposed any measures which would have admitted the clergy to the council of the University and feared a revival of the ecclesiastical monopoly of the Restoration. The question did not cease to be discussed during the entire reign of Louis Philippe; four times were laws regarding secondary education introduced into the Chamber, but as many times withdrawn; and the religious and educational agitation only served to embarrass still further, notably after 1840, the government and its ministry.

In these cases and in others of less note the position that the government occupied was open at many points to the cynical and supercilious attacks of the opposition. The press with few exceptions was against the ministry; and by its wit, effrontery, and brazen denunciation of the monarchical policy it called down upon itself the wrath of the Chamber of Deputies. On one occasion stormy debate followed the declaration of the *Tribune*, the most fiery of all the journals, that the Chamber was a "prostituted Chamber, which cheated and laughed at the people," and the offending journal was brought to trial. The conservatives won the victory, but it did them more harm than good; for the heavy penalty imposed upon the editor—three years' imprisonment and a fine of a thousand francs—was felt to be out of proportion to the triviality of the offence, and popular passion was only inflamed the more by this imprudent act. The ministry was still further compromised in the eyes of the people by the passage of two additional laws, one placing public criers and venders of political pamphlets under the surveillance of the municipal authorities, the other forbidding

all associations, whether religious, political, or literary, to exist without sanction of the government. Even Guizot confessed that the methods employed to enforce these laws, though necessary and legal, were sometimes brutal.

Such a negative policy of resistance and repression, persisted in by a government from which the people had expected positive action in the direction of liberal legislation, was alienating the moderates, and fast driving the republicans to revolution. The *Society of the Rights of Man* was already adopting as its program the doctrines of 1793; others were dreaming of the regeneration of society, and were interpreting the actions of the government as treasonable to the people by whom the revolution of 1830 had been fought. Between men of these ideas and the *doctrinaires* and other supporters of the monarchy there could be no agreement. The republicans and the socialists, repudiating monarchy, and denying the right of the government to exercise authority over them and to demand obedience from them, asserted their own right to resist despotism, and declared themselves willing to suffer martyrdom, if by so doing they might ensure the fulfilment of the promises of the Charta. Believing in a republic they urged the necessity of an extension of the constitutional liberties of the French people as the solemn duty of the party in power, and they saw no defence for a policy that did nothing but establish order, or as they would have preferred to phrase it, did nothing but violate the real intent of the Charta, the real wishes of the popular majority. Republicans, democrats, socialists, and anarchists, men of talent and social standing, men of the *noblesse* as well as of the people, were united in the endeavour to solve either by peaceful or revolutionary means the problem of the organisation of modern society. The uprising of 1834, one of the bitterest outbreaks of the whole decade, was one of the attempts that the revolutionary party made at a solution of the problem. It began at Lyons, the scene of the riot of 1832, and

took there the form of a civil war in which the weavers joined with the more purely political revolutionists to resist the municipal authorities. For five days the rioters held out, and owing to the success of this revolt, others broke out almost simultaneously in Lunéville, in the form of a military insurrection, and in Marseilles, Grenoble, and other smaller towns. But these insurrections were checked because none of them had sufficient strength to exist by itself. In Paris, under the leadership of the *Society of the Rights of Man*, the republicans gathered, and advanced to an attack on the national guard and the troops of the line ; but the government had taken unusual precautions and the attack was met with firmness. For two days the struggle continued between the revolutionists in their homes and the soldiers in the streets, and was stained by the horrible massacre of the *rue Transnonain*.

Again the policy of repression had won a decided success, for the immediate victory lay with the government and the ministry of October 11th, which had been reorganised a month before in consequence of the retirement of Broglie. The reprisal following the insurrection was of so stern a character as to reduce the republican forces to silence. Two repressive laws were passed, one relating to the increase of the military forces, the other to the possession of arms or the munitions of war. Toward the end of April, 1835, some 2000 republican offenders were brought up for trial ; of these, however, all were dismissed but 164, who were tried before the bar of the Chamber of Peers, presided over by Pasquier. The scenes in court were of the stormiest, for the republicans fought every point of the trial with arguments, threats, denunciations, and with a violence which more than anything else justified the policy of repression and injured the cause of the republican party. One hundred and six offenders, including twenty-six condemned for contempt of court, were sentenced to transportation or to imprisonment for terms varying from one to twenty years, or

were placed under the surveillance of the police. The defeat for the republicans was decisive, and the government, for the first time in its history, began to feel secure, and the moderates began to hope that a further employment of the policy of repression would be unnecessary. In this, however, they were doomed to disappointment; the revolutionary spirit was only temporarily suppressed and although the government had no reason to fear public uprisings, it was still in danger of radicalism working in secret against the lives of those in authority. Circumstances seemed to force the ministry to a constant activity in the direction of repression.

In July, 1835, the most fiendish of many attempts to assassinate the king was made in Paris by Fieschi, whose infernal machine, like the dagger of Louvel, struck down for the time being the liberal cause, and confirmed the conservatives in their determination to continue the policy that was needed if the established order were to be maintained. Fieschi's attempt failed of its chief object; but this atrocious act of a fanatical assassin, which sacrificed eighteen persons—among them Marshal Mortier—outraged the French people, and turned the tide of feeling strongly in the direction of the monarchy and the throne. It was a time when a moderately repressive policy suited to the occasion would have received popular support and have given strength to the government; but unfortunately this was just what the government was incapable of applying. Instead of considering this act as that of a fanatic with few accomplices, instead of passing laws merely to protect the royal person and the royal family, it chose to blame the entire republican party with the attempt, and to take it for granted that the attack had been directed against all legislative and executive authority. The laws adopted in September, 1835, were far from moderate. The ministry, not content with increasing the power of the courts by a simplification of procedure and a strengthening of the jury system,

struck a severe blow at the liberty of the press and the rights guaranteed by the Charta, by endeavouring to control dramatists and caricaturists and to prevent press attacks upon the king and the ministry, by increasing the responsibility of editors and subjecting them to exorbitant penalties for breaches of the law. Furthermore it roused intense opposition by refusing a trial by jury to certain classes of press offenders, thus seeming to infringe section 69 of the Charta, which guaranteed to all such offenders a regular trial by law. This tampering with the freedom of the press was construed by all those of the opposition to mean that the policy of resistance instead of being temporary, instead of being a mere expedient for the preservation of order, had become in fact a permanent policy, a means whereby the party in power might retain its supremacy. The effect of these laws is noteworthy. They alienated a large number of the voters upon whom the monarchy had been able to depend,—a defection which made itself felt in the elections of the next year; and they completed the division between the party of resistance and the party of movement, the latter of which now began to turn away from the *doctrinaires*, and to attach itself more firmly than before to the party of the Left. The old Left Centre had become hopelessly divided, and this breach in the ranks of the monarchical supporters weakened the ministry of October 11th, which had adopted the Périer policy and had carried it to extremes in the laws of September. Consequently when in February, 1836, the Chamber by a majority of two votes declared itself against the ministry on a financial question, the latter resigned; and the "heroic" period in the history of the July Monarchy came to an end.

With 1836 we pass to a period of four years, a "period of difficulties," when nothing was stable; when that which seemed strong was in reality weak, and that which seemed weak was in reality strong; when parliamentary government

gave place to a scramble for office, and political expediency became the policy of ministers; when the longest ministry was that of an opportunist; and when coalitions of rivals in policy were effected for no other purpose than to obtain a majority in the Chambers. As regards the internal condition of France the period was one of striking contradictions. The monarchy, fully confident that it was at last permanently established, was in point of fact entering upon its decline. The king trusting in the security of the monarchy, was endeavouring to exercise a personal influence in the government of the kingdom, but was instead simply attracting to himself the hostility that had hitherto been directed against the ministry, and was compromising the very existence of the monarchy. In the Chamber three parties struggled for constitutional supremacy: the *doctrinaires*, now become the Right Centre, the progressionists, now become the new Left Centre, and a new group—the *tiers-parti*, based on an opposition to the policy of resistance,—that after an existence of two years had become strong enough to be reckoned as a constitutional party. The attitude of this party was in the main one of censure and criticism, its faith was opportunism, and its policy, based on expediency, was conciliatory in that it sought to win the majority by acts of amnesty and by personal influence, and eclectic in that its program, so far as it was definite, was made up of parts of all the other programs. The ministerial chicanery of these four years was fast bringing the parliamentary system into discredit and was compromising the Chamber. And, finally, the republicans, silenced but not convinced, though seemingly inactive from 1834 to 1839, were in reality husbanding their resources and awaiting their time when a new uprising should by its success cancel previous failures.

The interest of the period chiefly centres in the rivalry of parties, which was encouraged and increased by the determina-

tion of the king to play off one party leader against another for the sake of strengthening his own position as the ruler of France. It was this attitude of Louis Philippe that made impossible any fixedness of policy or permanence of ministry. With the downfall of the Périer tradition in February, 1836, the king tried first a ministry from the party of movement under Thiers, but when the latter wished to aid the uprising of 1836 in Spain, in consequence of which Queen Christina had been forced to accept the constitution of 1812, Louis Philippe drew back, and accepted in August the resignation of his minister. The retirement of Thiers only aggravated the situation, and the *tiers-parti* was called into power in combination with the party of resistance, that is, Molé in combination with Guizot. But this union could not last; the rivalry of the party leaders soon led to dissensions in the cabinet itself, and when in March, 1837, the ministry suffered a defeat, and it became evident that a fusion of the two parties could not command a majority in the Chamber, the king appealed first to Guizot and then to Thiers in the hope that a ministry might be formed which would command the confidence of the deputies. But in this each failed, and Molé therefore retained office; but in the reorganisation of the cabinet doctrinairism was dropped, and the policy of the *tiers-parti* became more conciliatory and more expedient than ever. Its one aim seems to have been to obtain a parliamentary majority, and in the task of winning governmental supporters from the different parties in the Chamber, it forgot entirely the internal welfare of the country. Against the king and the Molé ministry all the other parties ranged themselves in a famous political coalition made up of the Right Centre represented by Guizot and Duvergier de Hauranne, the Left Centre represented by Thiers, and the Left represented by Odilon Barrot. At the same time the radical party with Garnier-Pagès, the elder, as its spokesman, and the Legitimists led by Berryer and Béchard threw their

whole weight against the government. Guizot attacked the ministry on the ground that the supremacy of a policy without system had thrown the country and the Chambers into uncertainty and confusion, that is, into anarchy, and he apologised for his attitude by saying that politics was not the work of saints. Thiers warned the country that the cabinet was allowing the personal influence of the king to increase too rapidly. "Take care," he said, "with time, with success, with peace you will have another Restoration." Duvergier de Hauranne accused the government of electoral corruption, and Garnier-Pagès repeated all the charges against the monarchy that the radicals had been emphasising for nine years. It was a curious situation. The monarchy which had seemed so strongly founded was attacked by all parties—except the *tiers-parti*—without regard to policy or program; and when in 1839 Molé appealed to the country for support, Guizot and the *doctrinaires* worked side by side with the radicals in their efforts to turn the majority against the ministers. Such political inconsistency for the sake of manipulating the parliamentary majority was fast destroying confidence in the governmental system of the July Monarchy. The party selfishness of the political leaders, who expended time and energy in combinations and coalitions for political purposes, the inertness of the ministries, the lack of close union between the government and the people increased disunity in the state at large, and encouraged the hopes of the republicans and revolutionists. It is not surprising, therefore, that the radicals should have taken advantage of the embarrassment of the government, when it was seen that the coalition, after having overthrown the Molé ministry in March, 1839, had been powerless to take advantage of its victory, because of the inability of Guizot, Thiers, and Odilon Barrot to agree on a common policy. In May, under Barbès, Blanqui, and others, who directed the *Society of the Seasons*, they made a furious attack upon the prefecture of police, the

Hôtel de Ville, and other public buildings. Though the revolt, a bloody one, was suppressed after a day's continuance, it both showed the activity of the radicals, and forced the formation of the ministry of May 12th. This ministry, made up of less important members of the *doctrinaires* and the *tiers-parti* under Marshal Soult, seemed to be well supported by the Chamber, and during its tenure of eight months took into consideration many important measures relating to railways and parliamentary reform. But at the beginning of the next year the old question of the prerogatives and privileges of monarchy was opened by the proposal to grant an annuity to the Duke of Nemours, son of Louis Philippe, on the occasion of his marriage. The defeat of the measure was followed by the resignation of the ministry in February, 1840, and the Left Centre entered upon its career of ministerial power under Thiers. In October of the same year this ministry went down in consequence of the attitude taken on the Eastern Question, and a stable ministry was at last obtained which lasted for eight years under Guizot.

In the final success of the party of resistance the monarchy seemed to have won a great victory, and to have passed successfully through a dangerous crisis. But the situation in 1840 at the close of the second Thiers ministry was more strained than ever. Not only was there the strong party hostility that made itself evident in the Legitimist movement, in the republican uprisings, in the two attempts of Louis Napoleon to excite a Bonapartist insurrection; but there was also a widespread dissatisfaction among the people at large. The industrial class as well as the republicans were far from contented with the selfish class policy of the *bourgeoisie*; they resented the police system of the party of resistance, and the aimless policy of the *tiers-parti*. The *bourgeoisie* were themselves divided on the subject of monarchical supremacy and a large body of them was strongly opposed to the part that the

king was taking in affairs of state. It was a divided country which confronted the Soult-Guizot ministry when it entered upon its long career in October, 1840.

Nor had the strength of the monarchy been increased by the foreign policy pursued by the various ministries up to this time. The plan of the government to give to France a peaceful rôle in the councils of Europe, to reassure the Powers that the revolution of 1830 meant little more than a change of monarchs, to maintain harmony abroad that prosperity might prevail at home, was not construed as either dignified or noble. When the Louis Philippe government refused to aid the Italians, the Poles, or the Belgians with anything besides sympathy, the young republicans of France accused it of cowardice, and called to mind how in 1792 France had taken her place as the protector of European liberties. When Périer said, "French blood belongs only to France"; Louis Blanc could reply, "Impious words! The genius of France has ever consisted in her cosmopolitanism, and self-sacrifice has been imposed on her by God equally as an element of her might and a condition of her existence." In spite of its policy of non-intervention, which offended the radicals, the July Monarchy found it no easy task to establish peaceful and satisfactory relations with the foreign Powers. Nor are the reasons hard to discover: the monarchy had been founded on a revolution which, by engendering other revolutions, had endangered the stability of states; the overthrow of the Bourbons had offended the supporters of legitimism; Russia was estranged; Austria entered into diplomatic intercourse with misgivings, for Metternich looked on London and Paris as "a couple of mad-houses"; and even when harmonious relations had been finally arranged, the government often weakened its influence by pursuing what seemed to be an inconsistent policy. In 1830 it joined with the Powers to support the independence of Belgium, but in 1839 agreed to the "twenty-four articles" whereby the territory of the young

kingdom was considerably curtailed. In 1834 it entered into an agreement with England, Spain, and Portugal to compel Don Carlos of Spain and Don Miguel of Portugal to withdraw from the Portuguese dominions ; but the next year, when direct French intervention was requested, Louis Philippe refused, an act which England construed as a breach of the French agreement, and the radicals of France—for Don Carlos represented the reactionist policy—as a desertion of constitutional government. In 1831 France had sent her troops to Ancona to promote reforms in the Papal States, but in 1838 the troops were withdrawn before anything in the way of the betterment of the people had been accomplished. This though done strictly according to diplomatic arrangement was considered as a desertion of Italy by the radicals, who had hailed the occupation in 1831 as a promise by the government to aid in the cause of liberty. The radicals, seeing in each of these acts submission to the will of Metternich and the reactionists, charged the government with criminally neglecting and abandoning the principles for which all had fought in the revolution of 1830.

But no phase of the foreign policy of the French government during the period under discussion was more disastrous than the attitude taken by Thiers on the Eastern Question, which, as we have already indicated above, brought about the fall of the Thiers ministry in 1840. Mehemet Ali, viceroy of Egypt, who had been dissatisfied with the territory allotted to him at the close of the Greek revolution, in which he had aided the Turks, began in 1831 to extend his dominion by force. In this attempt he was wholly successful ; Syria and Armenia fell into his hands, and in 1832 he prepared to cross to the continent to complete the overthrow of Turkey. In this crisis the Powers ranged themselves according to their interests. Russia took the initiative in supporting the Sultan, and in the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833) practically reduced Turkey to a condition of complete dependency ; England, resenting Russian

interference, and determined to maintain British commercial supremacy in the Levant, supported the integrity of the Turkish dominions; and France, from a desire to play an important rôle in the East, to gain a foothold in Egypt, and to extend the influence she had already acquired in the conquest of Algiers, supported the cause of Mehemet Ali. The diplomatic situation was a strange one. Russia and England, wholly out of accord in their motives for defending Turkey, were allied for the maintenance of the Sultan's dominions against Mehemet; France and England, who agreed in the policy of resisting Russian encroachment, took different sides on the question, because they were already becoming competitors for the control of Egypt; Austria and Prussia defended what they chose to consider a legitimate dynasty and took their stand upon the side of the Sultan. In 1839 Mehemet had but one ally in Europe, France. When, therefore, at the conference of the Powers called at London in 1840 it was found that the policy of Thiers was irreconcilable with that of the other Powers, a treaty was made with the Sultan to which France was not a party. This isolation of France in the presence of Europe wounded the pride of the French people, for it seemed like a return to the situation of 1815 and 1830. Many of the populace would have been willing to begin a war with all Europe, but they were obliged to content themselves with the downfall of Thiers, the minister who had brought upon them this humiliation.

We have thus far examined the policy of the government of Louis Philippe, both in its internal and its external relations, to the close of the second ministry of Thiers and the beginning of that of Guizot. But another phase of the situation must be taken up before we can pass on to a discussion of the Guizot ministry and the new problems that it was called upon to solve; and that is the antagonism which the king himself was arousing by his endeavour to become the real governor of France.

Louis Philippe—for he had never liked the firm and independent attitude of Casimir Périer—had seen in the downfall of the Périer tradition an opportunity of applying the doctrine of the conservatives, that the king was head of the state in fact as well as in name, and by his efforts to carry it out made possible in large part the disorders of the period from 1836 to 1840. The coalition of 1838 and 1839 was an attempt on the part of the liberals to resist this abuse of personal government, and Guizot, chief supporter of the royal prerogative, by opposing the supremacy of the *tiers-parti*, had unwittingly aided in the attack. Thus it was that the opposition which had at first been directed against the government as a whole and against the ministries as such, was turned against the king himself; and in the period from 1840 to 1848 it was the dynasty that was threatened quite as much as was the supremacy of the *bourgeoisie*. The reason for this will be found not merely in the desire of the king for a personal rule but in his character, in the origin of his government, and in his dynastic policy. Let us examine these.

Louis Philippe had not been chosen because of his birthright but in the face of it. He was a Bourbon of the younger branch who had known adversity during the Revolution and the Napoleonic *régime*, and had lived in France under the Restoration as a private citizen without display and without ambition. His title rested neither on principle nor on military genius, but on an accident; and it was therefore inevitable that no one should stand in awe of him, no one reverence him, no one bow to him. Generally speaking, the monarchy was disliked because it was a compromise, because it was neither legitimate nor Jacobin; it was railed at by men of letters whose influence in France was extensive; it was alternately laughed at and abused by the press because it was a *bourgeois* monarchy founded on vulgar commercialism. Had the king possessed a powerful individuality he might have made the monarchy royal, have

cast a glamour of mystery about it that would have relieved it of its commonplaceness, and have given to its court-life something of the lustre of the *régimes* of Louis XIV. and Napoleon ; he might even have won from the people of France that respect which genius commands, and have led them to forget the circumstances under which he had risen to power. But this he was manifestly unable to do. He could not raise monarchy from its place, because he stood on its own level ; he had none of the chivalry of the French nature, and he could not give to his kingship any of the sparkle and brilliancy of which the French are fond ; he lacked the power to inspire personal devotion, and without this quality all his other estimable traits availed little. He was an exemplary father, an economic householder, a man of spotless character in private life ; he walked the streets as a well-to-do member of the *bourgeoisie* ; he sent his children to the public schools, and in general conducted himself without extravagance and without pretence. But the people were not satisfied with the every-day character of the man who ruled over them, with the sombre, economical, and burgherlike court which surrounded him, just as they were not satisfied with the policy of peace and class aggrandisement which the government had thus far followed. The July Monarchy never seemed in harmony with the genius, the social environment, or the traditions of the French people.

In this, however, the hostility of the nation was chiefly negative, because there was nothing in the character of the king or the court at which positive offence could be taken. But when it came to the king's dynastic policy, the discontent took a more aggressive form. France accepted as inevitable a king without magnetism and a throne without dignity, but she was offended when the house of Orléans sought its security rather in an increase of wealth and in royal alliances than in the attachment of the French themselves. Louis Philippe certainly looked after the fortunes of his children with an industry,

which, while reasonable and natural in a citizen, was not wholly commendable in a king. Before he ascended his throne he left to them his whole fortune of one hundred millions of francs, reserving to himself only the right of use. Such an act deeply injured the people who saw in it evidence that the king distrusted the durability of the new order, and their resentment found expression at the beginning of the reign when the king was allowed from the civil list only about one third of the amount that had been granted under the Restoration to Louis XVIII. and Charles X. It was made insultingly evident at the close of the decade, when, on the occasion of the marriage of the Duke of Nemours, the Chamber refused to grant an annual allowance of 500,000 francs to the prince. The various attempts of the king to obtain a marriage alliance with one of the great Powers was in itself reasonable and pleasing to the French people ; but when he failed in all his negotiations, and was obliged to fall back upon connections with petty German principalities, France was less pleased. The king wished to place the Duke of Nemours upon the throne of Belgium, but when the other Powers objected, he accepted Leopold of Coburg on the condition that the king-elect marry his daughter Louisa. He sought for his eldest son, the Duke of Orléans, an alliance with the Austrian royal house, but when the negotiations failed he accepted a princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin as his daughter-in-law. In 1840 the Duke of Nemours married a princess of a branch of the house of Coburg, but the advantages of this excellent alliance were offset by the unfortunate discussion over the allowance and the dowry. The undignified controversy that arose from these and other similar events, together with the charges of stock-jobbing and commercial speculation unworthy of a king, only served to separate more widely the nation and its constitutional chief. At no time were they in close accord ; at no time did there exist among the people a real and permanent sympathy for royalty, or a strong tie bind-

ing together the governor and the governed. These were the reasons why the general discontent was not merely with the ministries ; why the hostility of the nation glanced from the policy of the government to the policy of the king ; and why the watchword of the coalition, " War on personal government," was able to serve as the battle-cry of so many rival parties. The discontent of France was quite as much with the monarchy as with the ministers, and the question was soon to be agitated whether the best interests of the state did not demand a change of government rather than merely a change of cabinets.

This was the tendency of affairs in the year 1840, when, after four years of changing ministries and an uncertain policy, a stable government was at last obtained under Marshal Soult and Guizot. The latter was, however, the real head of the cabinet ; he it was who directed the policy and held in his hands the reins of power to the end of the eight years that followed. As one of the foremost historians of France, Guizot may be said to exemplify Madame de Staël's statement that " a great historian is almost a statesman even if he has no training whatever in the governmental service." He was a brilliant orator, an influential politician whether in power or in the opposition, a man of upright and honourable personal character, yet when put to the test, he showed a lack of some of the qualities most necessary for statesmanship. As a *doctrinaire* he was unable to appreciate the importance of a governmental program adapted to the national needs, and failing to understand the social forces that were working within the country, he seemed unwilling to listen to the voice of public opinion or of national sentiment. Moreover, he was deficient in tact, and in important crises was without resources and political wisdom. His ministry was the strongest since that of Casimir Périer, whose traditions it followed, but it made mistakes at a time when mistakes were dangerous and indeed fatal ; it laid itself open to charges of inconsistency that destroyed its repu-

tation for reliability and a disinterested regard for the welfare of France, and alienated many of its supporters who were attached to the monarchy less from sentimental than economic reasons; it committed faults that were more than errors of judgment, and laid itself open to charges of dishonesty and intrigue. Guizot did nothing to reconcile the people to the monarchy; and, instead of binding the various classes together into an harmonious and closely compacted national whole, he only succeeded in widening the breach to the point of entire separation.

Although the Guizot ministry was made up of men from different political groups it was animated by one unchangeable purpose, to return to the policy of Casimir Périer, to re-establish a conservative majority in the Chamber, by means of which the stability of the July Monarchy might be assured, order be maintained within, and peace be obtained without. After his overthrow in 1840 Thiers went into the opposition, for though he agreed with Guizot as to the end in view, he differed with him in regard to the methods to be used to gain it. Guizot opposed constitutional changes and reforms, Thiers supported them; to Guizot the cry was "Peace everywhere and always"; Thiers on the other hand advocated a progressive reform, not in the interest of any class, but in the interest of France. The parliamentary history of these eight years consists in the struggle between the supporters of these views; for the monarchical party, inclining toward dogmatic conservatism, fearing reform because it encouraged revolution and offering resistance almost for resistance' sake, tended more and more toward the Right; and the party of the constitutional opposition, animated with a desire to adhere to the Charta, to maintain the house of Orléans upon the throne, placed a different interpretation upon the revolution of 1830, and in advocating reform, tended more and more toward the Left. What these leaders did not see was that parliamentary antagonism in the presence of the discon-

tent existent in France was aiding the enemies of the monarchy to effect its overthrow, and that they themselves were destined to disappear with the monarchy itself when that object was attained.

The real issue of these eight years was not, however, a parliamentary but an economic one. Peace brought prosperity, beneficial improvements were promoted, lighthouses were built, highways improved, railways constructed, commerce and industry were encouraged, and renewed efforts were begun in the interest of an extension of the educational system. Such activities were in the main carried on in the interests of a class, and the government of Guizot, even more than those that had preceded, took on the form of a class government. In the minds of the people, whose attention had been directed to the glorious days of the first Napoleon by the recent return of his body to France, the government was maintained in the interests of trade, of money-making, of concentration of wealth; it was without ideals, without national pride, without a broad, large-minded concern for the glory and honour of France. They said that the English alliance was sought because English capital was invested in French railroads; that the parliamentary majority was maintained because the government purchased the adherence of voters. They charged the ministers with using their powers to promote speculation and stock-jobbing, with bribery and sale of office; they believed that the ministerial patronage was employed for the single purpose of maintaining the supremacy of the ministry. Lord Normanby voiced this feeling when he said that "there was hardly a corner in France to which a ministerial candidate did not present himself with the most extravagant promises of what was to be done for the district through the intervention of the ministry." The people also maintained that the *bourgeoisie* gained money at the expense of French dignity, and spent it at the expense of French honour. If they were dissatisfied with the external

policy as humiliating, they were enraged at the way the internal policy was carried on as dishonest.

But there was another consequent of the *bourgeoisie* supremacy of greater moment than the unpopularity of the government, and that was the creation of a new set of problems, to solve which the government proved itself to be wholly incompetent. The interests of the *bourgeoisie* were essentially commercial and industrial. This class was the great employer of labour, the promoter of great financial undertakings. In the revolution of 1789 it had won its first great victory; it had overthrown feudalism and class privilege; it had broken the monopoly which the landowners had exercised over the right of suffrage and the right to govern; it had rescued trade from its narrow confinement of the old *régime* and had obtained for it freedom and a chance for normal development. But its victory was not complete until 1830; then it was that the *bourgeoisie* entered upon its supremacy, became the governing power, and made its interests the dominant interests. Italy was still struggling with feudalism and the autocratic rule of petty princes; Germany was still agitated by the conflict between the patriots who desired unity and the upholders of the sovereignty of each individual state, by the attempt of the commercial and industrial classes to gain a share in the government which the landholders were monopolising; but France, having unity, having thrown off the last vestige of monarchical absolutism, and having secured for its citizens political rights based on other conditions than class privilege and the possession of land, was now advancing to the solution of another set of questions which concerned not the political but the social and economic rights of the individual. France began the settlement of this problem of to-day, because under the July Monarchy the production and distribution of wealth and the relation of employer and employee had become integral parts of that movement which the *bourgeoisie* represented. The interests of

this class were economic, its members were the monopolists in capital and land ; it was not only a political power but an industrial power also ; therefore the struggle for the economic rights of the individual became an inevitable concomitant of its rule. With its elevation to power we are brought into the presence of a conflict that is only indirectly the result of the Revolution, the conflict between capital and labour. The *bourgeoisie* had set in motion new forces that it could not control ; it was called upon to reorganise trade and industry in the interest not of a class but of society as a whole, and its failure to meet the problem, and the necessity of finding a solution, called into being the various schemes of the socialistic writers.

The first to present a system that was in the true sense of the word socialistic was St. Simon, whose primary object was to ameliorate as soon as possible the moral and physical condition of the most numerous class. He and his followers advocated universal peace and the brotherhood of man ; they denounced revolution, and at the same time protested against all privileged rights particularly those of birth ; they believed that the state should own the means of production and should organise industry on the principle embodied in the motto, " Labor according to capacity and reward according to services." Toward such an organisation St. Simon believed that humanity was advancing, and the Simonian scheme was intended to further this progress. But the system was never a practical one ; experiments based upon it failed ; it had no political support, and its influence was intellectual, stimulating socialistic thought rather than inciting political action. The same can be said of the writings of Fourier, whose schemes, although fantastic, contained many noble ideas. Society living in *phalanstères*, imbued with a common desire for work, was not only to quadruple the products of industry but to effect universal association, the union of inequalities, and the cessation of revolution and poverty. The organisation of industry and

the division of products was to be in accord with the principle, "Labor according to capacity and reward in proportion to exertion, talent, and capital." Inasmuch as Fourier's plan retained inheritance and private property it was less pure as a form of socialism than that of St. Simon.

But St. Simon and Fourier never posed as political reformers ; they exercised an influence more through their own writings than through any attempt to utilise the governmental machine for the carrying out of their theories. Their ideas were rather abstract than concrete, their style flowing but not popular, and their logic was often too subtle for the popular understanding. The real part that the doctrines of St. Simon and Fourier played in increasing the popular discontent at this period is difficult to determine. With Louis Blanc, however, the case is different ; he was not merely a social reformer, he was a politician, who endeavoured to solve the problem of the organisation of labour not by fanciful theories but by a system of state aid that was definite and tangible. But first of all he endeavoured to rouse the people to an appreciation of their actual condition. In his *Organisation of Labour*, and again in his *History of Ten Years* he brought home to the labourers the evils that resulted from the *bourgeois* government. "Struggles between producers for the possession of the market, between the members of the working class for the possession of employment ; struggles of the manufacturer against the poor man on the subject of wages, of the poor man against the machine, which by supplanting him devoted him to starvation ; such under the name of competition was the characteristic feature in the situation of things regarded from a commercial and manufacturing point of view. . . . Here markets glutted and capitalists in despair ; there workshops closed and the operatives starving ; commerce degraded by tacit consent into a traffic of tricks and lies. . . . All the conquests achieved by the genius of man over nature converted into weapons of strife and tyranny multiplied in some

sort by progress itself. . . . There was no longer any community of faith or belief, no attachment to traditional uses ; while the spirit of inquiry denied everything and affirmed nothing, and religion was supplanted by the love of lucre. The nation turned to mercantilism, marriage was made a speculation, a matter of bargain. . . . The newspapers daily presented to the eyes of the public the lamentable spectacle of brothers wrangling for scraps and fragments of the paternal property. . . . Among the labouring classes . . . penury figured as the principal primary cause for debauchery. . . . It engendered concubinage and concubinage infanticide. . . . In a society in which oppression like this was possible charity was but a word and religion but a bodiless remembrance."

Such is Louis Blanc's arraignment of the July Monarchy, the three aspects of which he summed up in one sentence, "In social order there was competition, in moral order scepticism, in political order anarchy." No wonder he became an influence, when with such power he disclosed to the people of France the character and work of the *bourgeois* government. The volumes of his history, published continuously from 1841 to 1846, passed through many editions, and each volume, a small duodecimo, became in the hands of the people a party pamphlet furnishing facts and figures of a nature damaging to the party in power. The history has, it is true, all the characteristics of party literature ; it is badly proportioned, lacks perspective, and is unjust and one sided ; nevertheless, because it was written with an evident attempt at impartiality, because its statements were supported by a wealth of evidence, it carried conviction among the enemies of the government.

The social theories which attempted to solve the problem that the new economic situation presented found supporters who sympathised with the high ideals of their authors, and were willing to make sacrifices in order to test the truth of

the doctrines. But it was not from these men that the July Monarchy had to fear an attack. St. Simon might hope to leaven the mass of society in time, but he positively opposed revolution ; Fourier anticipated the millennium in ten years, but it was to be attained by the law of spontaneous attraction and not by insurrection. The chief socialists were men of peace, but the doctrines, more or less ideal when presented by the writers themselves, became materialistic when interpreted by the radicals. In a society where the opinions of Robespierre, as contained in his speeches and in his *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, were becoming the standards of thought, and the methods of 1793 were becoming the standards of action, theoretical schemes for the reorganisation of society had little place. Whereas the socialistic writers were endeavouring to bring about a better social condition, the men of the street and the factories, suffering from penury and aware that the government was making no effort to alleviate their miseries, saw that the construction of the new society must be preceded by the destruction of the old. The existing order they believed to be unjust, uneconomical, and oppressive ; and while it should last they saw no hope of a more equable relation between employer and employee, between governor and governed ; while in its overthrow there was at least the chance that up from the ruins there might spring a social order of which economic liberty and justice would be recognised as fundamental principles. Herein lay the inspiration to revolution. As the resultant of all these forces a hitherto unappreciated factor began to rise to prominence in France. The growing supremacy of economic interests, the selfish class policy of the *bourgeoisie*, the misery and want attendant on the introduction of machinery, on the increase of competition and unequal distribution, the strivings of the idealist to discover the principles of a better order of society, the arraignment of the *bourgeois* government by Louis Blanc, the powerful invective of the newspapers, the spirited

opposition of George Sand, the efforts of the pen-artist of the proletariat, Eugène Sue, combined to revive once more in France the revolutionary spirit of 1793 and 1830, to rouse to life the labouring classes, and to give a consciousness to the Fourth Estate.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN FRANCE.

I N studying the period from 1830 to 1840 we have seen that the July Monarchy, already out of sympathy with the spirit of the nation at large, was threatened by dangers that the various ministries, notwithstanding their strenuous efforts to obtain peace and order, were unable to avoid. This was due, as we have seen, to the fact that the revolutions of 1789 and 1830, undertaken in defence of the liberty of all men, had in reality given supremacy into the hands of the upper middle class, which in turn was accused by the radicals of a governmental and economic tyranny as grievous as had been that of the feudal *régime*. This accusation is to be traced in large part to the presence of a new group of problems, logically deducible from the events that had gone before, yet now made prominent for the first time, which the dominant class seemed unable or unwilling to meet. We have seen that the progress of invention, the introduction of machinery, the factory system and the division of labour, the increase in the rapidity of transportation and the growing internationalism in trade, which enlarged the field of competition, were making economic relations more complex, and were creating a schism between the labouring and the capitalist classes ; that the new social order was endangering the position of monarchy not so much because of any hostility to monarchy as such, but because monarchy was supported by the capitalist class and was identified with it ; and because Louis Philippe by his efforts at a personal government was lay-

ing himself open to the charge of acting in the interests of this class and not of the nation of which he was king. We have seen that the danger was increased by the unwillingness of the government to control the situation by representing the movement, or to meet it by measures of amelioration or conciliation ; that to the radicals the government seemed to exist for no other purpose than to suppress popular agitation, which was actuated more frequently than otherwise by motives that were just and reasonable ; and that in consequence of this narrow and unelastic policy it had roused against itself a party antagonism, not only radical and socialistic, but also constitutional, and had deprived itself of all support save that of the conservative wing of the *bourgeoisie*. Thus the monarchy of 1830 was without that reserve strength which a government must have if it is to preserve itself in the presence of danger.

From these facts it is evident that a monarchy thus situated could ill afford to weaken itself still further, either by adhering to a reactionary system of government and so increasing the bitterness of its enemies, or by alienating its remaining supporters by any neglect of the safeguards which made possible the success and happiness of the middle classes. Yet it did both of these things. The foreign policy of the government from 1841 to 1847 destroyed the confidence of the very class whose support it needed, and provoked among the people as a whole a feeling of opposition and hostility.

The fact was evident to all that the maintenance of the alliance with England, the only government in Europe that had consistently befriended France during the period from 1830 to 1840, had done much, because of the similarity of the economic interests of the two nations, to insure and make possible the prosperity of the *bourgeoisie*. Ever since 1836 Metternich had been endeavouring to break this alliance and to attach France to Austria, but without success ; but in 1841 Guizot made a special effort to maintain the harmonious relation with England,

which had been threatened by the failure of France to stand by the agreement of 1834 regarding Spain and Portugal, and by the exclusion of France from the quadruple alliance of 1840. His concessions, particularly in regard to the questions of the right of search and the protectorate of the Society Islands, which came up in the period from 1841 to 1843, had been made for the purpose of preserving the *entente cordial*, and, while they drew down upon the government the attacks of the press and the radicals, both of whom charged the ministry with a too ready submission to England's demands, they did prevent a rupture between the two nations. This amicable relation, though strengthened by the visit of Queen Victoria at Chateau d'Eu in 1843, and that of Louis Philippe the next year, when he met the Czar and the King of Prussia at Windsor Castle, was destined to be of but short duration. A new crisis confronted the ministry when in 1846 the question of the Spanish marriages, which had been under discussion since 1841, was brought to a settlement in a wholly unexpected manner.

The principle involved in this question derived its importance from the doctrine laid down at the treaty of Utrecht that France and Spain should never be united under one dynastic head. In 1833 Ferdinand VII. died, and according to the royal decree of 1830, which confirmed succession in the female line, the young Isabella succeeded her father under the regency of the queen-mother. But Don Carlos, the younger brother of the king, contested the title on the ground that the Salic law applied to Spain, and civil war followed. However, in 1839 the Carlists were defeated, and after a regency of four years the majority of the young queen was declared. At once the question of her marriage became one of international importance. The dynastic ambitions of Louis Philippe involved the king in a project to join the two Bourbon houses, and to increase the importance of the younger French branch by the marriage of the infanta to one of his own sons. To this arrangement Eng-

land objected, declaring such a union to be contrary to the provisions of Utrecht and injurious to the peace of Europe ; and the plan was given up. However, after considerable negotiation, an agreement was reached that the queen should marry a Spanish or Neapolitan Bourbon, and that the Duke of Montpensier, fifth son of Louis Philippe, should marry the queen's sister, provided such marriage were solemnised after that of the queen, and after an heir to the throne had been born. This was a compromise ; England was determined to exclude from the throne of Spain the sons of Louis Philippe, and France was equally determined to exclude any prince who was not a Bourbon. In 1845, when another visit was made by Queen Victoria at Chateau d'Eu, Lord Aberdeen, the foreign minister, declared that the English government would not support any other claimant than a Bourbon for the hand of the queen. But the matter was taken more or less out of the hands of the governments by their respective ambassadors at Madrid, and in the intrigues that followed, the English ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer, showed his strong sympathy for the candidacy of the Prince of Coburg. In 1846 Aberdeen was succeeded by Palmerston, and in consequence of the more aggressive foreign policy that was introduced, France claimed that the plan of the English ambassador at Madrid had received sufficient encouragement from the home government to be regarded as a breach of the agreement. Consequently in 1846 Europe was astonished to learn that the marriage of the sister of the queen to the Duke of Montpensier had taken place simultaneously with that of the queen herself, and that the house of Bourbon had gained thereby a double guarantee for its control of the throne of Spain, England was enraged at what she considered a violation of the compact, and denied strenuously that Palmerston had ever given his assent to the Coburg candidature. English historians charge Guizot with duplicity and deceit ; French writers throw the blame on Palmerston, whom they accuse of desiring

the humiliation of France, on the ground that the French were unreliable allies instigated by an overweening ambition. Wherever the truth may lie, it is certain that the affair resulted in injuries to the French government that had been unforeseen by Guizot, who had lost sight of the ulterior consequences in his loyalty to the house whose interests he was promoting. There is not a hint in his *Mémoires* of the ruin which his policy caused or of the attempts that the king made afterwards to justify his conduct in the eyes of the queen of England. He was at least guilty of a suppression of these facts of the case, even if he was not intentionally deceitful in his attitude toward England. The results of this breach of the alliance were exceedingly disastrous. The *bourgeoisie* charged the king with dynastic selfishness in his willingness to sacrifice the welfare of France in seeking to strengthen his own family, and the government with breaking the peace and with endangering their interests. They argued that Guizot having first compromised his country's honour in his concessions to England in order to maintain the alliance, had further compromised France by a dishonourable intrigue against England for the benefit of the house of Orléans.

This act of Guizot, which, in estranging the *bourgeoisie* from its own government, gave joy to the radicals, increased in its remoter consequences the radical hostility, and deeply offended the liberal party. The rupture of the English alliance meant the separation of the two Powers that had in the main supported the liberal cause in Europe since 1827, and was seized upon by the eastern and reactionary Powers as offering a fit opportunity for a bolder prosecution of their plans of repression. The constitution of Poland having been overthrown in 1831, in consequence of the insurrection of the year before, that country had remained quiet until 1846, when a revolt broke out in the Polish provinces of Prussia and Austria. As a result the three eastern Powers did not hesitate to violate the

conditions of 1815 by overthrowing the independence of the free city of Cracow, which had been guaranteed by all the Powers at Vienna. This was not only an act of high-handed aggression, but it was also a discourtesy to the western signers of the treaty, who were not even invited to discuss the question. Both France and England protested against it, but as the recent rupture made joint action impossible, their protests failed of any effect. In consequence, the radicals declared that liberalism had lost its place as an efficient principle in the councils of Europe; and seeing in the unfortunate Spanish affair the cause of all the evil, they accused the ministry of Guizot of sympathising with the policy of Metternich, of deserting the liberal program, and of violating the doctrines of 1830.

The peril of the government was not lessened by Guizot's attempt to strengthen his position in Europe by a new alliance. Cut off from friendly relations with England, he turned to the very Powers against whose action he had just protested, and made overtures to Austria in the hope of isolating England by forming a union of the Powers without her. In so doing he took a decided step in the direction of reaction, and, hoping to win the friendship of Austria, joined Austria, Russia, and Prussia in supporting the reactionary movement of the Sonderbund in Switzerland. He agreed to meet the three Powers at Neufchâtel, where Metternich was desirous of proclaiming anew the doctrine of intervention, and even declared himself willing to depart so far from the Périer policy as to take part in an armed interference to aid the Jesuits and the Sonderbund against the progressive and liberal party of the Union. About the same time he expressed his approval of Austria's occupying Ferrara in order to check the reform work of Pius IX., and wrote to Metternich that the French policy of resistance was in closest harmony with the policy of Austria. No wonder that Lamartine could say to Guizot in the debate that followed the opening of the session of 1847 and 1848: "Since

the day when you entered upon your policy in regard to Spain, your actions have been one long contradiction. As a result France contrary to her nature, in opposition to her interests has become Ghibelline at Rome, sacerdotal at Berne, Austrian in Piedmont, Russian at Cracow, French nowhere, counter-revolutionary everywhere." It is remarkable, as Martin says, that Guizot, who was "so fine an analyser of past events," should not have been able "to grasp things going on before his own eyes; he saw them as he would have them, not as they were."

Adherence to such a policy was suicidal. For the French government to turn deliberately from the alliance with England and to join itself to Austria; to sacrifice the interests of France for those of the Orléans dynasty; to commit the state to a defence of the principles of Metternich, when the majority of the French people were supporters of the cause of political liberty and constitutional progress, was in itself enough to destroy its moral influence if not to undermine its political supremacy. The bitterness became more intense when, with the retirement of Marshal Soult, in 1847, Guizot became the real chief of the cabinet of which hitherto he had been minister of foreign affairs. This advance of Guizot to the presidency of the council made it clear that the king was determined to persist in a course the unpopularity of which had been evident for many years.

But though an unpopular foreign policy may be a source of weakness to a government, it is rarely enough in itself to provoke insurrection and revolt. It is true that France was rapidly approaching that condition described by Normanby, when he said that there existed "neither political attachment to any individual, nor the slightest respect for any existing institution"; that the state of society was one in which a revolution might easily break out, if only the occasion should arise which would demand unanimity on the part of the diverse elements

forming the opposition, if only the governmental policy were applied to some question that concerned intimately the political liberty of all classes of citizens. Such a situation had not, however, arisen until the question of the suffrage, that is, of parliamentary and electoral reform, which had been discussed from time to time since 1818, became of sufficient interest and importance to demand immediate settlement. The grievance was threefold: in administration, that is, in the management of the business of the state as a whole, centralisation was too great; in the organisation of the Chamber of Deputies too many members were dependent on the government for official positions, and were, in consequence, supporters of the governmental policy less from conviction than from necessity; and lastly, in the elections the right of voting was limited to too small a part of the population.

Of these grievances, which we shall here examine in turn, the first was important, not only because it tended to make the state all-powerful at the expense of the community and the individual, but also because it increased the governmental patronage and made possible the long-continued governmental majority. Such administrative centralisation had made difficult in the past any development of local self-government, and had rendered it inevitable that matters of purely local concern should be under the control of the central authority. In the revision of the Charta and in later laws certain steps had been taken to secure greater local initiative; but even with these changes, which increased the powers of the departmental and municipal councils, the smaller bodies had very little actual power. The liberals were led to make this question a part of their program, not so much because of their desire to obtain local administrative rights, as because they felt that the government was trying to gain party supporters by bartering its offices for votes. They advocated decentralisation, believing that by throwing more responsibility upon the deputies from the provinces it would

increase their experience and efficiency, and would make them more independent in their opinions and ballots.

The question was thus closely connected with that of parliamentary reform, whereby the majority in the Chamber should be made more representative, even of that small body of electors who, under the limited franchise of the Charta, were given the right to vote. This body of electors, the legal nation (*pays légal*), was defined by a property qualification of from two to three hundred francs, and consisted of about 200,000 voters, mainly of the *bourgeoisie*. It was the governing body of the country, and exercised its legal rights in spite of the opposition of republicans and socialists. This opposition would, however, have been less effectual had the management of the elections within the *pays légal* itself been strictly honourable, and had the majority in the Chamber been actually an expression of the will of the majority of the 200,000 electors. But such was not the case. The majorities that the government gained in 1846 and 1847 were obtained, not by a fair and free casting of ballots at the polls, but by the exercise of ministerial patronage, by personal influence, and, what is much more serious, by the use of corrupt methods. By promising office to those who were candidates, by promising advancement to those who had been elected, by granting advantages and privileges to constituents, honours to relatives, opportunities for wealth to those who had capital to invest—by such means the government was able to attach to itself the deputies who were willing to be thus bought and sold. It is estimated that of the 450 deputies who sat in the Chamber of 1847, 193 were holding offices under the government. "This majority," says Normanby, "is notoriously obtained by the grossest corruption. . . . Many of [the members] are brought up, to the neglect of their various functions in different parts of the country, to support the government. A portion of them are removable at pleasure,—all depend upon the government equally for promotion. . . .

They are called upon to vote upon a question which directly affects their own position in the Chamber, and against a government, which unscrupulously exercises control on their actions ; and by the present manner of voting, each of these dependent creatures has to walk up one flight of steps to the tribune, and standing within a few paces of the minister of the interior, with his eyes fixed upon him, to place a ball either in a white or black urn, and then descend the opposite flight of steps, and pass close by the ministers on returning to his place."

It is little wonder that under such circumstances the government should have been able to maintain its majority vote in the Chamber ; and it is clear why the enemies of the party in power should have stigmatised the ministers and the deputies as a close corporation, selfishly determined to retain by corrupt means or otherwise its grasp upon power. If Guizot was not directly implicated in this buying and selling, he at least laid himself open to the charge that was brought against him in the Chamber at the time, of having participated in an affair of a very doubtful character ; and he was undoubtedly guilty of conniving at corrupt practices for the purpose of preserving the policy of resistance to which his ministry was committed. By reason of this manipulation of the parliamentary system France was reduced to a condition of political torpor. It is estimated that not more than one-fifth of those privileged to vote took part in the election of 1847, that is, the Chamber of Deputies was returned by 40,000 actual electors, and the will of the kingdom was expressed by a body of deputies who represented only one in five of those legally entitled to vote, and only one in two hundred of the adult male population of the state. Parliamentary practices in France in 1847 presented some striking contradictions. The government adhering strictly to the Charta, and in no way troubling itself about the origin of the majority in the Chamber, believed that it was maintaining a

free parliamentary system so long as it had this majority. On the other hand this majority was worthless as a representative of the people, nor was its existence a guarantee that the ministry had the sympathy and support even of the *bourgeoisie*. It was not representative because it did not voice the will of the nation ; it was not constitutional because it did not express the views of the majority of those legally entitled to vote. Guizot, with that deplorable lack of insight that he had already shown in the matter of the Spanish marriages and the Sonderbund war, failed to realise that the majority upon which he depended was not a veritable representative majority, such as the free parliamentary government for which he pleads in his *Mémoires* demands. His doctrinairism, his want of the habits of a man of the world, his contempt for the opinions of others, and his faith in the legality of his own position, blinded him to the crisis that confronted him.

But let us pass on to the third grievance. The ministry made a serious blunder when it refused to consider the question of parliamentary reform, that is, the reduction of the number of those who, holding office under the government, were at the same time members of the Chamber ; but by stubbornly standing out against an extension of the franchise, it precipitated the revolution and drew down ruin upon itself and the monarchy alike. In nearly every session since 1842 had this question under one form or another been discussed. The radicals, notably Arago in his paper, demanded universal suffrage, but this the nation at large did not desire. The constitutional opposition led by Thiers, though likewise opposed to any such sweeping change, desired that the government should definitely pledge itself to a measure for extending the franchise to certain classes of citizens qualified by intelligence and education ; and tried by every parliamentary means to break down the passivity of the government, and to effect the passage of a measure of this character. But as long as the majority voted down all

bills brought in by the opposition, Guizot refused to bring in a bill of his own ; for both he and the king believed that the policy of resistance was necessary to prevent revolutions and to give France peace, and both thought that, were concessions made to the liberals, the control of the government would fall into the hands of another party and the policy would be sacrificed. The king was too old to enter heartily into the spirit of progress which dominated France, and there still lingered in his mind a horror of revolution and a belief in the will of the prince. To grant measures of reform would be, he believed, to make concessions to anarchy. When it was reported to him that many deputies had voted against the measure brought in by the opposition in 1847, because of the promise of the ministry to bring forward the next year a measure of its own, he replied, " Ah ! they said that, did they, my ministers ! But I have promised nothing. Never will I consent to a reform ; consider that as definitely said." Guizot on the other hand did not share the king's objection either to parliamentary or to electoral reform, for he considered them both to be " the natural and legitimate consequences of the upward movement of society and of the continued exercise of political liberty." But he was convinced that the time had not come for such reforms. " I cannot find among us to-day," he said, " in the actual state of society, any real or serious motive, any motive worthy of a free and sensible country, to justify the proposed electoral reform." He thoroughly believed that all abuses would disappear with a gradual improvement of political habits and customs, and declared that the proposed measure was an outrage upon the majority, inasmuch as the excitement attending it had been stirred up by newspapers and journalists, and was in no way expressive of the real feeling of the legal body of electors. Upon the existence of a constant majority in the Chamber of Deputies Guizot based this opinion. " As a result of many elections," he says, " the liberty and legality of which cannot

be seriously contested, the preponderating influence of the middle class has led, both in the Chamber and in the country, to the formation of a majority who approved the policy [of resistance], wished it maintained, and supported it through the difficulties and tests both internal and external to which circumstances subjected it." This was a strictly parliamentary position, and would have been tenable, had not the minister been the dupe of a mistake. The king and Guizot were superstitious believers in something that was unreal. The parliamentary majority was a fiction; yet upon it they based their adherence to a policy of immobility and inertness, and opposed the demands of constitutional liberals and republicans alike.

It was a striking situation, the more so because of the age and experience of the king and the superior intelligence of Guizot. While Germany was increasing the number of her constitutional states, and was progressing rapidly along economic, social, and administrative lines; while Holland and Spain were improving their governments and adopting measures of reform; while the liberals of Switzerland were winning victories over the Sonderbund; while Pius IX. was opening his pontificate with promises of better government; and while England under Palmerston was encouraging liberalism abroad and was reaping the fruits of electoral and industrial progress at home—while the liberal movement was thus gaining ground everywhere, France stood unchanged, because her leading statesman, having by corrupt means gained a governmental majority, thought that it was a representative and truly parliamentary majority, and defended his position by reference to it.

When the cabinet was brought face to face with the Chambers in the spring of 1847, it came unprepared with a program, for the discussion of the two previous years, over the question of the Spanish marriages, had so absorbed its time and energy that it had paid but little attention to the many indispensable

measures that must confront any legislative body at so critical a period. But the government, making no attempt to rectify its mistake, shielded itself behind its time-honoured policy. Its position, supported as it was by a legal majority of votes in the Chamber, seemed invulnerable, and against it the opposition hurled itself in vain. Compare the measures proposed during that session with those actually passed. In the group of rejected laws were projects to reduce the tax on salt, to reform the postal system, to reform prisons, to lighten the military burdens, to extend liberty of education to secondary schools, to regulate the relations between employer and employee, to increase ministerial responsibility, to revise the jury system, and finally to reform the electoral and parliamentary system. Of the laws passed Guizot mentions but three, and these relate not to social and political amelioration but to railways. Rightly could Montalembert sum up the work of the session in the three famous words, "Nothing, nothing, nothing!" and with justice could Lamartine say that so far as the government was concerned "the genius of statesmen consisted solely in planting themselves in the situation created for them by chance or revolution, and in remaining there motionless, inert, implacable to every amelioration."

Thwarted in the Chamber the liberal party turned to the country, determined to test the reiterated statement of the ministry that the country neither wanted nor was ready for reform. "If we are wrong," said the opposition, "and the ministers right, then we will cease to pursue the question. It is important for us to be instructed upon this point—do the people wish reform or do they not?" In consequence of this determination a series of "reform banquets" were planned in July, 1847, under the general direction of Duvergier de Hauranne, an *ex-doctrinaire*, and Odilon Barrot of the Left, to be held in the various cities of France for the purpose of finding out the wishes of the people upon this important

question. Every effort was made to avoid extravagance and to escape any entanglement with the party of the extreme Left—a difficult matter, for Thiers by refusing to associate himself personally with the movement, had made it appear, for the moment, that the Left Centre was unwilling to co-operate. This fortunately proved not to be true, for a number of Thiers's friends expressed their sympathy with the plan and rendered hearty assistance. Toasts were drunk at the majority of the banquets *au roi constitutionnel*, and in but one instance, at Lille, was there any marked attempt of the radical and revolutionary forces to control the meeting. Beginning as had the movement between the sessions of the legislatures of 1846-7 and 1847-8, it took the form of a campaign manœuvre for the purpose of sounding popular opinion, and of increasing popular interest in the projects for reform. By means of it the constitutional opposition had no other object than to accomplish a legitimate end by legitimate means; but they soon found that they had given to the revolutionary agitators an instrument of which they were not slow to avail themselves. Banquets for revolutionary rather than constitutional purposes were held at Châlons, Dijon, Autun, and other places; and on these occasions speeches were made of a radical, anti-constitutional, and even anti-social character, full of the bitterness that had been accumulating for eighteen years. Among the leaders was Lamartine, whose *History of the Girondins*, better called *A Glorification of the Reign of Terror*, was strengthening the cause of revolution by minimising its horrors. At a banquet in Mâcon, his birthplace, Lamartine prophesied that in consequence of the outraged public conscience there would be a new uprising against the government; and in the Chamber a few months after, he said to the ministry during the debate on the right of the government to suppress the banquets: "Who gave you authority to place the hand of the police upon the mouth of France? Have you forgotten that the meeting

in the tennis court, which though but a meeting to effect reform, ended in a revolution?"

But in the general discussion the constitutional opposition had not committed itself to the cause of the revolutionists, for it had conducted its campaign strictly according to the principle of "reform to avoid revolution." The banquets did, it is true, stir the passions of the people and rouse the country out of the political lethargy into which it had fallen, but they did not precipitate a revolution. One more expression of the policy of resistance was needed to complete the rupture with the nation, and to render hopeless the cause of the monarchy. When in December, 1847, the Chambers again came together, those who had studied the political and social condition of France saw clearly that the future lay in the hands of the king and the ministry; that there were two currents of opinion moving in France, one toward reform, the other toward revolution, and that it lay with the government to choose between them. Legally the government was still strong: it had scrupulously observed the letter of the Charta; it had followed in its acts all the required legal forms. What would the new session bring forth? Would the ministry retire, or would it, even against the will of the king, support reform? The acts of the month of January, 1848, would settle irrevocably whether the policy of resistance or the policy of reform were to triumph. Should the government recognise the importance of yielding to the wishes of the country, as unmistakably expressed in the agitation aroused by the "reform banquets," the continuance of the July Monarchy would be assured, inasmuch as the revolutionists, encouraged by the death in 1842 of the Duke of Orléans, the only able son of Louis Philippe, had agreed to take no action till after the death of the old king. But should it persevere in its doctrine of inaction and oppose the wishes of the nation, the issue would be uncertain. It might be, as Lamartine said, revolu-

tion. Soberer men simply knew that things could not last as they were, and awaited with anxiety the results of the new session.

The debate in the Chamber, which followed the king's opening speech, began on January 17th, and lasted with few intermissions until February 12th. The gravity of the crisis called forth from the opposition oratory of the most brilliant character. Lamartine, Odilon Barrot, Thiers, and Billaut led the hostile forces, and attacked the governmental position with all the vigour and eloquence at their command. They made use of all the past charges : they outlined the policy of resistance ; they analysed the motives of Guizot ; they discussed and criticised his desertion of the liberal cause, his sacrifice of the interests of the nation for those of the dynasty, his methods of obtaining a parliamentary majority ; and lastly, they denied the right of the government to suppress the banquets. Through all this verbal castigation the ministry sat unmoved, and scarcely tried to enter upon any defence. It met the charges with a shrug of the shoulders, and declared its intention of applying still further the policy of resistance. Guizot, who was well aware of the seriousness of the situation, proposed to the king that the cabinet retire, saying that men sincerely attached to the dynasty could certainly be found in the opposition, who would make reform and the defence of the monarchy their main objects. But the king would not agree to any change, saying that he needed the old ministers to save him from this first concession, which he was convinced would be a fatal one. Guizot therefore remained, and in his resolve not to abandon the king he took his stand once more on the parliamentary majority and refused to commit the government to any promise of reform. Although from the larger point of view the ministry and the *doctrinaires* generally were responsible for the calamities that followed, the fault in this crisis rested with Louis Philippe, and with him alone.

When it became known that the ministerial policy was unchanged, and an amendment favouring reform, which had been appended to the address to test the Chamber, had been rejected by the majority ; when the ministry in an infamous speech of Hébert, keeper of the seals, denied the right of Frenchmen to meet in political discussion ; the opposition determined to turn once more to the people to test the legality of such a doctrine regarding public meetings, which, Lord Normanby says, " no minister for the last 150 years would have ever ventured to pronounce in England." The challenge was given and accepted. Two large banquets had already been planned at Paris, and in one of these, that of the twelfth arrondissement, the constitutional opposition determined to take part. Its object in the first instance seems to have been to test the constitutionality of the government's position by means of a banquet reunion on the 22d of February, which should be followed by peaceful arrests and a trial before the court of cassation. To this plan the government agreed, and it was hoped that the crisis had been peacefully averted. But when on the 21st of February it became known that a procession of large proportions was planned to accompany the meeting as a manifestation of public feeling, the consent of the government was withdrawn. When this was made known to the opposition the deputies after a long discussion decided to give up the banquet altogether ; because, feeling sure that a collision would take place between the populace and the police if such a popular demonstration were made, they preferred to risk their own popularity rather than to run the chance of a civil war. The memoirs of Normanby and Odilon Barrot show how alive the deputies were to the dangers that threatened France from the formidable radical and revolutionary elements in Paris. They knew that their own plan for electoral reform fell far short of the views of the most extreme radicals, who were only awaiting the opportunity of the king's death to excite another

insurrection. The immediate danger was the more serious from the fact that the streets of the city were thronged with crowds of people, large numbers of whom had come up from the provinces ready to take part in any movement against the government.

When the decision of the deputies to give up the banquet was known throughout Paris, the excitement instead of diminishing increased. Lamartine and other deputies, who had voted against the decision, declared that they would not be bound by the opinion of the majority. Officers of the national guard, which was to have accompanied the procession as originally planned, were enraged by the news, and vowed that this new insult would cost the king dear. Deputations of students from the schools came to the house of Odilon Barrot and charged the deputies with "desertion in the presence of the enemy." Partly to appease the people the deputies of the opposition drew up an injudicious accusation against the cabinet, in which were repeated all the old charges of corruption at home and humiliation abroad,—an unfortunate act in that it in no way aided the reform cause, and only served to increase the popular excitement. During the 22d the events were unimportant. Crowds wandered about the city, crying, "Down with Guizot ! Long live reform !" Windows were broken and a few barricades were built ; but nothing serious happened. It was not until the afternoon of the 23d that the national guard refused to act against the people in the service of a government that it detested. Its defection, accompanying a movement that was rapidly becoming an insurrection, roused the king from his position of fancied security. The revolt was not yet revolution, and Louis Philippe, struck with consternation at the situation, determined to prevent trouble by sacrificing his minister. On the same afternoon Guizot was dismissed. The insurrectionists awaited with expectancy Guizot's successor. He was the opportunist Molé, an appointment which in no way bettered the situation. The secret societies, notably the

Rights of Man and the *Seasons*, were urging the revolutionists to complete their work thus auspiciously begun. The new minister lost valuable time in his attempt to formulate a program ; for while the king was grudgingly conceding a few of the many demands of the opposition, barricades were rapidly rising in all parts of the city, and the republicans, organised, armed, and determined, were already preparing for definite action. At last, on the 24th the king called Barrot and Thiers to the ministry, but unfortunately placed the regular troops under the command of Marshal Bugeaud, who was hated by the people. This attempt to provide adequate military defence came too late. Already had the regulars come into conflict with the crowd in a wretched *mêlée*, in which about a hundred men had been killed or wounded ; and the people, exasperated and suspicious, would listen to no proposal that had for its object the preservation of the king's power. In vain did Odilon Barrot attempt to harangue them as he drove from point to point in the city. "They are deceiving us now as they did in 1830," the people insisted, and already the cries of "Down with Louis Philippe !" "Vengeance for our slaughtered brothers !" were accompanied with, "Long live the republic !" Said Arago, "Unless the king have abdicated before evening there will be a revolution." The situation had passed beyond the control of the liberals ; it was now in the hands of the men of the sections, of the faubourgs. Reform had become revolution, and with the mob already at the gates of the Tuileries, with Émile de Girardin declaring that nothing less than the abdication of the king could prevent a more violent outbreak, with the king's sons urging him to the act, Louis Philippe hurriedly wrote that blotted document that closed his rule over the people of France. "I abdicate that crown, which the national voice called me to bear, in favour of my grandson, Count of Paris. May he succeed in the great task which has fallen to him to-day."

Thus, after a blunderingly inadequate defence on the part of the government, the July Monarchy fell at the hands of an audacious Parisian mob aided by revolutionary recruits from the provinces. In all the arrangements from the 22d to the 24th of February the government seemed always one day behind the revolution. The republicans, entering upon the last of many insurrectionary movements, brought experience, organisation, and confidence to bear upon the situation; while on the other side the king was hampering the ministers by his indecision and stubbornness. But however many were the mistakes committed by those in authority during those eventful days, the fact remains that no amount of promptness, efficiency, or show of authority could have strengthened the foundations of the monarchy or have given it a long lease of life, unless a very radical change in policy had been made. In reality the July Monarchy was not overthrown, it crumbled away. In appearance strong, it was in fact wanting in that which alone could give it permanence, a place in the sympathies of the people of France. One by one during its eighteen years of power had the bulwarks of its strength been removed, until now scarcely anything remained to support it. One act after another had alienated the different portions of the population. Those who were not hostile or dissatisfied were weary of the prosaic *bourgeois* rule. Where one class saw an enemy, and another a constitutional opponent, a third, and that by far the largest, saw vulgarity and commonplaceness. France lost all respect for the monarchy that ruled over her, and when a Parisian mob threw itself against the weakened structure, it became evident that no ties of loyalty bound together the king and the people. As the government of the king collapsed and his own personal power vanished, France looked on indifferently, and saw without a sigh the passing away of a leadership, the memory of which recalled only the humiliation of the state.

But the populace was not satisfied with the retirement of

Guizot and the abdication of the king. When the Chambers took up the question of the dynasty, and Dupin and Odilon Barrot tried to save the crown for the young Count of Paris, in whose favour the king abdicated, popular feeling expressed itself more emphatically than before. Inasmuch as the Chamber was in no sense the true representative of France, because its majority was the result not of a fair election but of governmental abuse, and had been created in the face of the opposition not merely of a party but of the nation as well, such a Chamber was not the mouthpiece of the nation and should no longer be allowed to exercise power and to impose its will upon France. So the people argued. "The right of regency," said Ledru-Rollin, "appertains only to the sovereign people"; and the crowd cried, "Down with the Chamber!" "Disperse the deputies!" The mob, fresh from the assault on the Tuileries, invaded the Chamber, shouting, "No more Bourbons! a provisional government and after that the republic!" and in the midst of the confusion, the regency of the Duchess of Orléans and the dynastic rights of the Count of Paris were lost sight of, the president of the Chamber disappeared through a convenient door, deputies of the Centre silently took themselves away, and out of the uproar and the turmoil, in the same chamber where so long had reigned the policy of resistance, there gradually arose a new government, the so-called government of the people. Born of a republican orgy, named by two or three republican leaders, and confirmed by some forty or fifty deputies and a band of a few hundred excited revolutionists who had crowded into the chamber with butcher knives and muskets, this government placed itself at the head of affairs, although it had received no authority from the people it was supposed to represent. The control of France passed into the hands of the extreme Left, the seat of power was removed from the Chamber of Deputies to the Hôtel de Ville, and the last trace of the July Monarchy disappeared.

The new government was from the outset under the leadership of Lamartine, to whom more than to anyone else was due its success in controlling the people. It claimed for itself no other powers than those of a provisory character, exercised for the purpose of organising the victory of the revolutionists, and of conserving the public safety. It knew that it had no constituent powers, that it had no right to determine the form of the new *régime*, and it fully understood that its functions were administrative and not constitutional; yet, forced on by the pressure brought to bear by the Parisian populace, against the better judgment of many of its own members, without consulting the wishes of the nation, without waiting for the opinion of any other element than that which surrounded the Hôtel de Ville, it took a step of the most momentous character,—it assumed all the prerogatives of a constituent assembly and changed at one stroke the form of government in France. Not content with dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, and with forbidding the Chamber of Peers to reassemble, it issued a proclamation establishing the republic, granting to every citizen the right to vote, and authorising the summons of a National Assembly as soon as the voting system should be put in working order. Thus was founded the second republic, based on the right of universal suffrage; and the remarkable fact is that the new order never at any time received the legal sanction of the people of France, for when the National Assembly met it was not even asked to consider the question. The people accepted the new government less from conviction than from fear. As Normanby says, “No one likes the Republic or was the least prepared for it; yet everyone is determined to support it through disgust of all of which they have got rid, and from nothing else presenting itself that would be better borne.” Such a fact hardly augured well for the long tenure of the new system.

The establishment of the second republic completed that cycle in the political history of France, which having begun in 1815

with the doctrine of divine right and with power in the hands of the Right and Right Centre, passed on to government by constitutional fiction with power in the hands of the old Left Centre, and finally entered upon the government by the people in the hands of the republican and socialistic Left. The old republican party now became the conservative supporters of government, and all the other parties, Orléanists, Legitimists, Bonapartists, socialists, and anarchists, as parties, not as individuals, became the opponents, the enemies of the republic. The small body of seven, afterwards eleven, men composing the provisional government found themselves at the head of a republic that stood for no guaranteed liberties, for no liberties denied by the preceding government, and represented no definite progress as had the government of 1830. It was an experiment, and its leaders looked into a future more uncertain than any since 1793, and faced problems darker than any since those of the first republic. That the provisional government, which was without national foundation, without other authority than that which it assumed to itself, and without that sense of conviction which comes from the unanimous adherence of parties, was able to maintain its power during four eventful months, in the face of odds that would have crushed many a more stable government, was due in the main to the want of a definite plan among the opponents of the republic, and to the firmness and ability of the chief men who made up its government,—to Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin, Arago, Garnier-Pagès the elder, Louis Blanc, Marrast, Marie. To the first more than to any other man was it due, in those early days when the red flag was waving conspicuously at the head of the insurgents, that the revolution did not end in a reign of terror. "For sixty hours," says Normanby, "the government was in the presence of an infuriated rabble, half drunk, and almost all armed." But by the force of his eloquence Lamartine held back the people, and by his wit and personal courage turned every opportunity to his

advantage, put the masses to shame, and at the same time won their respect and admiration. His calmness and moderation in the work of administration equalled his presence of mind in the face of danger. As the fact became evident that the republic meant order and not anarchy, the adherents to the new government increased in number. Supporters of the old monarchy, members of the late opposition, Legitimists, and others rallied to the defence of the republic, believing that in so doing they were acting for the best good of France. Deputations came from the schools, the bar, the church, the army, and the labouring classes to express their approval of the firm attitude taken by the new government ; and the more intelligent men of France were willing in the emergency to give a speedy encouragement to the men who, sitting in the Hôtel de Ville, were endeavouring by every means in their power to guarantee order at home and to inspire confidence abroad. Whether their adherence would be permanent was another question ; whether the nation as a whole desired the republic and would support it at the polls was yet to be tested ; the important fact for the moment was that the new government stood for order as over against anarchy, moderation as over against radicalism, security of person and property as over against revolution accompanied with conflagration and pillage. These reasons, rather than any loyalty to republican principles, account for the fact that the provisional government received the support of so many diverse elements at this critical period ; and truly did it deserve the respect it inspired. If it was the outcome of a hasty and ill-judged movement, and was in respect of the cause it represented an error from the point of view of political progress ; if it reaffirmed the old principles of 1793, and made liberty, equality, and fraternity its watchwords ; nevertheless, accepting the situation as a *fait accompli*, it set its face deliberately against further disturbance, whether reactionary or revolutionary, announced its determination to maintain

tranquillity at home and to avoid war abroad, and to trust to the progress of intelligence rather than to the force of arms.

But the government had social as well as political problems to deal with. The real question at issue in 1848 was not that of electoral reform, but that of capital *versus* labour, which the government of Louis Philippe had made more difficult of solution by its partiality to the interests of the *pays légal*. The electoral limitations had drawn a sharp line between the capitalists with full electoral privileges, and the working class with none. The latter had thus been set apart by themselves, and struggling against the new conditions of labour, fighting poverty and distress, they had come to look with envy and hatred upon the *bourgeoisie*, who, themselves prosperous, had upheld a selfish electoral policy and refused to pass laws lightening the burdens of the oppressed. Masses of books, pamphlets, and leaflets, which, circulating with rapidity during the months preceding the revolution, had reached these classes, and had furnished them with theories much more practical than those of St. Simon and Fourier regarding the organisation of society and the right to work. These theories, definite and simple in themselves, meant one thing to their authors and another to those who put them into practice. To the conservative in 1848 socialism meant more than a public control of production, accompanied with distribution according to some ideal standard; it meant defiance of order, disregard of the rights of individuals, the employment of revolt for the gaining of ends, pillage, terror, and all the other accompaniments of those republican uprisings that had threatened France for eighteen years. The speeches and acts of those who seemingly represented socialism tended to confirm this view. "We demand," said Marche, the spokesman of a deputation that forced its way into the Hôtel de Ville, "the extermination of property and capitalists, the immediate installation of the proletariat in community of goods, the proscription of the bankers, the rich,

the merchants, the bourgeois of every condition above those of wage earners . . . [we demand] the acceptance of the red flag to signify to society its defeat, to the people its victory, to Paris the Terror, to all foreign governments invasion." Such a doctrine indicates what the more conservative elements of France feared from the supremacy of the socialists, and explains in large part why they rallied around the provisional government, when it was found that a majority of its members was determined to resist any such application of the socialistic doctrine.

But the government could not summarily dismiss the question that had been the real issue of the revolution. It owed its own existence to a body of radical deputies and a mob to whom the republic meant socialism or nothing. Among its own members were Louis Blanc and Albert, who enthusiastically advocated governmental support of socialistic doctrines; while around it for sixty exciting hours at the Hôtel de Ville raged a mob of socialists of the most radical type, whose apostle was Louis Blanc and whose argument was force. Although there can be little doubt that the majority of the government was opposed to the doctrines and schemes of Louis Blanc, it took up the new problem, either from necessity or from a hope of bringing the whole system into discredit. Aided by the shouts of the mob outside the minority won the day: it was agreed that the plan of Louis Blanc should be tried. Government aid was to be extended to the furtherance of the new schemes, in accordance with the doctrine of the *droit au travail*, the right of the unemployed labourer to demand work of the government, and the obligation of the government to furnish such work when demanded. On the 25th of February, in order to satisfy some five or six thousand clamouring socialists, an address dictated by Louis Blanc was issued to the workingmen containing this paragraph: "The government agrees to guarantee the existence of the workman by labour and work to all citizens; it

recognises the fact that the workmen ought to form associations among themselves in order to enjoy the benefits of their labour, and it will give back to the workmen, to whom it belongs, the million which will soon become due on the civil list." That the decree might be put into execution Louis Blanc demanded that a "minister of labour and progress" be appointed to concern himself with all labour problems that might arise, and that arrangements be made for the formation of co-operative associations. But instead of a minister a committee was appointed "to study ardently and to solve," so reads the commission, the problem of the long and unjust sufferings of the labouring classes. At its head was Louis Blanc, its vice-president was Albert, its seat, the Luxemburg. Instead of taking the initiative in reform, and performing its work with rapidity and dispatch, it could only recommend. With the committee sat delegates sent from trade-unions of the city, and at this labour parliament were discussed projects for the betterment of the relations between labour and capital. Something was accomplished. A few of its proposals, one concerning the sweating system, another limiting a day's work to ten hours, were adopted by the government, and became laws. In other instances the commission brought a moral influence to bear in the settlement of disputes, and made a number of interesting experiments in co-operation. The Great Northern railway, for instance, reduced the hours of its workmen from ten to nine and admitted them to a share in the profits of the railway. Far as all this was from the socialistic ideal, it proved to be too extreme for those who looked with dread upon all socialistic experiments. On one side the socialists claimed that the government desired to embarrass Louis Blanc, to get him out of the way by locating him and all his schemes across the river at the Luxemburg, and so destroy his influence with the crowd by taking away all power to act, thus making him and his debating club ridiculous in the eyes of the revolution-

ists. On the other the anti-socialists, who considered the commission a menace to the city, and the Luxemburg a rallying point for all the revolutionary and anarchistic elements, censured the government for allowing so dangerous a centre of radical opinion to exist.

But the government could not stop at this point, for having guaranteed the *droit au travail* it was obliged to make some attempt to fulfil its promise. Owing to the crisis brought on by the revolution, and to the speculation and stock-jobbing that had preceded it, the number of idle labourers was exceptionally large. Failures were imminent, industry was at a standstill, factories were closed, loans were difficult to obtain, and workmen were thrown out of employment. On March 9th, four thousand tradesmen came to the government to complain of the ruin that had come upon their business. In Rouen alone it was estimated that 20,000 workmen had been dismissed from the factories. When therefore the government opened the great buildings—*ateliers nationaux*—that had been constructed on the banks of the Seine, and promised two francs a day to all workmen actually employed and one franc and a half a day to those obliged to remain idle, labourers hastened to Paris in such numbers that by April 9th there were 59,000 enrolled in the workshops. By the 15th this number had risen to 66,000, and by May 14th, according to the *Moniteur* of that day, from 115,000 to 120,000 were in Paris supported by pay from the state. Of these many were needy workmen who were willing to earn their wages, but many more were idlers who meant to work as little as possible for the wages they received. The result of this governmental guarantee was that the private workshops in the large cities of the provinces as well as in Paris were deserted by those who might have obtained work there. Inasmuch, therefore, as the national workshops could not provide occupation for more than 14,000 men a day, the situation took the form of a general strike of

about 100,000 men supported by the government. The wages of the idlers amounted to strike pay, the wages paid to those who were set at work excavating in the Champ de Mars, were equally a drain on the government, inasmuch as the labour was unproductive, netting the government no return. The immediate effect of receiving into the workshops the good and the bad, the skilled and the unskilled labourers alike, without regard to ability, honesty, or deserts, was to pauperise the working classes, and to encourage conspiracy and revolution. And the danger was the greater in that each of these workmen was a citizen of the new republic and a member of the national guard. Possessed of the right to vote and to carry arms, this body of 100,000 labourers became the army whose leaders were at the Luxemburg, whose camp was the street, whose recruiting ground was the workshops, and whose grievance was that the government had deceived it. It received its instructions from the three hundred clubs that were organised during the revolution, which in turn were directed from the central revolutionary committee, the club of clubs.

Thus it is evident that Paris was divided into two hostile camps: one the majority of the provisional government, supported by the better elements in the city and the country, anti-socialistic, without sympathy for the proletariat to whose relief and organisation the government had officially committed itself; the other, the commission of the Luxemburg, the national workshops, and the clubs, representing an organised proletariat ready to turn and rend the government that had called it into existence. In the face of such a threatening body, the organised and armed supporters of doctrines which the *bourgeoisie* believed to be subversive of peace and order, it is little wonder that the government of the republic appeared to be the only mainstay of society. Imminent as the danger was it proved in reality greater than could have been anticipated. For four months the republic was called upon to defend itself

against the distrust, hatred, and organised hostility of the very body into whose hands it had given the weapons of attack.

The war between the proletariat and the government increased in intensity as the cause of the radicals became more and more hopeless. The first struggle was, however, due less to social grievances than to the fear that the new elections would endanger the gains that the radicals had made in the revolution of 1848. The government had proclaimed universal suffrage, which was a cardinal feature of the radical doctrine, and in the elections that were to be held on April 9th the opportunity was given to the French people to express without limitation or qualification their approbation or disapprobation of the work of the government in organising the republic and in establishing the system for the relief of labour. As yet this approval had not been given. In the revolution of 1848 France, indifferent to the July Monarchy, had left the task of overthrowing that government to the radical and socialistic elements in Paris. Did the nation approve of what the republicans of Paris had done? Would the sober second-thought that must inevitably follow the bewilderment of a revolution be socialistic or anti-socialistic, republican or anti-republican? This was the question that only the elections themselves could answer, although there was a general feeling among the conservatives and radicals alike that the results would be anti-socialistic. Lamartine and others who made up the conservative wing of the provisional government feeling reasonably certain that the elections would redound to their advantage, welcomed the prospect. But what brought joy to the conservatives alarmed the members of the radical wing of the government, of which Ledru-Rollin, minister of the interior, was chief. He and the radicals throughout the city agreed that if possible the elections should be postponed until the commissioners appointed by the minister of the interior to spread republican ideas throughout the provinces should have had time to accomplish their work ; for they were

convinced that it would not do to endanger the results already gained by the election of an assembly antagonistic to their doctrines. "Whoever," said Ledru-Rollin, "is not willing to recognise that the old society has perished, and that it is necessary to erect a new, will be a deputy lukewarm and dangerous."

In order, therefore, to bring about a postponement of the elections that were to be held on the 9th of April a monster demonstration was prepared in Paris under the leadership of Blanqui, Cabet, Raspail, Sobrier, and others, and supported by Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, and Albert of the provisional government. The clubs had decreed that the republican government must be reorganised in the interests of the socialists, and that their tenure of power must not be disturbed by any unfavourable elections. The plan of the leaders was to force an indefinite postponement of the elections, to purge the provisional government of its conservative members, and to erect a committee of public safety that would undertake at once the task of republicanising the provinces, and of preparing the way for an election that would prove favourable to the maintenance of a Jacobin republic. This demonstration was, therefore, in plan a deliberate attack by one wing of the provisional government, supported by 130,000 of the proletariat, upon the other, but in execution it failed to accomplish any important result. Postponed from one day to another the first demonstration was finally made on March 17th and was eminently peaceful; for though the government refused to grant the larger demands of the insurgents, it consented to postpone the elections till April 23d. This did not however prevent a second demonstration of a much more threatening character, which took place just a week before the elections were held. Thirty or forty thousand men met in the Champ de Mars and advanced against the Hôtel de Ville. Fortunately, however, the national guard, whose loyalty had been severely tested by certain unpop-

ular acts of the government, responded to the call to arms and guarded the City Hall with 50,000 bayonets, and was ready in case of need to respond with 100,000 more. The great demonstration became more subdued in the presence of the *bourgeoisie* of Paris, and the day ended, not with the overthrow of the government, but with a review of the national guard, and the slinking back of the socialists of the street to the workshops and the clubs whence they had come.

The grand result of the events of April 16th was to ensure a peaceful election. The struggle between parties was transferred to the polls, where on April 23d France experimented with a suffrage "the most radically universal," says Barrot, "that had ever been recognised or practised in the world." Eight million electors, under a system of direct and universal suffrage for all persons over twenty-one years of age, voted according to the *scrutin de liste* by secret ballot. The results of this election, the first fair and free test of the opinion of France for many years, were remarkable. In Paris, where the hopes of the socialists had centred, but three of the twenty-four workmen whose names were placed on the ticket, were chosen deputies to the National Assembly. Some of the most influential radical leaders, such as Blanqui, Eugène Sue, and Cabet, obtained scarcely a recognition, and even such representative socialists as Albert, Ledru-Rollin, Flocon, and Louis Blanc stood far down on the list of those elected. The moderate wing of the provisional government was everywhere successful, and Lamartine's victory was complete. In the provinces the returns were no less satisfactory to the friends of order, and showed positively that socialism was supported by a very small minority even among the working classes themselves. But the most striking fact regarding the elections is that nearly one-fourth of the persons elected were Legitimists, that is, monarchists. This large monarchical element made it difficult to determine beforehand the future of the Assembly or the policy

of France, should the socialistic incubus be safely removed. For the moment, however, all the newly elected members were willing to try the experiment of the republic, and were agreed in their wish to support the policy of the moderates.

The result of the elections made the socialists desperate, and the fear of losing their grasp upon power precipitated the struggle and hastened the inevitable issue. The beginning of the end was seen when the country declared against a socialistic republic. The socialists denied that the elections had been fair. Said Louis Blanc: "Universal suffrage has been proclaimed. Is it an expression of the will of the people? Yes! in a society where the conditions are equal. But no! a thousand times, no! when master can say to servant, 'If you do not vote as I desire you shall die; your wife and your children shall die!' Call you that liberty? I swear that it is slavery." But if the elections roused the anger of the radicals they did not in themselves indicate what the policy of the Assembly would be on the question of labour. Here lay the supreme test. Would the Assembly favour the new labour scheme or oppose it? Would it include socialism as part of its program or would it repudiate it forever? On May 10th an executive commission was appointed to take the place of the provisional government, and while Arago, Garnier-Pagès, Marie, and Lamartine were chosen, Louis Blanc, Albert, and Flocon were omitted. Ledru-Rollin was retained, but only because of the express intervention of Lamartine. The "purging" had taken place, but it was of a very different character from that planned by the leaders of the demonstrations of March 17th and April 16th. A few days afterwards Louis Blanc, as deputy, resigning his position as head of the Luxemburg commission, moved the appointment of a minister of labour. By an almost unanimous vote this motion was rejected, and socialism received another blow, which was scarcely lightened by the appointment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the situation,

and to discover means whereby the condition of industrial and agricultural labourers might be improved.

By these two acts the National Assembly put itself on record as opposed to any further strengthening of the cause that Louis Blanc and his associates represented. When the news got abroad that nothing was to be expected of the new body, the clubs condemned the Assembly as antagonistic to the interests of the people. The uprising of April 16th, they declared, had been a warning from which the government had not profited ; and now the time had come to carry into effect the threat then made, to execute the sentence then imposed. On May 15th, when the Polish question was to be argued in the chamber, the proletariat, ostensibly to present a petition regarding Poland, moved in large numbers toward the assembly hall. Through carelessness or treason the hall was left unguarded, and the mob burst in waving their flags and shouting for Poland. In vain did their own representatives, Barbès, Louis Blanc, and Albert harangue them ; in vain did Lamartine try the eloquence of his voice. He was greeted with " Enough of phrases, it is action that we demand." The mob pressed on into the chamber. " Immediate war to save Poland, right of work and bread for the masses, who die of hunger," was the cry. Ledru-Rollin, sobered by the threatening character of the crowd, shouted from the tribune that deliberation under the circumstances was not possible, but was answered by jeers and reminded of the revolution of February. Still they came in even greater numbers, bearing with them a banner draped in black, and having threatened to consider as a traitor to his country every deputy who refused to vote immediately according to the wishes of the people, they swept on, and stood a bawling, vociferating crowd before the president, who was flanked on one side by a workman who had aided in the construction of the building, on the other by a noisy ruffian brandishing a drawn sabre. Finally, at the end of three hours

and a half, during which the deputies had remained in their seats, Huber, who had signed the original placard calling out the proletariat, mounted the tribune, and declared in the name of the people the dissolution of the National Assembly. Thereupon a mass of the insurgents precipitated itself upon the president, overturned his chair, and established in his place the man with the drawn sabre. The president and many representatives withdrew, but for two terrible hours those remaining stood their ground though in constant danger of personal attack. But the *rappel* summoning the national guard had been sounded, and the proletariat, taking alarm, hastily named a provisional government and started off *en masse* with Barbès and Albert at their head to establish the new government of France, the government of the mob, at the Hôtel de Ville. But the national guard under Lamartine's leadership was close upon their heels, and scarcely were they established than their government was overthrown and they themselves put to flight. So great was the wrath of the armed *bourgeoisie* that even Louis Blanc narrowly escaped lynch-law. The very class which the republicans had ejected from power only three months before had come to the defence of the new government, and the second attempt of socialism to seize for itself the reins of power had failed.

The crisis had been a terrible one, and the Assembly had learned by bitter experience of the danger that threatened the republic. Again the forces of law and order had won the victory, but there was no assurance that it would be permanent until the roots of the evil should be eradicated, and socialism—which had now become what its worst enemies declared it to be, a conspiracy for the overthrow of the state—should be driven from its stronghold. The workshops offered the best ground of attack, for through bad management they had come to be considered by all as a menace not an advantage to the city. For nearly a month the question of their disposal was hotly debated, and at length on June 19th it was made clear that the government

was determined to break up the working element concentrated at Paris. Fifteen thousand individuals, who had fraudulently entered the workshops, and over two thousand convicts and galley slaves supported there by the government, were immediately dismissed. Then the following decrees were issued. All who had not resided in Paris at least one year were to be returned, with tickets for their journey, to the departments where they belonged ; all labourers who could find employment in the free, *i.e.*, the private, workshops were required to do so, and private employers were called upon to engage labourers whenever possible ; all unmarried workmen between the ages of eighteen and twenty were given their choice of leaving Paris to work on the railroads in the various departments, or of going into the army. But these decrees were not sufficiently thorough-going to accomplish the desired result, for the numbers in the workshops were reduced by but little more than ten thousand men, while work could be provided for only two thousand. The situation was as bad as before, and the danger even greater, in that the proletariat, roused to desperation, were weaving new plots and forming new conspiracies for the destruction of their enemies.

But at last a decision was reached by the government, and Marie, minister of public works, in replying to the protest of a delegation of workmen, said, "If the workmen will not depart for the provinces, we will compel them to go by force ; by force, do you understand ;" and on June 22d the Assembly in the same spirit pronounced the words, "*Il faut en finir.*" The struggle between order and anarchy was now at hand. On one side were the proletariat, bound by oath to fight to the death for their cause, organised with all the completeness of an army, and directed by leaders, some of whom were veterans ; on the other were the representatives of order, supported by regulars as well as by the national guard, and commanded by General Cavaignac, minister of war. Behind the barricades were not only Jacobins and socialists, but also those who for

nearly four months had been reading Bonapartist newspapers, which with startling audacity had been doing all in their power to strengthen the spirit of revolt in the workshops, to excite the poorer classes against the *bourgeoisie*, and to rouse their hatred for the rich. Men who had already elected Louis Napoleon as their deputy to the National Assembly began the war against the government with the cry of "*Vive Napoléon*," and Bonapartist, Jacobin, and socialist fought side by side in that fearful municipal war. Beginning with the 23d the conflict became each day more bloody; army struggled against army, and the battle raged now in one quarter of the town and now in another. At length the Assembly, despairing either of a reconciliation or of a speedy end of the war, made Cavaignac dictator and authorised the use of artillery. This act, which might well have reminded thoughtful men of the conferring of like powers upon Bonaparte by the National Convention on 13th Vendémiaire (1795), had the desired result. On the 26th the fratricidal war was over, on the 27th Cavaignac proclaimed that "the cause of order and the true republic" had triumphed, and on July 3d the decree closing the workshops was carried. The attempt of the provisional government to carry out the socialistic policy had resulted in a narrow escape from anarchy or a despotism. The June days had not only cost the state two thousand of its citizens, but they had disclosed the ill-omened union of Bonapartists with the proletariat, and had brought to the front that figure ominous for France, the military dictator.

But joy for the victory of the present excluded for the moment any anxious forebodings for the future, and the National Assembly was able to turn its undivided attention to the task for which it had been summoned—the drafting of a constitution for the republic. But new difficulties now began to present themselves. Hitherto the fear of socialism had acted as a bond of unity holding together antagonistic elements; but with the

victory of the June days and the resumption by the National Assembly of its functions as a constituent body, there again appeared all the party rivalries, all the personal ambitions, and all the difference of opinion that had hitherto been kept in the background by the necessity of uniting for the defence of the state. Though the members of the Assembly had solemnly taken their oath to the republic and had expressed their loyalty to the cause of the revolution of February; though in the presence of anarchy all parties had been willing to try the new experiment and had come together shouting "*Vive la République!*" nevertheless, with anarchy removed, the majority of those elected soon showed that not only did they care but little for the republic as a permanent institution, but that they had never renounced their loyalty to one or other of the dynasties that still claimed rights to the throne of France. The republic was therefore brought face to face with a new danger, and the conflict that had been waged with the proletariat in the streets was replaced by the struggle of the republic with its enemies on the floor of the chamber.

The task that now lay before the National Assembly was to give once more constitutional form to the doctrines of 1789, to define popular rights in the terms of a new revolution, and to divide and to balance the functions of legislative and executive in such a way that they should supplement, not conflict with, each other. The task was most difficult; for it had to be done by an Assembly whose members, bound to the republic by scarcely any other tie than their oath, were already distrustful of the results of universal suffrage, and in the presence of a people who, through the exercise of this same suffrage, had just elected more than two hundred supporters of monarchy as their representatives, and by the return of Louis Napoleon from three departments had shown that the Napoleonic legend was beginning to work among them.

The basis of discussion, when the Assembly finally took up

the question of the constitution, was the report of a committee that had been appointed to prepare the first draft of the fundamental law. Of this report two features are of special importance here: the legislative was to consist of one chamber, which was to be chosen by universal suffrage and to be entirely renewed at the expiration of three years; the executive was to consist of a president, a citizen of France, "who had never lost the character of a Frenchman," also to be elected by universal suffrage and to hold office for four years, but not for two consecutive terms. Thus two co-ordinate bodies, each deriving its authority from the people, were to be set over against each other. The critics of the report were quick to detect three points of weakness: the single chamber, the election of the president by the same body of electors that chose the chamber, and the presidential tenure of four years. In denouncing the project of allowing two co-ordinate bodies to come thus face to face Llerbette said: "Is it not possible that a president would not accept voluntarily the passive and subordinate rôle which a single chamber might wish to impose upon him? Then if he should encounter in that assembly opposition that should appear to him contrary to the interests of the country; if despairing of vanquishing by constitutional means he should wish to break down opposition with his sword, would he in order to succeed need to have behind him the victories of Lodi, Montenotte, and the Pyramids? No! it will be enough for him to have before him the deplorable condition into which your constitution will put the country. . . . Blind is he who cannot see that the result of that struggle will be either the military despotism of a president, or the anonymous and multiplex despotism of an assembly." Notwithstanding so clear an utterance, the Assembly failed to see the danger of a single chamber, and tried to meet the difficulty by changing the mode of electing the president,—a proposition which created discord and confusion. Said Grévy in speaking upon this

point : " Are you very sure that in that series of personages who will succeed each other every four years there will not be found one sufficiently ambitious to attempt to perpetuate his power? And if he be the offspring of one of those families that have reigned in France; if he has never expressly renounced that which he calls his rights; if commerce languishes, if the people are suffering; if such an one come to the presidential chair in one of those crises when misery and deception deliver the people to those who mask under their promises projects against liberty, do you reply that such an ambitious man will not attempt to overthrow the republic?" Even after this prophetic utterance the Assembly, believing that the Grévy amendment proposing election by the representatives of the people rather than by the people themselves would make the president the creature of a parliamentary faction, rejected it by a large majority. It is one of the remarkable facts of the period that so few of the political leaders had sufficient foresight to see the dangers of a direct popular election. Léon Faucher in a brilliant speech warned the Assembly of the result of such a constitutional provision. "The French nation," he said, "is only just emerging from the mould of the monarchy. Our manners are monarchical and military. If you summon the whole people to elect a president it will elect, under the title of president, the equivalent of a king; he will perhaps even found a new dynasty. The nation will be dazzled by the power of the sword or the splendour of an historic name; it will choose from the ranks of the pretenders rather than one of our parliamentary celebrities. If you wish to found a republic, give the assembly the choice of the president; if you appeal to universal suffrage, mark my words, you will establish a government which will not be republican."

The truth of the matter seems to be that the republic was in a situation from which it could not extricate itself. Two cham-

bers were indispensable, but, as Lamartine declared, there were not to be found in France the materials for a division of the legislative into two bodies. The republic had obliterated all distinctions and was now in dire want of that which it had destroyed. Even a change in the mode of electing a president could not prevent the discord that was sure to arise between chamber and president. In consequence of this, says Normanby, "I believe that there is hardly a republican who would not now acknowledge, as preferable to an elected president, a constitutional sovereign who, by education and character, should duly understand and appreciate the nature of his royal functions, selecting with patriotic judgment those rare occasions on which it becomes his duty to exercise a direct influence, always respected because never abused." Lamartine, hoping perhaps that the suffrage of the people would raise him to the presidency, pronounced in favour of popular election. "The die is cast," he said, "let God and the people decide. It is necessary to leave something to Providence, she is the light of those who, like us, are unable to read in the darkness of the future."

Such was the situation in October, 1848. An Assembly, summoned to draw up a constitution of which universal suffrage was the foundation principle, was already expressing its distrust of this newly conceded electoral privilege; many of its members, sworn to defend the republic, were already doubting its permanence or were openly expressing their preference for a constitutional sovereign; others loyal to the republic but unable to rescue it from its perilous position, were putting their trust in Providence with no certainty regarding the future; while still others, seeing the dangers and pointing them out with remarkable accuracy, were unable to influence the majority and were awaiting with apprehension the outcome of the experiment. The fate of the republic was already sealed. Its overthrow was foreshadowed when on November 7th this impossible constitution, which Normanby calls "the worst

that ever reached that finishing stage of manufacture," a constitution "with no one original idea, confused in its expressions, contradictory in its provisions, unintelligible to many of its authors, impracticable in its execution," was adopted by the large majority of seven hundred votes.

The revolution of 1848 in its inception and in the sequel followed the lines of that of 1789; for whereas the earlier revolution had been an attempt to realise political liberty by revolutionary means, to put into immediate practice political formulas and doctrines for which France was unprepared, that of 1848 was an attempt to realise social and economic liberty by a similar application of principles for which the opportunity had been furnished by a revolution. In neither case was France willing to await the results of a gradual political and social reform. The attempt of 1789 had resulted first in the revolutionary despotism of the Terror, followed by the weakness of the Directory, and the victory of one man over a government divided against itself. The attempt of 1848 came very nearly ending in the despotism of the proletariat, but France having been saved from a Reign of Terror by the victory of the moderates, became involved in a constitutional experiment of the most unsatisfactory character. The struggle between the president and the assembly, foreshadowed in the debate upon the constitution, resulted in the victory of the former, and France wearied with the party strife, which accomplished nothing either at home or abroad, accepted the despotism of a Louis Napoleon because he promised order and prosperity. The victory for social liberty in 1848 ended three years later in a social and political reaction, and France in 1851 took her place among the other reactionary states of Europe, whose struggle for liberty, as the next two chapters will show, was to prove to all appearances even more hopeless and unsuccessful.

CHAPTER IX.

REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.—I.

THE downfall of the house of Orléans, important as it was for the future history of France, was of far greater moment in its effect upon Europe. As the first uprising on a large scale against an unpopular and reactionary government, and as a success rapid and thorough—for at one stroke the republic was erected, and universal suffrage proclaimed—the revolution of 1848 startled the princes and the people of Europe as had no preceding event since the execution of Louis XVI. In dealing with questions of wider interest, both social and political, than had any previous movement of a similar character, it roused to action those states that, independent of any outside influence, were fast approaching a revolution of their own. But it must not be supposed that the French uprising was in any sense the cause of the general movement; it was itself in no small degree influenced by the attempts of Poles, Hungarians, and Sicilians to gain national independence and constitutional rights: nor could it become a model according to which any but the most extreme radicals could shape their action, because it was not a national act, not a struggle for liberties denied or rights withheld. Before Paris rose against the government of Louis Philippe, Palermo had given the signal of revolt, and the Neapolitans, following the initiative of Sicily, had wrung a constitution from the Bourbon king, Ferdinand; the Hungarian Diet having taken into consideration its language-and-nationality bill and discussed questions

of taxation and local government, had made preparation to present its demands to the Austrian Emperor ; while Switzerland by her victory over the Sonderbund had already secured the supremacy of liberal ideas, and given encouragement to the revolutionists in neighbouring states. France did not supply the forces that made the greater uprising inevitable ; those are to be found in the discontent aroused by the narrow economic and political systems of the countries themselves, and by the inequalities of their social life ; in the contradiction between that which was, and that which the majority of the people were coming to believe should be. Convinced that the old views regarding the legitimacy of governments and the divine right of kings would have to be modified to meet the larger needs of society that were arising from the growing importance of commerce and industry and the altered relations of social classes, the people of Italy, Austria, and the Germanic Confederation welcomed the proclamations of the French Republic as an indication that the time had come when they, too, might successfully resist the methods of government based on the doctrines of Metternich. No new ambitions were created, no new ideals ; but the success of the French inspired the people of central Europe to make one mighty effort to gain for the industrial and commercial classes a share in the government of the state, to effect political unity where it was wanting, and to win for the subject nationalities, where such had been withheld, a recognition of their ability to govern themselves ;—in other words, to transform a progressive and gradual revolution into a cataclysm, and to seize by force those rights and liberties that they were acquiring but too slowly by peaceful means. The attempt may have been premature, but even in its failure it was not wholly unsuccessful.

The general movement of 1848 affected in one way or another nearly every country in Europe. Young Ireland undertook a

rebellion ; the Chartists in England presented anew their petition for parliamentary reform ; the republicans in Belgium and Spain began agitations, with, however, negative results ; the kings of Holland and Sweden voluntarily made constitutional concessions ; even the principalities of the Danube felt the revolutionary influence. But in each of these cases the effect was either limited in scope or momentary in character. In none of these states were questions raised of vital importance to the future welfare of the nation at large ; in none were the people as a whole concerned in the agitation ; in none did the results alter seriously the character of the government or the condition of the people. The real interest of the revolutionary movement centres in the states of central Europe : in Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and Italy, where alone were the great problems of unity, national independence, and constitutional liberty in large part unsolved.

This localising of the influence of the French revolution was due in great measure to the part that the government of Austria and the house of Habsburg had played in the history of the preceding thirty years. Of the central European system Austria had stood as the guiding spirit. Placed in such a position that her influence extended from the Baltic to the Mediterranean seas, she had been able to control, either directly or indirectly, the political activity and political ideas of the greater number of states between France on one side and Russia on the other. As presiding member of the Germanic Confederation she had controlled the Diet, summoned conferences at Vienna, and acted as the adviser of each individual king and prince of the Confederation. As hereditary head of the Austrian provinces, and dynastic head of Hungary and Bohemia, her Emperor possessed the absolute rights of sovereign over the conglomerate of territories making up the Austrian state ; and as overlord of Lombardy and Venetia and accepted protector of all the states of Italy, he was able to

restrain popular movements by a firm military administration as in Lombardy, by direct intervention as in Naples or the Papal States, or by persuasion and diplomacy as in Modena and the lesser principalities. Thus Austria controlled, to a large extent, the politics of the states to the north, the east, and the south of her own particular provinces, and seemed herself in no way affected by the political struggles going on in other countries, and at times even within the disaffected parts of her own territory. As regards government, the principles of the house of Habsburg were clearly and frankly expressed. "Govern and change nothing," was the advice of the Emperor Francis to his son in 1835; and Metternich voiced the same idea when he said that "principles of government were like religious dogmas; any discussion of them was often dangerous and always useless." According to these principles Austria had acted in the past and meant to act now. Determined that the foundations of the state should in no way be disturbed at home, she was equally determined to make disturbances impossible abroad, if in any way she could interfere to prevent them. Yet withal, Austria was hardly more than a government, a kind of administrative machine; her chief was emperor, king, archduke, count, and margrave—many feudal lords in one. The Austrian state possessed neither unity nor homogeneity, it had no national foundations, no natural frontiers; it was a government holding together four distinct races in some twenty separate territorial divisions, which, as a whole, possessed but ill-defined boundaries, were without seaboard of importance, and had no exit by water save at Trieste, Fiume, and by the Danube, whose mouth was not to be thrown open to the free use of the nations for nearly ten years to come. As any encouragement of national independence, any extension of constitutional rights, would serve only to weaken and dismember the state, Austria's safety lay in the permanence of the situation as it was; and in view of this necessity, it is

hardly to be wondered at that her policy should have been hostile to disturbance and revolution. Metternich's doctrines may have been based on conviction, but they were also based on necessity. By holding such doctrines in the midst of a Europe that was progressing politically, socially, and intellectually, and by contributing neither men nor ideas to aid the advancing movement, Austria was inevitably doomed to see her principles discarded, and her policy spurned outside of the sphere within which she had a lawful right to interfere. Now that France had given the signal for the general uprising, it was the Austrian policy as applied in Italy, Bohemia, Hungary, and the states of the Germanic Confederation against which the revolution was undertaken; and however much we may concern ourselves with the details of the struggle that follows, we shall find that it was not the despotism of isolated princes, but Austria and Austria's policy that the people of central Europe were endeavouring to overthrow.

In the states of southern Germany appeared the first indications of that popular excitement which was soon to spread with marvellous rapidity over the whole of central Europe. In Baden, where the liberals under the guidance of skilled political leaders had been pressing hard upon the government, the ministry at the first presentation of the popular demands made the required concessions. Once started, the movement gained rapid headway. In one form or another, after a certain amount of popular agitation, the states yielded to the urgency of the moment, and, as a rule, admitted liberal representatives to a share in the government. In no case was there bloodshed; for the opposition made up of all classes of society, of land-owners as well as of burghers and peasants, and fully alive to the righteousness of their cause, drew up reasonable programs in terms of national unity and political freedom; and the princes, aware of the selfishness of their past policy, dared not resist the clamour that broke out against them. With the

news of each succeeding gain the area of commotion widened, the leaders became bolder, the governments, losing courage in the presence of what appeared to be the forerunner of a general popular revolt, dared not employ either threats or force. The various organisations founded for purposes of agitation acted systematically and with dispatch, and the use of the telegraph made possible the rapid conveyance of the news from point to point. State after state and town after town took up the cry until, almost before February had ended and March had begun, the news of the fall of the Orléans dynasty had not only spread through Italy and Germany, but had penetrated even to the farthest confines of the Austrian Empire. As reports of new revolutions and popular victories followed close upon the earlier rumours, enthusiasm rose to fever heat, and it seemed as if the millennium of the people had really arrived.

The news of the French movement reached Vienna during the last days of February, and on March 1st government and people alike were aroused by the report that a republic had been proclaimed. "Europe finds itself to-day," wrote Metternich, "in the presence of a second 1793"; and seemingly unaware of the real character and strength of the popular movement, the Austrian chancellor went blindly on taking measures to protect the Austrian states and the Germanic Confederation from an attack by France. But Europe was in the presence of no revolution of 1793; and it was not necessary for France, when once she had given the signal, to extend liberal ideas by force of arms: for sixty years these ideas had been working in Europe, and in the year 1848 were accepted by nine-tenths of the people from Heidelberg to Agram and from Berlin to Palermo. The Europe of 1848 was not the Europe of 1793; and while Metternich was looking for an attack from without, he was startled by the presence of the revolution at his very door.

While Vienna, so long politically bound and fettered by the

presence of the most conservative government in Europe, was giving expression to her excitement in words and not works, a cry more stirring even than that of France or the South German states thrilled the whole Austrian Empire. It was the cry of Kossuth and the Hungarian Diet. During the months of January and February Hungary had been engaged in a discussion of plans for the reformation of her system of finances, for the improvement of the peasantry, and the representation of the free towns in the Diet. But when, on February 29th, the news from Paris reached Pressburg, the liberals became more aggressive, and determined to commit the Diet to a full expression of Hungarian demands in an address to the Emperor. On March 3d Kossuth, in proposing such an address, uttered that famous speech sometimes called the "baptismal speech" of the revolution. "The suffocating vapour of a heavy curse hangs over us and out of the charnel-house of the cabinet of Vienna a pestilential wind sweeps by, benumbing our senses and exerting a deadening effect on our national spirit. . . . I am apprehensive lest the stagnant bureaucratic system that prevails in the state councils of Vienna should lead the Empire to destruction; and while compromising the existence of our beloved dynasty, should also entail upon our country, which requires all its powers and resources for its own development, enormous sacrifices and an interminable succession of calamities. . . . The future of Hungary can never be secure while in the other provinces there exists a system of government in direct antagonism to every constitutional principle. Our task is to found a happier future on the brotherhood of all the Austrian races, and to substitute for the union enforced by bayonets and police the enduring bond of a free constitution." The effect of this speech upon the Austrian states was immediate and general. On the 11th the Diet of lower Austria presented a petition demanding the regular convocation of a representative assembly, liberty of the press, and the reform of justice

and local government. Kossuth's speech translated into German was circulated among the Viennese, who on the 13th rose in revolt. Then the most momentous of events took place. Without a struggle, and as if Austria had been a petty state instead of the first Power in Europe, the government of Metternich, the mainstay of the European system, fell; and Metternich, deserted by the Emperor as well as by the Austrian statesmen but still faithful to the doctrines he had so long upheld, yielded to "the most invincible of forces, that of events," and withdrew from public life. In one effort the Viennese populace, who up to this time had practically taken no part in the political life of Austria, had overthrown the bulwark of conservatism.

The news ran like a lightning flash throughout not only the Austrian states but Europe as well. Hungary responded at once. The address to the Emperor that had been drafted and passed by the House of Delegates on March 3d, was now amended to include freedom of the press, trial by jury, and annual diets at Pesth; and having been passed on the 14th, by both Houses by acclamation, was sent directly to Vienna by a deputation of which Kossuth was a member. The demand for a constitution was granted by the Emperor, and the Diet, resolving itself, on the return of the deputation, into a constituent assembly in which each individual was to cast a free vote, began the work of drafting a constitution for Hungary. At one stroke, under the leadership of men of peaceful and moderate views, and in no way in sympathy with the radicals of Paris or Baden, the Diet swept away the abuses to uproot which the liberal opposition had been working in vain for years. During the month of March the new constitution was drawn up, containing provisions for an independent and responsible ministry, annual diets, triennial elections, extension of the franchise under certain qualifications to every man, whether tradesman, artisan, or peasant, equal taxation, equality of religions, liberty

of the press, establishment of a national guard, and Hungarian control of the army. These, the March Laws, became in all the later constitutional struggles of Hungary the basis of the Hungarian demands. On the 31st the Emperor gave his consent, and with Batthyáni as the head of the ministry, aided by such conservatives as Esterhazy and Széchenyi, and by a moderate as strict and just as Deák, the government of Hungary, which was now bound to Austria by no other than a dynastic connection, entered upon an independent career under most favourable auspices.

The national impulse that had roused the Hungarians to demand autonomy and independence quickened also the Bohemians, who for forty years had been interested in the revival of a national language and a national literature. Overshadowed and subordinated in the past by the large German population and the dominance of the German language in Bohemia, the Czechs had up to this time made little effort to gain either political or educational equality; but animated by the news from France they had begun during the early days of March to draw up quietly and peacefully, in the form of a petition to the Emperor, the national wishes. Through a deputation dispatched to Vienna March 19th they asked for the recognition of the Bohemian nationality; for the political equalisation of German and Czech; for equality of education between the two races; for equality in the distribution of taxes; for increased communal privileges, and improvements in the condition of the peasantry; for liberty of the press, of religion, and the person; for the right of public meeting, and the appointment of suitable persons to public office; and, lastly, for annual diets composed of members from the three provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. On the 24th of March the Emperor conceded nearly all of these wholly reasonable demands.

While Hungary and Bohemia were drafting with remarkable moderation those privileges that they deemed essential to

their existence as autonomous, and not subject, nationalities, the inhabitants of Vienna and the Austrian provinces, quick to recognise their advantageous position, were preparing to force the embarrassed government to make further concessions. After the demands of the Hungarian and Bohemian deputations had been granted with scarcely any qualification, and when the agitation in the city was daily increasing, and reports were coming in of additional uprisings in Germany and of the menacing attitude of the Italian provinces, it was no time for the Austrian government, in disorder, financially embarrassed, without a plan or a resource, its authority gone and its military defence for the moment inadequate, to resist the request of the Viennese for an imperial constitution, and of the people of the upper and lower provinces for increased powers of self-government. A constitution was promised ; and there was every hope that with the abolition of the censorship that had been one of the greatest obstacles to the literary development of Austria, and the breaking down of the old bureaucratic government that had so long checked all local life and initiative, an opportunity would be given to the people of Austria to improve the condition of their country, which, intellectually and materially, was far behind the other states of Europe. The future was to bring grievous disappointments : but when the Emperor authorised the formation of a student regiment and the establishment of a national guard ; when he authorised the provinces to send delegates to a common assembly at Vienna and lightened the press law ; when it was announced that Count Ficquelmont, Metternich's successor, was to begin the drafting of an imperial constitution, Vienna gave herself up to joy and festivity.

Thus far the popular feeling against the government of Austria had been expressed positively but peacefully in demands neither revolutionary nor radical, and by states that were strictly speaking a part of the Empire, in that they accepted the Emperor as their legal sovereign, and had made no effort

to sever their connection with the house of Habsburg. Hungary, Bohemia, and the Austrian provinces, even though they were demanding constitutional privileges of a far-reaching character, remained loyal and willing parts of the Austrian Empire ; but this was not true of those southern provinces whose union with Austria had been compulsory and of recent date, whose affiliations were entirely with Italy, and whose desire was not for constitutional privileges but for entire independence of the rule of the Habsburg house. The uprising in Lombardy and Venetia was, in reality, a part of the general Italian movement, in which the people of Italy made their first great effort to throw off the burden of Austrian rule, to rid themselves of the iniquities of Austrian intervention.

Since the days in January, 1848, when the people of Palermo and Naples had risen against the despotic government of Ferdinand, the revolution in Italy had been creeping steadily northward. Already had the impulsive nature of the Italian people been aroused by the liberal reforms of the Pope, and his attitude toward Austria on the Ferrara question ; already had the granting of constitutions in Naples, February 11th, in Tuscany, February 17th, the promise of a constitution in Piedmont, February 8th, and further reforms and a constitution in Rome, excited the hopes of the Italians from Sicily to the foot of the Alps, and strengthened their feeling that link by link they were striking off the chains that bound them to Austria, and that, too, by methods moderate and, on the whole, peaceful. But as Metternich saw drawing nearer to the Austrian provinces the movement that was gradually undoing all his work in Italy, he felt that the "reign of Young Italy and the most advanced radicalism" had begun, and that the Powers ought to be called together to consider measures for the defence of the principles of public order. The chancellor's reign was, however, about to close, and the "advanced radicalism" that he saw winning constitutional victories in Italy was gathering

strength to overthrow him in his own conservative stronghold. Against it he made one last effort. Fearing that Lombardy and Venetia might yield to the excitement of the time and enter upon an insurrection, he increased the Austrian troops in the provinces, and during the months of January and February applied his repressive policy more vigorously than ever. When the news of the fall of Louis Philippe, of the granting of a constitution by Piedmont, and of further revolutions in the north came to the Lombards and Venetians, a tremor of excitement seized upon the provinces ; but in fear of Radetzky and the Austrian forces they made no sign until the news of the uprising in Vienna, followed by Metternich's flight, encouraged them to believe that the perplexed and entangled Austrian government could lend no more aid to the troops already in Italy. The Italians would not have been human had they failed to take advantage of their opportunity. On March 18th, the day before the deputation left Prague to carry the Bohemian petition to Vienna, with a unanimity of action that displayed long preparation, and a regular correspondence with revolutionists in other countries, Milan rose against the troops under Radetzky with the determination "to break once and for all the infamous treaty that had sold [their] liberties without [their] own consent." The Milanese, after fighting for five days from the house-tops, in the streets, and at the bridges, forced the Austrians to abandon the city ; and, aided by bands of revolutionists from other towns of Lombardy, Como, Bergamo, and Brescia, and from the country districts, drove Radetzky to the Mincio. In less than one week the greater part of Lombardy was free. And Venice also was to do what Milan had done. Prouder than all the other peoples of northern Italy because of their historic past, and feeling with especial bitterness their dependence upon Austria, the Venetians received with unrestrained joy the news that reached them on March 16th of the fall of Metternich. Under the control of Palffy and


Zichy, both Hungarians, the Austrian resistance was only half-heartedly conducted, and on March 22d the Austrian troops evacuated the city, and Daniele Manin proclaimed in the great square of the city the Republic of St. Mark.

The success of Milan and Venice was doubly important to the liberal cause. Not only had the Austrian troops been driven to seek refuge along the banks of the Mincio or in the famous fortresses of the Quadrilateral, but the issue had been raised that the other Italian states had up to this time been hardly ready to consider seriously, the issue of a war with Austria. The Milanese knew that in the struggle that was bound to come aid must be furnished by other and more powerful forces than those of the cities of the two liberated provinces. They therefore turned to Charles Albert of Piedmont for help. It was a crisis in the career of a man upon whom history has passed many judgments, and one the more difficult to meet in that Piedmont had no grievance against Austria of such a character as to constitute a *casus belli*. How could Piedmont justify herself in the eyes of Europe if she undertook a war without a cause more tangible than that of a general feeling of bitterness toward a state that had sought to prevent her constitutional advancement? But the decision hardly lay in the hands of the king. National interests outweighed dynastic, and the demands of Italy proved stronger than the objections of the ruler of Piedmont. The wave of enthusiasm that had moved from Sicily to the Alps during the two exciting months just past, now swept back with redoubled force. "The hour for Austria has struck," was the cry that was taken up, and not by Piedmont alone. Tuscans, Romans, and Neapolitans, roused to a patriotic frenzy by the news from the north, threw themselves into the movement clamouring to be led to the aid of the northern patriots; Parma and Modena were in revolt against their rulers; and Mazzini was urging from Paris the necessity of the co-operation of Young Italy in any project for

war against Austria. Finally Charles Albert yielded, but not without many misgivings ; and on March 23d, having made known his determination to go to the aid of the Lombards, declared war on Austria. In Tuscany the grand duke, also carried away by patriotic fervour, announced that he would be true to the "holy cause of Italy," and ordered regulars and volunteers to prepare for the march to Lombardy. Even in Rome, through the efforts of d'Azeglio and Durando, the Pope was forced to join the war party, and to give his consent to the arming of his troops. And lastly, Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies, yielding to a situation that he could not control, proclaimed to his people, in a speech full of Bourbon hypocrisy, his conversion to the cause of Italian independence. Under William Pepe, the hero of the uprising of 1820, who was again in Naples after an exile of twenty-seven years, the Neapolitan volunteers started northward, strong in the justness of their cause and the expectation of victory. Thus Italy, trusting solely in her own forces, began her first war for independence. The sequel will show the measure of her success ; but for the moment, the armed revolt of the southern provinces of Austria, supported by troops from the four strongest of the Italian states, was of sufficient importance to bind the hand of Austria in Italy, and to prevent her from interfering in the affairs of the north.

In consequence of the difficult position in which Austria was placed because of the concessions made to Hungary, Bohemia, and the home provinces, and of the war in which she was about to enter with Italy, it was impossible for her, even though she was the first state of the Germanic Confederation, to do anything to prevent the steady progress of the revolution in this body which had so long felt the weight of her reactionary policy. The German movement, therefore, went forward unrestrained by any Austrian intervention, and without other obstacles to overcome than those that her own princes and

the conservative parties in her own states placed in her path. Already, before the uprising in Vienna, before Hungary had made known her wishes through the deputation sent to Vienna, and before Italy had declared for war, Germany had begun to act; and the movements in Baden, Würtemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony had no small influence in strengthening the courage of the Bohemians, and in bringing the Viennese radicals to the point of action. In all these South German states the liberal demands, though often excessive, were in large measure granted; and even before the fall of Metternich, the South German governments were becoming liberal in character, and the people even radical and revolutionary in tone. While ministers were conceding liberty of the press, trial by jury, and abolition of feudal dues, and the people, giving themselves up to the excitement and intoxication of success, were too often using the occasion as an opportunity for lawlessness, the moderates, who had the interest of united Germany at heart, were endeavouring to carry out successfully the plan of a German assembly that should be representative not of the estates but of the nation. As the hopes that had centred in the Prussian United Diet were destroyed by the declaration of the king that he would not agree to any form of government based on a written charter; and as the six hundred representatives of the provincial estates separated and went to their homes after a session that boded no good for the future of constitutional government in Prussia, the German liberals turned their attention to the larger questions of the repeal of the hated decrees of 1819 and 1832, the reconstitution of the Germanic Confederation, and the unity of the German fatherland. For the attainment of these ends a meeting of leaders of the constitutional party, as opposed to the radical republicans, was called, October 10, 1847, at Heppenheim near Heidelberg. Here gathered representatives from Würtemberg, Hesse Darmstadt, Nassau, Baden, Prussia, and others of those states that made up the Zollverein,



for the purpose of giving to that commercial union a political character. A proposition, which was, in fact, but another form of Gersdorf's proposal of 1814, to demand an assembly for the states of the Zollverein only, was seen in the existing state of national feeling to be too narrow ; for it was felt that the new German assembly should represent all and not a part of the fatherland. When, therefore, Bassermann proposed in the Baden Chamber on February 12th, and Heinrich von Gagern in that of Hesse Darmstadt on the 27th, such an assembly as had been discussed at Heppenheim, both demanded that the area of representation should be extended from the states of the Zollverein to all the states included in the Germanic Confederation. The news of this proposal of a national German assembly, coming at the same time with the report of the revolution in France roused the enthusiasm of the German people ; and the summons of the new representative body became not only the chief interest of the constitutional party, but the chief hope of all the liberals. In the unanimity of the desire consisted the strength of the liberal cause.

Thus had the plan for a national assembly been already matured before the uprisings in the South German states, due to the news of the revolution in France, made its consummation a certainty. The leaders of the constitutional party, determined to take advantage of the demoralisation of the absolute governments, issued a call for a meeting on March 5th at Heidelberg, to discuss and decide the question of an assembly. Here it was agreed that all parties should lay aside their differences of opinion as to the future form of the German state—whether it should be an empire or a republic—and unite in the one effort to obtain the consent of the other states and the Federal Diet to the summons. A committee of seven was appointed to arrange for the calling of a preliminary convention, and to agree upon some definite method of electing deputies. After Baden, Würtemberg, and Saxony had consented to the scheme,

a program was drawn up by leading liberals embodying a plan for a temporary central government ; and this having been accepted by the various states and conventions as well as by the committee of seven, all that was needed for the successful execution of the new, popular scheme was the consent of Prussia and the Federal Diet.

Upon the position that Prussia should take in this emergency everything depended ; for the liberal leaders felt that, as the head of the Zollverein, Prussia was the natural leader of the new movement, and Württemberg had joined the others with the express stipulation that Prussia should take this position. The history of Prussia's attitude toward liberalism during the years 1847 and 1848 passes through three important stages. In 1847 Frederic William IV. had declared himself positively opposed to a representative assembly, and had refused to consider the proposition of a constitution. The king, firm-bound by the ideas of government in which he had been brought up, and listening with satisfaction to the advice of Metternich, was determined to deal with his people in his own particular way. The news of the February revolution in France only intensified his opposition to the liberal movement ; and believing with Metternich that a second revolution of 1793 was at hand, he consulted with him regarding a congress of the Powers to prevent French aggression. At the same time he took advantage of the occasion to repeat in a new form the proposal, made by Bernstorff in 1831, that Prussia should take the military leadership of the Confederation ; and to this he added the suggestion that a congress of German princes should be called to consider the revision of the legislative authority and the parliamentary procedure of the Federal Diet. To this proposal, made on March 1st, Metternich, who in his determination to maintain the full supremacy of Austria had flatly rejected the proposition in 1831, deemed it wise to yield, and agreed on March 25th as the time for the meeting of the congress. Thus during the

first period the King of Prussia, determined to yield in no way to the liberal influence, was even willing to co-operate with Austria in any project for intervention, and desired to do no more for Germany than to strengthen Prussia's military position and increase the legislative authority of the Federal Diet. But when, after March 1st, the news of the proclamation of the French Republic came to Berlin, and when one after another of the South German states accepted the liberal program, he was of a different mind ; for he saw the need of making some concession to the popular feeling. Yet as late as March 8th he refused to repeal the law limiting liberty of the press, or to consider any privileges that were inconsistent with his own ideas of government ; and clinging to his own plan of a united provincial diet, he repudiated anything like a representative assembly. Fearful of the growing radicalism of the south, and of the new German assembly that was taking on so threatening a form, he determined to strengthen the United Diet, which had proved so obstinate a year before, and, by increasing its powers, to make it a support for monarchy and a safeguard against revolution. On March 12th a patent was issued summoning this body to meet on the 27th of April ; and in order to allay the discontent engendered by the royal attitude of the year before, he agreed that a written definition should be made of its powers. Though such a contract with the United Diet, whereby certain legislative functions and a limited control over taxation were conceded, was in no sense a constitution, it indicates the full extent of the royal liberality at the close of the second stage in the history of Prussia's attitude toward the revolution. But the fall of Metternich on the 13th, and the acceptance by Bavaria of the project of a national assembly wrought a great change. There was now no thought of a congress of princes on the 25th ; Metternich had fallen a victim to "the disorder of an epoch fundamentally perverse," and Frederic William had lost his guide and adviser in reac-

tionary doctrines. No help was to be expected from Austria and the South German states ; and if Prussia were to maintain the respect of the people of her own state, she must take prompt action. It was determined, therefore, to call a new ministry, to repeal the hated press-law, and to issue a new patent. According to this patent, which was drafted on the 17th, the United Diet was to be summoned for the 2d of April instead of the 27th, a constitutional system was to be introduced into the kingdom, and, most remarkable of all, the project of the new national assembly was to be accepted.

It is evident that these liberal concessions were not due to any special desire of the King of Prussia for reform or to any uprising of the people either of Berlin or the provinces, but solely to pressure from without. When Frederic William yielded he did so with doubt and hesitation, and largely for the sake of avoiding a riot in the streets of Berlin. But in the issuing of the patent, a delay, due to the desire that the document be signed by the new ministry, led to an insurrection in the city, which lasted from March 18th to March 20th, and during which the streets were barricaded and the city was in the hands of the rioters. This outbreak has led to no little discussion on the part of Prussian writers, because it seems to have been without sufficient cause, inasmuch as it was generally known that the king had promised a constitution and had accepted the plan for a national assembly. In all probability it resulted from a misunderstanding in regard to the disposition of the troops, and was made more serious by the excitable condition of the people, by an unfortunate gun discharge, and, more important than all else, by the interference of republican agitators from other states who were determined to force a crisis. The effect of this event upon the king was very remarkable. Unable to reach a conclusion after four days of wavering, he at last turned his thought to the larger interests of the people whom he loved, and of the Germany he longed to see once

more an empire surrounded by all the brilliancy of the romantic past. On March 21st, accompanied by the crown prince and by his ministers and generals, and followed by a great throng of citizens, he led a procession through the crowded streets of the city, wearing across his breast the old German colours, black, red, and yellow, and every now and then stopping to address groups of citizens with high-sounding phrases that accorded well with the spectacle in which he was taking the leading part. During the evening of the same day he issued a proclamation which contained these words: "I assume to-day the leadership in the hour of danger; my people will not desert me, and Germany will gather around me with confidence. Prussia henceforth takes the lead in Germany." A few days afterward a decree was issued in which the king promised to summon a representative assembly for Prussia, which should draw up a constitution in accordance with the wishes of the Prussian constitutional party, and in the election of which every male citizen over twenty-five years of age should be qualified to participate. In due time, on the 22d of May, this Constituent Assembly, which represented the nation and not the estates, met at Berlin, and began the task of drafting the constitution.

By these acts the king entirely reversed the reactionary policy, in favour of which he had declared himself only one short month before, and Prussia took her place in the ranks of the liberal states. Already had the committee of seven made all its preparations for the Preliminary Convention to meet at Frankfort, at which definite measures were to be taken regarding the calling of the national assembly. But as yet the Federal Diet had taken no action. It was no time, however, now that Metternich's influence was removed, and Austria was endeavouring to preserve what remnants of authority were still left to her, to think of resisting a project to the execution of which Bavaria and Prussia had given their consent. The Diet desired only to forestall the work of the Convention by

officially determining the form that the national assembly should take, by deciding who should be the president of the new body, Prussia or Austria, by settling the question whether there should be one chamber or two, and by fixing the method of election and the proportion of representation. But the days passed ; the time came for the meeting of the Convention ; and still the Diet had practically done nothing. Therefore, on March 30th, without settling the question of the headship, and having, in a sense, shirked the question of the number of chambers by stating that only one was possible considering the existing popular feeling, the Diet gave its legal sanction to a national assembly, and authorised the states of the Confederation to send representatives in the proportion of one to seventy thousand inhabitants, chosen either by the people or by the assemblies as each state preferred, to meet at Frankfort for the purpose of drawing up a constitution for Germany. The decision of the Diet, it may be well to notice here, was not accepted by the Convention, which, though without official standing, was in fact more influential than the Diet, in that it directly represented the German people whose will at this time was law. Coming together the day after the Diet had issued its decree, this Convention reduced the proportion to one in fifty thousand inhabitants, and voted unanimously that the representatives should be elected by universal suffrage. The Diet, retiring from the position taken on March 30th, confirmed the decision of the Convention, repealed the Carlsbad decrees, authorised Prussia to protect the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and admitted East and West Prussia into the Confederation. With the election of the representatives in the various states during the interval from April 4th to May 18th, and the gathering of the members of the assembly on the latter date at Frankfort, the first great period in the revolution of 1848 in Germany came to an end.

Truly hopes were high at the close of that famous month of

March. With Hungary and Bohemia guaranteed constitutional independence ; with the Austrian provinces already awaiting the promised imperial constitution ; with Lombardy and Venetia free ; with four Italian states possessing constitutions, and all agreed on a war with Austria ; and, lastly, with the promise of a constitution in Prussia, and a National Assembly about to draft a constitution for a united Germany ; it is little wonder that to the people of Europe the supremacy of absolutism and legitimism seemed to be forever overthrown, and the era of constitutional government begun.

Thus far the movement had been characterised by moderation and unanimity of action ; for the demands of the liberals, reasonable in themselves, had been made without undue excitement. In Baden and Vienna there had been a certain amount of violence, in Paris, Milan, and Venice serious fighting and bloodshed ; but in the majority of cases the control of the movement had been in the hands of men of moderate rather than of radical views, supporters not of republican nor of anarchical forms of government, but of constitutional monarchy guaranteeing a reasonable measure of popular liberty and, under certain qualifications, a share in government to all classes alike. Such moderation was the more remarkable because it was maintained in the presence of so many disintegrating forces. So long had the patriots of Germany, Hungary, and Italy waited for the day of success, that when it did come, they put aside for the moment all differences of political opinion and of national interest in their great desire to obtain the object upon which all hearts were set. The enthusiasm and courage, which the hope of success engendered, carried the liberals in those exciting March days safely through many perils, and concealed from view still others that were destined to shipwreck the whole cause in the end. Italy in her eagerness for war with Austria did not realise how hollow was the support of many of the princes, who, forced by

the vehement passion of their subjects, had sanctioned a movement in which they had little faith ; Hungary and Bohemia, dominated by the single idea of winning from Austria a recognition of their historic rights, did not appreciate, even if they understood, the dangers that were to arise from the diversity of races within their boundaries ; while Germany, setting aside all political differences in the one hope that a national assembly would solve all difficulties, postponed many a question of vital importance that was destined to bring about irreconcilable party feeling in the future. This singleness of purpose, concentration of action, and economising of strength that characterised the March days was made doubly efficient by the embarrassment of Austria. Other states made helpless by their long dependence on Metternich, and their long adherence to the system of government that he advocated, found themselves without a guide, and, unable to offer an efficient resistance, were forced to drift with the current of liberalism.

But the liberals had yet to discover that promises unwillingly made and concessions unwillingly granted are but an uncertain guarantee of permanent success. With the close of the March days the countries of central Europe entered upon the most difficult part of their work. The moderates, by whom in large part the victory had been won, had still to make good the advantages thus far gained, a task in which they were confronted by dangers other than those which threatened to create division and discord among themselves. On one hand they had to reckon with the power of a revived Austria, who was determined to take her revenge for the humiliation recently inflicted upon her ; on the other, with those radical and socialistic spirits, who, hating the moderates because of their willingness to compromise, were determined to put into operation their own extreme doctrines regarding government. Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc in France, Mazzini in Italy, Giskra in Vienna, Hecker and Struve in Germany, and Kossuth and

the revolutionary party in Hungary, fanatical upholders of inopportune and injudicious measures, were in no small degree a menace to the cause of progress. At the same time the moderates had to reckon with the spirit of conservatism that still possessed so many of those who feared lest liberalism meant radical socialism, and preferred to be on the side of the stable past than to rush to an uncertain future, the character of which they knew nothing.

As it had been the fall of Metternich and the demoralisation of the Austrian government that had given the signal for so many of the March revolts, so it was to Austria *redivivus* that the failure of the revolutionary movement was in the last instance due. It was too much to expect that the Power which had controlled the diplomatic history of Europe for thirty-five years, and which looked back for six centuries over a past more important than that of any other continental Power save France, should be permanently overthrown by even so general an uprising as that of March. Austria stood for established government based upon the past, for security against revolution and disorder, for the maintenance of diplomatic agreements and treaties ; and in this position she was supported not only by the strength of her own institutions, by the prestige of her own great name, and by the forces that she could bring to bear upon all movements that aimed at the overthrow of the existing order, but also by the conservative princes of Europe, who, though they had made concessions to liberalism, had done so unwillingly, and with doubt in their innermost hearts as to the expediency of the great changes that were threatening Europe. Austria's power was far from destroyed ; for she was destined to recover her efficiency and leadership in a way almost incredible to one who has followed her career during the latter days of March. She was destined to take her place once more as the dominant Power of central Europe, to be again an obstacle in the path of progress, and to over-

throw by military force the liberty which the March days had begun to make real. In speaking of Austria's attack on liberalism Robert Blum once said, that "five men who manage the army cannot understand that though their bullets may kill men they cannot make a single hole in the idea that rules the world"; but the liberals were to learn that popular enthusiasm and popular uprisings could not overthrow at a single stroke ideas that up to this time had dominated the minds and influenced the actions of the greater number of princes and diplomats of Europe.

The material strength of Austria and her last resource lay in her army, that instrument whereby Metternich had so often made good his famous and oft-repeated maxim, *la force dans la droit*. Yet it, too, had suffered in those days of March when a body of untrained citizen-soldiers had driven out of Milan the tried Croats of Radetzky, and had forced that experienced general to the banks of the Mincio. And now Italy, enthusiastically confident of her ability to throw off the Austrian yoke single-handed, was advancing under the leadership of the King of Piedmont to complete the work that Milanese bravery had begun. It was a critical time for Austria, for if the army should fail her and Radetzky be driven from the Quadrilateral up the Adige through the Tyrol, or be surrounded and captured at Peschiera where he was soon to take refuge, not only would Austria lose her control of Italy, but by giving way under this last stroke and separating into a number of independent national states she might disappear as a great Power from Europe. Or, on the other hand, should the war with Italy be long-drawn-out, and the Italians show sufficient unity of action to win the moral support of Europe, Austria would find herself powerless when the final struggle came with Hungary and Germany; and, in case France and England decided to aid the Italian cause, might suffer a diplomatic defeat that would injure her prestige among the Powers. The Italian war

was to test the situation ; for on its issue depended the fortunes of Austria.

On March 26th, Charles Albert left Turin, and at the head of the Piedmontese army hurried across Lombardy to Cremona, hoping thereby to prevent Radetzky, who had not yet crossed the Mincio, from entering the Quadrilateral. In a skirmish at Goito, April 8th, as Radetzky was passing up the river, the Piedmontese won a victory that sent a thrill of joy through Italy and increased the courage of the royal army. But as the Austrian general withdrew into the Quadrilateral it became evident that the task before the king, of defeating the Austrians or of driving them out of Venetia, was a more serious one than had at first been supposed, and one that would require able generalship, and energetic and efficient co-operation of all the Italians, were it to be performed successfully. During the month of April the Austrian fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua were assaulted but in vain, and a desultory guerilla warfare was carried on that did little more than give a much needed experience to the Piedmontese troops, very few of whom had ever been under fire. By the end of April volunteers from Rome arrived, and these, together with a small body of men from Tuscany and about the same number from the Lombard cities, raised the effective force of the king to very nearly ninety thousand men. So full of hope did the cause of Italy seem during these April days, and so embarrassing was the situation in which the Austrian government found itself, that Ficquelmont, the Austrian chancellor, began to treat for peace, and offered to give up Lombardy if Charles Albert would withdraw from the war. It was a tempting offer ; but the king held firmly to his pledge of freeing northern Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, and on April 30th he received at Pastrengo a merited reward, for his troops made a successful attack upon an Austrian corps that had been placed as a guard

in the valley of the Adige to prevent an advance of the Piedmontese upon Verona.

But the noble persistence of the King of Piedmont and the courage of the army fighting against Austria availed little against the forces that were undermining the strength of the Italians. The best ally of Austria was the lack of unity, the jealousy, and the lukewarm spirit that the Italians showed as soon as the war was actually begun. At the very outset of the campaign it was evident that Charles Albert did not have the full support of the people of Milan and other Lombard cities, a state of affairs that was due partly to the over-confidence of the Milanese, who, underestimating the valour of the Austrians, imagined them as fleeing in terror up the Adige back to Austria ; partly to the inefficiency of the provisional government of Milan, which failed to do its part in supporting the king ; and partly to the opposition of the Lombard republicans, who charged Charles Albert with dynastic ambitions. At the same time the king, though the acknowledged head of the war, had, in fact, no authority over other troops than his own ; and in consequence, Tuscans, Romans, Lombards, and Venetians, obeying only when they chose to do so, failed more often than not to co-operate with him when he most needed them. With Garibaldi and Mazzini, each of whom offered his services, relations were far from satisfactory ; while to complete the embarrassment of the king, Piedmont became involved in a long-drawn-out diplomatic controversy with the neutral Powers, for Prussia and Russia had shown their sympathy for Austria by withdrawing their representatives from Turin, and England, who supported the Italian cause, was opposed to the war.

The difficulties that confronted the King of Piedmont were vastly increased by other events of the month of April, during which the Italian army was lying practically inactive before the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. The Pope, who had been

urged by his ministers to declare himself in sympathy with the war, had for some time been undecided as to whether his duties as spiritual head of the Roman Catholic Church were not higher than his obligations as temporal prince of an Italian state. In supporting the Italian cause he should be warring not only against the first state of the Germanic Confederation, but also against the first son of the church, thus making possible a loss of spiritual influence, and perhaps, in the end, schism. Finally, on April 29th, he read to the College of Cardinals an allocution, in which he took a definite stand regarding the foreign relations of the Roman state. He practically repudiated the attempt of the other princes of Italy to war against Austria, and declared that the troops under General Durando had been sent north for the single purpose of guarding the papal frontier from outside attack. He rejected the Neo-Guelph plan of a papal presidency of an Italian republic; and in extending a fatherly love to all nations counselled peace, and obedience to all rulers who possessed the legitimate title to govern their people. By this allocution the people of Italy were informed that not only was the co-operation of the Pope no longer to be expected, but that the moral support of the church had been withdrawn. The war was no longer "holy," and the dream of Gioberti, who had seen a federation of Italian states under the presidency of the Pope, was over. Frightened at the effect his words produced, the Pope consented to the establishment of a liberal government at Rome under Count Mamiani; yet he had deliberately cut loose from the cause of Italy, and while antagonising the Neo-Guelphs, had given encouragement to every reactionary prince and enemy of the war. Hardly had the full purport of the Pope's action been realised by the Italians when they were confronted by the rumour that the liberal cause had been defeated in Naples, and that Ferdinand, who had only entered into the war because under the circumstances he could not do otherwise, had taken

advantage of an uprising in the streets of Naples to recall the troops from Bologna. General Pepe, the commander of the troops, refused to obey, but the majority of the soldiers, placing the authority of the king above that of the general, deserted and returned to their homes. This defection was doubly disastrous, for not only did it show that Naples was about to abandon entirely the national cause, but it also weakened the national forces at a time (May 20th) when reinforcements were on their way from Austria to aid Radetzky, and Charles Albert needed the help of every Italian soldier.

Thus before the close of May, the war that three months before had been undertaken with so much enthusiasm was already half lost. A reaction of fear seizing upon the Papal States and Naples had divided the south from the north; differences of policy, even among those who were continuing the struggle, were preventing efficient action, and forcing the King of Piedmont to carry on the war practically alone; jealousy and distrust between radicals and conservatives were dividing Italy's forces, for the king disliked the republicans, and Mazzini and the Milanese looked upon the royal policy as selfish, half-hearted, and dynastic:—these were the obstacles in the path of the Italians that, combined with the natural hesitation of Charles Albert, gave Radetzky the desired opportunity to recoup his forces and caused him to urge the Emperor not to negotiate with the Lombards. He was sure of an ultimate victory, he said, and his forecast was true. Even though Charles Albert's victory at Pastrengo (April 30th) and a later advantage at Goito (May 30th) gave to Italy a gleam of hope, and led to a somewhat untimely decision on the part of Lombardy, Venice, and the duchies of Parma and Modena to unite politically with Piedmont; nevertheless, when at last Radetzky found himself strong enough for aggressive action, and the two forces met at Custozza on July 25th, the Italians, badly defeated, were forced back into Lombardy with all hope of driving the

Austrians out of Venetia destroyed. But even at Milan, whither the king had retreated in the hope of saving the city, a successful resistance to the approaching Austrians was found to be impossible ; and after long hesitation, the king, who through all the campaign had never failed in his loyalty to the cause that he had espoused, negotiated for an armistice. In consequence of this he nearly lost his life at the hands of the frenzied mob of the city. No better commentary upon the failure of the Italian war is needed than that fearful Saturday in Milan, when the maddened crowd sought to take the life of the man who for three months had been defending by every means in his power the cause of Milan and Italy. On August 9th an armistice arranged by General Salasco was signed with Austria, and the king agreed to evacuate Lombardy, Venetia, and the duchies, and to withdraw his fleet from Venice.

Italy's attempt to gain independence under the leadership of princes had been watched by the republicans and radicals at first with sympathy, but finally with distrust ; and now that she had failed they seized the opportunity of wresting from the moderates the control of the Italian movement, and of putting into operation in certain centres their own principles of government. In Venice the people refusing to accept the terms of the Salasco armistice, called Daniele Manin to the headship of the republic, and prepared to resist Austria single-handed ; in Turin the radicals grew daily in influence, and in Genoa, were on the eve of a revolt ; in Leghorn the citizens resisting the authority of the Tuscan grand duke took part in an uprising that for scenes of violence rivalled the insurrection in Paris of the February before ; while in Florence the democrats, taking advantage of the many concessions thus far made, forced the grand duke to flee from the city, proclaimed the republic on the 7th of February, and established a government of triumvirs, of whom Guerrazzi was chief.

But it was at Rome that the victory of the radicals was most

complete. The positions that the Pope had occupied, those of pontiff and prince—were of necessity antagonistic to each other ; and in his endeavour to carry out the policy that each demanded, he laid himself open to charges of inconsistency and vacillation. While refusing to war against Austria, he permitted his subjects as individuals to take part in the campaign ; he expressed himself as desirous of continuing the liberal government at Rome, yet allowed his ministers to be hampered in the carrying out of important temporal measures by cardinals at home and legates abroad who were known to be trying to win the Pope to the cause of reaction. When Austria, after completing her conquest of Lombardy, entered the Papal Legations and occupied Ferrara, Pius IX. merely protested ; and even when Austrian troops advanced farther into the Romagna and entered Bologna, he refused to consider the demand of the Roman people for war. In consequence of this attitude, the Roman Parliament, which had up to this time given him its confidence and support, became distrustful, and more radical in tone. So strained were the relations between the Pope and the Parliament that Count Mamiani, finding his position untenable, resigned on August 1, 1848, and after an interval of six weeks, during which Count Fabbri was prime minister, was succeeded by Pellegrino Rossi, ex-minister of Louis Philippe and friend of Guizot.

In his earlier years Rossi had been a Muratist, and a professor of law at Bologna ; but in 1815 he had removed to Geneva, and in 1833, when an effort had been made to establish in Switzerland a stronger central government than that of 1815, had brought his legal training to bear on the problem of the Swiss constitution. His fame as an economist and a lawyer attracted the attention of Guizot, and led to the invitation to settle in France. There he became a professor in the College of France and in the law school, a member of the Institute, and a peer of France, and finally, ambassador to Rome. Relieved of this office by the revolution of February he had remained in Italy

until Pius IX., whose personal friend he was, called him to be the chief of his cabinet ; and in September, 1848, he undertook the difficult task of allying the papacy with modern civilisation, and of rendering the Romans free and the Italians united. He tried in large part to do what he had attempted in Switzerland fifteen years before, that is, to find a middle course between ecclesiasticism on one side, and radicalism on the other. But as his work for Switzerland had been rejected because of the opposition of the conservative cantons, so his work for the papacy was to prove a failure because of the opposition of the radicals. He was hated by the ecclesiastics because of his liberal views, his writings, and his protestant wife ; and distrusted by the republicans because of his friendship with Guizot, his moderate policy, and his determination to suppress disorder at Rome. Although in the two months of his leadership he made noteworthy attempts to reform the administration of the city and the provinces, to strengthen the finances, the law, and the police, and, in external affairs, to effect a league of the Italian states, he alienated many supporters by his sarcasm and ridicule, and antagonised the revolutionary element by his enforcement of the policy of resistance. After attacking him vehemently in their clubs and their newspapers, the revolutionists dared at last to attack him in person, and on November 15th he was assassinated on the steps of the palace in which Parliament had just convened. This act destroyed every hope of a moderate government in Rome, and threw the power into the hands of the republican party. Emboldened by the death of Rossi, the leaders of this party at once demanded of the Pope the summons of a constituent assembly, the calling of a liberal ministry, and a decree favouring the national war ; but these demands the Pope refused, saying that he would do nothing under compulsion. When, however, a riot broke out in the city and a revolution seemed imminent, he yielded, and authorised the formation of a radical ministry. The Roman

movement had, however, passed the limits of papal endurance. What Pius IX. might have accomplished by his honourable attempt to bring the church into touch with modern society, had Italy's advance toward reform been gradual and not revolutionary, can only be conjectured. That he failed was due, in the first instance, to the fact that while this attempt was being made the revolution of 1848 burst upon Europe, and he was called upon, in order to keep pace with the movement, to accept ideas that were tending to establish, without deliberation and without transition, a constitutional form of government. Finding himself out of sympathy with these ideas, and realising that his authority over his people was gone, he secretly left Rome on November 25th, and put himself under the protection of the King of Naples at Gaëta. The republicans, now in full possession of Rome, established a provisional government, and called a Constituent Assembly for the following February. Three days after the deputies had assembled, on the night of the 7th of February, 1849, and after an exciting and tumultuous session, the Constituent Assembly declared the temporal power of the papacy to be abolished ; and following the example already set by the revolutionists in France, proclaimed the Roman Republic.

. Thus at the close of 1848 and the beginning of 1849 the situation in Italy was most discouraging to the moderate constitutionalists, and pleasing only to those who like Mazzini, Sterbini, Guerrazzi, and others were determined to force on the people of Italy, without regard to their needs and their education, a constitutional government of the most extreme republican character. This tendency of the revolution to throw the supremacy in each country into the hands of the radical party, which was soon to be illustrated by the course of events in Germany and Hungary, had already made itself evident in Vienna. During the month of May, 1848, after Charles Albert had won the battle of Pastrengo, and the people of northern Italy had

voted for fusion with Piedmont, and when the outcome of the Italian war was wholly uncertain, the situation in Vienna was daily growing worse. The constitution, the promise of which had been received by the Viennese with so much satisfaction, when finally promulgated by imperial edict on the 25th of April proved to be little more than a copy of the Belgian constitution, and consequently but poorly suited to the conditions of Austria. In the opinion of the people of Vienna it gave too much strength to the aristocratic and landholding elements, paid too little attention to the differences of race in the Austrian Empire, and took no account of the recent guarantees given to Bohemia. Dissatisfaction led to agitation, and under the direction of a central committee of professors and students new demands were made. The Emperor was asked to revise the constitution in the interest of popular supremacy, by the substitution of a single representative chamber for the double chamber, which had been arranged for in the constitution in order to preserve the ascendancy of an hereditary peerage. The Austrian ministry, unable to resist, granted these demands; but the movement was becoming too radical for the weak-minded Emperor Ferdinand, and on May 17th he secretly left Vienna and fled to Innsbruck. A momentary reaction took place in the city, and the ministry, taking advantage of this, made an effort to recover its control by decreeing the abolition of the student regiment that had taken the lead in the recent agitation. But when on the 26th another outbreak seemed imminent, the ministry again gave way, revoked its order abolishing the student regiment, and consented to the establishment of a committee of public safety to be composed of members of the middle and peasant classes, under the leadership of Dr. Fischhof, one of the agitators of March 13th. By this act the government handed over the control of the city of Vienna to the people and their leaders, and power for the time being fell into the hands of the Viennese agitators.

But Austria's humiliation at home was nearing its end, and the tide was soon to turn in her favour as her strength revived, and the real weaknesses of her enemies began to appear. The first advantage to be taken of that rivalry of the races, which was destined in the end to prove so disastrous to the struggling nationalities, was in Bohemia. In that kingdom there were, as we have seen, two races, German and Czech, the latter of whom were Slavs. The party and racial lines of these two races were far from always agreeing, and their interests were often industrially and socially antagonistic. After the return from Vienna of the deputation that had borne the petition of the Czechs to the Emperor, a serious disagreement arose. The Germans, excited by the appearance of a delegation from the Convention at Frankfort, began to consider with interest the project of sending members to the National Assembly of Germany that was to open on the 18th of May. But this plan the Czechs strenuously resisted, knowing full well that if Bohemia were in any way joined with Germany, she herself could never become an autonomous state, nor use the privileges already granted her in the imperial decree of April 8th. In this crisis the Czechs appealed to Austria, hoping that the imperial government would forbid the election of delegates; but the ministry, already involved in a conflict with the Germans of Vienna, refused to do anything further to offend the German element. Failing of help from this quarter, the Czechs at once put into execution a scheme of their own. On May 1st they issued an appeal to all the Slavs to send delegates to Prague to a panslavic congress that should do for the Slavs what the Frankfort Assembly was planning to do for the Germans, that is, to strengthen the loyalty for the common nationality. To this congress the Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks sent 237 delegates, the Poles and Ruthenians 41, and the Serbs and Croats 42. Opened on June 2d by the historian Palacky, it at once began to formulate projects for the union

of all the children of the common Slavonic mother, to discuss a future for Bohemia commensurate with the greatness of her past, and to draw up manifestos to other countries and other governments. But while the congress was peacefully pursuing its work, the deep-seated rivalries of race and class were leading to disturbances in Prague itself. Troubles between employers and workmen, the hatred of Czech for German, the interference of the Slovak radical, Turanksi—who was said to have been sent by the Magyars to effect the dissolution of the congress—the appointment of Windischgrätz to the command of the imperial forces in Prague—these and other similar causes led to various outbreaks that finally culminated in a riot on the 12th of June, just at the time that the session of the congress was drawing to a close. Shots were exchanged in the streets, barricades were erected, and acts of violence committed. For four days attempts were made, both by the Austrian commander and by the moderates, to effect a peaceful settlement of the difficulties; but as the rioting checked in one quarter broke out in another, Windischgrätz declared the town to be in a state of siege, and turned his cannon against the rioters. The bombardment of Prague, followed by the establishment of a military government over the city and the proclamation of martial law, reduced the city to subjection; but a continuance of the congress was now out of the question. With the dispersion of the members every hope of a union of all the Slavonic peoples vanished, autonomy for Bohemia was no longer possible, and the hatred of the Czech for the German and the Magyar became greater than ever. Thus was Austria enabled, in the main through the rash acts of the excitable populace of Prague; to win her first victory over those who two months before had wrung from her the promise of constitutional liberties.

But in Hungary the national rivalries reached their height. There the dominance of the Magyars had been maintained in

the past at the expense of many subordinate races, each with its own traditions, its language, its literature, and its religion. In the winning of the March constitution the victory had lain entirely with the Magyars, and no thought had been taken of the liberties of those other peoples, Serbs, Croats, Saxons, and Roumanians, who had already begun to realise their national importance, and were ready to struggle for such national privileges as the use of their own language and the exercise of local government. Among the Saxons and Roumanians in eastern Hungary this wish for greater privileges was expressed during the summer of 1848, but it was voiced with greater emphasis by the stronger races of the south, the Serbs and the Croats, who looked to the Diet at Pressburg for those liberties that the Magyars had themselves won from the government at Vienna. The plan of separating the Slavs of the south from the Magyars was not new; for many years there had existed among the Croats and Slavonians a movement known as Illyrism, which had for its object the national independence of a united Slavonic kingdom made up of Carniola, Carinthia, Istria, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, and Servia, provinces located mainly on the southern side of the river Drave. After the revolution of March, the Magyars had endeavoured to check the growth of this movement by offering to the southern Slavs a share as individuals in the gains of the revolution; but as accepting this proposal meant the sinking of the Slavonic nationality in that of the Hungarian, the Serbs and Croats refused to consider it. The Croats in their determination to preserve their national integrity had as early as March 29th dispatched a deputation to Vienna to ask for the autonomy already granted to the Magyars; and though this request had been refused, another asking for the appointment of Baron Jellachich as governor of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia had been granted by the Emperor. Jellachich, a native of Croatia, had been elected by the Croats as their *ban* and was known to be a determined enemy of

the Magyars ; but even though the Emperor appointed him before the petition was actually handed in, there is no reason to suppose that in doing so he had any intention of casting an affront upon the Magyars or of stirring up a revolt among the Croats, inasmuch as at this time Jellachich was not looked upon as a champion of Austrian unity.

Shortly after the appointment of Jellachich and the rejection of the chief petition of the Croats, a deputation of the Serbs set out from Neusatz, the commercial centre of Slavonia, and another from Carlowitz, the clerical centre, for Pressburg, where was sitting the new Hungarian ministry of Batthyáni, which had been appointed under the March Laws. These deputations asked from Hungary the recognition of the language and customs of Slavonia, and the concession of a separate patriarch and a separate *vojvode*, or old clan lord, of the Serbs. The rejection of these petitions, and the knowledge that the Magyars were determined to enforce the use of the Magyar language in all the provinces, roused the antagonism of the Serbs ; and during the months of April and May movements were started in Slavonia that soon took the form of open revolt. On May 13th at Carlowitz the Serbs meeting in assembly voted to organise themselves as a separate nation, and to re-establish without the consent of Hungary, the offices of patriarch and *vojvode*. By this act they became rebels against the Hungarian Diet, and the latter began at once to take military measures to compel their obedience.

In the meantime the Croatian movement was rapidly becoming a rebellion. The natural hatred of Magyars for Croats increased, for the former looked upon the appointment of Jellachich, in regard to which they had not been consulted, as an imperial recognition of Croatian independence, and an unwarranted interference of the Austrian court in the affairs of Hungary. And no sooner was Jellachich installed in office on April 14th than he began to encourage this independent atti-

tude of the Croats and their hatred of the Magyar. He allowed Magyar officials to be driven from the country ; and when the Hungarian government ordered the Croatian authorities to enter into correspondence with the Hungarian departments of state, he advised, and even commanded, them not to do so. This, as a direct contravention of the imperial guarantees of March, was an affront to the Emperor as well as to the Hungarian government ; yet even when, at the request of Batthyáni, the Hungarian premier, an imperial rescript was issued commanding him to respect the Hungarian authorities, he refused. In response to the decree from Pressburg that at once placed him under the ban of the Hungarian government he convened the Croatian Assembly, and when, in consequence, the Emperor declared him a rebel and the assembly dissolved, dared to defy him by threatening to recall the Croats from the army in Italy, and so involve Radetzky in inevitable defeat.

This action of Jellachich would be inexplicable did we not know that the Austrian government had already seen in him the willing instrument whereby the integrity of the Empire might be preserved. After June, 1848, a change took place in Austria's relations with the revolting Slavs ; for Jellachich, having come to an understanding with the Serbs, let it be known that the safety of the Empire lay to no small extent in his hands. Consequently, after June 29th, when he was invested by the Croatian Assembly with dictatorial powers, he was recognised not as the champion of Croatian independence, but as the upholder of the unity of Austria, the soldier of the Empire. No further effort was made by Ferdinand to prevent his assuming the full governorship of Croatia, and but one more attempt was made to effect a peaceful settlement, when in July Batthyáni and Jellachich were brought together at Vienna. But no reconciliation was possible, and the Hungarian premier and the Croatian *ban* parted to begin preparations for war.

Hungary's position was now becoming perilous. On July

With the Diet, transferred to Pesth, had on the motion of Kossuth granted two hundred thousand men and forty two millions gulden to defend the state against Slavonic uprisings ; and it was evident that the pressure of danger was strengthening the hand of the war party, and bringing to the front the revolutionary leaders who, in opposition to the pacific policy of the Batthyáni ministry, were outspoken in their hostility to Austria. At the same time the new policy at Vienna, which had already influenced the attitude of the government toward Jellachich, was taking a more definite shape with those of the ministry, notably Latour, the minister of war, who were antagonistic to Hungarian liberty, and were determined to take every advantage to increase the number of Hungary's enemies and to force the Emperor, whether he wished it or not, to adopt a system of rigid centralisation for the Austrian state. When in August the defeat of Charles Albert at Custozza had by releasing a part of Radetzky's army enabled the Emperor to return from Innsbruck to Vienna, this policy was put into practical operation. In consequence of certain acts of the Hungarian Diet regarding the attitude of Hungary toward Italy and Germany, and its refusal to assume a share of the Austrian national debt, the imperial decree went forth on August 22d reducing the powers of the Count Palatine of Hungary, Archduke Stephen, annulling the loan and recruiting laws, and commanding the Hungarian government to relinquish its hostile preparations against the Serbs and Croats. On September 4th, even while Batthyáni and Deák at Vienna were endeavouring to effect the withdrawal of the decree, and a deputation of one hundred Magyars was on its way from Pesth to supplement the appeal of the premier and his minister of justice, another decree was issued reinstating Jellachich in all his honours. Five days afterward, while the Magyar deputation was striving to influence the Emperor, who had long since ceased to take any guiding part in the affairs of state, Jellachich, confident now of the

full support of the Austrian cabinet, crossed the Drave at the head of his Croats and thirty thousand Serbs, and entered Hungary.

The effect of this invasion was immediate and momentous ; it made hopeless the peace policy represented by the palatine and the ministry of Batthyáni, which had up to this time pursued a strictly constitutional course ; and it strengthened the hand of Kossuth and the revolutionists, who were in control in the Hungarian Diet. Schechényi, Eötvös, and Deák in despair at once withdrew. On September 21st the palatine, unable to bring Jellachich to a discussion of a peaceful agreement, and convinced that the latter was acting under orders from the Emperor, gave up his office and left Hungary. The position of the March government was rapidly becoming untenable ; even though Batthyáni remained and endeavoured to form a new ministry, nevertheless on one side the Austrian government no longer supported him, while on the other Kossuth and the revolutionists, in their desire to obtain from the Hungarian Diet the proclamation of a dictatorship and war with Austria, were working against him. Only one more event was needed to complete the overthrow of the peace party and to bring the revolutionists into full control.

On September 25th new ministerial appointments were made for Hungary : Mailath was substituted for the Archduke Stephen, Bay for Batthyáni, and General Lamberg was created commander-in-chief of all the forces in Hungary, both Magyar and Croat. The appointment of Lamberg was unfortunate, for, as his commission was not countersigned by the Hungarian premier, he was looked upon by the people of Pesth as a military usurper. Pesth was the centre of the radical feeling, and the natural hostility of its people toward the Austrian government had recently been increased by the refusal of the Viennese Parliament to receive the Magyar deputation sent to Vienna a few weeks before. For this refusal, an unworthy act, the Czech

members of the Parliament, who charged the Magyars with having instigated the riot in Prague, were chiefly responsible. The revolutionary excitement in Pesth was at this juncture made more intense by the action of the Hungarian Diet forbidding Lamberg to assume command, and establishing a provisional government under Kossuth. So great was the popular wrath that when Lamberg appeared at Pesth to carry out the imperial orders, he was attacked on the bridge crossing the Danube, and brutally murdered. This act, for which the radical party was indirectly responsible, destroyed all hope of peace; immediately Batthyáni gave up his premiership, and power fell into the hands of the war party.

The Austrian government now threw off its mask. On October 3d the Emperor declared the Hungarian Diet dissolved, and appointed Jellachich to full command of all the imperial forces in Hungary. This decree roused the democrats of Vienna, who had controlled the affairs in the city since the appointment of the committee of public safety on May 26th but who had not favoured the Hungarian movement as long as it was controlled by a conservative ministry. But now revolutionist joined with revolutionist, and the Magyar deputation having been refused an audience by the Viennese Parliament, found a hearing among the radicals in the streets. A report that Latour, the minister of war, was planning to send a regiment of troops to aid Jellachich in enforcing the imperial decree, gave to the Viennese their opportunity. Poverty and distress, financial difficulties, sympathy for the Hungarians, hatred for the Czechs, and above all the policy of the committee of public safety, which by guaranteeing the *droit au travail* had created a situation not unlike that in France under the provisional government, were the influences that roused the radicals on October 6th to an attack on the Austrian government. The insurrection resulted in the revolting murder of Latour, and the temporary success of the revolutionists; and after the flight of the

Emperor Ferdinand to Olmütz, the city remained for three weeks in the hands of the Jacobin element, who were with difficulty prevented by the more sober-minded revolutionists from dissolving the Parliament and erecting a radical government. But this situation could not last : Vienna had reached the last stage in the movement toward radicalism ; and the radicals unable to maintain their position in the presence of the Austrian forces, which under the command of Windischgrätz had been recalled from Prague, were forced, even though a Hungarian army came to their aid, to surrender on October 31st, after a siege of five days. Austria had won her third victory ; for Bohemia, Italy, and now Vienna had, each in turn, failed to maintain the advantages they had gained in the March days.

Austria had now so far recovered as to venture upon a step that was to complete the policy begun two months before,—the strengthening of the imperial government. Emperor Ferdinand was forced to abdicate and his place was taken by his nephew, who on December 2, 1848, succeeded to the throne as Francis Joseph I. At his side was the new Metternich, Prince Schwarzenberg, to whom more than to any other was due the final restoration of Austria to her former authority. An energetic course was at once decided upon,—to reduce Hungary to subjection, and to retract entirely the concessions of March. Hungary, in her turn, took a stand equally decisive, and, on the ground that the new Emperor was a usurper, refused to recognise him as her king, and at once entered into the struggle for the defence of the deposed Ferdinand and the March constitution. This was the attitude of Kossuth and the revolutionary committee of public defence, which, after the murder of Lamberg and the flight of Batthyáni, had assumed entire direction of Hungarian affairs. Although every effort was made to strengthen the military forces of the kingdom, Austrian arms, during the first period of the struggle from January to March,

1849, were in the main successful. On January 1st, unable to hold Pesth, the Diet removed to Debreczin beyond the river Theiss, and Windischgrätz occupying the capital established martial law and began a reign of terror in the city. On February 26th the Austrians gained a notable victory at Capolna, between Pesth and Debreczin, and drove the Hungarian army to join the Diet beyond the Theiss.

These successes warranted the promulgation on March 4, 1849, of a new constitution for the Austrian Empire, which placed the various nationalities, each with its provincial diet, on an equal footing, separated Croatia and Slavonia from Hungary, and established a common commercial system for the entire Empire. Although by this constitution Hungary was reduced to the level of the other states and the concessions of March were entirely withdrawn, nevertheless so strong were the conservative and loyal elements, and so discouraged the revolutionary party by recent defeats, that during the month of March, 1849, the struggle was continued in defence of King Ferdinand and the March constitution. But the republicans and revolutionists grew more confident of their powers, and their chances of effecting a separation of Hungary from the Empire increased in number as the Hungarian armies under Bem won victories, first over the Austrians and Wallachians who opposed them in the south, and then over the Russians who had entered Transylvania. The victory of Görgei over Windischgrätz on April 6th, by which the Austrians were driven from Gödöllő back to Pesth, completed this series of successes, gave renewed strength to the war party, and made of no avail further resistance on the part of the moderates to the project of separation.

Then it was that the Hungarian Diet, roused to a frenzied enthusiasm by the recent victories, took that step which the moderates and constitutionalists had so strenuously resisted a month before. On April 14th, acting on the motion of Kos-

suth, it issued from Debreczin a declaration of independence, deposing King Ferdiuand, for whom they had up to this time ostensibly fought, abolishing the constitution, which they had thus far supported, and declaring Hungary to be a free and independent state. "The house of Habsburg-Lorraine as perjured and treacherous is forever excluded," said the declaration, "from the throne of the United States of Hungary and Transylvania, and deposed, degraded, and banished forever from the Hungarian territory." Power was now wholly in the hands of the radical revolutionists, and, although the name republic was not expressly mentioned in the declaration, the form of the new government of which Kossuth was chosen the president was republican. The successes of the Hungarian army continued. On May 19th Welden, the successor of Windischgrätz, was defeated and driven from Pesth ; and once more the Hungarian government returned to the capital city. But the general situation had changed ; the Hungarians were now fighting for independence, not for their king and their March constitution, and in the eyes of the reactionary Powers had become the enemies not of Austria alone, but of all established governments. After the declaration of independence, when the other Powers of Europe had taken a neutral stand supporting neither Austria nor Hungary, the Magyars hoped to be allowed to fight out the struggle alone, and in this event, even with dissensions among their own leaders, they would probably have succeeded. But this was not to be. To the appeal of the young Francis Joseph the Czar, who had already sent Russian troops into Transylvania, replied favourably, and on May 1st it was learned that he had placed his troops at the disposal of the Austrian Emperor. The reasons for this are clear : by the terms of the treaty of Münchengrätz Nicolas was bound, if called upon, to aid either Austria or Prussia against revolutionary uprisings ; he was, moreover, the natural protector of the Slavonic peoples against the Magyars ; and he feared that

success in Hungary would lead to an inevitable revolt in his own subject states, particularly in Poland.

With the entrance of the Russian troops upon the scene, the war took the form of a struggle for life or death. Haynau, the Austrian general, attacked from the west, Paskiévitch with 150,000 Russians from the east. In these desperate straits Hungary made heroic efforts to gain support ; she sought help from Turkey but in vain ; she promised equality to the disaffected Slavonic nationalities, but they refused to respond. Forced from Pesth the revolutionary government moved from one town to another, until, finally seeing the hopelessness of the struggle Kossuth resigned the presidency and made Görgei dictator. On August 13, 1849, the latter surrendered unconditionally to the Russian general, Paskiévitch, who handed over Hungary to Nicolas, who in turn placed it at the disposal of Francis Joseph. The vengeance of Austria was frightful. Under the direction of the pitiless Haynau, Hungarian patriots, even those of high rank, were shot or hanged ; thousands were imprisoned, and those who escaped the bloody tribunals of Pesth and Arad did so only by flight into other lands. The constitution was abolished ; the country was divided into military districts, and for ten years was governed with despotic severity. So Hungary waited, making no sign until other events should rouse her to gain, by truer methods and under leaders who were statesmen and not revolutionists, constitutional and political independence.

CHAPTER X.

REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.—II.

WITH the overthrow of the Hungarian army at Vilagos and the reduction of the Hungarian state to military subordination, Austria was able to establish once more the unity of the imperial government, and to revive and give efficiency to the bureaucracy and centralised administration that had been to the liberals of Central Europe so obnoxious a part of her government in the days of Metternich. During the year 1849 Europe was beginning to feel once more the supremacy of the old conservative ideas. France, with Louis Napoleon as president of the republic, was already proving false to the principles declared after the revolution of February, and was committing herself to acts that foreshadowed the destruction of the newly-established government. The monarchists of the French Assembly, elected under the most democratic of suffrages, were already determined to undo all that the revolution had accomplished, and were fast bringing the country into that condition of political confusion which was to make possible the erection of an empire, itself in form and spirit a return to the past, a hindrance to the cause of political and social progress. In Russia, Nicholas I., ruling tranquilly during these months of disturbance and esteeming himself the divinely appointed protector of thrones and legitimate governments, was declaring himself ready to interfere, as he had just done in Hungary, to put down revolution, and to support the principles of the Holy Alliance wherever such interference seemed

necessary. Embodying in his own person all the characteristics of absolute power, both civil and ecclesiastical, he stood at this time as the grand upholder of all those political ideas and theories that the revolutionists of 1848 had sought to overthrow; and, uninfluenced by the desires and claims of the liberals in other countries, he encouraged his brother princes to resist the popular demands, and to maintain intact their royal and imperial prerogatives. Thus France on one side and Russia on the other, although differing absolutely in their motives, were alike in offering no encouragement to the liberal cause. The ebbing of the tide of revolution was nearly complete, and only in Italy and the states of the Germanic Confederation had Austria still to make good her supremacy, and to regain the position of leadership in central Europe that she had held before the revolution of 1848 began.

It will be remembered that on the 9th of August, 1848, the campaign upon which Italy had entered with so much promise the March before, was brought to an end by the Salasco armistice; and that this cessation of war released a large portion of Radetzky's army for service against Hungary, and strengthened Austria in her determination to recover the position that she had lost four months before. It will be remembered, also, that during the period of the armistice, which lasted seven months, republicanism gained ground in Italy, destroying the unity of the Italian cause and alienating the sympathy of the moderate constitutionalists, notably at Rome. It was evident before the close of the armistice—so sharply defined had become the position of the reactionists on one side and the revolutionists on the other—that the governments of Tuscany and Naples would furnish no aid to the national cause, and that if the war were to be renewed, Piedmont must do battle alone against the common enemy. And for many reasons the King of Piedmont was willing to renew the struggle. He was desirous of bringing the matter to an issue

of one kind or another, for the armistice, in compelling Piedmont to hold herself in readiness for war at any moment, was becoming unendurable; and as his army during the truce had been increased to 117,000 men, he felt reasonably sure of success. Furthermore, the democrats of Turin were clamouring for war, and from Lombardy, where the military government of Radetzky was harsh and unrelenting, appeals for aid were frequent and pitiful. Therefore, on March 12th, Charles Albert, who had cancelled all his earlier failures by his unflinching devotion to Italy during the later days, declared the armistice at an end, and on March 19th entered upon his last campaign for the independence of his country. Of all the other states only Rome and Venice stood by him. Mazzini, practically dictator of Rome, in a speech that will always rebound to his honour, declared that "There should be only two kinds of Italians in Italy, the friends and the enemies of Austria. Republican Rome," he added, "will make war by the side of monarchical Piedmont." Daniele Manin promised that Venice also would render all the assistance in her power; but unfortunately, before the troops of either Rome or Venice could come to the aid of Piedmont, the struggle was over.

The war, which destroyed for the time being all hope of Italian freedom, lasted but five days, during which at no single instant was there a chance of success for Piedmont. The brief campaign was filled with instances of bad management, inefficient generalship, and mutual distrust. The Piedmontese forces under the leadership of a Pole, Chrzanowski, were outmanœuvred by the Austrians under Radetzky, who, while Chrzanowski was entering Lombardy at Buffalora, invaded Piedmont at Cava. The Piedmontese turning back received their first check at Mortara, and then risking all in a general battle, were entirely defeated at Novara, March 23d. No alternative remained to the king but to submit to the harsh terms of the conqueror and retire from the struggle; but hoping to

lighten the punishment that would be inflicted upon his country, and seeing in himself the chief obstacle to her welfare, he determined to abdicate. In the Bellini palace in Novara, which had served as the royal headquarters, in the presence of his military staff, he gave up his title in favour of his son Victor Emmanuel, and in so doing brought to a pathetic close one of the most eventful and unhappy reigns in the history of modern Europe. Withdrawing from the field of battle, the old king journeyed to Oporto, where he died two months afterwards; while the young Victor Emmanuel, fully aware of the difficulties of the task before him, made terms with Radetzky that were hard but not disgraceful, and returned to Turin, there to take up, in the face of Austria's opposition, the burden of kingly rule. In this crisis his policy was a dual one; on one side he rejected all advances of the Austrian government, preferring the position of a prince honourably conquered to that of a vassal of Austria; on the other he maintained loyally the Statuto, as the constitution of 1848 was called, and after the retirement of Alfieri, summoned the leader of the party of reform, Massimo d'Azeglio, to the first place in his new cabinet. By one act he proclaimed himself the defender of Italy against Austria; by the other he brought to his support the liberals of the peninsula, who watched with expectation his attempt to convert Piedmont into a strong constitutional state and the Italians into a free and united nation. From this task Victor Emmanuel never drew back, and the history of his reign is the history of the consummation of Italian unity and independence.

With the defeat of Piedmont Austria's work was greatly simplified. No organised army confronted her in Italy. The centres of resistance were only the revolting municipalities, Bergamo, Brescia, Florence, Venice, and Rome, and for their overthrow nearly eighty thousand troops were ready under Austria's most redoubtable generals, Radetzky, Haynau, and Nugent. With Bergamo success was speedy, but the resistance

of the Brescians was heroic. For twenty-four hours, March 30th and 31st, they defended their city against twelve thousand troops under Haynau; but Brescia fell, and the vengeance of the Austrian commander began for him in Europe that unenviable reputation for atrocity that the war-tribunals of Hungary were to complete. In Tuscany, where liberals and revolutionists were already at each other's throats, there was practically no resistance save at Leghorn. In April, Grand Duke Leopold in Gaëta appealed to Austria for aid, and in reply the Austrian general, d'Aspre, entered Tuscany in May. Leghorn after a two days' struggle capitulated, and in two weeks Austrian troops entered Florence. All that had been gained in 1847-48 was lost; the constitution was abolished, all liberal decrees were annulled, and Leopold on his return put into force all the old reactionary institutions.

Austria was steadily pushing her way southward. In May, Bologna was invested, and on the 20th fell; Ferrara and Ancona were occupied, and Austrian troops were in Umbria and the Marches prepared to march to the aid of the Pope. At the same time Ferdinand of Naples was ready to support the papal cause, and to assist, if needed, in the overthrow of the Roman Republic.

But at this juncture another actor appeared. France, who had been watching with disquietude the growth of Austria's power in the peninsula, now determined to revive the old policy that had led to the occupation of Ancona in 1831. Louis Napoleon, wishing to conciliate the ultramontane element and to gain the support of the conservative and monarchical parties, had proposed to his minister, Odilon Barrot, that an expedition be sent to Rome "to maintain the legitimate influence of France in Italy, and to obtain for the Roman people good government founded on liberal institutions." The ministry, in supporting the measure before the Chamber, declared that France was trying to save the Romans from the extreme re-

action that would inevitably follow a restoration of the Pope by Austrian bayonets; and at the same time it did not hesitate to say that if the Roman Republic refused to accept the friendly intervention of the French, then such intervention would have to be effected by force. A favourable vote having been obtained in the Chamber, eight thousand men were dispatched to Civita Vecchia under General Oudinot to carry out the ministerial plan. No act shows more strikingly than this the inconsistent character of the second republic, and the fact that it was a republic only in name. When the republicans of Rome, detecting the real nature of the ministerial plan, declared that they did not believe in the friendly words of the French ministry, Oudinot attacked the city; but so vigorous was the defence and so loyal the support received from other parts of Italy, that on April 30th the French were repulsed and compelled to retreat. To Garibaldi in large part is due the honour of this success.

At this juncture the ministry in France found itself seriously embarrassed. The Chamber was not so conservative as not to resist any further extension of this policy of coercion and require of the ministry a change of program. Many of the deputies were already feeling that the republic had broken one of its own fundamental principles, its pledge that never—as the constitution said—would it use its arms against the liberty of any people. On this account, the ministry resolved to temporise until the results of the May elections should be known. Ferdinand de Lesseps was sent to Rome to mediate, and succeeded so well that, contrary to the intentions of the ministry and to its further embarrassment, a treaty was arranged with the Roman Republic, according to which the French were not to interfere in the affairs at Rome, and were even to repel foreign attacks if necessary. But when, on May 28th, it was found that by the new elections a Chamber had been returned more conservative than before and more favourable to the ministerial

policy, the treaty of de Lesseps was repudiated as contrary to instructions and injurious to the interests and dignity of France ; and Oudinot was ordered to continue the attack. On June 30th, after a brave resistance, the second Roman Republic was overthrown. Mazzini, escaping first to Marseilles, finally contrived, after many perils, to reach neutral territory, and took up his residence at Geneva ; Garibaldi and four thousand followers fled to the mountains ; and a government of cardinals was established, awaiting the return of the Pope. But it was not until April, 1850, that Pius IX. dared to venture back to the city thus restored to him. In November of the same year Louis Napoleon completed the drama by announcing to the French Chamber that French "arms had overturned that turbulent demagoguery, which had compromised true liberty in all the Italian peninsula, and that [French] soldiers had the peculiar honour of having restored Pius IX. to the throne of St. Peter."

Venice alone remained to commemorate the victories of 1848, yet around her, too, reaction had already drawn its lines slowly but with pitiless certainty. The siege by land had been begun by Austria as early as April, and the blockade by sea as early as June ; and when one by one the Italian cities fell, and the surrender of the Hungarian army, August 13th, destroyed all chances of help from abroad, Venice, torn by factions, afflicted with cholera, cut off from all supplies, finally realised that her struggle was hopeless. On August 24th, Manin, resigning from the presidency, turned over his authority to the municipal government ; on the next day the Venetians, reduced to helplessness by sickness and starvation, surrendered to the Austrian general ; and three days later Austria entered into full possession, and the victory of the reactionary forces was complete. One by one all the strongholds of the liberals had fallen, and in every case, save that of Piedmont, the constitutional gains of 1847-48 had been swept away. In Naples, Rome, Florence,

and Venice, as in Bohemia and Hungary, the old system was restored, and the old rulers took up the exercise of their absolute authority. In Piedmont alone, where ruled the future King of Italy, was constitutional government maintained; there alone were preserved the safeguards of the modern state.

While thus the Austrian army and the Austrian military authority had been for more than a year proving its power in Hungary and Italy, a different struggle, one of ideas rather than of arms, was taking place in Germany, where Austria was destined to recover her supremacy rather by diplomacy and the influence of her great prestige than by the exercise of physical force. Her victory, however, if less brutal, was in the end no less complete.

It will be remembered that in Germany the victory of the March days—the consummation of thirty years of active agitation—was in the main the victory of the people, who desired a united Germany with free and representative government guaranteed by a written constitution, over the princes of the separate German states, who stood for state sovereignty, royal rights, and the supremacy of the landed classes in the administration of affairs. After a number of preliminary meetings and the appointment of a committee of seven to complete the arrangements, five hundred representatives of the people convened without any official authority in a preliminary assembly at Frankfort, March 31, 1848, to take more definite measures for the calling of the larger body, the national assembly, which was to represent the German nation rather than the German states. The assembly was entirely distinct from the Federal Diet, which, made up of deputies sent by the princes and not the people, was at this time the only legal central authority in Germany. Although the Preliminary Convention sat but five days, adjourning April 4th, it accomplished an important work. It decided to summon a national assembly, but recommended to the Federal Diet, who alone

could give official sanction to its acts, the reduction of the unit of representation from seventy thousand to fifty thousand inhabitants; it also recommended at the request of Prussia the admission of East and West Prussia into the Germanic Confederation, and at the request of the Holsteiners, expressed in an address issued from Altona, March 15th, the admission of Schleswig, also. Of these recommendations, which were immediately accepted by the Federal Diet, thus confirming the victory of the liberal party, one only in any way endangered the peace of Germany. The admission of Schleswig into the Confederation was a direct defiance to the public letter that Christian VIII. had issued in 1846, and to the constitution that Frederic VII., his successor, had published in January, 1848, in both of which the annexation of Schleswig, Lauenberg, and parts of Holstein to the kingdom of Denmark was definitely proclaimed. This proclamation had led to the insurrection of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, the establishment of a provisional government, and the issue of the Altona address mentioned above. Although the admission of Schleswig was in the interest of a rebellious people, the Federal Diet, unable to resist, was forced to sanction the movement; and inasmuch as this rebellion of necessity involved the duchies in a war with Denmark, the Diet authorised Prussia to protect them against Danish attack. This is the first stage in the history of the complicated Schleswig-Holstein question that was destined to play so important a part in the later history of Germany.

The members of the Convention, although amicably agreeing to these recommendations, found themselves confronted with problems more difficult of solution, and with party hostilities that boded no good for the future. There was in the Convention a large group of radical republicans who were opposed to all monarchical and imperial forms of government, and there was serious disagreement, even among the conservative members themselves, regarding the question of the

admission of Austria into that new German state, for which the National Assembly was to draft a constitution. Many felt that it would be impossible to create a federal union containing both Prussia and Austria, while others, representing Prussia and the South German states, were determined to oppose any arrangement that left Austria out of account. But these differences, however ominous they may have been for the future, were not allowed to destroy the unanimity of the Convention, and when on April 4th that body broke up, the members parted in harmony. The only discontents were the Baden republicans, who, influenced by the socialistic doctrines of the French radicals, were endeavouring to transform the Germanic Confederation into a republic. As Struve's proposal to proclaim the one indivisible German republic and Hecker's motion that the Convention remain *en permanence* until the meeting of the National Assembly had been voted down by large majorities, it was clear that the Convention, although opposed to all absolute forms of government, was in no sense willing to commit itself to republican or socialistic doctrines. In consequence of this failure of the republican agitators to influence the Convention, revolutions were inaugurated by Hecker, Struve, and the poet Herwegh in Baden, and by Mieroslawski in Poland, but both movements were put down, though not until after considerable fighting on the part of the Confederate and Prussian troops. Unable to carry through their doctrines by force and hoping to consummate their plans by constitutional means, the republicans turned their attention to the coming National Assembly.

During this agitation, verbal in the Convention, revolutionary outside, Austria involved in the threatened ruin of the imperial government, had remained inactive, and had, in consequence, exercised practically no influence in German affairs. But by the end of April, having recovered a little from the effects of the March uprisings, she succeeded in effecting the postpone-

ment of the meeting of the Assembly until the 18th of May, hoping by that time to be able to enforce her doctrine of Austrian leadership in an unrestricted German state, organised as a loose confederacy after the old scheme of Metternich. It may be well to add here that before the Assembly met Austria was placed *hors du combat*, by the uprising in Vienna of May 15th, which drove the imperial family to Innsbruck and made it impossible for her to take any important part in the coming discussion.

When on April 4th the Convention broke up it left behind a committee of fifty to carry out the arrangements already made for the election of members to the National Assembly. After this committee had completed its work there met at Frankfort, on the 18th of May, 586 representatives of the German people, sent from nearly every part of the German-speaking world. Immediately committees were appointed to draw up reports upon nearly every subject more or less closely connected with the work of the Assembly, of which by far the most important was that one chosen to prepare a preliminary draft of the new constitution. But while these committees were performing their work, it was necessary that a provisional government should be established for Germany, to take the place of the Federal Diet, which was ready as soon as such government were organised to bring to an end its official existence. At once the question arose as to what form the head of such a government should take. Should it be a regent, or a directory of three or more persons? If a regent, should he be one of the princes or a member of the Assembly? Should he be made irresponsible, that is, invested with full powers, or should he be held responsible to the Assembly? After a long debate, lasting from June 3d to June 28th, the Assembly agreed to accept a regency of one person who should be invested with full executive, military, and appointing powers. Archduke John of Austria, whose hostility to the imperial government, even in the days of

Metternich, had won him the favour of the liberals, and whose independent attitude was at this time a matter of concern to the cabinet at Vienna, was chosen as regent. This choice was generally recognised by all except the members of the Left side of the Assembly as an excellent one. Invested with the power of selecting his own ministers the archduke named men of fairly moderate views: Schmerling for the interior, Heckscher for foreign affairs, von Peucker for war, von Mohl for justice, and others who, though strong opponents of particularism, were wholly out of sympathy with the principles of the radical republicans. When on July 12th the archduke took the oath to the decree of the Assembly, the new government, thus legally inaugurated, took the place of the old, and the Federal Diet, though not abolished, ceased for the time being to exist as an official body. The different states of Germany, whose creature the Diet had been, recognised the new regent, and transferred to him the powers that the Diet had formerly exercised. The archduke and his ministers were to govern Germany until the National Assembly should complete its work, and a new government under a liberal constitution be erected.

Having now safely passed this its first crisis, the Assembly took up as its next work the consideration of that for which the representatives of the people had been gathered together—the framing of a constitution. For two months they had sat, debated, and discussed, and had only succeeded in forming a provisional government. Above all things now haste seemed desirable and necessary. On the very day that the question of the constitution came up for discussion, Windischgrätz reduced Bohemia to subjection; the provisional government in Paris had already won its victory of June over the proletariat in the streets; the states of Germany were recovering from the fear that the March uprisings had created; and the old ideas were once more pressing hard for recognition. It was no time,

therefore, for delay and dispute ; it was imperative that the National Assembly lay firmly the foundations of its own strength by drafting with speed and unanimity a constitution to express the will of the German people, and to make possible a strong government for the fatherland. But in this particular the Assembly committed its first serious error. It is true that even under the most favourable circumstances the task would have been exceedingly difficult ; but it was made infinitely less likely of successful accomplishment by continued postponement. The Assembly, confident of its own strength and anxious to postpone the solution of the many difficult problems that the work involved, put off the evil day by taking up the discussion of a question that it would better have left untouched—that of the fundamental rights of the German people. It not only did not take advantage of the time when enthusiasm and a general willingness to make concessions might have made it possible to agree to some common measure, and failed to seize the opportunity when Austria was embarrassed and unable to interfere ; but it introduced a subject that was sure to deepen party lines, to create personal hostilities, and to antagonise the supporters of the rights of the individual states.

For more than three months, critical months in the history of Europe, this body continued its discussions. It took up the questions of national citizenship, of equality before the law, of an independent judiciary, of freedom of the press, of religion, of education, of association ; it discussed the necessity of popular representation in the separate states, of a new organisation for the local communes, of a new canon law for the established church. Heated controversies arose ; motions were made followed by interminable discussion ; German professors and lawyers revelled in the spinning of wordy arguments, in the analysis of abstract principles more or less remotely connected with the subject in hand. In two weeks three hundred and fifty amendments to the twelve original articles of the bill of

rights were proposed, and the debate that Gagern, the president of the Assembly, had believed would end in three weeks, threatened to prolong itself indefinitely. The results were disastrous; within the Assembly rivalries increased, party hatred grew stronger, and new party lines were drawn; without, the people watched with a daily decreasing enthusiasm and interest this ceaseless logomachy, the industrial classes growing more and more enraged at the vacillation on the part of the Assembly, which was injuring business, blocking trade, and bringing German traffic to a standstill.

The harmony of parties within the Assembly and the relations of the Assembly with the various German governments were subjected to a still heavier strain by the outcome of the controversy between Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. A brief review of this question is, therefore, necessary here. We have already noticed that in 1846 Christian VIII. of Denmark had announced in an open letter his determination to annex the duchies, by extending to them the Danish law of succession, which recognised the female right of inheritance. This act had been confirmed by Frederic VII. in the constitution promulgated January 28, 1848. Inasmuch as the inhabitants of the duchies had confidently expected that a male heir to the Danish throne would soon fail—for Frederic VII. was childless—in which case the duchies would separate from Denmark under a prince of their own, this decree of annexation, together with the influence of the March revolution, roused them to resist Danish aggression by force; and they appealed to Germany for aid. At the recommendation of the Convention, the Diet had authorised Prussia to protect the duchies, and the latter state, somewhat imprudently accepting the offer, declared in favour of a separation between the two parts of the Danish kingdom. In the war that followed, which lasted from April to August, 1848, Prussia was not content with protecting the duchies, but, taking the offensive,

pushed her way across the Danish frontier and advanced to Jütland. The question thus became one of international importance, and the Powers, England and Russia, ranged themselves on the side of Denmark, in defence of the integrity of the Danish state. Prussia was supported by the Confederation and the duchies, but not by Austria, who, determined to act as a European Power and not as a member of the Germanic Confederation, refused to be drawn into the controversy. Russia threatened to interfere if Prussia carried on the war, and Sweden was already arming. In August, 1848, when the Assembly was entering upon the second month of its debate regarding the fundamental rights of the German people, Prussia found herself in an embarrassing position. To prolong the war not only meant giving serious offence to the Powers, which might involve her in a larger struggle, but it also meant continued injury to her commerce, which had already suffered much from the Danish blockade. On the other hand, to bring the war to a close was to arouse the anger of the National Assembly, and to offend the liberals of Germany, to whom it was a matter of honour to secure the independence of Schleswig and its admission into the Confederation. In this crisis Prussia, considering the latter the lesser of the two evils, decided to withdraw from the war, and, calling back her troops from Denmark, agreed to the armistice of Malmö, August 26th.

This act came like a thunder-clap upon the members of the Assembly, causing bewilderment and rousing animosity. Dahlmann, the leader of the constitutionalists, vehemently refused to yield to the will of Prussia, and to commit the Assembly to so cowardly an act as that of retreat in the presence of danger. In the exciting debate that followed, the Left, giving up for the moment its former attitude of hostility toward the conservative leader, joined with Dahlmann in its desire to bring about the rejection of the treaty and to effect the discomfiture of Prussia and the conservatives. In the first outburst of anger, although

the moderates in large numbers deserted their leader, the opposition succeeded, on September 5th, in carrying by seventeen votes a motion not to accept the treaty of Malmö. This meant of course the downfall of the Schmerling ministry and the formation of another by Dahlmann, who, deserted by his own party and supported chiefly by the radicals, found himself in an anomalous position. For three days he attempted, but in vain, to form a new cabinet, and the old ministry, somewhat reorganised, returned to office. When the Assembly, already cooling in its indignation toward the so-called treason of Prussia and frightened at its own audacity, learned of this fact, it took the question once more into consideration, and on September 16th, after a brilliant discussion of three days' duration, reversed its former decision, and to the wrath of the radicals voted to accept the truce.

The effects of this incident were most disastrous: the parties in the Assembly became hopelessly divided, and the radicals were in full revolt, ready to oppose every measure and to resist every compromise short of a republic. At the same time the Assembly was losing its prestige, for it was giving unmistakable evidence of its inability to impose its commands upon the individual German governments, who were far from willing to yield to the authority of a national government (the regency) that, as yet unrecognised abroad, was proving to be, when brought to the test, uncertain of its powers and without efficiency at home. Particularism was fast regaining its former strength in Germany.

This was the position of the National Assembly, when, on October 19, 1848, five months after it had been summoned, the work of drafting the constitution was begun. Under strikingly changed circumstances the attempt was made to solve all the difficult problems, the consideration of which, put off from month to month, could not be longer deferred. It is no part of our task to follow the various phases of the discussion upon

this important matter. The first question that came up related to the admission of Austria; and on October 27th the *Klein-deutsch* party, which advocated a restricted Germany, won a victory by carrying through a measure whereby only German Austria (without Hungary and her dependencies) was to be admitted into the new German state. This as a direct blow at Austria might have been efficient had it been given three months before; but delayed until October, it had lost all its force. Austria had won at Prague, had defeated Charles Albert in Italy, had overthrown the revolting Viennese, who had risen out of sympathy for the Hungarians and murdered the war minister, Latour. The Austrian army had begun the restoration of the Austrian power, and it was the army that made the first reply to the defiant act of the Assembly. On November 9th Robert Blum, a member of the Assembly who had taken part in the Vienna uprising, was condemned to death and shot, to remind the Assembly that Austria would not recognise the inviolability of the Frankfort delegates. Toward the end of November, Austria took a firmer stand. With her army everywhere victorious over her rebellious states, she was ready to effect that change in the reorganisation of the imperial government that the situation made possible and necessary. Ferdinand was forced to abdicate, and Francis Joseph came to the throne. The vigorous policy upon which the new minister, Schwarzenberg, at once decided to enter was not in its application limited to Hungary. While the National Assembly was engaged in its discussion of the constitution, Schwarzenberg was secretly bringing all his influence to bear upon Frederic William IV., and at his request drew up in clear and unmistakable terms the imperial demands: Austria was to be admitted in its entirety into the Germanic Confederation, and in conjunction with Prussia should draw up, without regard to the wish or decision of the National Assembly, a constitution based upon a confederation of states. Thus the civil

power of Austria deliberately set its face against all that the representatives of the people sitting at Frankfort were endeavouring to accomplish, and ignored the constituent authority of the National Assembly as completely as the military power had ignored the inviolable privileges of its members.

During the next two months, while the members of the Assembly were discussing the articles of the constitution, various plans for a constitutional reorganisation of the Confederation were passed between Prussia and Austria. Though no definite conclusions were reached it was becoming evident that the princes of the lesser states, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, and Hanover, who had been from the beginning lukewarm in their support of the National Assembly, were awaiting the favourable moment to turn once more to Austria and accept her leadership. Finally, in February, 1849, strengthened by the victories of Windischgrätz, which drove the Hungarian government from Pesth to Debreczin, the Austrian government felt that the time had come for definite action. Schwarzenberg proposed to the other kingdoms of Germany that they should unite with Austria to reject, by military force if necessary, whatever the National Assembly proposed, to draft a separate constitution, based on the old ideas, and to force it unconditionally upon the remaining German states. And Schwarzenberg's plans gained strength with success. After the victory of Capolna, February 26, 1849, by which the Hungarian army was driven to join the Diet at Debreczin, believing that the imperial supremacy was at last assured, he first issued in the Emperor's name, on March 4th, the new constitution for the whole Austrian Empire, and then, five days afterwards, made known Austria's plan for a reorganisation of the Germanic Confederation. Having by the imperial constitution declared to Europe that the Emperor was determined to be master once more in his own house, he also made it known by this proposal for Germany that the Emperor was to become once more the

leading prince in the Germanic Confederation. By the new plan Austria with her thirty millions non-German population was to be admitted into the new German state, a directory of seven members, under Austrian and perhaps occasionally under Prussian leadership, was to be established, and a chamber of deputies to be organised that should represent not the people but the states, in which Austria, by virtue of the increase of her population, would possess thirty-eight votes, while the other states altogether would possess but thirty-two.

This thoroughly military and unnational scheme waked great wrath in the National Assembly, where the work of drafting a constitution for the German people, and not for the German states, was going steadily on. On February 3d the final draft had passed its first reading, but through Austrian influence the second reading had been postponed, and time had been lost during February and March in a further discussion of fundamental rights, of the question of suffrage, and proposed amendments to the constitution. Finally on March 27th, nearly a year after the meeting of the Preliminary Convention, the second reading of the constitution was reached, and after long debate the Assembly voted that the head of the new government should be an hereditary emperor and not a directory. On the 28th, amidst great excitement, Frederic William of Prussia was chosen by the Assembly as the first emperor under the new constitution. A deputation with the president of the Assembly (Simson, the successor of Gagern) at its head was immediately appointed to receive the king's acceptance. It was an important moment for Germany. Austria's defiant act of March 9th, to which the vote of the Assembly was in a sense a reply, had lost much of its force from the unexpected defeat of the Austrian army by General Bem in the south and south-east, and the entanglement of the Austrian government in a war that promised to be indefinitely prolonged. It was an opportunity that a strong king, a second Frederic the Great,

might readily have seized and turned to his own advantage ; and no one doubted that Prussia wished to take the leadership in Germany. What, therefore, was the situation in Prussia, and what were the influences dictating the answer that the king was to make to the Frankfort delegation ?

✓ By his unnecessarily theatrical submission to liberalism on March 20, 1848, Frederic William had undoubtedly lost caste in the eyes of the conservative and feudal parties of Prussia and the Confederation ; at the same time it can hardly be said that he had gained a very loyal support from the radical republicans who were gathering in increasing numbers in Berlin. When on May 22d the Constituent Assembly that was to draft a constitution for Prussia convened, it became clear that the best and ablest members of the constitutional party had gone to the National Assembly at Frankfort, leaving the Constituent Assembly in the hands of men of mediocre abilities, who were powerless to control the radical members. During the months of June and July disturbances arose in the streets outside of the building in which the Assembly was sitting ; and finally, on July 31st, in an attack by the mob upon the arsenal and in a bloody conflict with Prussian troops, fourteen of the citizens were killed. This unfortunate encounter led to disagreements between the Assembly and the Prussian government as to the disposition of the troops, and the rapid increase in the audacity and power of the radicals in the chamber. When in October the constitution, which had been for some time under discussion by the eight provincial groups into which the Assembly was divided, came up for general debate, the radicals, zealous to imitate the work of the French National Assembly of 1789, carried through motions to abolish all feudal privileges, all orders, titles of nobility, and differences of rank, to strike out the words " by the grace of God " before the title of the king, and, finally, when the news of the uprising of October 6th and the murder of Latour came from Vienna, to ask

Frederic William to send aid to the "heroic people" who had just driven the Austrian Emperor to Olmütz. This was more than the King of Prussia, with his ideas of the sanctity of rulers, could endure; and when, therefore, the agitators in the streets began to threaten the moderate members of the Assembly with death after the fashion of Latour, and it became evident that Berlin was fast approaching the condition of Vienna, the Prussian ministry determined to put a summary check upon any further radical proceedings. The attack of Windischgrätz upon Vienna gave the authorities in Berlin their cue, and in the early days of November a new ministry was formed by the king under Count Brandenburg with Manteuffel as minister of war. When the Assembly, denying the authority of the ministry, refused to be prorogued, the city was placed in a state of siege; and when the Assembly, enraged at this employment of force, passed measures forbidding the regular payment of taxes, it was dissolved, and a body of radical members that refused to obey was dispersed by the police. The movement in Berlin, as well as that in Vienna, had passed beyond the limits of reason and justice, and had become a menace not only to the peace of the city but also to the constitutional development of Prussia. On the day that the king announced the dissolution of the Assembly, he issued a constitution, based on a plan that he had submitted to the committee of the Assembly the May previous, but which the committee had rejected. This *octroyed* constitution, put forth under such circumstances, was no reactionary document; it contained all the essential features of representative and parliamentary government, and as revised by the legislative body, which met under its provisions in February, 1849, it is the present constitution of Prussia.

These events increased the confidence of the Prussian government in its own strength and intensified the hostility of the king toward all revolutionary and radical movements. Now that he had of his own free will and accord granted a constitu-

tion to Prussia, Frederic William felt himself able to act independently regarding the offer that had come from the National Assembly at Frankfort. The situation would have been different six months before ; but in April, 1849, he was free to follow the promptings of his own nature, uninfluenced by the events of the year just past, except as they had strengthened his belief in the divinity of kings and the principles of kingly honour. In the first place, as a man of mediocre statesmanship, with a distinct aversion to warlike measures, it is evident that he would have been unable to take the prompt and decisive action that the situation demanded, and would not have dared, even had he been willing, to assume so great responsibility at so critical a juncture. To have accepted the imperial title, and to have taken the headship of a Germany from which the greater part of Austria had been excluded would have led to a struggle, not only with Austria, but with Russia, for the Czar Nicolas was opposed to the policy of his brother-in-law, the King of Prussia, and had been ready for a year past to advance to any point, whether Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein, or Vienna, where revolution threatened the established order. "I am not a great sovereign," said Frederic William afterwards to Baron Stockmar ; "Frederic II. would have been your man." Then, too, so keen was his sense of honour among kings, and so great his abhorrence of revolution, that he would have scorned to take advantage of Austria's embarrassment, entangled as she was in a war with Hungary. Even if he had been willing to receive the imperial crown from the National Assembly, whose election of Archduke John as regent and whose attitude toward Prussia in the Schleswig-Holstein affair had offended him, he doubted the right of this body, which had just proclaimed universal suffrage as a concession to the radicals, to choose an emperor. That he would have accepted the title had it been offered by the princes of Germany, acting without compulsion, is probable, but, imbued with a certain mystical liberalism and an extravagant

veneration for the imperial office, he was unwilling to accept such a title from an Assembly whose authority came from the people alone. He was willing to admit the people to a share in government—as he had done in the liberal constitution just granted to Prussia—but it was quite a different matter to receive from them a title associated with the most august traditions of the past. It is probable, therefore, that the king's solution of the problem before him was dictated quite as much by scruples of conscience and doctrines of kingship as by fear of consequences. His admiration and respect for Austria, his veneration for the divinity of sovereigns, his loyalty to the principles of the Holy Alliance, and his unwillingness to accept such an office without the consent of all the German states, influenced him to put aside that which the delegation from the Frankfort Assembly offered to him. On April 3d he replied, but not categorically; on April 21st, after Austria had withdrawn her deputies from the Assembly and had suffered her greatest defeat at the hands of the Magyars at Gödöllő, April 6th, he announced to the Prussian Chambers, which on February 26th had met for the first time under the new constitution, that he rejected entirely the imperial scheme drafted at Frankfort.

This decision of the king destroyed, as far as the acceptance of the constitution was concerned, all the work that the National Assembly had accomplished during the past year. Even though Würtemberg and twenty-eight of the minor states of Germany accepted the Frankfort draft, and the assemblies of Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony, which in the main represented the people and not the princes, were wholly in favour of the new imperial constitution, nevertheless, the hostility of the Austrian government, and the opposition of the kings of Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, and Bavaria gave the last blow to the liberal cause, and new energy to the reactionary movement that had begun during the last months of 1848. The end of the National Assembly had come; one by one the states

withdrew their representatives until only the radicals were left in control. Transferred from Frankfort to Stuttgart, and no longer a grand representative body of the German people working for the unity of the fatherland, it became merely a revolutionary committee, ready to promote radical uprisings, and during the months of May and June, 1849, was the leader in the last struggle of the revolution in Germany. With the failure of the moderates, the radicals took up the task, and in Prussia, Saxony, Baden, Württemberg, the Palatinate, and some of the minor states entered upon a desperate attempt ostensibly to defend the Frankfort constitution, in reality to effect the overthrow of the existing governments and to found a republic. On June 18th, the members of the Assembly at Stuttgart were dispersed by Württemberg troops ; but it was not until the end of July, a month before the Hungarian army surrendered at Vilagos, and five weeks before the capitulation of Venice closed the struggle in Italy, that the last body of the revolutionists was defeated by Prussian troops, the last fortress held by the radicals, Rastadt in Baden, surrendered, and southwestern Germany reduced to submission. By the 1st of August the victory of the governmental troops was complete. With the rejection of the imperial constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly, with the defeat and dispersion of the revolutionary party, the old state governments, liberalised it is true, and benefited by the lessons that the liberal movement had taught them, resumed once more full sovereign powers.

But the failure of the National Assembly to form a strong government for Germany left the country without an permanent central authority. In July, the regent, Archduke John, resigned, and on September 30th, after much discussion, a provisional government, the "Interim," was established, in accordance with which Austria and Prussia, receiving from the archduke the powers that the states had transferred to him from the Federal Diet in July, 1848, governed jointly the Con-

federation. Such an arrangement could be, however, but temporary. The national attempt to solve the difficult problem had failed, owing to the opposition of the sovereign princes. Union spontaneously and voluntarily entered into by all the people of the separate states had proved to be an unrealisable ideal in Germany as in Italy, and the only thing that remained to be done was for the two leading Powers to present their solution of the problem. Thus far the struggle had been between the states and the nation, between sovereign princes and the National Assembly ; but now it was to be a contest between Austria and Prussia over the form that a federal government for Germany should take. Should such a government be the old, loose confederation enlarged to include Austria's non-Germanic provinces, as Schwarzenberg had already demanded ? Should it be a compactly united federal body, with a strong central authority similar to that suggested in the Prussian draft, which Metternich had successfully opposed in 1815 ? Or should it be a restricted federal union without Austria, under Prussia's leadership, similar to Gersdorf's plan of 1814, or the Zollverein plan of 1847 ?

It will be seen that the new turn that affairs had taken may be looked at from two points of view ; that on one hand it may be considered a continuation of the attempt begun as early as the congress of Vienna to give Germany constitutional unity ; or, on the other, a phase of the revolution of 1848-49, the final scene in the drama of reaction in which Austria was to complete her victory over central Europe by forcing Germany to accept once more the doctrine of political immobility and stagnation that Metternich had so long supported. ✓

No sooner had Frederic William rejected the imperial constitution of the National Assembly, than he announced his own scheme for a federal union of the German states. Unwilling to accept the plan that Schwarzenberg had presented on the 9th of March, which involved the admission of an entire Aus-

tria, and confident that the Austrian government would not agree to any project for a strong union in which the Austrian state should be even in the slightest degree subordinate to any other prince or central government than its own, he proposed having a federal union without Austria that should be made up of such states as would unite voluntarily under Prussian leadership to form a single federal state with Prussia for president. It was Frederic William's desire that this restricted German union, when organised, should enter into bonds of close alliance with Austria for mutual protection, support, and intercourse, and should with her have a common government, in the composition of which each should share equally. This plan was elaborated by the king during the months of April and May, at a time when Austria, owing to the prolongation of the war with Hungary, was unable to act effectively. Even though Schwarzenberg let it be known that he would not for a moment agree to any such plan, Frederic William called at Berlin, May 17th, a conference composed of representatives of such states as were willing to co-operate with him in forming such a union. Inasmuch as Würtemberg, as well as many of the minor states, had accepted the imperial constitution drawn up by the National Assembly, the only large states that could accept Prussia's invitation were Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover. Representatives from these states appeared at Berlin, but when the Austrian representative withdrew after the first session, and the Bavarian, on learning of the character of the proposed scheme, declared that he was without authority to enter into any definite agreement, Hanover and Saxony alone were left as Prussia's partners in the new venture. On May 26th these kingdoms agreed, hurriedly because of the progress of the revolution in the southwest, to form a league, known as the "league of the three kingdoms," that should last for one year. A diet and a constitution were promised for the new federal organisation, and an invitation was extended

to all the remaining states of Germany to enter the union. The final adoption of the Frankfort constitution seemed farther off than ever, and as the Prussian scheme became better known, and Prussia continued to be successful in putting down the revolutionary uprisings by force of arms, the minor states of Germany began to consider with more favour the idea of the new federal union, and by September 1st nearly all had joined the league. Arrangements were immediately made for the calling of the promised diet, and the new scheme of a federal German state, which corresponded very closely to Gersdorf's plan of 1814, seemed in fair way of being realised.

But during the period from May to October, 1849, important events were taking place in the Austrian state. While engaged in war with Hungary, Austria had been unable to do more than protest against the formation of such a union as this that Prussia proposed, and express her exceeding annoyance that Prussia should have taken the military leadership of Germany in suppressing the recent revolutions. Schwarzenberg was confident, however, that the jealousy which the other kingdoms felt for Prussia would eventually frustrate the scheme, and awaited the time when, with Austria freed from the war and once more mistress of all her dependent provinces, he could bring all his powers to bear upon the German situation. With the defeat of the Hungarians, August 13th, and the reorganisation of Hungary during the months of August and September, the opportunity was given, and Schwarzenberg turned his entire attention to the overthrow of the Prussian league. On October 20th, Saxony and Hanover, who had apparently joined the league more from fear of the radical republicans than from an honest interest in the league itself, and were only waiting for Austria to recover her authority at home, withdrew and went over to the side of Austria. Prussia, deprived of the support of the two kingdoms, was left with only the twenty-eight minor states, and as the term "league of the

three kingdoms" was no longer applicable, it was changed to the "federal union." Schwarzenberg having gained this important advantage over the King of Prussia, immediately organised a counter-league, known as the "league of the four kingdoms," composed of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, and Würtemberg; and in December, 1849, a new constitution was drawn up, closely modelled upon that suggested on March 9th. Two leagues were thus in the field: one, the Prussian Union, based on the idea of a restricted German federal state under the protectorship of Prussia; the other, the "league of the four kingdoms," based on the idea of an entire Germany, loosely confederated, of which Austria should be the president. On March 20, 1850, the promised diet of the Union met at Erfurt and elaborated the constitutional compact, which had been drawn up when the league was first formed in March, 1849, revising the articles in accordance with the wishes of Prussia, and incorporating a supplemental act that had been drafted after the withdrawal of Saxony and Hanover.

To bring about a permanent establishment of the Union would have been at best a difficult if not a hopeless task, owing to the jealousy that so many of the states, large and small, felt toward Prussia; but it was made an impossible one by the policy that the Austrian government immediately adopted. Schwarzenberg, fully aware of the weakness of the tie that bound together the members of the Union, acted in this emergency in a manner thoroughly characteristic of him. Setting aside the "league of the four kingdoms" and all other schemes of a similar nature, he issued a circular on April 19th to all the governments except Prussia, announcing that inasmuch as the government of the "Interim" would expire on the 1st of May, it was necessary to take some action whereby a common government for all Germany might be established. On the 26th, in a second circular, he summoned the German governments to send delegates to Frankfort, and although he did not in so

many words state that the object of the conference was to revive the old system, nevertheless it was evident that he meant to demand the restoration of the old Federal Diet, which had been in a state of suspended animation since July, 1848, and to revise the old Confederate Act as far as it was necessary to put it once more into operation in Germany. That is, he purposed, as Metternich had done thirty-five years before, to prevent the establishment of a strong central government that might weaken Austria's supremacy, and in the end crowd her out of Germany. The Prussian king, angered at this illiberal and reactionary project, which took no account of what Germany had thought and done for thirty years, at once denied that the Federal Diet had any existence whatever or could be revived, and in answer to Schwarzenberg's conference of deputies at Frankfort, having declared that he would never abandon the Union, he called a meeting of German princes at Berlin on the 8th of May, 1850, to discuss the matter.

The situation thus created was further aggravated by the reopening of the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty, which had been temporarily settled by the armistice of Malmö, in August, 1848. On April 3, 1849, Denmark, declaring the armistice at an end, had begun preparations for war; and during the months of April, May, and June, while the negotiations had been taking place looking to the formation of the "league of the three kingdoms," the Schleswig-Holsteiners, aided by Prussia, had taken up arms to resist the Danish attack, Prussia standing loyally by the revolting duchies, and Austria supporting, without pretence at secrecy, the cause of the King of Denmark. But in July, 1849, Prussia, finding herself in the awkward position of being opposed by both her former associates in the Holy Alliance, Austria and Russia, and supported only by France, the very Power against which the Holy Alliance had been formed, had agreed to a general peace, although in so doing she had by no means deserted the cause of the duchies, but

stood ready, in case diplomacy failed, to solve the difficult problem by war. During the months following the armistice negotiations for final settlement had been conducted with alternate rapidity and slowness ; but so little trust had the Schleswig-Holsteiners placed in the diplomatic interference of the Powers that at the time Austria was demanding the revival of the Federal Diet, and Prussia was summoning the princes to Berlin to discuss further the matter of the Union, the inhabitants of the duchies, having renewed the struggle, were fighting Denmark single-handed.

Thus in May, 1850, Germany was divided into two camps : on one side Austria and the lesser states, committed to the revival of the old Federal Diet and to the support of the Danish cause, were demanding the maintenance of the old governmental methods and the principles of particularism in a loose confederation ; on the other, Prussia and the minor states, committed to the defence of the Union and the cause of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, demanded constitutional government in a restricted federal union freed from the dominance of Austria. Prussia's policy, although selfishly upheld in this as in later instances for the aggrandisement of Prussia and the union of Germany under Prussian leadership, represented in the main the ideas in defence of which the revolution of 1848 had been undertaken, and recognised the social and political progress that Austria with astonishing blindness persisted in ignoring. Although, like the constitution that Frederic William had just granted to Prussia, this policy was distinctly a compromise between the traditions of the past and the necessities of the future, nevertheless in comparison with that of Austria at the same time it was both liberal and national ; although it had little of the Pan-Teutonic policy of the National Assembly, nevertheless its maintenance would be an important victory for the party of progress. The test was soon to be made, for the struggle with Austria was inevitable, and the incident which

actually brought matters to a crisis had already taken place—the quarrel between the elector and the people of Hesse Cassel.

Of all the princes of Germany Frederic William of Hesse Cassel had been least in sympathy with the liberal movement of 1848. Fettered by the liberal constitution that Hesse had received in 1831 and by the liberal ministry that he had been forced to appoint in 1848, he had taken advantage of the reactionary movement of 1849 to recover his control of the government. He had joined the Prussian Union, but on discovering that his sovereign independence was still further curtailed by the alliance, he had made it his chief ambition to overthrow the Union, and to destroy the democratic institutions of Hesse. To accomplish his purpose—for he was opposed by both his ministers and his people—he dismissed his ministry in February, 1850, and called Hassenpflug, an old, free-thinking Burschenschafter turned reactionist, for the second time to take the management of affairs. Hassenpflug's previous career as chief minister of Hesse had earned for him the hatred of Germany and the unenviable title of the curse of Hesse (*Hessenfluch*), and his appearance at this time worked, as he himself wrote, "like a Spanish fly on an open wound." The popular indignation that was roused by this appointment was followed by popular resistance when the minister, effecting the withdrawal of Hesse from the Prussian Union, began to override the constitution and to quarrel with the estates sitting at Cassel. In consequence, an uprising in Cassel seemed imminent, and Hassenpflug sought the aid of Austria and the deputies at Frankfort, to whose side he had led Hesse after the withdrawal from the Union.

In this crisis Austria and the Frankfort deputies, who had already been organised as the Plenum of the revised Federal Diet, threatened to send confederate troops to force obedience upon the rebellious people of Hesse. Against such an action

Prussia vigorously protested, and, influenced for the moment by the war party in the Prussian cabinet represented by General Radowitz, took measures to protect the people of Hesse in their constitutional rights, and sent word to the princes of the Union sitting at Berlin to prepare their troops for war. When, therefore, Austria, to the indignation of Europe, carried out her threat and dispatched Austrian and Bavarian troops to Hesse, Prussia sent a considerable body of men to prevent their entrance into the state. In November, 1850, the two armies stood face to face on Hessian territory, and fighting at Bronzell, described as a "military misunderstanding," had already begun. All Europe stood in suspense awaiting the issue. Would war actually be undertaken by the two great Powers? Would Prussia dare to take up the gauntlet that Austria had so often thrown down, and, yielding to the importunities of the war party, dispute Austria's supremacy in Germany? Not for forty years had the relations between the Powers been so strained as at this juncture; never had Prussia advanced so far in her open defiance of Austria. In the establishment of the Union, in the defence of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, and in the maintenance of the constitutional rights of the Hessians, Prussia had taken a definite stand. But now that the crisis had come, it was a question whether after all such a policy could be upheld in the presence of the strong opposition of the peace party in the Prussian ministry, of the unquestioned financial and military weakness of the Prussian state, and of the very unfavourable attitude of the European Powers.

There had been a long struggle between the two parties in the cabinet. Count Brandenburg, believing that to involve Prussia in a war with Austria would be disastrous to the future well-being of the state, favoured a policy of peace, while Radowitz and his colleagues, feeling that Prussian honour was at stake, and that to withdraw was cowardly and humiliating to Prussia, insisted on a policy of war. After a sharp controversy,

during which both ministers threatened to resign, the peace party won the victory, and a decision was reached that it was absolutely necessary for Prussia's offensive policy to cease, that the order for the mobilisation of the troops be immediately countermanded, and that the best terms possible be made with Austria. Awkward as this decision was and humiliating as it was to Prussia's pride, nevertheless it was unavoidable if Prussia were to be saved from a struggle for which she was unprepared. Even had Frederic William been willing to take up arms against Austria, as he was not, Prussian finances, and the Prussian army, which not only had scarcely seen war for thirty years, but was also badly equipped and wretchedly organised, would not permit such a dangerous enterprise. Abroad the situation was even less favourable. Prussia could not have counted on the support of a single European state, with the possible exception of France, whose friendship Frederic William vehemently rejected. Three months before, the four great Powers and Denmark and Sweden had met at London and had decided (August 2, 1850) as against Prussia, in favour of the integrity of Denmark. In October of the same year, in an interview with Count Brandenburg at Warsaw, the Czar, refusing to take the part of a mediator, because he did not wish to meddle in German affairs, declared that if Prussia continued her interference in Holstein he would take up arms himself; and expressing his anger at the Holstein rebels, applauded the action of the elector and Hassenpflug in turning to the re-established Federal Diet for aid. Shortly afterwards he announced his determination to recognise officially the Federal Diet as the chief central authority in Germany, and in so doing declared his disapproval of Prussia's attempt to establish any other form of central government.

The disputes in the Prussian cabinet, the wavering of the Prussian king, and the favourable attitude of the Powers increased the audacity of Schwarzenberg, and made him more

determined than ever not to compromise with Prussia in any particular. Taking advantage of the skirmish at Bronzell, and tired of the delay incident to the long discussion in the Prussian cabinet, he had, on November 9th, sent his ultimatum according to which Prussia was to dissolve her Union, to recognise the Federal Diet, and to recall the troops from Hesse. In the meantime, in consequence of the defeat of the war party and the resignation of Radowitz, the Prussian cabinet had been reorganised ; Count Brandenburg was given charge of the department of foreign affairs, but as he was already on his death-bed, his place was temporarily filled by Baron Manteuffel, minister of the interior, a man who had long been opposed to the Prussian Union, a defender of the sovereign rights of princes, and a believer in the policy of repression at home and of peace at any price abroad. He began by making two important concessions—by pledging Prussia to withdraw from Holstein and abandon the duchies to such penal measures as Austria desired to mete out to rebels ; and to give up the Union and bring before the princes at Berlin the official proposal to abandon the constitution of May 26, 1849. On the question of the evacuation of Hesse a long discussion ensued, Austria maintaining that the presence of the Prussian troops was an obstacle to the application of penal measures by the Confederation in Hesse and Holstein ; Prussia resisting this last concession through fear that the employment of the confederate troops was for something more serious than the mere restoration of order.

Again did Schwarzenberg send in his ultimatum, this time on November 25th, which demanded a decision on the Hesse question in forty-eight hours, by noon of the 27th. At once Manteuffel was dispatched to Olmütz to meet the Austrian chancellor, who, with ill grace, consented to an interview and to the postponement of the date named in the ultimatum. On the 28th the ministers met, and in less than twenty-four hours Manteuffel, who had been given definite instructions to obtain

concessions regarding a remodelling of the Confederation, and a peaceful settlement of the Holstein and Hesse questions in a general conference rather than in the Federal Diet, out-manceuvred by the Austrian statesman at almost every point, conceded all that Austria demanded. Prussia suffered at his hands a signal defeat. Having already yielded to Austria in the matter of the Union and the abandonment of the Holsteiners, she now further promised, in the Olmütz agreement drawn up on the 29th, to withdraw her troops from Hesse, to recognise the Federal Diet, and to join with Austria in calling a conference at Dresden to settle the Hesse and Holstein questions. In this agreement, as in the previous concessions, some of the principles for which the people of Europe had been fighting for two years were rejected without consideration. The constitutional rights of the people of Hesse were abolished ; the rights of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which the King of Prussia had solemnly promised to maintain, were ignored ; and when, in 1852, the Powers met at London to settle the Danish question, Prussia, with the other Powers, signed the protocol that handed over the duchies to Denmark and established the integrity of the Danish kingdom. At the same time the Prussian Union was dissolved, and although the protests of England and France prevented Austria from bringing her non-German population into the Confederation, yet when at Dresden a few months later agreement upon any other form of central authority was found to be impossible, the Federal Diet was fully restored, and was recognised by all the states of Germany. The victory was complete ; reaction to all outward appearances was everywhere successful ; and all that Prussia had saved to represent her ambitious designs of earlier years, was the Zollverein, which, steadily increasing in strength, gained an important victory in the accession of Hanover the next year. The defeat of Prussia, disgraceful as it was then ✓ considered, was probably a fortunate termination of the

struggle. Neither the Prussian king nor the Prussian ministry was sufficiently in sympathy with the matters in dispute to carry a war through to the bitter end ; and although the economic strength of the state was greater than that of Austria, nevertheless the army needed a complete reorganisation and the people a thorough military training before Prussia would be able to hold her own against the odds that confronted her—Austria, the South German states, and Russia. A disastrous war would have made impossible the policy of the next decade, and would undoubtedly have cost her greater humiliation than that she actually suffered. Submission in 1850 made it possible for her to preserve intact her institutions, to remain free from excessive financial burdens, and to maintain better relations with the Powers abroad ; so that when, under new leaders and a changed diplomatic situation consequent upon the Crimean war, the time came to test the power of Austria, Prussia found herself ready to reverse the decision of Olmütz.

With the close of the struggle between Prussia and Austria, the revolutionary movement begun in 1848 reached its end, and the years that followed from 1851 to 1853 are the dreariest of the century. To all appearances the imperial government at Vienna had more than recovered its control in central Europe, and the political system in the majority of the states from the Baltic to the straits of Messina had become increasingly illiberal. Austria returned to a despotism more severe and arrogant than before ; Hungary, Bohemia, and Lombardo-Venetia sank to political insignificance as parts of a great machine ; the rule of Ferdinand of Naples became tyrannous and cowardly, that of Leopold of Tuscany, who was despised by all Italian patriots, followed slavishly the Austrian model. In Germany many of the princes, seemingly ashamed of their former sympathy for German unity, sought to erase all traces of the revolution ; in Saxony the old estates were restored ; in Mecklenberg the constitution was abolished and the old feudal

practices were introduced ; in Hanover the Junkers gained their old privileges ; and in Würtemberg the older and less liberal constitution was revived. The Federal Diet reëstablished the organic law of the Confederation, annulled the bill of rights drawn up by the National Assembly, and demanded that all liberal measures passed since 1848 not in conformity with the organic law be repealed ; in consequence of which there took place a general narrowing of political privileges even in those states that preserved intact constitutional government. The liberals, disheartened by failure and losing courage in the presence of so complete a reaction, relapsed into silence and took little part, even in the more liberal states, in political affairs. The Roman Catholic Church, strengthened by the victory of dogma and authority in matters of state, reasserted the supremacy of the church, and won concessions from the governments of France, Austria, Bavaria, and some of the minor states that increased its control over many matters of purely secular concern ; and in 1850 Pius IX. dared to issue a Bull reëstablishing the papal hierarchy in England. Ultramontanism took its place beside political absolutism and prepared to outline its creed and press its claims more vigorously than ever.

Nevertheless the revolution of 1848 had been far from unsuccessful. As an expression of popular feeling it had been too widespread, too definite for its meaning to be misunderstood by the upholders of the old *régime*. Even though many of the reforms of the previous decade were done away with and absolutist princes restored to their thrones, yet the Europe of 1850 was in many respects far in advance of the Europe of the earlier period. The political atmosphere had become clearer, a sentiment of sympathy for the popular cause, of willingness to recognise the popular claims, had become more prevalent. A healthier public opinion condemned the tyrannous policy of repression, and resented the employment of military force as an

insult to the civilisation of Europe. The best gains of the revolution had not been lost; the struggle for unity in Italy and Germany and for constitutional independence in Hungary had become an historical fact; the work of Mazzini, Manin, and d'Azeglio made possible the success of Cavour; the work of the National Assembly, that of Bismarck, the work of the Hungarian Diet, that of Deák. And the immediate advantages had not been unimportant; governments had been liberalised, many constitutions were retained, and the people were admitted to a not inconsiderable part in the management of affairs; permanent changes had been made in matters of inheritance and finance, and in judicial as well as in parliamentary matters; and the importance of the classes engaged in trade and commerce was vastly increased. Piedmont was a constitutional state, and though it is doubtful whether the Piedmontese were ready for the extensive parliamentary privileges granted to them, nevertheless under wise management the state was saved from democratic excesses and the political education of the people became only a matter of time. Prussia also had entered on a constitutional *régime*, and even though the independence of the representatives in parliament and the activities of the people of Prussia were reduced to a minimum by the reactionary policy of Frederic William and the Manteuffel ministry, yet the conditions were favourable for a more progressive government under a new king and a new ministry. Lastly, in economic matters notable advances had been made. Efforts to improve the condition of industry and to promote commercial interchange with other countries characterise this era of political indifference consequent upon the failure of the political revolution. Already had Austria proclaimed free commercial intercourse between her provinces; in 1850 the erection of a German-Austrian postal union prepared the way for the commercial treaty of 1853 between Austria and the Zollverein—the first of a series of international

agreements that altered the economic relations of all the Powers,—and led to an economic agitation in Germany that resulted in the adoption of many inter-state tariff reforms.

Thus the revolution of 1848, though not resulting in a great overturning of society as had that of 1789, was supplemental to it in that it made impossible a long retention by the governments of central Europe of the doctrines and methods of the old *régime* which the greater revolution had overthrown in France nearly sixty years before. It was a political movement as far as it sought to break down the despotism of princes and the old bureaucratic system of administration; it was an economic movement as far as it sought to gain for the commercial and industrial classes, that is, for the Third Estate, that place in the management of affairs that their economic importance demanded; it was a social movement as far as it sought to overthrow mediæval privileges and mediæval distinctions and to give rank to the non-feudal elements. But while it attempted to do for central Europe what the earlier revolution had done for France, it lacked the national unity and territorial compactness that gave strength to the movement of 1789; and it was called upon to deal with problems more numerous and complex than those that had confronted the men of the Constituent Assembly or the National Convention. Hungary sought not merely constitutional autonomy, but entire independence as well; Germany endeavoured to recast, not only the institutions of each particular state, but of the whole Confederation also; Italy tried to carry on two incompatible operations; institutional reorganisation at home, which demanded peace abroad, and war with Austria, which demanded harmony and the co-operation of all classes at home. The situation, thus difficult in itself, was made much more intricate by the introduction of those newer problems that the reign of the *bourgeoisie* had created in France, problems that were not feudal but modern, not political but economic, not

constitutional but industrial, that concerned the relation of the state to industry, of capital to labour. Theories regarding the reorganisation of industry in the interest of the whole society formed part of the program of nearly all the radical elements. In the majority of cases socialists and republicans, men ambitious to establish, without regard to the training and education of the people, extreme theories concerning the organisation of society and the state, joined in an uncompromising opposition to the moderates, and seizing upon the revolution, gained the control of the movement during the later days. But the final victory of the radical revolutionists, who, in their determination to gain all, imperilled the benefits already won, could not have been advantageous to the cause of national independence and political liberty. These ends were to be attained under other circumstances and by other methods than those which characterised the revolutionary uprising of 1848.

END OF VOLUME I.

INDEX.

- Acte additionnel*, 106
 Aide-toi, Society of, 167, 170
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of, 121, 122, 148, 149, 243-245
 Albrecht, Wilhelm, 265
 Alexander I., and Napoleon, 45; at Tilsit, 48, 49, 52; and Napoleon's matrimonial projects, 59, 60; hostility of, toward Napoleon, 62; at Châtillon, 79; at Congress of Vienna, 95; liberal attitude of, 114, 115; and Holy Alliance, 118; and Metternich, 120, 122, 198, 199; attitude of, toward Greek Revolution, 125, 126; death of, 126; and Kotzebue, 245
 Algiers, Conquest of, 172, 307
 Amiens, Treaty of, 42
 Ancona, 213, 291, 292, 306, 413
 Arago, Dominique François Jean, 339, 343
Ateliers Nationaux (see National Workshops)
 Austria, Declaration of war against, by France, 22; attack on, by Napoleon, 45, 46; defeat of, at Wagram, 58; and Continental system, 57, 58; dynastic alliance with Napoleon, 59, 60; and Fourth Coalition, 69-71; indemnity of, at Vienna, 93; territorial extension of, toward southeast, 96; treaty of, with Piedmont, 224; and Germanic Confederation, 233, 236, 416, 418, 419; and Eastern Question, 307; and free city of Cracow (see Cracow); government and policy of, 365-367; and Revolution of 1848, 367, 386-388; war of, with Hungary, 405-408; war of, with Italy, 375-377, 387-392, 410-413; and National Assembly, 425-427; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 437, 438; and Prussia, 432-444
 Azeglio, Marquis Massimo d', 218, 219, 225, 226, 376, 412
 Baden, 46, 255, 264, 377, 378, 432
 Balance of Power, 4, 81, 117
 Balbo, Cesare, 217, 218
 Barrot, Odilon, 302, 303, 333, 336, 338, 339, 341, 413-415
 Basle, Peace of, 32
 Batthyányi, Lajos, 400-405
 Bavaria, 46, 93, 236, 252, 255, 258, 264, 377, 426, 431
 Belgium, 66, 365; united to Holland, 93; revolution in, 128, 129, 205, 257, 258, 287, 288, 291; and France, 305, 310
 Bergamo, 374, 412
 Bernstorff, Count, 233, 259, 262, 379
 Berry, Duke of, 151, 156
 Blanc, Louis, 316, 317, 343, *passim* to 355, 385
 Blum, Robert, 387, 425
 Bohemia, 365, March days in, 371; overthrow of, 397, 398, 420, 444
 Bonaparte (see Napoleon Bonaparte)
 Bordeaux, Duke of (Count of Chambord), 156, 178, 283, 292
Bourgeoisie, 5, 105, 166, 207; under July Monarchy, 280 *ff.* 304, 314, 315, 318, 319, 321, 324, under Second Republic, 345, 349, 355, 357
 Brandenburg, Count, 429, 440-442
 Brescia, 374, 412, 413
 Broglie, Duke of, 142, 294, 298
 Bronzell, Skirmish at, 440, 442

- Bucharest, Treaty of, 64
 Burschenschaft, 242-244, 247
- Capodistrias, 132
 Capolna, Battle of, 406, 426
 Carbonari, in France, 158, 167; in Italy, 192-198, 201-204; Mazzini on, 206, 207, 220
 Carlsbad Decrees, 247-249, 258; acts supplemental to, 260; repealed, 383
 Carrel, Armand, 170, 289
 Cavaignac, General, 357
 Cayla, Countess du, 154, 158
 Charles Albert, Regent of Piedmont, 200, 201; King of Piedmont, 211, 212; and Austria, 214, 224; reforms of, 227, 228; war of, with Austria, 375, 376, 387-392, 410, 411, 425; abdication of, 412
 Charles Felix, 200, 201, 251
 Charles X., as Count of Artois, 19, 86, 138, 146, 151, 154; King of France, 157-178; abdication of, 178, 257
 Charta (French), 135-137, 252, 300; revision of, 226, 277, 278, 327
 Châtillon, Congress of, 78-81
 Chaumont, Treaty of, 81, 90-92
 Christian VIII., King of Denmark, 271, 417, 422
 Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 14, 17
 Classicism, in Italy, 215; in Prussia, 268
 Coalition (political) in France (1839), 302, 303, 311
 Coalitions against Napoleon, First, 32; Second, 41, 42; Third, 45, 46; Fourth, relation of, to modern diplomatic history, 68; after battle of Leipzig, 74-76; renewal of, in 1815, 104
 Coast System, 43, 44, 50
 Committee, of Fifty, 419; of Public Safety (1793-4), 27-30; of Public Safety in Vienna (1848), 396, 404; of Seven, 378
 Commune of Paris, 25, 28
 Confederation of the Rhine, 66, 229, 231; establishment of, 66; sovereignty of states of, 73; dissolution of, 74
 Conferences at Vienna; in 1819-1820, 249, 255, 258; in 1834, 262, 263
 Congregation, 145, 146, 155, 162-164
 Congresses, at Châtillon, 78-81; at Vienna, 90-102, 187, 188, 230; at Aix-la-Chapelle, 121, 122, 148, 149, 243-245; at Troppau and Laibach, 122, 123, 198, 199, 251; at Verona, 124, 125, 156, 157, 251; at London (1830), 129; at Carlsbad, 247
 Constituent Assembly, in France (1789), 11, 14-16; in Prussia (1848-49), 382, 428, 429; in Rome (1849), 395
 Constitution, of 1791, 15, 16, 19; civil—of clergy, 14, 17; of 1793, 26, 29; of 1795, 31; of year VIII., 37, 38, 84; of year XII., 44, 45; Spanish—of 1812, 66, 124, 197, 219; Sicilian—of 1813, 191, 197; French—of 1814 (see Charta); of Germanic Confederation (1815), 97, 98, 232-238, 249, 250, 433; in Bavaria, Brunswick, 252; Hesse (Grand Duchy), 252; Hesse (Electoral), 257, 443; Hanover, 252, 257, 265; Würtemberg, 252, 445; Mecklenburg, 444, 445; Two Sicilies (Naples), 226, 373; Tuscany, 227, 373, 413; Rome, 227, 373; Piedmont, 228, 373, 412; of Second Republic in France, 357-362; in Hungary (1848), 370, 371, 406, 408; in Prussia, 382, 429; for Germany, drafted by National Assembly, 383, 424, 427, 432; for Austrian Empire (1848), 396; (1849), 406, 426
 Continental System, 50, 51, 54, 55, 57, 58, 61, 62
Coup d'État, 35-37
 Cracow, 95, 130, 271, 324, 325
 Crimean War, 132, 212
 Croats, 397, 399, 400-403
 Custozza, Battle of, 391, 402
 Czechs, 397, 398, 403, 404
- Dahlmann, Friedrich, 265, 266, 423, 424
 Danton, George Jacques; policy of, 17, 23, 26, 28; fall of, 27; character of, 28; and Committee of Public Safety, 28
 Deák, Ferencz, 371, 402, 403
 Decazes, Élie, 142, 147, 171; ministry of, 149-152

- Declaration of Independence (Hungarian), 407
- Denmark, and duchies of Schleswig-Holstein; First war, 422-433; second war, 437; third war, 438; integrity of, maintained by Powers, 423, 441, 443
- Diet (Federal) of Germanic Confederation, 98, 99, 234-236, 249, 250, 254, 265; increase of powers (1832), 260; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 270, 271; and National Assembly, 382, 383, 416, 417; suspension of, 419, 420; revival, 436, 437, 439, 441, 443
- Directory, 34-36, 43
- Doctrinaires*, 142, 152, 297, 300, 303, 304, 336
- Droit au Travail*, 346 ff., 404
- Eastern Question, 304, 306, 307
- Electoral Reform (France), 330-332
- Émigrés*, 18-21, 31; return to France, 86, 103, 138, 145; indemnity for, 162
- England (Great Britain), and Napoleon, 42-46, 49-51, 54, 57, 58, 75, 83; and Fourth Coalition, 68, 73; and quadruple alliance of 1815, 120; of 1834, 306; and Eastern Question, 306, 307; and government of Louis Philippe, 321-325; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 423
- Erfurt, 52, 55, 436
- Ernst Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, 265
- Ewald, George Heinrich von, 265, 266
- Executive Commission (1848), 353
- Ferdinand I. (Emperor), 396, 401, 405, 425; as King of Hungary, 405-407
- Ferdinand I., of Two Sicilies, 182, 191, 197, 198, 201
- Ferdinand II., of Two Sicilies, 213, 226, 376, 390, 391, 413, 444
- Ferdinand VII., of Spain, 92, 156, 197, 322
- Ferrara, 213, 224, 373, 413
- Fieschi, 299
- Final-Act (Congress of Vienna), 99; of 1820, 250, 262
- Follen, Karl, 244, 245
- Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 54
- Fouché, Joseph, 107, 144
- Fourier, Charles, 294, 315, 316, 345
- France, before 1789, 9-11; Revolution in, 11; Constituent Assembly of, 11-20; Legislative Assembly, 20, 21; National Convention of, 24-34; under Directory, 34-36; under Consulate, 40-44; under First Empire, 44-84; under the Bourbons, 86-89, 134-174; and return of Napoleon, 105; and Revolution of 1830, 174-179; under Louis Philippe, 276-339; and Second Republic, 342-362; and Pius IX., 413-415
- Francis II. (Emperor), 33, 61, 65, 206, 366
- Francis Joseph I. (Emperor), Accession of, 405, 425; appeal of, to Russia, 407, 408
- Frankfort Parliament (see National Assembly)
- Frankfort, Peace proposals of, 76, 80; commission of, 261, 263; conspiracy of, 261
- Frederic VII., of Denmark, 417, 422
- Frederic William, Elector of Hesse, 439
- Frederic William III., of Prussia, 65, 114; and ordinance of May, 1815, 115, 238, 239; and Metternich, 240, 247, 263; position of, in 1830, 258; death of, 267
- Frederic William IV., of Prussia, after 1849, 132, 446; Accession of, 267; character of, 267-269, 430, 431; and United Provincial Diet, 272-275; attitude of, in 1848, 379-382, 428; and imperial title, 427, 430, 431; and Constituent Assembly of Prussia, 428, 429; constitution granted by, 429; plan for Federal Union, 433, 434
- Fundamental Rights, Declaration of, by Constituent Assembly (1789), 11, 12; by National Assembly of Germany (1848), 421, 422, 427, 455
- Gagern, Heinrich von, 378, 427
- Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 389, 414, 415
- Garnier-Pagès, the elder, 302, 343
- Gentz, Friedrich von, 246, 248
- Germanic Confederation, Formation of, 97-99, 232-234; Diet of, 234-238; and Carlsbad Decrees,

- 247, 248; and Austria, 365; plans for reorganization of, 426, 427
- Gersdorf, Ernst Christian August, plan regarding German federal state, 98, 378, 433, 435; on Kotzebue's death, 246
- Gervinus, Georg Gottfried, 265
- Gioberti, Vincent, 216-218, 221, 390
- Girondins, policy of, 20, 21; fall of, 22, 24, 25; and Jacobins, 24, 25; character of, 25
- Gödöllő, Battle of, 406, 431
- Goito, Battle of, 391
- Greek Revolution, 125-128, 205, 252, 306
- Grégoire, Abbé, 141, 150, 151
- Grimm, Jacob, 265, 266, 268; Wilhelm, 265, 268
- Guizot, François, 130, 131, 142, 155; foreign policy of, 130, 131, 321-326; under July Monarchy, 280, 281, 287, 303; ministries of, 286, 294, 302, 321-338; character of, 311, 312; attitude of, toward electoral reform, 326-336; dismissal of, from ministry, 338
- Hampach Festival, 259, 260
- Hanover, 44, 45, 92, 236, 252, 264; and Ernst Augustus, 265, 266; in 1848, 426, 431, 434-436, 445
- Hardenberg, Karl August von, 98, 231, 232, 241, 246, 259
- Hassenpflug, Ludwig Friedrich, 439, 441
- Hauranne, Duvergier de, 302, 303, 333
- Haynau, General, 408, 412, 413
- Hecker, Friedrich Karl, 385, 418
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 270
- Hesse (Electoral Hesse), 236, 257, 439, 440, 443
- Hesse (Grand Duchy), 236, 252, 255
- Holland, 66, 74, 78, 92, 288, 291
- Holstein, 236, 271, 383, 422
- Holy Alliance, The, Origin of, 117-119; and Greek Revolution, 125-129; and Nicholas I., 132, 409, 410; and Frederic William IV., 132, 431, 437; and Eastern Powers, 132; overthrow of, 132, 133
- Holy Roman Empire, remodelling of, 41, 42, 46, 47; fall of, 47
- Hundred Days, The, 105-110, 112, 113, 139
- Hungary, 363, 365; March days in, 368-370; and Austria, 398-407; war of, for independence, 407, 408; overthrow of, 408, 409, 415, 435, 444
- Illyrism, 399
- Interim, The Government of, 432, 436
- Intervention, Doctrine of, 117; application of, 122-125; rejection of, by Western Powers, 125-129, 204, 205; maintenance of, by Eastern Powers, 129-132, 204, 325; as defined in 1847, 131
- Isabella, Queen of Spain, 322
- Italy; her past, 180; during Revolution, 181; and Napoleon, 66, 74, 182, 183; and Powers in 1813-1815, 185-188; reconstruction of, 188-191; condition of, after 1815, 191, 192; in 1820, 196-204; in 1830, 205; from 1835 to 1845, 213-221; from 1845 to 1848, 220-228; and first war of independence, 375-377, 387-392, 410-412
- Jacobins, 23, 26, 27, 35, 43
- Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 241, 242
- Jellachich, Baron, *ban* of Croatia, 399-400; attitude toward Magyars, 400, 401; relations with Austrian government, 401, 402; invasion of Hungary by, 402, 403
- Jesuits, 7; in France, 140, 146, 155, 162, 163, 164, 166, 168; in Italy, 188; in Germany, 270, 271; in Switzerland, 325
- John, Archduke of Austria, 271; regent of Germany, 419, 420, 430; resignation of, 432
- July Monarchy; character of, 276-278; policy of, 285, 286; "heroic" period of, 290-300; period of difficulties under, 300-305; foreign policy of, 305-307, 321-326; and Louis Philippe, 307-311; social and political problems of, 314-319, 326-330; downfall of, 339, 340, 350
- Kalisch, Treaty of, 67-69, 73, 90
- Kotzebue, August, 245, 246
- Kossuth, Louis, 369, 385, 386, 402, 403, 405-408

- Labour commission at the Luxembourg, 347, 349, 353
 Lafayette, Marquis de, 22, 141, 149, 158, 169, 176, 178, 278, 280, 289
 Lafitte, Jacques, 176, 280; ministry of, 288-290
 Laibach, Congress of, 122, 123, 198, 199, 251
 Lamartine, Alphonse de, 325, 333, 334, 336; and Revolution of 1848, 342 *passim* to 361
 Lamberg, General, 403, 404
 La Rothière, Battle of, 78, 79
 Latour, Theodor Baillet von, Minister of War, 402, 404, 425, 429
 League of Four Kingdoms, 436
 League of Three Kingdoms, 434, 435; changed to Federal Union, 436
 Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre Auguste, 343 *passim* to 354, 385
 Legislative Assembly (1791-1792), 19-21
 Legitimism, Theory of, 88, 91, 101
 Leipzig, Battle of, 74
 Leopold, Grand Duke of Tuscany, 223, 224, 226-228, 444
 Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 414, 515
 Löhning, 245
 Lombardo-Venetia, 93, 189, 190, 213, 374, 391, 444
 London, Conference of, 129; protocol of (1850), 441; (1852), 443
 Louis XVI., 13, 17, 18, 157, 363; death of, 24
 Louis XVIII., as Count of Provence, 18, 82; restoration of, 88, 92; character of, 137, 138; acts of, 147, 154, 156, 157; death of, 157
 Louis Philippe, as Duke of Orléans, in 1830, 177, 178, 278-280; as King of France, 178, 278; character of government of, 276-278; character of title of, 279, 280; powers of, 281, 282; attack on, by Fieschi, 299; personal government of, 302, 307-311; and Spanish marriages, 323, 324; and reform movement, 331, 332; responsibility of, 336; abdication of, 339; its effect on Europe, 363
 Louvel, Pierre Louis, 151
 Lunéville, Treaty of, 41, 76; revolt in, 298
 Lyons, Rising in (of 1832), 292; (of 1834), 297, 298
 Maasen, Karl Georg, 255
 Mainz, Commission of, 248, 259
 Malmö, Armistice of, 423, 424, 437
 Manin, Daniele, 375, 392, 411, 415
 Manteuffel, Baron, 429; minister of foreign affairs, 442; concessions of, to Austria, 442; at Olmütz, 443; after 1850, 446
 Manuel, Jacque Antoine, 141, 149, 157
 March Days, in South German States, 367, 368, 416; in Hungary, 368-371; in Bohemia, 371; in Vienna, 372, 373; in Lombardy, 373, 374; in Venice, 374, 375; in Berlin, 381, 382; in Schleswig-Holstein, 422; general character of, 384, 385
 Marie Louise, marriage of, with Napoleon, 60; in 1814, 84, 85; and Count Neipperg, 104; receives Parma, 84, 85, 188
 Martignac, Viscount Agay de, ministry of, 168, 169
 Mazzini, Joseph, 205, 206; and Carbonari, 206, 207; foundation of Young Italy by, 207-211; invasion of, into Savoy, 211, 212, 261; and Italian war of 1848, 212, 375, 385, 389, 395, 411; flight of, from Rome, 415
 Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 236, 310
 Mehemet Ali, 218, 306
 Metternich, Clement, Minister of Austria, 59; and Fourth Coalition, 69-71; political theories of, 71, 87, 115-117, 366, 368, 387; attitude of, toward German nationality, 73, 74; and the Napoleonic dynasty, 75; and Murat, 184; scheme of, for German constitution, 98, 99, 231-233; influence of, 120, 121; opinions of, regarding Italy, 191, 192, 220, 225; and revolutions in Italy, 122, 123, 198, 199; and Germanic Confederation, 230, 231, 236; and liberal movement in Prussia, 240; and Wartburg celebration, 243; and murder of Kotzebue, 245, 246; at Vienna conferences, 249, 250, 262, 263; opinions of, in 1830, 257-259; and Sonderbund war, 130, 131; and Guizot, 321, 325, 326; opinion of, concerning United Provincial Diet, 273, 274; and Revolution of 1848, 368, 373; and

- Frederic William IV., 273, 379, 380; retirement of, 370, 386
 Milan, March days in, 374; and Charles Albert, 389, 392
 Mirabeau, Count de, 13
 Modena, 188, 200, 375, 391
 Molé, Louis Mathieu, 280, 288, 302, 303, 338
 Moscow, Fall of, 65
 Münchengrätz, 129, 262, 407
 Murat, Joachim, 53, 78, 93, 182-185, 190, 191
 Naples (Kingdom of Two Sicilies), 92, 190, 191, 213; revolution in (1820), 122, 196-199, 251; revolution in (1848), 226, 363, 373; and war against Austria, 391
 Napoleon Bonaparte, and National Convention, 31; under Directory, 34; in Italy, 35, 41, 181-183; and *coup d'état* 18 Brumaire, 36, 37; attitude of, toward Revolution, 36, 38-40; expedition of, to Egypt, 36, 43; as First Consul, 40; struggle of, with England, 43, 44, 49-51; as Emperor (Napoleon I.), 44; Empire of, 45; attack of, on Prussia, 48; position of, in 1806, 47-49; turning-point in career of, 51-52; despotism of, 52, 53; attitude of France toward, 53-54; commercial war of, with England, 54, 55; attack of, on Spain, 55, 56; attack of, on Austria, 57-59; matrimonial projects of, 59, 60; position of, in 1810, 60, 61; campaign of, against Russia, 62-67; and first war of liberation, 68, 69; and second war of liberation, 71-74; campaign of, on French soil, 77, 78, 81-83; and congress of Châtillon, 78, 79, 80, 81; victories of, in 1814, 79; dethronement of, 83-85; abdication of, 84; at Elba, 85, 103, 104; return of, to France, 102, 105-107; at Waterloo, 108-110; influence of, upon France, 134, 135; death of, 156; return of body of, to France, 313
 Napoleon II., 158; death of, 294
 Napoleon III., as Emperor of the French, 110, 133; as Louis Napoleon, 294, 304, 357, 358, 362, 409, 413, 415;
 National Assembly, under Second Republic, 352-361
 National Assembly of Germany (1848-1849); plan for, 377, 378; meeting of, 382, 383; proceedings of, 418 *passim* to 431; end of, 431, 432
 National Convention (1792-1795), 24-31
 National workshops, 348, 349, 355-357
 Neander, Johann August Wilhelm, 270
 Neo-Guelphs, 217, 221, 390
 Neufchâtel, 130, 131, 325
 Nicolas I., 126, 129, 257, 407, 408, 430; position of, in 1848, 409, 410; and Count Brandenburg at Warsaw, 441
 Non-intervention, Doctrine of, supported by England and France, 129, 262; upheld by July Monarchy, 128, 205, 288, 292, 305, 306
 Norway, 69, 94
 Novara, 201, 212; battle of, 411
 Old *Régime*, The; the state under, 2-4; forms of government under, 4-6; reform movement under, 6, 7; in France before 1789, 9-11; and Constituent Assembly, 13, 16; and Napoleon, 52; restoration of, in France, 86, 161; end of, in France, 174; and Revolution of 1848, 447
 Olmütz, 405, 429; meeting at, 442, 443; agreement of, 444
 Ordinances of St. Cloud, 173-175
 Orléans, Duke of (see Louis Philippe)
 Orléans, Duke of, son of Louis Philippe, 292, 310, 335
 Ottoman Empire (see Turkey)
 Palmerston, Lord, 225, 323, 332
 Papal States, restored to Pius VII., 92, 188
 Paris, Count of, 339, 341
 Paris, First treaty of, 89, 90; second treaty of, 111, 112
 Parliamentary reform in France, 328, 330
 Particularism, 237, 238, 249, 250, 438
 Party, of movement in France, 283; of reform in Italy, 216-221; of resistance in France, 281, 282
 Pasquier, Étienne Denis, 60, 142, 154, 162, 171, 184, 298

- Pastrengo, Battle of, 391
- Peninsular War; beginning of, 54, 55; battles of, Busaco, Torres-Vedras, 61; Salamanca, 65, 66; Vittoria, 69; close of, 74
- Périer, Casimir, 280, 286, 290-293; death of, 293; tradition, 294, 300, 302, 312
- Piedmont (Kingdom of Sardinia), 91, 181; restored to Victor Emmanuel I., 92, 188; revolution in (1820), 199-201, 203; (1830), 257; reform movement in, 214, 224, 225; constitution of, 228; war of, with Austria, 375, 376, 389-392, 410-412; after 1849, 446
- Pillnitz, 18, 19
- Pius IX. (Jean Mastai Ferretti), election as Pope, 221-223; reforms of, 222, 223, 332, 373; grant of constitution by, 227; refusal of, to war against Austria, 389, 390, 393; summons of Rossi by, 393; flight of, to Gaëta; return of, to Rome, 415; Bull of, in 1850, 445
- Poland, 62, 94, 115, 257, 287, 291, 324, 354, 408
- Polignac, Jules, 288, 289; ministry of, 169-176
- Political parties in France; under the Restoration, 139-142, 163; under July Monarchy, 280-285
- Portugal, 49, 54, 58, 62, 92, 291, 306, 322
- Preliminary Convention (Vor-Parliament), 382, 383, 397, 416-418, 427
- Press, under Napoleon, 39; under Restoration, 150, 152, 156, 165, 168, 174; under July Monarchy, 300; in Italy, 183, 213, 223, 224, 228; in Germany, 234, 248, 259, 260, 263; in Hungary, 370, 371; in Prussia, 380, 381
- Proletariat, Uprisings of, in Paris; May 17, 1848, 351; April 23d, 351, 352; May 15th, 354; June 22d-27th, 357, 420
- Provisional Government of France (1848), 342-353, close of, 353
- Prussia, 3, 7, 21, 33, 52, 236; and treaty of Pillnitz, 18; and peace of Basle, 32; and Third Coalition, 45; in 1806, 48; in 1809, 58; and treaty of Kalisch, 67; and wars of liberation, 67-74; indemnity of, at Vienna, 93, 94; as guardian of the Rhine, 96, 258; and constitutional reorganisation of Germany, 97, 98, 232, 233, 433; at Waterloo, 109; liberal movement in, 114, 115, 238, 239; reaction in, 239-241, 250, 251; and Zollverein, 254-257; position of, in 1830, 257-259; and Eastern Question, 307; and Revolution of 1848, 379-382, 431; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 417, 422, 423; 437, 438; Constituent Assembly in, 428, 429; constitution of, 429; and Austria in 1848-1849, 432-439; after 1849, 446
- Punctuation of Töplitz, 247, 249
- Quadrilateral (Austrian fortresses in Italy), 375, 387-389
- Quadruple Alliance, of 1815, 119, 120; of 1834, 306, 322
- Radatzky, General, 374, 387, 391, 410-412
- Radowitz, General, 440
- Reconstruction, beginning of, 67, 73, 74, 76, 81; in first treaty of Paris, 89; at Vienna, 92-102, 188
- Reform Banquets, 333-335, 337, 338
- Reichenbach, Treaty of, 69, 73; secret treaty between Austria and Prussia and Russia at, 70
- Revolutions, of 16th century (Reformation), 2; of 1789, 9-36; of 1820, in Naples, 123, 196-198; in Spain, 123, 124, 197; in Greece, 125-128; in Belgium, 128, 129, 287; in Piedmont, 199-201; in Poland, 257, 287, 291, 324; of 1830 in France, 175-179, 257; in Italy, 205; of 1848 in France, 338-341; causes, 320-328, effects, 363-368; of 1848, throughout Europe, 363-384
- Richelieu, Duke of, 111; first ministry of, 144-149; second ministry of, 152-154, 251; death of, 156
- Robespierre, Maximilien, policy of, 17, 24, 26, 29; and Committee of Public Safety, 29; fall of, 30
- Roman Republic, 395; fall of, 415
- Romanticism, in Italy, 215, 216; in Prussia, 268
- Rossi, Pellegrino, 393, 394

- Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, 142, 162, 165, 171
- Russia; attitude of, toward French Revolution, 21; and Second Coalition, 42; under Alexander I. 45, and war with France, 62-65; at Frankfort, 74, 75; indemnity of, at Vienna, 93, 94; and Greek Revolution, 125-128; and Hungary in 1848, 132, 407, 408; under Nicolas I., 126, 409; and Eastern Question, 306, 307; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 423, 437, 441
- St. Simon, Claude Henri, Count of, 294, 315, 345
- Salasco Armistice, 392, 410
- Sand, Karl, 245
- Sardinia (see Piedmont)
- Saxony, 95, 236, 264, 377, 378, 426, 431, 434-436, 444
- Schelling, Friedrich von, 270
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 269
- Schleswig-Holstein Question, 271, 383, 417, 422, 423, 437, 438, 441, 443
- Schlosser, Friedrich Christoph, 269
- Schwarzenberg, Felix, Prince of, Austrian Chancellor, 405; policy of, 405, 406, 425, 426; constitutional schemes of, for Germany, 426, 427, 433, 434; and Prussian Union, 435, 436; counter-league of, 436; revival of Federal Diet by, 436, 437; and Prussia in 1850, 441, 442; at Olmütz, 442, 443
- Scrutin de liste*, 352
- Second French Republic, 342-362
- Secondary education in France, 295, 296, 333
- Septennial Law, 159, 160, 166
- Serbs, 397, 399, 400-403
- Serre, Count de, 142, 150, 156
- Sicily, civil war in, 203; uprising in, in 1848, 226, 363
- Slave trade, 100
- Slavonic Congress at Prague (1848), 397, 398
- Socialism, 295, 315-319, 345-349
- Societies, in France during Restoration, 158, 159, 167; in Italy, 192-196, 207-211; in Germany, 241-244; under July Monarchy, 284, 293, 295, 297, 298, 303, 304; under Second Republic, 338, 339
- Sonderbund, 130, 131, 325, 364
- Soult, Marshal, 57, 69, 74, 292, 304, 311, 326
- South German States, 230, 233; and Revolution of 1848, 367, 368, 377, 378, 380, 444
- Spain, her past, 55; her weakness, 55, 56; and Napoleon, 56, 61, 65, 66, 69, 74; and quadruple alliance of 1834, 306, 322; and Spanish marriages, 322, 324
- Spanish marriages, 322-324, 330, 332
- Stourdza, Alexander, 244, 245
- Strauss, David, 270
- Struve, Gustav von, 385, 418
- Suffrage, in French Revolution, 14; under Restoration in France, 136, 149, 151, 152, 159, 168, 173, 174; in Italy, 228; in Germany, 273, 383, 430; under July Monarchy, 277, 280, 290, 329-331; under Second Republic, 342, 349, 352, 358; in Hungary, 370
- Sweden, 51, 61, 62, 64, 68, 69, 92, 93
- Switzerland, 66, 92, 94; constitutional reorganisation of, in 1815, 99, 100; and Sonderbund war, 130, 131, 325, 332, 364; similar attempt in 1833, 393
- Talleyrand, Charles Maurice, Prince de, and restoration of the Bourbons, 84, 114; at Congress of Vienna, 91, 92, 94-96; at Congress of London (1830), 129; and Revolution of 1830, 173
- Thermidoreans, 30-32
- Thiers, Louis Adolphe, editor of *National*, 170; and Revolution of 1830, 176, 177; under July Monarchy, 280, 288, 294, 302, 303; ministry of, 304; and Eastern Question, 306, 307; in the opposition, 312, 313; and Revolution of 1848, 339
- Thirty Years' War, I, 2
- Tiers-Parti*, 301, 304
- Tilsit, Treaty of, 48, 54, 76, 97; breach of, 62, 63
- Töplitz, Treaty of, 72, 73, 80, 81, 90, 92; punctuation of, 247-249; agreement of, 129, 261, 262
- Treaties: Westphalia, 2, 4, 9; Pillnitz, 18, 19; Lunéville, 41, 76; Amiens, 42; Tilsit, 48, 54, 62, 63, 76, 97; Fontainebleau, 54; Press-

- burg, 57, 76; Bucharest, 64; Kalisch, 67-69, 73, 90; Reichenbach, 69, 70, 73; Töplitz, 72, 73, 80, 81, 90, 92; Chaumont, 81, 90-92; First, at Paris, 89, 90; Second, at Paris, 111, 112; Unkiar Skelessi, 306
 Troppau (see Laibach)
 Tugendbund, 241
 Turkey, 51, 64, 125, 126, 218, 306, 307
 Tuscany, restored to Ferdinand III., 92, 188; after 1830, 214; reform movement in, 223, 224, 226, 227; and war of independence, 376; radical movements in, 392; reduced to subjection, 413
 Undiscoverable Chamber, 143-147
 Union (Federal), 436, 437, 439; abandonment of, 442, 443
 United Provincial Diet, 273-275, 377, 380, 381
 Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of, 306
 Varennes, 17, 18
 Venice, March Days in, 374, 375; and Salasco armistice, 392; fall of, 415, 416
 Verona, Congress of, 124, 125, 156, 157, 251
 Victor Emmanuel I., 92, 188, 199, 201
 Victor Emmanuel II., 412
 Vienna, Congress of, 90-102, 187, 188, 230
 Vienna, Uprisings in, March, 1848, 370-372; May, 1848, 396; October, 1848, 404, 405, 425
 Villèle, Joseph, Count de, 153; ministry of, 155-167; reactionary measures of, 161-166, 251
 Wartburg, 242
 Waterloo, 108-110
 Wellesley (see Wellington)
 Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, and Peninsular War, 61, 65, 69, 74; at Bordeaux, 82; at Waterloo, 108, 109
 Westphalia, Treaty of, 2, 4, 9
 White Terror, 143-145
 Windischgrätz, General, 398, 405, 407, 420, 426, 429
 Würtemberg, 46, 252, 255, 258, 377, 378, 426, 431, 434, 436
 Yorck, General, 67
 Young Italy, 204, 207-213, 220, 373, 375
 Zollverein, 253-257, 264, 272, 377, 433, 443, 446

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